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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss recent developments in the field of appellate
practice in Florida. Although this article will focus primarily on cases
decided between July 1, 1998, and June 30, 1999, it will also deal with
certain cases decided shortly before and after that period. These cases are
either of particular interest to the appellate practitioner or provide the
background for, or the culmination of, issues that were addressed by cases
decided during that period.
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those
substantive areas and therefore, will not be discussed here. Rather, this
article will focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and
examines those areas. This article will not discuss cases relating to the
preservation of particular issues, nor will it discuss the question of whether
particular errors were harmless.
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
In light of the enactment of legislation requiring parental notification, or
judicial waiver thereof, before an abortion may be performed on a minor, the
supreme court' adopted, on an emergency basis, amendments to Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.110(1). 2 The amendments replace the reference to
1. In this article, references to "the supreme court" will constitute references to the
Supreme Court of Florida. The Florida district courts of appeal will be referred to as "the
First District," "the Second District," "the Third District," "the Fourth District," and "the Fifth
District."
2. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 24 Fla. L. Weekly
S299 (June 24, 1999).
5
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an order denying a petition for "termination of pregnancy" with one to an
order denying a petition for "judicial waiver of parental notice of abortion,"
and add a sentence reading, "[n]o filing fee shall be required for an appeal of
the denial of a waiver of parental notice of abortion." In the same opinion,
the court also made appropriate amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.
4
I1. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
By an administrative order entered by the chief judge and pursuant to
the affirmative vote of a majority of the judges of the court, the First District,
the only Florida appellate court to ever split into subject matter divisions,
dispensed with those divisions.5  6
In 1-888-Traffic Schools v. Chief Circuit Judge, the supreme court
addressed the issue of which court should review challenges to
administrative orders entered by circuit courts.7 Rejecting the First District's
conclusion that only the supreme court can consider such issues, the court
found that review by the district courts is appropriate. The court limited its
prior holding in Wild v. Dozier,9 which had concluded that it had sole
jurisdiction to review judicial assignments to administrative orders making
such assignments.
10
IV. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
The supreme court declined to answer a certified question in State v.
Schebel," concluding that the necessary facts for a determination of the
issues were not contained in the record.1 2  An opinion based on the
"speculative facts" alleged by the party who filed the initial motion in the
trial court "would necessarily be advisory in nature," the court concluded.1
3
The court also declined to answer a certified question in State v. Vazquez,1
4
3. Id. at S300.
4. Id. at S299-S300.
5. Administrative Order 98-3, In re Abolishment of Court Divs., 24 Fla. L. Weekly
D84 (1st Dist. CL App. Dec. 15, 1998).
6. 734 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999).
7. Id. at 413.
8. Id. at 416.
9. 672 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1996).
10. Traffic Schools, 734 So. 2d at 415.
11. 723 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1999).
12. Id. at 830.
13. Id.
14. 718 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 1998).
1999]
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basing its action on the fact that the district court had not ruled on the issue
raised by the question . 16
In Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 97-04, Re: Elizabeth L. Hapner,
the court determined that it has the authority to tax costs in a proceeding of
the Judicial Qualifications Commission ("JQC").17 The court limited the
costs in the case to certain charges relating to the court reporter and the
transcript, 1 concluding that attorneys' fees may not be awarded as costs. 9
The court directed the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration Committee
to draft a proposed rule addressing the assessment of costs in a JQC
proceeding.
V. APPEALABLE ORDERS
The Fourth District provided some guidance with regard to the manner
of review of orders impacting nonparties to trial court proceedings. In Shook
v. Alter,21 a lawyer representing a party in the trial court sought certiorari
review of an order holding him in indirect civil contempt.22 The district
court concluded that because the order was final as far as the lawyer was
concerned, review was proper by appeal, not by certiorari. 2 The appellate
court noted that this distinction was important because a petitioner seekin
certiorari must meet a heavier burden than an appellant taking an appeal
and stated that it was publishing its order in the case "so that the Bar will
know that, where a final order is entered against a non-party [sic] such as,
for example, a lawyer or a witness, the appropriate method for review of that
order is by final appeal." s
Numerous other cases discussed the issue of whether particular orders
were reviewable on appeal. These cases included the following: Meyers v.
Metropolitan Dade County (jury's verdict as to liability in a bifurcated
proceeding was the equivalent of an order determining liability under the
interlocutory appeal rule and was therefore appealable under that rule);
15. Id. at 756.
16. 737 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1999).
17. Id. at 1075.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 715 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
22. Id. at 1082-83.
23. Id. at 1083.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S135 (Mar. 18, 1999).
[Vol. 24:1
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Thomas v. Thomas2 7 (denial of a motion to transfer a pending modification
of a child custody case to another state was appealable as a determination in
the nature of venue); Okeelanta Corp. v. McDonald8 (rule providing for
appeals from orders granting or denying certification of a class does not
extend jurisdiction to orders ruling on motions to decertify a class and an
appeal from such an order was therefore dismissed); Key Club Associates v.
Mayer29 (nonfinal order dismissing counterplaintiffs' request for certifica-
tion of their class for purposes of their compulsory counterclaim was appeal-
able); Croteau v. Operator Service of South Florida, Inc. (order denying a
motion to enforce a settlement agreement which constituted the equivalent of
a partial final judgment was appealable); Blakeslee v. Morse Operations,
Inc.3 (conditional order of dismissal, requiring a plaintiff to arbitrate within
thirty days or have the case dismissed, was not appealable as an order of
dismissal); Red Bird Laundry v. Park32 (appeal from order denying
attorneys' fees was not proper when the final order in the underlying action
had not yet been entered); Wanner v. State33 (order granting bank's motion to
intervene in a criminal case as a victim for purposes of restitution was not
appealable); Crawford v. Dwoskin34 (order remanding a matter to an
arbitrator to clarify certain portions of an award was not appealable).
VI. INSTITUTION OF APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS
In Holden Avenue Inter-Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Orange
County,35 nine days after an action by the Orange County Board of County
Commissioners, the petitioner filed a notice of intention to file a petition for
writ of certiorari to review the Board's decision 3 6 This action was taken
pursuant to a county code provision which provides that such a notice must
be filed in the circuit court within ten days after the decision at issue and that
the petition must be filed within sixty days after the Board's ruling. 7 The
petitioner filed the petition within the time provided by the code, but after
the expiration of the thirty-day period allowed for seeking certiorari under
27. 724 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
28. 730 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
29. 718 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
30. 721 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
31. 720 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
32. 728 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
33. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D924 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1999).
34. 729 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
35. 719 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
36. Id. at 1003.
37. Id.
1999]
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38Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(2). The circuit court then
granted the County's motion to dismiss the proceeding as untimely.
39
Although agreeing that the petitioner could not rely on the code provision
because the Florida Constitution provides that only the supreme court has
the authority to adopt rules of practice and procedure, the Fifth District
granted certiorari .41 The court concluded that the notice of intention to file
the petition, which was clearly filed within the time frame established by the
appellate rule, was the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal and that it
plainly ?laced the County on notice that the petitioner intended to seek42 .43
review. Noting that the petitioner was "understandably misled" by the
code, the court "in the interests of justice,"44 treated the notice of intention to
file the petition as the petition itself and the actual petition as an amended
petition. 5
In its opinion in Horst v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, the
Second District called for a legislative change with regard to the time for
instituting appeals to the Unemployment Appeals Commission.47 Under
section 443.151(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes, such appeals must be taken
within twenty days of the order under review." In the case at issue, the
appeal was dismissed because it was instituted twenty-five days after the
order.49 The district court accordingly indicated that it was "constrained to,,50
affirm the Commission's ruling." The court noted, however, that the case
was not an isolated one and that it "frequently affirms without written
opinion when the Commission dismisses an appeal because it was filed a few
days late." 51 In asking the legislature to establish a thirty day period that
would equal the period given in other civil and administrative appeals, 52 the
court pointed out that claimants are typically not represented by counsel, are
often ill prepared to prosecute a legal appeal, are appealing because they are
unemployed and did not receive benefits, and "may be distracted from filing
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Holden, 719 So. 2d at 1003-04.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1003-04.
44. Id. at 1004.
45. Holden, 719 So. 2d at 1004.
46. 725 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
47. Id. at 1267.
48. FLA. STAT. § 443.151(4)(b) (1999).
49. Horst, 725 So. 2d at 1267.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
[Vol. 24:1
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an appeal within the abbreviated period by their need to search for anotherjob."In State v. West,54 after the state instituted an appeal from a sentence
that constituted a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines, the
trial court, which had not previously given any reasons for the departure, sua
sponte made written findings of its reasons.55 The Fifth District reversed the
sentence, stating that "the trial court's belated effort.., to supply written
reasons after an appeal was taken cannot cure the defect since the trial court
had by that time lost jurisdiction."5 6
VII. STAYS
In Mann v. Brantley,57 an appeal was taken from an order granting a
new trial.58 The trial court denied a stay and the appellants sought review of
the denial in the Fourth District.5 9 That court pointed out that since an order
granting a new trial is a nonfinal order, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(f) precluded the trial court from entering a final order during the
pendency of the appeal.60 In light of that fact, and the fact that the holding of
a new trial while the appeal was pending would be a waste of money and
judicial resources, the district court found the denial of the stay to constitute
an abuse of discretion.6'
The appellants in Begonia Corp. v. Nam Financial Corp.6 2 sought
review of an order imposing sanctions in the amount of $100,000 against
them for frustrating orders of the court relating to a sale under a final
judgment of foreclosure. 3 They sought a supersedeas bond as to the amount
of the sanctions, but the trial court refused to set or allow such a bond and
thus any stay pending review.64 Reviewing the denial of stay, the Fourth
District noted that while the final judgment of foreclosure itself may not
have been solely for the payment of money, such as to create an entitlement
to bond under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(1), the
53. Id.
54. 718 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
55. Id. at 267.
56. Id.
57. 732 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
58. Id. at 1091.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 724 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
63. Id. at 714.
64. Id.
1999]
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sanctions order was reasonably understood as such a judgment.65 The court
found that an order lacking words allowing for immediate execution did not
remove it from the realm of orders essentially requiring the payment of a
fixed sum of money and that the appellants were therefore entitled to bond
the sanctions order while they pursued their appeal.
66
The Fifth District, in Garvin v. Jerome,67 rejected a contention that
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2), which provides for
automatic stays pending review when public bodies and officials file notices
of appeal, applied to stay an election when the appellant, a public official,
appealed from an order denying a request for an injunction to halt the
conduct of the election. 68 Aligning itself with decisions of the Second and
69Fourth Districts, the First District, in Taylor v. Barnett Bank of North
Central Florida, N.A., 70 found that the provision of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code,71 providing for an automatic stay of all legal proceedings "against the
debtor," applies on appeal when the original proceedings were against the
debtor, "regardless of whether the debtor is an appellant or appellee." 72 The
court recognized that the Third District had reached a contrary conclusion,73
but indicated that the Third District's decision was reached at a time when
there was a dearth of law on the subject and that since the federal courts
began considering the issue, all six courts of appeals that have addressed the
question have taken the approach adopted by the Second and Fourth
Districts.74
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 721 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 735 So. 2d 1284
(Fla. 1999).
68. Id. at 1229.
69. Crowe Group, Inc. v. Garner, 691 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Florida E. Dev. Co. v. Len-Hal Realty, Inc., 636 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
70. 737 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1995).
72. Taylor, 737 So. 2d at 1105.
73. Shop in the Grove, Ltd. v. Union Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 425 So. 2d 1138 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
74. See Farley v. Henson, 2 F.3d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1993); Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp.
v. Miller Mining Co., 817 F.2d 1424, 1426 (9th Cir. 1987); Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys.,
Inc., 790 F.2d 206, 207 (2d. Cir 1986); Marcus, Stowell & Beye Gov't Sec., Inc. v. Jefferson
Inv. Corp., 797 F.2d 227, 230, n.4 (5th Cir. 1986); Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 711
F.2d 60, 62 (6th Cir. 1983); Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel
Corp., 682 F.2d 446,449 (3d Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 24:1
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VIII. RECORD ON APPEAL
The Second District, in Licea v. Blancher,75 found notes made by jurors
in the record on appeal.76 The court found that the trial court had erred when
it preserved the notes and that the notes should have been destroyed as soon
as the jury was discharged.77 In affirming the judgment, the court sealed the
envelope containing the notes and remanded with instructions to correct the
record by unsealing the envelope and destroying the notes.78
IX. TRANSCRIPTS
In Palomares v. Palomares,79 the appellant filed a "Motion To Require
Court Reporters To Charge A Reasonable Rate For Transcription." 80 The
court noted that the court reporter charged $5.95 per page for appellate
transcripts, a fee that included an original and two copies, but only $3.50 per
page for non-appellate transcripts.8 1 Noting that Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.200(b)(2) allows parties to acquire an original transcript and
make additional copies at their own expense, the court concluded that the
court reporter should make available an original copy only and that it should
. 82do so at a cost not to exceed its charge for a nonappellate transcript. The
court stated that the purpose of the appellate rule would be defeated if court
reporters were permitted to require designating parties to pay for copies as
well as the original.83 "Although we recognize that we do not have the
authority to fix and determine the reasonableness of a fee," the court
continued, "we can as a matter of law require the court reporter to follow the
rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida."84
The Second District, in Mathis v. State,85 reversed the denial of a
petition for writ of mandamus which sought an order compelling the court
reporter to inform the petitioner of the cost for transcripts of certain trial
proceedings.
86
75. 724 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct App. 1999).
76. Id. at 663.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 730 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
80. Id. at 706.
81. Id. at 706-07.
82. Id. at 707.
83. Id. at 708.
84. Palomares, 730 So. 2d at 708.
85. 722 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1998).
86. Id. at 236.
1999]
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
Further, in Manuel v. State,87 the First District reversed a judgment and
remanded a case for a new trial when the trial transcript was not produced in
accordance with the procedure mandated by the rules of judicial
administration and an order of the chief judge of the trial court." In that
* 89
case, no court reporter was present during trial. Instead, the proceedings
were tape recorded and transcribed by a deputy clerk.9° The court pointed
out a number of problems with the quality of the transcript, but emphasized
that its conclusion was not based on these concerns. 91 Rather, the court
found that the principal problem was the fact "that the transcript was not
produced by a licensed court reporter, and, therefore," was "not the official
record" of [the] proceedings. 92 Thus, the court pointed out that it would
have reached the same conclusion "[e]ven if the transcript were otherwise
letter perfect."
93
X. MOTIONS
After setting forth a series of motions filed by the parties and denying
all but one of them, the Fourth District, in Slizyk v. Smilack,94 warned the
parties "that motions are not to be used to present arguments which should
be addressed in the briefs... nor to delay the progress of the appeal. 'g
XI. AMICUS CURIAE
The Third District endorsed and adopted the principles stated in Chief
Judge Posner's opinion in Ryan v. CFTC9 6 in denying a motion to appear and
file a brief as an amicus curiae.97 In Ryan, Chief Judge Posner indicated that
"[a]fter 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast majority of which
[had] not assisted the judges," he had decided "that it would be good to
scrutinize these motions [for leave to file amicus curiae briefs] in a more
careful, indeed a 'fish-eyed,' fashion." 98 The opinion notes that most amicus
87. 737 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
88. Id. at 583.
89. Id. at 581.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 582.
92. Manuel, 737 So. 2d at 582.
93. Id. at 582-83.
94. 734 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
95. Id. at 1167.
96. 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997).
97. Rathkamp v. Department of Community Affairs, 730 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
98. Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063.
[Vol. 24:1
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curiae briefs are filed by allies of the parties and duplicate the arguments
made in the parties' briefs, "in effect merely extending the length of the
litigant's brief."99 It went on to state that an amicus brief should normally be
allowed when a party is not represented or is not represented competently,
when the amicus has an interest in some other case that may be affected by
the case under review, and when the amicus has unique information or a
unique perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the parties
are able to provide.100 "Otherwise," Chief Judge Posner concluded, "leave to
file an aniicus curiae brief should be denied." Noting that "[t]he bane of
lawyers is prolixity and duplication," 1 2 Chief Judge Posner summarized by
stating that "we judges should be assiduous to bar the gates to amicus curiae
briefs that fail to present convincing reasons why the parties' briefs do not
give us all the help we need for deciding the appeal.
10 3
XII. DISQUALIFICATION OF CIRCUIT JUDGES IN THEIR APPELLATE
CAPACITIES
The First District found that a circuit judge considering a petition for a
writ of certiorari erred in denying a motion for disqualification in Smith v.
Santa Rosa Island Authority. 04 The court found that the procedures for
seeking disqualification that are set forth in Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.160 were applicable. 105 The court rejected the argument
that the rule applies only to judges sitting in their capacities as trial judges,0 6
pointing to the fact that rule 2.160(a), although titled "Disqualification of
Trial Judges," provides that the rule aplies to "county and circuit judges in
all matters in all divisions of court."'
XIII. SANCTIONS
After the Third District issued a per curiam affirmance without opinion,
counsel for the appellant in Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc.,'Os filed a
motion for rehearing that the court considered to be "solely ... a tool to
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1064.
103. Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1064.
104. 729 So. 2d 944 (Fla. lstDist. CL App. 1998).
105. Id. at 946.
106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis in original).
108. 716 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1999]
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express his personal displeasure with this Court's conclusion,"' 9 and thus "a
flagrant violation of [Florida] Rule [of Appellate Procedure] 9.330(a)."' 10
The motion included the following language:
4. For this Court to simply ignore all the legal precedents is
atrocious. Whatever hapened to Justice and Fairness? We come
before this Court for rulings which are based on the well-
established law. We do not come to hear Nothing, which is
precisely what a Per Curiam Affirmed opinion tell us. NOTHING!
What a "cop-out." But I suppose, when you don't have a good
reason for doing something, then you do nothing and don't even
have to explain it.
6. From the Opinion rendered in this case, it would appear to be an
exercise in futility to even try and get a fair hearing before this
tribunal, and I suppose the reality is that people have to suffer, as a
result. However, if there is one courageous Jurist out there who
would take a moment to look again at this case, perhaps my faith in
the system would be restored, even though I realize that my faith 'is
not the issue.'
11
'
Because of what the court termed "counsel for the appellant's flagrant abuse
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure" and because the court found the motion
"to be both frivolous and insulting," the court ordered the appellant's
counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed upon him12 The
Clerk was directed to provide a copy of the court's opinion to The Florida
Bar.'
13
The attorney filed a response to the court's order and a second opinion,
ordering the attorney to pay $2500 as a sanction was filed. 1 4 The court
found that the response attempted "to explain and justify the language used"
in the motion and that in some respects, the response made the attorney's
"conduct appear to be even more egregious."" As examples, the court
quoted portions of the response which stated, "[m]y intent in writing the
109. Id. at 876.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 877 (emphasis in original).
112. Banderas, 716 So. 2d at 877.
113. Id. at 877-78.
114. Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc., 718 So. 2d 376, 377 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
115. Id.
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[m]otion was based on my belief that my comments and criticism did not
exceed the boundaries of truth," and, "I do not believe that what I wrote
could be construed as being false."1 16
In Rampart Life Associates, Inc. v. Turkish,' 7 counsel for the appellees
moved to supplement the record with a deposition taken after the entry of the
order being appealed.1 ' s After this motion was denied, counsel filed a brief
that made reference, in a footnote, to the contents of the deposition and
pointed out that the motion to supplement the record had been denied by the
court. 119 The Fourth District indicated that "[it would have been bad enough
if counsel.., had included the information in appellees' brief without
moving to supplement the record," 1 but that "[tlo make matters worse,'121
counsel did so after the motion was denied. 2 The court stated:
In doing so... [counsel] violated two ethical rules: (1) Rule 4-
3(5)(a) of the Florida Bar Rules of Professional Conduct which
provides that a lawyer "shall not seek to influence a judge
... except as permitted by law or the rules of court;" and (2) Rule
4-3.4(c) which provides that counsel shall not "knowingly disobey
an obligation under the rules of a tribunal." 12
Accordingly, the court struck the footnote and sanctioned the appellees'
attorney by assessing $500 in attorney's fees to paid to opposing counsel.124
XIV. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
A. Certiorari
The supreme court clarified the scope of certiorari review with regard
to pretrial discovery matters in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Boecher.12 The
court began its discussion by pointing out that in Martin-Johnson, Inc. v.
Savage, it described certiorari relief as an "'extraordinary remedy' that
'should not be used to circumvent the interlocutory appeal rule which
116. Id. (quoting appellant's response motion).
117. 730 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
118. Id. at 385.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Rampart, 730 So. 2d at 385.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 733 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 1999).
126. 509 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1987).
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authorizes appeal from only a few types of nonfinal orders."" 27 In the same
opinion, the court indicated that not every erroneous discovery order creates
certiorari jurisdiction and focused on the existence of "irreparable harm" as
the governing standard.128
The court then discussed its opinion in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Langston,129 which cited to Martin-Johnson with approval and disapproved
contrary appellate court decisions to the extent that "they could be
interpreted as 'automatically equating irrelevant discovery requests with
irreparable harm."' 30 In Langston, however, the court quashed the district
court decision under review "to the extent that it permit[ted] discovery even
when it has been affirmatively established that such discovery is neither• - • ,,131
relevant nor will lead to the discovery of relevant information.
The court went on to note that this language in Langston apparently
"caused at least one appellate court to experience 'an increase in the number
of petitions for certiorari seeking review of discovery orders.', 132 Noting
that Judge Klein concluded in Eberhardt that the decision in Langston did
not expand certiorari review in the discovery context, the court expressed its
agreement with Judge Klein's analysis and reiterated that Martin-Johnson
properly sets forth the parameters for certiorari relief in pretrial discovery.'33
Citing Boecher, the Fourth District, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Cumming, 3 stated "that certiorari does not lie to review the relevance of
discovery, since the disclosure of information that is merely irrelevant is not
likely to cause irreparable harm within the meaning of Martin-Johnson."'
35
The court noted the petitioner's reliance on its prior decision in Nissan
Motors Corp. v. Espinosa, 136 which reversed an order requiring disclosure of
irrelevant discovery information without discussion of whether the order
posed a threat of irreparable harm.' 37 To the extent that Nissan Motors can
be read as dispensing with the irreparable harm factor, the court indicated
127. Boecher, 733 So. 2d at 999 (quoting Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d
1097, 1098 (Fla. 1987)).
128. Id.
129. 655 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1995).
130. Boecher, 733 So. 2d at 999 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91,
95 (Fla. 1995)).
131. Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 95 (Fla. 1995)).
132. Id. (quoting Eberhardt v. Eberhardt, 666 So. 2d 1024, 1024 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
133. Id. at 999-1000.
134. 736 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
135. Id. at 1248.
136. 716 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
137. Wal-Mart Stores, 736 So. 2d at 1248 (citing Nissan Motors Corp. v. Espinosa, 716
So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
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that it conflicts with Boecher and cannot be relied upon as an expansion of
the court's certiorari jurisdiction.138
Clarifying its earlier denial without opinion of a petition for writ of
certiorari in Casey-Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 39 the Fifth District aligned itself
with rulings of other district courts, which have held that such a denial is not
a ruling on the merits and does not establish law of the case. 140 "Of course,"
the court continued, "if the court of appeal chooses to do so it can issue a
denial on the merits, which would establish law of the case."
141
A number of cases dealt with the question of whether particular orders
were reviewable by certiorari. The First and Fifth Districts each considered
whether certiorari is appropriate to review comprehensive plan amendments
directly related to proposed small-scale development activities. This issue
was specifically left open by the supreme court when it ruled in Martin
County v. Yusem' 42 that amendments to comprehensive land use plans are
legislative, rather than quasi-judicial decisions, and therefore can only be
challenged through original proceedings, as opposed to review proceedings
such as certiorari, in the circuit courts.143  Both of the district courts
concluded that the same rationale applied to small-scale amendments.
In City of Jacksonville Beach v. Coastal Development of North Florida,
Inc.,144 the First District based its determination on its conclusion "that all
comprehensive plan amendment requests necessarily involve the formulation
of policy, rather than its mere application" and that whatever the size of
"proposed development, a comprehensive plan amendment request will
require that the governmental entity determine whether it is socially
desirable to reformulate the policies previously formulated for the orderly
future growth of the community." 145
The Fifth District, in Fleeman v. City of St. Augustine Beach,14
discussed some of the practical reasons for its conclusion.
We cannot discern any good reason for the courts to treat small-
parcel amendments differently than any other amendments or
adoption of comprehensive land use plans. To do so would invite
138. Wal-Mart Stores, 736 So. 2d at 1248.
139. 735 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
140. Id. at 610 (citing Degrasse v. Wertheim, 566 So. 2d 515, 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Johnson v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 542 So. 2d 367, 369 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1988); Bevan v. Wanicka, 505 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
141. Id.
142. 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
143. Id. at 1295.
144. 730 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
145. Id. at 794.
146. 728 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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more uncertainty in this still unsettled area of law. How small must
the parcel be? How many other people must be affected?
147
Both courts certified to the supreme court that the question at issue is one of
great public importance,' 48 although the Fifth District did not formulate a
specific question.1 49 That court did, however, also certify that its decision
conflicted with that of the Third District in Debes v. CiV of Key West.' 50
The supreme court in Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc.,15 found that certiorari
is inappropriate to review trial court orders striking parties' demands for jury
trials because such orders do not cause irreparable injury that cannot be
152
remedied on direct appeal. The court's opinion resolved conflict among
the district courts by upholding the Fourth District decision that was under
review' 53 and disapproving decisions of the First,
154 Second, 155 and Third156
Districts on the same issue to the extent that they are inconsistent with the
supreme court's opinion. 57  158
In Schneider v. Schneider, the Fourth District relied on Jaye in
concluding that certiorari could not be used to review an order requiring a
trustee to retain counsel.159 The court stated that "if the importance of the
right to trial by jury could not displace the requirement of injury that cannot
be corrected on appeal," as concluded in Jaye, "then neither can the right of
self-representation."'1' The court found to be misplaced the petitioner's
reliance on federal cases allowing review of comparable orders under the
collateral order doctrine because "Florida has not adopted the doctrine, and
certainly under Jaye it could not be used as a basis to avoid the requirement
of irreparable injury uncorrectable on final appeal."''
147. Id. at 1180.
148. City of Jacksonville Beach, 730 So. 2d at 792; Fleeman, 728 So. 2d at 1178.
149. Fleeman, 728 So. 2d at 1178.
150. Id. (citing Debes v. City of Key West, 690 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997)).
151. 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998).
152. Id. at 215.
153. Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 698 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), decision
approved by 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998).
154. Quality Coffee Serv., Inc. v. Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 474 So. 2d 427
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
155. Johnson Eng'g, Inc. v. Pate, 563 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
156. Spring v. Ronel Ref., Inc., 421 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
157. Jaye, 720 So. 2d at 216.
158. 732 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
159. Id. at 1148 (citing Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998)).
160. Id. (citing Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998)).
161. Id. at 1149 (citing Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998)).
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The petitioner in Martin v. Doe162 sought certiorari review of an order
entered by a circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity. 63 The district
court noted that whether it had certiorari jurisdiction under such circum-
stances was "questionable."' 64 However, it did not determine the issue in
light of its conclusion that the petitioner had not shown irreparable injury. 65
Other cases included the following: Sheley v. Florida Parole
Commission'66 (certiorari rather than direct appeal appropriate method of
review of circuit court's denial of petition for writ of mandamus challenging
order of the Florida Parole Commission); Pee v. Aaron 67 (certiorari granted
to quash a trial court order requiring plaintiffs' counsel to accept documents
from defense counsel by fax); Williams v. Spears161 (certiorari review of
denial of parents' motion for summary judgment warranted when the motion
challenged the constitutionality of a statute authorizing courts to order
grandparent visitation if the parents' marriage has been dissolved because
the continuation of the trial court proceedings would violate the parents'
right to privacy by exploring questions of parental decision-making and
considering the best interests of the child); Florida Commission on169
Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology v. State (court lacked jurisdiction
to entertain a petition for certiorari when the order at issue was fully
favorable to the party seeking review and the party only claimed departure
from the essential requirements of law was a conclusion in the nature of
dicta); City of Tallahassee v. Kovach170 (challenges to a municipality's
annexation of property must be conducted by certiorari pursuant to section
171.081 of the Florida Statutes); and Panagakos v. Laufer 71 (court lacked
jurisdiction to review, by certiorari, an order denying a motion to dismiss,
based on a claim that allegedly defamatory statements were privileged from
suit because they were made during the course of judicial proceedings and
court declined to address whether certiorari jurisdiction would lie to review
a claim of judicial proceedings privilege denied after summary judgment).
162. 731 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
163. Id. at 806.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 807.
166. 720 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1998).
167. 719 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
168. 719 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
169. 716 So. 2d345 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
170. 733 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
171. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D801 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1999).
1999]
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
B. Mandamus
Cases involving requests for mandamus included the following: Soto v.
Board of County Commissioners1 2 (mandamus appropriate to compel Board
of County Commissioners to process a grievance filed by a county employee
in situation in which the county had provided that employee disputes would
be resolved through a grievance process); Pisarri v. State173 (mandamus not
available to require Florida Department of Law Enforcement to remove an
individual's name from its list of sexual predators when the individual was
included on the list pursuant to a written finding by a court and an appeal
from the court's order would have been the appropriate manner to allege that
the individual was erroneously found to be a sexual predator); and Donahue
v. Vaughn'74 (mandamus denied for various reasons when petitioner sought
to have the court order his former attorney to furnish him, free of charge,
copies of documents in his case; reasons included the fact that mandamus in
these circumstances only applies to government officials, not private
lawyers).
C. Prohibition
In Anderson v. Glass,175 the Fifth District granted a writ of prohibition
solely because the trial court delayed too long before ruling on a motion for
disqualification. 176 Without discussing the merit or lack of merit of the
motion, the district court relied on the fact that the trial court took the matter
under advisement for more than thirty days before entering an order denying
the motion and the fact that Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160(f)
requires a trial judge to "immediately" enter either an order granting
disqualification or denying the motion. 7
In Smith v. State,178 a criminal defendant's petition for a writ of prohibi-
tion on speedy trial grounds was summarily denied.179 After he was con-
victed, he apealed and raised the same issue that had formed the basis for
the petition. The Fifth District noted that other district courts disagree as
to whether a summary denial of a writ of prohibition constitutes an absolute
172. 716 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
173. 724 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
174. 721 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
175. 727 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
176. Id. at 1147.
177. Id.
178. 738 So. 2d410 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
179. Id. at 411.
180. Id.
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bar against raising the same issue on direct appeal."' In this regard, it
pointed out that the Third"' and Fourth"' Districts have held that denials of
petitions will be, unless otherwise indicated, rulings on the merits, 184 and
that the Second District'85 has held that a summary denial of a petition does
not preclude the raising of the same issue in a subsequent appeal unless it
can be affmnatively established that the denial was on the merits or that a
merits determination was the only possible basis for denial.186 The Fifth
District stated that although it had not previously articulated its policy, it had
followed procedures similar to those practiced by the Second District.187
Notwithstanding what it termed "the persuasive reasoning set forth by" the
Third and Fourth Districts, the court "decline[d] to depart from [its]
established practice."
188
The Second District found, in Panagakos v. Laufer,1s9 that prohibition
was not available to review a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to
dismiss based on a claim that the complaint was barred by the statute of
limitations. 19° The court recognized that in Swartzman v. Harlan,1 9 it issued
a writ of prohibition because an action was barred by the statute of
limitations. r92 To the extent that the decision in Swartzman, which did not
specifically address the appropriateness of prohibition, suggested that
prohibition is the proper remedy, the court indicated that it believed that the
supreme court's decision in Mandico v. Taos Construction, Inc.,193 which
held that prohibition may not be used to raise the affirmative defense of
workers' compensation immunity, required a contrary conclusion.
194
181. Id. at411-12.
182. Obanion v. State, 496 So. 2d 977, 980 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
183. Hobbs v. State, 689 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (en banc).
184. Smith,738 So. 2dat411.
185. Sumner v. Sumner, 707 So. 2d 934,935 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
186. Smith, 738 So. 2d at 411-12.
187. Id. at412.
188. Id.
189. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D801 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1999).
190. Id. at D801.
191. 535 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.,1988).
192. Panagakos, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D801 (citing Swartzman v. Harlan, 535 So. 2d
605 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
193. 605 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1992).
194. Panagakos, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D801.
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D. Habeas Corpus
In Harvard v. Singletary,195 the supreme court declined to exercise its
jurisdiction to consider an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus,
instead transferring the matter to the circuit court where the petitioner was
incarcerated. 196 In doing so, the court took the opportunity to explain that it
will take similar actions with regard to future writ petitions which "raise
substantial issues of fact or present individualized issues that do not require
immediate resolution by this Court, or are not the type of case in which an
opinion from this Court would provide important guiding principles for the
other courts of this State."'197
The court also indicated that it would continue its practice of denying
petitions when it is able to determine from the face of the petition that the
claim is successive or procedurally barred. 198 Discussing its policy, the court
noted that review of petitions that fall in the above categories "requires the
expenditure of substantial time that would otherwise be devoted to the
performance of our unique duties as the State's highest court."' 99 The court
then concluded that "[c]ommon sense dictates that we reserve our exercise of
original writ jurisdiction for cases which require this Court's specific or
immediate attention."w
In Basse v. State,2° 1 the supreme court considered a challenge to an
order of the Second District that struck a 117 page petition for writ of habeas
corpus and ordered that an amended petition of no more than fifty pages be
filed. 2 2 In support of its order, the district court had cited Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.210(a)(5), which limits appellate briefs to fifty
pages. °3 The supreme court agreed with the petitioner that the rule does not
apply to writ petitions, but found that the district court had the inherent
authority to place reasonable page limitations on filings so long as the rules
do not provide otherwise.2 4 The court also found that the fifty page limit of
the rule provided a reasonable benchmark for the district court to use in
exercising its authority, but cautioned that petitioners must be afforded the
opportunity to show good cause for filing longer petitions and that when
such cause is shown, the court must allow petitioners to exceed the limit to
195. 733 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1999).
196. Id. at 1021.
197. Id. at 1021-22 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 1022.
199. Id. at 1023.
200. Harvard, 733 So 2d at 1023.
201. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S273 (Jun. 10, 1999).
202. Id. at S273.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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the extent necessary for adequate presentation of their claims.205 The court
also referred to the Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee the issue of
whether the rules should contain a provision governing the length of original
writ petitions.2
Other cases dealing with requests for habeas corpus included the
following: Minott v. State2' (circuit court order denying habeas corpus
vacated when the petitioner was not given the opportunity to serve a reply to
the respondent's response) and S.C. v. Peterson2°s (habeas corpus not
available to individual on home detention pursuant to section 985.03(18)(c)
of the Florida Statutes).
E. Coram Nobis
The supreme court, in Wood v. State,2w determined that the time
limitations for filing motions for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850 should also apply to petitions for writs of error
210
coram nobis. The court amended the criminal rule to include such
petitions and stated that the time limitations would apply to all defendants
adjudicated guilty after the date the decision was filed (May 27, 1999) and
that all defendants adjudicated prior to the filing date would have two years
from that date to file claims traditionally cognizable under coram nobis. -11
212In Gregersen v. State, the Fourth District found that coram nobis is
available to challenge a trial court's failure to inform a criminal defendant of
213the deportation consequences of a plea. The court recognized that the
Third District had reached a contrary conclusion in Peart v. State.2 14 The
supreme court has accepted jurisdiction to review both Gregersen and Peart.
In addition, the Third District, in adhering to its approach in Van Tuyn v.
215 2State, certified conflict with Gregersen.
205. Id.
206. Basse, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S273 n.1.
207. 718 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
208. 718 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
209. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S240 (May 27, 1999).
210. Id. at S241.
211. Id. at S241-42.
212. 714 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 728 So. 2d 205
(Fla. 1998).
213. Id. at 1196.
214. Id. (citing Peart v. State, 705 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
215. 736 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
216. Id. at 71.
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XV. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. Orders Reviewable
In State v. Schultz,217 the supreme court concluded that a defendant
found guilty may appeal from an order withholding adjudication without
placing the defendant on probation.218 The court resolved a conflict between
the districts by approving the Fourth District decision under review 219 and
disapproving the Second District's decision in Martin v. State.m2
The state moved to dismiss a defendant's appeal in Jefferson v. State.1
The state pointed to the legislature's recent enactment of the Criminal
222Appeal Reform Act, which states that an appeal may not be taken from a
judgment or order of a trial court unless a prejudicial error is alleged and is
properly preserved or, if not, would constitute fundamental error, and
asserted that since the alleged sentencing errors in the case under review
were neither preserved nor fundamental, the Third District lacked
223jurisdiction. The court denied the state's motion, concluding that the
legislation did not limit its jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the
question of whether errors have been preserved and, if so, whether they have
merit are issues to be decided on appeal, not on a motion to dismiss.2 4 The
court did certify to the supreme court a question of great public importance
that asked whether, in light of the legislative enactment, the failure to
preserve a sentencing error that is not fundamental is a jurisdictional
impediment that should result in the dismissal of an appeal. 
22 5
Also certifying questions of great public importance on this subject was
the decision of the Second District in Bain v. State. M6  Reiterating the
conclusion it reached in Denson v. State,227 the court opined that the
Criminal Appeal Reform Act does limit the jurisdiction of Florida's
appellate courts to entertain appeals from final orders in criminal cases.228
217. 720 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1998).
218. Id. at 247.
219. Schultz v. State, 700 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
220. 600 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
221. 724 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 732 So. 2d 328
(Fla. 1999).
222. FLA. STAT. § 924.051 (1999).
223. Jefferson, 724 So. 2d at 105-06.
224. Id. at 106.
225. Id.
226. 730 So. 2d 296,306 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
227. 711 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
228. Bain, 730 So. 2d at 302.
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In State v. Gaines,229 after the state presented its case, the defense
moved for the first time to suppress certain evidence2 30 The trial court
granted the motion, and after the state announced that it had no other
evidence with which to prove its case, entered an order dismissing the
case.231 The state appealed from the order of dismissal, asserting that the
trial court erroneously suppressed the evidence.232 The Fourth District
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal, which contended that
any error in the suppression ruling was moot because retrying the defendant
would constitute a double jeopardy violation. 23 The district court indicated
that the state should have argued to the trial court to exercise its discretion
not to consider the motion to suppress unless the defendant would agree to a
mistrial in the event the motion was to be granted.2 4 In a motion for
rehearing, the State pointed to section 924.07(1)(1) of the Florida Statutes,
which provides that the state may appeal "[a]n order or ruling suppressing
evidence or evidence in limine at trial"'2 5 was pointed to by the state. 2 6 The
court denied rehearing, finding that the provision violated article V, section
4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution, which vests exclusive power to authorize
non-final appeals in the supreme court.2 7
Other cases dealing with the question of whether particular orders were
reviewable included the following: State v. Gray s (state may not appeal
from orders modifying probation or community control) and State v.
Figueroa239 (state does not have the right to appeal from a legal sentence
entered over the state's objection after the trial court advised the defendant
that if he pled to the crimes charged, it would withhold adjudication and
place him on probation).
B. Bond Pending Appeal
The trial court in Coolley v. State240 denied bond pending appeal,
relying on four factors:
229. 731 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
230. Id. at 7.
231. Id. at 7-8.
232. Id. at 8.
233. Id.
234. Gaines, 731 So. 2d at 8.
235. FLA. STAT. § 924.07(1)(1) (1997).
236. Gaines, 731 So. 2d at 8-9.
237. Id. at 9.
238. 721 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
239. 728 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
240. 720 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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1) Following a finding of guilt by a jury there "remains a high
presumption of guilt."
2) As a firearm was used in the offense, the defendant poses a risk
to the community.
3) Coolley's conviction involves a mandatory prison term.
4) The trial court feared that the Coolley would not appear for any
future court dates if released on bail.241
The Second District granted the defendant's motion for release and
directed the trial court to set a reasonable bond.242 The court "disagree[d]
that there is but a presumption of guilt after a jury returns a guilty
verdict." 243 The court recognized that there is a presumption of correctness
that follows the verdict, but said that "this presumption applies in every
criminal case and is not, therefore, an appropriate factor upon which to base
the denial of a bond in a specific case. The court then stated that it did
"not consider the use of a firearm, in and of itself, conclusive evidence that a
defendant poses a risk to the community.'245 The court went on to indicate
that if the legislature had seen fit to deny an appeal bond to any offender
who used a firearm or who faced a minimum mandatory sentence,
appropriate legislation to that effect would have been enacted. 246 Finally, the
court found no factual basis for the conclusion that the defendant would not
appear for future court dates if released. 247
C. Capital Cases
In Arbelaez v. Butterworth,248 a petition was filed by the Capital
Collateral Regional Counsel ("CCRC") for the Southern Region of Florida,
which asked the court to "exercise its all writs jurisdiction to stay all
applicable time limits, court proceedings, and executions until adequate
funding was provided to CCRC, or until.., the start of the next fiscal
year." 19 Subsequently, the CCRCs for both the Northern and Southern
Regions filed separate all writs petitions asking the court to "impose a
general moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty until the CCRCs
241. Id. at 598.
242. Id. at 599.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Coolley, 720 So. 2d at 598.
246. Id. at 599.
247. Id.
248. 738 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1999).
249. Id. at 326.
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are adequately funded pursuant to a caseload methodology." 2 0 Finding that
since the actions were filed, "the structure of the CCRC offices has been
substantially modified and the funding has significantly changed and
increased through two legislative sessions,"251 the court concluded that there
was "no present case in controversy"252 and denied the petitions.
253
D. Appeals From Denials of Motions for Postonviction Relief
In Gantt v. State,254 the Fourth District made it clear that it is not
necessary for court apointed counsel to follow the procedures set forth in
Anders v. California, which allow attorneys to satisfy their ethical obliga-
tions when they can identify no meritorious issues to raise in direct appeals
of convictions and sentences, before seeking to withdraw from appeals of
orders denying postconviction relief.25 6 Pointing out that the Anders proce-
dures stem from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the court concluded
that since the appointment of an attorney to handle an appeal from an order
denying a motion for postconviction relief is not a matter of right, but is
based on due process considerations, the procedures need not be followedY27
The court also took the opportunity to remind the trial court that the
Criminal Appeals Reform Act limits the court's power of appointment of
appellate attorneys in postconviction matters. 8 Since appointment is not a
matter of right, the court continued, trial courts should apply the standards of
Graham v. State,z 9 and when, as in the case under review, "no issues arepresent, let alone a complex one," counsel should not be appointed.2 °
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Arbelaez, 738 So. 2d at 327.
254. 714 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
255. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
256. Gantt, 714 So. 2d at 1116.
257. Id. at 1116-17.
258. Id. at 1117 (citing FLA. STAT. § 924.051 (1997)).
259. 372 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1979).
260. Gantt, 714 So. 2d at 1117.
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E. Belated Appeals
In State v. Trowell,211 the supreme court resolved conflict among the
districts by concluding that a defendant who seeks a belated appeal after a
guilty plea need not allege that there exists a potentially meritorious issue. 
2
The court aligned itself with the approach taken by the First District in the
case under review263 and by the Fourth District in Gunn v. State,264 while
rejecting the conclusions to the contrary reached by the Second 265 and ThirdDistricts.266
XVI. APPEALS IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES
In G.L.S. v. Department of Children & Families,267 the supreme court
found that an order which initially terminates parental rights in a child
dependency case is a partial final judgment; 26' a partial final judgment is
reviewable either on appeal from the partial final judgment or on appeal
269from the final judgment in the case.
The Second District, in K.W. v. Department of Children & Families,270
clarified the question of what steps appointed counsel should take when
unable to identify an arguable issue in an appeal from an order terminating
parental rights.A Alig1ing itself with the three district courts that had
spoken on the subject, the court rejected the necessity to follow the
procedures set forth in Anders v. California,273 which allows attorneys
261. 739 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1999).
262. Id. at 78.
263. Trowell v. State, 706 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (en banc), decision
approved by 739 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1999).
264. 612 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
265. Bridges v. Dugger, 518 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
266. White v. Singletary, 711 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), quashed in
part, 24 Fla. L. Weekly (Sept. 2, 1999) (quashing "the part of the decision below denying
petitioner's request for belated appeal").
267. 724 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1998).
268. Id. at 1185-86.
269. Id.
270. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D87 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1998).
271. Id. at D87.
272. See J.A. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 693 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1997); Jimenez v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 669 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Ostrum v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
273. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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handling criminal appeals to satisfy their ethical obligations under similar
circumstances. 
274
Instead, the court concluded that attorneys who cannot identify an
arpmable issue shall file motions to withdraw, reciting the necessity to do
so.75 The motion must include:
(1) the last known address of the parent; (2) a statement that, if
requested, counsel will assist the parent in obtaining the record; (3)
a request that the parent be given forty days to file a pro se brief;
and (4) a certificate of service upon all relevant parties, including
the parent."
276
The court indicated that upon receipt of a sufficient motion to withdraw, it
would enter and forward to the parent's last known address an order
allowing the parent to file a pro se brief within forty days.277 If no brief is
received, the motion to withdraw will be granted and the appeal dismissedY 8
If a brief is received, it will be examined to determine whether it raises a
preliminary basis for reversal.279 If so, the motion to withdraw will be
denied and counsel ordered to file a suwlemental brief.20 If not, the appeal
will be subject to summary affirmance.
XVII. APPEALS IN JUVENILE CASES
The supreme court, in A.G. v. Department of Children & Family
Services,282 held that an order declaring a child dependent may be challenged283
on appeal from a subsequent final disposition order. The court found such
orders to be analogous to initial orders terminating parental rights that were
found in G.L.S. v. Department of Children & Families,'m discussed in the
preceding section of this article, and reviewable as a partial final judgment
or on appeal from a subsequent final judgment. 2 5
274. K.W., 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D87 (citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967)).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. K.W., 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D87.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. 731 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1999).
283. Id. at 1261-63.
284. 724 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1998).
285. Id. at 1261.
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In Department of Juvenile Justice v. E.R.,28 6 the Third District found
that the Department of Juvenile Justice has standing to appeal orders
modifying the commitment of juveniles.28 7 The same court concluded in
Department of Children & Families v. Morrison, s that the Department of
Children and Families had standing to challenge a circuit court order
directing the department to place a juvenile, who had been found
incompetent to stand trial, in a secure facility, in which there was no
integration of adult patients with juveniles.28 9
XVI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
In Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co.,290 the supreme court found that
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), which provides that "if a
party... is required or permitted to do an act within some prescribed time
after service of a document, and the document is served by mail, 5 days shall
be added to the prescribed period," does not extend the time for seeking
review pursuant to rule 9.400(c) of a trial court's order on appellate
attorney's fees.29 1 The court pointed out that rule 9.400(c) allows for review
within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed and that the five-
day mailing rule applies only when an act is to be done within a specified
number of days from service of a document.
292
XIX. COSTS
The appellant in Mulato v. Mulato293 appealed from a circuit court order
denying a motion for appellate costs.2 The motion was untimely under
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a), which requires that such
motions be filed within thirty days of the issuance of mandate. 295 The Fourth
District affirmed the denial of the motion, finding that the time requirement
of the rule is jurisdictional and that compliance with it cannot be waived.296
286. 724 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
287. Id. at 130.
288.. 727 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
289. Id. at 405.
290. 734 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1999).
291. Id. at 412-13.
292. Id. at 412 (citing FLA. R. APP. P. 9.400(c)).
293. 734 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
294. Id. at 478.
295. Id.
296. Id.
[Vol. 24:1
31
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Musto
XX. REHEARING
The Fourth District granted a motion for rehearing in Teca, Inc. v. WM-
TAB, Inc.,297 withdrawing a per curiam affirmance and substituting an en
bane opinion reversing the judgment under review.29 8 In a specially con-
curring opinion, Judge Klein noted that the motion for rehearing was less
than two pages and was limited to one issue.299 Judge Klein then stated:
I believe there are two things which can be learned from this
experience. First, although Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.330 does not limit the length of motions for rehearing, long
motions for rehearing are not nearly as effective as short ones.
They should almost never exceed three or four pages. Second,
although we see far too many motions for rehearing, they can be
appropriate, even in cases which are initially affirmed without
opinion.
3 00
In DeBiasi v. Snaith,30 the Fourth District considered an appeal in a
legal malpractice case from an order granting summary judgment for the
defendant lawyer on the basis that alleged negligence was excused under the
doctrine of judgmental immunity.3°2 The attorney had filed a timely motion
for certification, rehearing, and rehearing en bane of an appellate decision.0 3
Within fifteen days of the denial of the motion, but more than fifteen days
after the opinion had been issued, the attorney filed a motion for certification
of conflict with decisions of other district courts and of a question of great
public importance.3 4 The motion for certification was denied as untimely
despite the attorney's argument that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.330 permits motions for certification to be filed within fifteen days of
orders denying rehearing.305  The lawyer's client then brought the
malpractice suit, alleging that the untimely filing of the motion for
certification deprived the client of the opportunity to have the appellate
decision overturned.3°
297. 726 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (en banc).
298. Id. at 829.
299. Id. at 831 (Klein, J., concurring specially).
300. Id. (citations omitted).
301. 732 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
302. Id. at 15.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. DeBiasi, 732 So. 2d at 15.
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The district court recognized that a literal reading of the rule presented
"a degree of ambiguity," but held that the filing of a motion for rehearing or
clarification does not toll the time for the filing of a motion for
certification.307 The court also stated that "mere 'ambiguity of a rule' of
procedure, without more, does not equate to the somewhat more amorphous
realm of 'fairly debatable' or 'unsettled area of the law' to which the
doctrine of judgmental immunity is applied."308  Accordingly, the court
reversed the order granting summary judgment. 309
310The Third District, in Perez v. State, granted the state's motion for
rehearing which asserted for the first time that the defendant did not preserve
an issue that had formed the basis for an opinion reversing the defendant's
conviction and sentence. 311 The court noted that in the past it had been
reluctant to consider new arguments made on rehearing that were not raised
312in the main appeal, but indicated that such a general practice does not
deter it from considering such an argument when recent developments in the
law or the justice of the cause persuades it to do So. 3 13 The court then
pointed to the enactment of the Criminal Appeal Reform Act of 1996, which
mandates that an appeal may not be taken from a trial court judgment or
order unless a prejudicial error is alleged and is properly preserved or, if not,
would constitute fundamental error.Y4 In deciding to consider the state's
argument, the court stated that it was giving "great weight to the clearly
expressed intent of the Florida Legislature that review of criminal appeals
must be limited to those issues which have been properly preserved in the
trial court or which constitute fundamental error."
33
In Barnes v. State,316 the state filed a motion for rehearing which,
among other things, called the court's attention to an erroneous attribution in
, 317
the court's opinion. The motion was signed by an assistant attorney
general other than the one who had handled the case to that point and by an
assistant state attorney. 18 Without reaching any decision on the merits of
the motion, the court determined that it would issue a corrected opinion
deleting the attribution and accordingly sent a copy of the corrected opinion
307. Id. at 16.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. 717 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
311. Id. at 605-06.
312. Id. at 606.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Perez, 717 So. 2d at 606.
316. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1250 (4th Dist. Ct. App. May 26, 1999).
317. Id. at 1250.
318. Id.
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to West Publishing ("West"). 1 9 Shortly afterwards, the court received a
copy of a letter from the assistant state attorney to West asking that West
"withhold alteration of any portion of the opinion" until the court had finally
disposed of the case.
320
Subsequently, a document styled as "Appellee's Supplemental Motion
for Rehearing/Rehearing En Banc," signed only by the assistant state
attorney, was filed. 321 The court then issued an order to the attorney general
and'the assistant state attorney to show cause why the supplemental motion
should not be stricken as unauthorized. The order called attention to
section 16.01(4) of the Florida Statutes, which provides that the attorney
general shall handle all suits in the district courts of appeal, and section
27.02 of the Florida Statutes, which indicates that the state attorney shall
appear in the circuit and county courts on behalf of the state."
The assistant attorney general who signed the motion for rehearing filed
a response which indicated that the supplemental motion was filed without
any prior notice to the attorney general's office.324 The response did not
adopt any part of the supplemental motion.32 The assistant state attorney
also filed a response, recognizing the statutory provisions cited in the court's
order, but arguing that a state attorney has a common law right unaffected by
those statutes to represent the state in criminal appeals. 3
The defendant filed a reply to the assistant state attorney's response,
bringing to the court's attention that there had never been a motion to
substitute counsel for the initial assistant attorney general on the case and the
fact that the state attorney's office, "apparently unhappy with the
performance of the Attorney General's office," did not become involved
with the case until after the issuance of the court's opinion. 327 The defendant
also contended that the state attorney's office had a "recent practice" of
intervening in cases when a decision of the court was "adverse to that
office," and asked that the court strike the supplemental motion.
32
The court indicated that none of the cases cited by the assistant state
attorney had decided that a state attorney has a common law right to
represent the state in a higher court.329 Rather, the court said, they merely
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Barnes, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1250.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Barnes, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1250.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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showed that a state attorney represented one of the parties.330  "We can
understand why the Attorney General might prefer to appoint the State
Attorney... to represent the state" on appeal in particular cases, the court
noted. The mere fact that the attorney general may have done so in certain
situations, the court continued, "does not create any common law right in an
assistant state attorney to represent the state in an appellate court without the
express authorization of the Attorney General. 332
Turning to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the attorney
general apparently did approve of the assistant state attorney's participation
in the preparation of the initial motion for rehearing, but that the
supplemental motion was not approved by the attorney general.3 3 The court
therefore deemed the supplemental motion to be unauthorized and granted
the defendant's motion to strike it.334 In a footnote, the court provided some
insight into the manner in which it makes appropriate non-substantive
corrections, such as the one arising from the erroneous attribution in the case
under review and cautioned attorneys not to take it upon themselves to
become involved in the publication process.
335
Although we have struck the supplemental motion for rehearing,
we do wish to stress that our opinions are subject to correction by
us at any time before we have decided pending motions for
rehearing. We frequently correct an opinion promptly when
someone calls our attention to a factual, grammatical, orthographic
or other kind of error, inaccuracy or omission not necessarily
affecting any substantive decision on our part. The lawyers
involved need draw no dire conclusions from our so doing except
that we desire to remove such errors from an opinion no matter
what else we might do. And, we trust, we need not bother to
explain why it is not for attorneys representing the parties in a case
in our court to attempt to tamper with the publication of our
decisions or to attempt to countermand our directions to West
Publishing.33
6
330. Id. at D1250-51.
331. Barnes, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1251.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Barnes, 24 Fa. L. Weekly at D1252 n.4.
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XXI. MANDATE
In Raulerson v. State,337 one panel of the Fourth District affirmed a
338criminal defendant's conviction without opinion. Several months later, a
different panel, considering the same issue that had been raised by the
defendant, reversed the conviction of a codefendant.339 After the defendant
filed a motion to recall mandate in his case, the court withdrew the mandate
in the codefendant's case in order to resolve the conflict.4 After an en banc
conference, the court was persuaded that the opinion in the co-defendant's
case was correct and that the defendant's conviction should not have been
affirmed.3 4
The court indicated that the defendant's motion to recall mandate would
have been appropriate had the court still been in the same term of court in
which his conviction was affirmed.342 Since the motion was not filed until
after the term of court had expired, however, the court concluded that it did
not have the authority to recall the mandate.343 The court therefore treated
the motion to recall mandate as a petition for habeas corpus granted the
petition, and vacated the defendant's conviction and sentence.
3
XXII. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
Over the upcoming year, the Florida Appellate Court Rules Committee
will submit to the supreme court the committee's four-year cycle report. This
report will set forth proposed amendments to the rules. The changes that the
court decides to adopt will unquestionably have a significant impact on
appellate practice in Florida.
Of course, the courts in the next year will provide answers to many of
the questions raised by the cases discussed in this article. These answers, as
they frequently do, will likely generate new questions. These questions, and
others, will continue to provide the large number of court decisions that
shape the field of appellate practice.
337. 724 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
338. Id. at 642.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Raulerson, 724 So. 2d at 642-43.
343. Id. at 643.
344. Id
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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most exciting and dramatic aspects of trial are the closing
arguments. Passion and emotion can aid in persuading a jury to return a
favorable verdict, but a "win at all costs" mind-set can lead to reversal on
appeal.! Unfortunately, some attorneys continue to ignore the Supreme
Court of Florida's decisions on the use of improper closing arguments.
1. See Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197,1203 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Ryan v. State, 457 So.
2d 1084, 1091 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1984)) (reversing and commenting that the "prosecutor's
'over zealousness in prosecuting the State's cause worked against justice, rather than for it");
Hoggins v. State, 718 So. 2d 761, 772 (Fla. 1998) (reversing in part because prosecutor made
prohibited comments on defendant's post-Miranda silence during rebuttal closing argument);
D'Ambrosio v. State, 736 So. 2d 44, 48 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing because
prosecutor repeatedly referred to the defendant's defense as innuendo, speculation, and a sea of
confusion); Milburn v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1936, D1937 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1999)
(reversing because prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding insanity defense);
Barnes v. State, 743 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that prosecutor's
disparaging statement of defense counsel constituted fundamental error and warranted reversal of
the conviction); Izquierdo v. State, 724 So. 2d 124, 125 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1998) (vacating
and remanding because the prosecutor "referred to the defense as a 'pathetic fantasy' and
"improperly appealed to the jurors sympathy"); Freeman v. State, 717 So. 2d 105, 105-06 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing because prosecutor improperly bolstered credibility of police
officers); Boyer v. State, 713 So. 2d 1133, 1133-34 n.1 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1998) (reversing
because prosecutor "accus[ed] the defendant of suborning the perjury of a defense witness... [;]
personally express[ed] his belief that the defendant was guilty;... vouch[ed] for the credibility of
a state witness;... appeal[ed] to the jury's sympathy and emotions; and... call[ed] the
defendant and the defendant's witness liars"); Miller v. State, 712 So. 2d 451, 452-53 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing because prosecutor's closing argument ridiculed the defendant's
voluntary intoxication defense and misstated the law); Baker v. State, 705 So. 2d 139, 139 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing because prosecutor's comments implied that "defense counsel
was fishing for gullible jurors" was an improper comment and was not "an invited response to
defense counsel's proper closing argument").
2. See Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 422 (Fla. 1998); Campbell v. State, 679 So. 2d
720, 724 (Fla. 1996); Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992); Rhodes v. State,
547 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1989); Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 1988); Bertolotti v.
State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985).
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Attorney misconduct3 may occur during discovery,4 voir dire,5 or
6
examination of witnesses. However, this article will focus solely on miscon-
duct that occurs during closing arguments, discuss selected civil and criminal
cases decided by Florida courts in 1998 and 1999, and also address earlier
cases that are important to the issue.
II. THE LAWYER' S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CONDUCT DURING TRIAL
Come to law as a process, not with the sole purpose of winning
every cause, but instead with a strong dedication to the rule of law.
Make your client's case in the best way permitted by our law and
ethics, but with the civility and personal restraint that marks the
best of our profession. Return to the understanding that our pro-
fessional role is most concerned with the process and with the
belief that if we make the best case within the law and ethics, the
probability is that the right result will be reached. Come back to
law as a process.
Look upon your role as that of a teacher, who will lead the court
through the legal thicket. And then, just as Virgil left Dante, leave
all legal proceedings with an air of grace, with an indelible
perception of all that is good in legal advocacy. Leave your
audience with a lasting impression of your dedication, not to the
goal of victory above all else in the trial or hearing, but instead of
an abiding deference to the rule of law, to the canons and ethics of
professionalism, to the constraints and limits of circumstance and
3. Misconduct, "when applied to an act of [an] attorney, implies dishonest act or
attempt to persuade court or jury by use of deceptive or reprehensible methods." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIoNARY 901 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). Misconduct of counsel means "[tihe conduct
of counsel... which prevents the adverse party from having a fair trial, consisting in improper
remarks, comments, or arguments .... " BALLANr 's LAW DicroNARY (3d ed. 1969) available
in LEXIS, Reference Library, General File. Professional misconduct means "[c]onduct that tends
to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public."
BALLANTINE'S LAw DICIONARY (3d ed. 1969) available in LEXIS, Reference Library, General
File.
4. See McArthur v. State, 671 So. 2d 867, 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing
where the State provided inaccurate and misleading information concerning the test results of the
victim's clothing).
5. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Dewberry, 383 So. 2d 1109, 1109 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL
App. 1978) (reversing where insured's counsel made repeated references to the amount of policy
limits during voir dire).
6. See Boatwright v. State, 452 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fia. 4th Dist. CL App. 1984)
(reversing because the prosecutor asked a witness whether the prior witnesses had lied).
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the primary codes of human conduct. Do that and there is a chance
that we can erase the current low image of our profession and
restore ourselves once again in the minds of fairminded people
everywhere that ours is still the profession that gave the world a
Thomas Moore, an Abraham Lincoln, a Louis Brandeis, and [a]
Thurgood Marshall.7
The Florida Bar has 65,445 members who represent all lawyers licensed
to practice in Florida.8 One of the basic purposes of The Florida Bar is to
assure high standards of professionalism in the practice of law for the benefit
of the public.9 Rule 4-3.4(e) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conductl°
provides that: A lawyer shall not:
[I]n trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when
testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness
of a cause, the credibility of a witness, tht culpability of a civil
litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.'
Rule 4-3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly disobey an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on
an assertion that no valid obligation exists."'* Additionally, rule 4-3.5(a)
states that "[a] lawyer shall not seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective
juror, or other decision maker except as permitted by law or the rules of
court."'
13
All lawyers who are members of The Florida Bar, or otherwise
authorized to practice in any court of the State of Florida, must abide by the
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.14  Additionally, the McDade Amend-
ment,1s provides that "[a]n attorney for the Government 16 shall be subject to
7. Honorable Gary M. Farmer, Keynote Address at the Nova Law Review Annual
Banquet (Mar. 20, 1999), reprinted in Honorable Gary M. Farmer, Civility and Professionalism
in LegalAdvocacy, 23 NOVA L. REv. 809, 816-17 (1999).
8. Frequently Asked Questions (visited July 27, 1999) <http://www.flabar.org>.
9. Id.
10. The Rules of Professional Conduct are found in chapter four of the Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar.
11. FLA. R. PROF. CoNDucT 4-3.4(e).
12. Id. at R. 4-3.4(c).
13. Id. at R. 4-3.5(a).
14. Id. at preamble.
15. Codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B (West Supp. 1999).
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State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules governing attorneys in
each State where such attorney engages in that attorney's duties, to the same
extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State. ' 7 Thus,
federal prosecutors and public defenders must abide by the Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar even if he or she is not a member of The Florida Bar.
Ill. THE REQUIREMENT TO REPORT ETHICAL VIOLATIONS TO
THE FLORIDA BAR
Lawyers have an obligation to report ethical violations to The Florida
Bar.18 Rule 4-8.3(a) states that "[a] lawyer having knowledge that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate professional
authority."' 9
Judges also have a responsibility to act accordingly when confronted with
unethical conduct.2° The Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a] judge who
receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar should take
appropriate action."2' The Code pJudicial Conduct does not specify what the
term "appropriate action" means. The Fifth District Court of Appeal recently
stated that a trial judge, "in the case of lawyers who do not heed less severe
judicial efforts to correct such conduct... ,"2 should refer the matter to The
Florida Bar.
24
A complaint against a Florida lawyer for unethical conduct is a serious
matter. When an attorney makes an unethical improper argument during
closing argument, The Florida Bar can enforce its rules through its
16. An '"attorney for the Government' includes any attorney described in section 77.2(a)
of part 77 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations and also includes any independent
counsel, or employee of such a counsel, appointed under chapter 40." 28 U.S.C.A. § 530B(c).
17. l § 530B(a).
18. FLA. R. PROF. CoNDucr 4-8.3(a).
19. Id. at R. 4-8.3(a) (emphasis added).
20. MODELCODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D(2) (1998).
21. 1l
22. Id.
23. Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
24. See also Izquierdo v. State, 724 So. 2d 124, 125 n.1 (referring the prosecutor to The
Florida Bar where it was the third time the Third District Court of Appeal had been "forced to
deal with his indulgence in what is often euphemistically called 'overzealous advocacy,' but
[was] really just unprofessional and unethical behavior").
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disciplinary process. "Discipline... can range from an admonishment to
suspension from the practice of law for a definite or indefinite period of
time, or disbarment." 26  Negative consequences may arise even if the
conduct does not degenerate to the level of unethical conduct because
"[c]ourts are often critical of trial conduct even if they do not find that it
rises to the level of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct."27
Moreover, attorney misconduct often becomes the focus of adverse media
attention. 28
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 924.33 of the Florida Statutes provides that "[n]o judgment
shall be reversed unless the appellate court is of the opinion, after an
examination of all the appeal papers, that error was committed that
injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant. It shall not be
presumed that error injuriously affected the substantial rights of the
appellant." 29
Improper comments during closing arguments are subject to the
harmless error rule as provided in section 59.041 of the Florida Statute:
No judgment shall be set aside or reversed, or new trial granted
by any court of the state in any cause, civil or criminal, on the
ground of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or
rejection of evidence or for error as to any matter of pleading or
procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which application is
made, after an examination of the entire case it shall appear that the
25. Id. at 125.
26. Complaint Against A Florida Lawyer (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http:llwww.
flabar.org>.
27. Timothy P. Chinaris & Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Professional Responsibility: 1998
Survey of Florida Law, 23 NOVA L. REV. 162, 205 (1998). See also Copertino v. State, 726 So.
2d 330, 334 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1999)
(stating that the "prosecutor engaged in conduct throughout the trial suggesting too much a
personal interest in winning, rather than detached advocacy for the state"); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Sommers, 717 So. 2d 178, 178 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (describing plaintiffs' attorney as
lacking "verbal dexterity").
28. See Carol Marbin Miller, Appeals Court Urges Bar Discipline of Trash-Talking
Broward Prosecutor, DAILY Buspn;ss REvIEw, Feb. 25, 1999, at Al (outlining history of
Broward County prosecutor's inappropriate comments during trials); The Road to Hell is Paved
with Lawyer Jokes, CIy LuN, Feb. 24-Mar. 2, 1999, at 9 (discussing a Broward prosecutor's
"penchant" for making disparaging comments about opposing counsel during closing arguments).
29. FLA. STAT. § 924.33 (1999).
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error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This
section shall be liberally construed.3°
In State v. DiGuiio,31 the Supreme Court of Florida stated that the
harmless error test "places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the
error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. 3 2 The
Supreme Court of Florida has cautioned that the "harmless error analysis
must not become a device whereby the appellate court substitutes itself for
the jury, examines the permissible evidence, excludes the impermissible
evidence, and determines that the evidence of guilt is sufficient or even
overwhelming based on the permissible evidence. 33  In DiGuilio, the
Supreme Court of Florida pointed out that:
[o]verwhelming evidence of guilt does not negate the fact that an
error that constituted a substantial part of the prosecution's case
may have played a substantial part in the jury's deliberation and
thus contributed to the actual verdict reached, for the jury may have
reached its verdict because of the error without considering other
reasons untainted by error that would have supported the same
result.
34
Where the error is not constitutional in nature, section 924.051(7) of the
Florida Statutes governs and the burden will be upon the defendant to show
prejudice. 35
In a direct appeal or a collateral proceeding, the party challenging
the judgment or order of the trial court has the burden of
demonstrating that a prejudicial error 6 occurred in the trial court.
A conviction or sentence may not be reversed absent an express
finding that a prejudicial error occurred in the trial court. 37
30. FLA. STAT. § 59.041 (1999).
31. 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).
32. Id. at 1135 (articulating harmless error test established by quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
33. Id. at 1136.
34. Id (quoting People v. Ross, 429 P.2d 606,621 (1967) (Traynor, J. dissenting)).
35. FLA. STAT. § 924.051(7) (1999).
36. Prejudicial error is defined as "an error in the trial court that harmfully affected the
judgment or sentence." Md § 924.051(1)(a).
37. Id § 924.051(7).
Tobin
43
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
V. INVITED RESPONSE DOCTRINE
In United States v. Young, 38 the United States Supreme Court explained
the Invited Response Doctrine:
[D]efense counsel argues improperly, provoking the prosecutor to
respond in kind, and the trial judge takes no corrective action.
Clearly two improper arguments-two apparent wrongs--do not
make for a right result. Nevertheless, a criminal conviction is not
to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments
standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in
context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the
prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. To help
resolve this problem, courts have invoked what is sometimes called
the "invited response" or "invited reply" rule.
[T]he Court must consider the probable effect the prosecutor's
response would have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence
fairly. In this context, defense counsel's conduct, as well as the
nature of the prosecutor's response, is relevant.
[T]he reviewing court must not only weigh the impact of the
prosecutor's remarks, but must also take into account defense
counsel's opening salvo. Thus the import of the evaluation has
been that if the prosecutor's remarks were "invited," and did no
more than respond substantially in order to "right the scale," such
comments would not warrant reversing a conviction.
39
Florida courts have refused to reverse convictions where they found the
prosecutor was merely making a fair reply to the defendant's own closing
argument.4 0 It is important to note that a prosecutor must object to improper
comments by defense counsel at the time defense counsel makes them in
order for the trial judge to impose timely restrictions on defense counsel.4'
The Invited Response Doctrine "does not contemplate that a prosecutor will
38. 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
39. Id. at 11-13.
40. See Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1982); St. Jean v. State, 721 So. 2d 448
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Kent v. State, 702 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), review
denied 717 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1998); Meeks v. State, 667 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
41. Fryer v. State, 693 So. 2d 1046, 1051 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Sorondo, J.,
concurring specially).
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sit silently while defense counsel pursues an impermissible line of argument
so that he or she can then pursue his or her own impermissible and highly
prejudicial response."42
In Dix v. State,43 the defendant was charged and convicted of
aggravated battery by shooting the victim in the chest. 4 During opening
statement and closing argument, defense counsel argued the shooting was an
accident. 45 The defendant did not testify at trial, but an eyewitness testified
at trial about the shooting and about his conversation with the defendant
while they were both in jail.'4 During closing argument, the prosecutor
stated the eyewitness asked the defendant why he shot him, and the
defendant replied he had a beef with the victim and did not like him.47 The
prosecutor then argued the shooting was not an accident.48 Defense counsel
moved for a new trial and argued that the prosecutor commented on the
burden of proof and on the defendant's right to remain silent.49 The circuit
court granted the defendant's motion for new trial and the State appealed.
50
The Fifth District Court of Appeal said the State had a right and a duty
to respond to the explanation of the charges given by the defense because to
ignore the defense would give it credence.5 1 The court concluded the
prosecutor did not refer to the absence of any testimony by the defendant.52
The court found the prosecutor had merely commented on the defendant's
statement to the eyewitness and compared that statement to the accident
defense asserted by defense counsel.53 The Fifth District reversed the trial
court's order granting a new trial, and directed the trial court to enter a
judgment on the jury verdict and sentence. 54
42. Id.
43. 723 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
44. Id. at 352.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Dix, 723 So. 2d at 352.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Dix, 723 So. 2d at 352.
54. Id.
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VI. PRESERVING THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL
The law is clear that absent a contemporaneous objection improper
comments during closing argument are not cognizable on appeal. A timely
objection allows the trial court an opportunity to give a curative instruction
or admonish counsel. 56 "The only exception to this blanket procedural bar is
where the comment constitutes fundamental error. ' 57  Notably, Florida's
district courts of appeal are divided on the concept of fundamental error.58
In Pait v. State,59 the Supreme Court of Florida explained that some
unobjected-to comments may be so prejudicial that they warrant a new trial:
55. Wal-Mart Stores v. Gutierrez, 731 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999);
Gutierrez v. State, 731 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Kelly v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins., 720 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1998); King v. Byrd, 716 So. 2d 831,
836 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411,418 n.8 (Fla. 1998).
56. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (Fla. 1990).
57. Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 418 n.8 (Fla. 1998). See Street v. State, 636 So. 2d
1297 (Fla. 1994); Eichelkraut v. Kash N' Karry Food Stores, 644 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 474 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1985).
58. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Gutierrez, 731 So. 2d 151, 151-52 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (finding that unobjected-to comments "were not so prejudicial or inflammatory as to
constitute fundamental error"); Gutierrez v. State, 731 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App.
1999) (holding that an "improper comment on a defendant's right to remain silent is not
fundamental error which may be raised on appeal without an objection at trial'; Henderson v.
State, 727 So. 2d 284, 285-86 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1999) (holding that where the prosecutor
argued that the defendant "would not know the truth if it hit him up side the head," that an
acquittal would mean that the witnesses were "all a pack of liars," and that the defendant had
invented a "fairy tale" did not constitute fundamental error and the defendant waived review by
failing to object); Ross v. State, 726 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1998) (finding that
although the defense failed to object when the prosecutor called the defendant and defense
witnesses "pathetic," "insulting," "preposterous," "nonsense," and "bologna," the court found the
repeated comments constituted fundamental error); Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that where the prosecutor vouched for an officer's testimony, told
the jury to send a message, argued matters not in evidence, and commented on the defendant's
exercise of his right to a jury trial, the court found the comments did not constitute fundamental
error); Freeman v. State, 717 So. 2d 105, 105-06 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding where
the prosecutor's improper bolstering of a police officer's testimony and mention of an officer's
funeral in the newspaper together with other improper remarks rose to the level of fundamental
error); DeFreitas v. State, 701 So. 2d 593, 600-01 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1997) (holding
numerous acts of prosecutorial misconduct were of such a nature and character that the
cumulative and collective effect rose to the level of fundamental error); Knight v. State, 672 So.
2d 590, 590-91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that prosecutor's verbal attacks on
defense counsel, arguing facts not in evidence, and bolstering the credibility of a police officer's
testimony constituted fundamental error).
59. 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959).
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[W]hen an improper remark to the jury can be said to be so pre-
judicial to the rights of an accused that neither rebuke nor
retraction could eradicate its evil influence, then it may be con-
sidered as a ground for reversal despite the absence of an oblection
below, or even in the presence of a rebuke by the trial judge.
Once a proper objection has been made, objecting counsel must move
for a mistrial to preserve the issue for appeal . The motion for mistrial may
be made as late as the end of closing argument, thus avoiding interruption in
the continuity of the argument and allowing an opportunity to evaluate the
prejudicial nature of the objectionable remarks in the context of the entire
argument.62 However, where the objection is overruled, requiring a motion
for mistrial is purposeless because "[t]he objection itself calls the court's
attention to the error alleged to have prejudiced the party making the
objection and to the possibility that a mistrial may be in order."63
VII. CLOSING ARGUMENT
Closing argument is the trial attorney's final opportunity "to argue the
facts in evidence and/or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom." 6
However, this is not a license for an attorney to argue fiction.65  The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the purpose of closing
argument in United States v. Bailey.6 In Bailey, the court stated that "'[t]he
sole purpose of closing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing the
evidence."' 67  The court pointed out that "[w]hile a prosecutor may not
exceed the evidence in closing argument, he may state conclusions drawn
from the evidence." 68  The court continued and said that "[a]lthough a
prosecutor may not make an argument directed to passions or prejudices of
the jurors instead of an understanding of the facts and law, there is no
prohibition on 'colorful and perhaps flamboyant' remarks if they relate to the
evidence adduced at trial."69
60. Id. at 385.
61. Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284,288 n.3 (Fla. 1990).
62. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1340-41 (Fla. 1990).
63. Holton, 573 So. 2d at 288.
64. Willis v. State, 669 So. 2d 1090, 1094 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
65. Dunsizer v. State, No. 97-03068, 1999 WL 94970, at *2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. Feb.
26, 1999) (Casanueva, J., concurring).
66. 123 F.3d 1381 (llthCir. 1997).
67. Id. at 1400 (quoting United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524,1529 (1lth Cir. 1990)).
68. Id. (internal citations omitted).
69. Id. (internal citations omitted).
1999]
47
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
In Bertolotti v. State," the Supreme Court of Florida described thepurpose of the closing argument:
The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence
and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from the evidence. Conversely, it must not be used to inflame the
minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an
emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the
logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.
71
A. Civil Cases
1. Expressing Personal Opinion vs. Confining Argument
to the Evidence Presented
In Simmons v. Swinton,72 the passenger and driver of a rear-ended motor
vehicle sued the driver of the other vehicle.73 The trial court granted a new
trial based on improper statements by the defense counsel during closing
argument, that the trial court concluded constituted fundamental error.
During closing argument, the defense attorney argued the plaintiff's treatinx
physician had an ulterior motive in blaming her injuries on the accident.
The defendant's attorney argued the plaintiff's injuries were actually caused
by falls resulting from medication prescribed by the treating physician.76 On
appeal, plaintiff's counsel argued the comments were egregious but
"admitted that he did not object to the closing in order to preserve the error
for appellate review.
' 77
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that defense counsel's
arguments were proper because "the attorney confined closing argument to
the evidence presented and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from
70. 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985).
71. Id. at 134. See Robinson v. State, 610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Mann v. State, 603
So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1992); Jackson v. State, 522 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1988); Cochran v. State, 711 So.
2d 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Williams v. State, 689 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Hightower v. State, 592 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Gersten, J., dissenting);
Rosso v. State, 505 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
72. 715 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied 727 So. 2d 911 (Fla.
1999).
73. Id. at 371.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 373.
76. Id.
77. Simmons, 715 So. 2d at 373.
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the evidence."78 The appellate court noted that opposing counsel should
make an objection at the time the offensive comment is made to "allow the
trial court to correct the offending counsel's behavior."79 The Fifth District
reversed and instructed the trial court to reinstate the verdict.80
2. Community Conscience Arguments
In Kiwanis Club of Little Havana, Inc. v. Kalafe," Kalafe, a Brazilian-
born singer and composer, sued Kiwanis Club and its representative for
tortious interference with a contract and defamation.82  The trial court
83
entered a final judgment in favor of Kalafe, and Kiwanis Club appealed.
During closing argument, Kalafe's counsel stated "[w]hat if in the past
somebody was a Democrat or Brazilian, where do you draw the line? Use
reason. Look at the evidence and realize this type of politics is uncalled for
and shouldn't be used." 4 Kalafe's counsel also argued that "Eighth Street
belongs to all of us. It is not their home and your verdict should reflect how
you feel about this conduct.,8 5 Kalafe's counsel further argued that "people
of Cuba[] ... haven't been too lucky with politics .... The last thing in the
world is that we should bring the type of politics here that causes the
problems to begin with .... ,86
The Third District Court of Appeal addressed the impropriety of
Kalafe's counsel's remarks and stated "Florida courts have consistently
rejected arguments that are nothing more than 'impassioned and prejudicial
pleas intended to evoke a sense of community law through common duty and
expectation.', 8 7 The Third District characterized the comments as an imper-
missible reference to community conscience and noted the comments in the
case "stray[ed] dangerously close to constituting reversible error.' 88 The
judgment was reversed on other grounds.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 373-74.
80. Id. at 374.
81. 723 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. C App. 1998).
82. Id. at 840.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 842 n.5.
85. Id.
86. Kiwanis Club, 723 So. 2d at 842 n.5.
87. Id. at 842 (quoting Norman v. Gloria Farms, Inc., 668 So. 2d 1016, 1021 (Fla. 4th
Dist. C App. 1996)).
88. Id.
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3. Expressing Personal Opinion and Bolstering Credibility
Davis v. South Florida Water Management District9 was a
condemnation proceeding that involved a large tract of land in Palm Beach
County taken for Everglades restoration purposes. 90 The landowner present-
ed expert testimony that the fair market value of the land was eighteen
million dollars.91 The water district ex1pert testified that the fair market value
of the land was ten million dollars. The landowner appealed the final
judgment of the trial court and asserted that the water district's counsel
placed "his own credibility into the argument, offered his personal opinion to
the jury, and suggested that the jurors would ultimately pay for the verdict as
taxpayers. 93 During closing argument, the landowner's counsel argued the
"full bucket" compensation theory:
Full compensation is your goal, as the constitution requires. It's
kind of like a bucket of water. A bucket of water you fill to the
brim, and you know if it spills over and you know when it's less.
And what we want here is for the bucket to be full. And by full I
simply mean, please find from the evidence, not from the
hypothetical argumentation, but from actual sales in the
marketplace, what this property would bring to these owners if it
weren't taken as of February 7, 1996.94
The water district's counsel then argued:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it's easy to make an appeal that
the property owner ought to receive a full bucket. And as a lawyer
and an officer of the court, and an attorney who is proud to
represent South Florida Water Management District and other
condemning authorities and private property owners, I will tell you
that $18 million overflows that bucket by $8 million because
they're asking you to pay, they're asking you to consider the value
of this property with elements of risk, and elements that aren't there
and may never be there.
95
89. 715 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
90. Id. at 997.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 998.
94. Davis, 715 So. 2d at 998.
95. Id.
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Davis' counsel objected and moved for a mistrial arguing the comment
"suggested that the jurors would pay an inflated amount in their role as
taxpayers. '96 The trial court reserved the ruling and allowed the district's
counsel to remedy that suggestion.9 The water district's counsel then stated:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it's very clear that none of you
have to pay anything, and when I said you, I meant you in the role
of a willing buyer would have to pay. I understand that none of
you are the buyers. This hypothetical buyer would have to pay that
amount of money, and that would overflow, that would reduce the
compensation using Mr. Brigham's analogy, more than overflow
the barrel, the bucket, by almost $8 million or $9 million.98
The Fourth District Court of Appeal said it would be patently improper
to suggest a jury consider that the jury award would come out of their
pockets as taxpayers. 99 However, the Fourth District continued and said that
"[a]lthough the 'asking you to pay' comment could be construed as
reminding the jurors that they are taxpayers, here it does not rise to the level
of reversible error."'1  The district court found the statement was in
response to Davis' prior "characterization that the jurors had to fill the
'bucket' of full compensation" and was not prejudicial considering the
clarification.01 The Fourth District noted that using the phrase "award"
would have been more prudent than using the phrase "to pay.'' °
Although the Fourth District affirmed the judgment, it recognized that
the water district's counsel's statement that as an "officer of the court" and
an attorney for a state agency was an improper attempt to bolster his own
credibility. 03 The court found those statements "particularly offensive."' 4
However, the Fourth District affirmed because opposing counsel had failed
to object at trial and the remarks did not constitute fundamental error.105
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Davis, 715 So. 2d at 999.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Davis, 715 So. 2d at 999.
105. Id.
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4. Violating an Order in Limine
In Leyva v. Samess,'°6 Mr. Leyva sustained personal injuries when he
was involved in a collision with a vehicle operated by Daniel Samess and
owned by his parents, Dr. Ronald Samess and Mrs. Claudette SamessY°7 The
trial court granted defense counsel's motion in limine in part and prohibited
Leyva's counsel from referencing during closing argument that the owner of
the vehicle was a doctor.108 However, the trial court allowed the use of the
"doctor" reference during voir dire so that Leyva's counsel could determine
if any of the jurors had been treated by Dr. Samess.1 9
During closing argument, Leyva's counsel said "I would like to explain
to you, Dr. and Mrs. Samess are a party to this lawsuit... owners of a
vehicle are responsible for any negligence on the part of their driver if the
driver is driving their car with their knowledge and consent."110 Plaintiff's
counsel then stated "the Defendants have admitted that Dr. and Mrs. Samess
own the vehicle." ''1 Defense counsel objected to the violation of the motion
in limine, and the trial court sustained the objection.1 12 The defense moved
for a new trial, and the trial court reserved ruling on the motion for new
trial.' The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for $119,400,
reduced by the twenty percent for comparative negligence. 1
14
The trial court then granted the motion for new trial having determined
that "one party's 'egregious' violation of an order in limine entitled the other
party to a new trial."1  The trial court found that plaintiff's counsel "had
violated the [pretrial] order by referring to Ronald Samess as a doctor."'
1 6
The trial court incorrectly determined "where an order granting a pretrial
motion in limine has been established, a subsequent egregious violation of
that order by one party entitles the other party to a new trial."
17
The Fourth District Court of Appeal found the trial court abused its
discretion when it granted the new trial because it used an incorrect standard
of review when it reviewed the comments made in closing argument.1 8 The
106. 732 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
107. Id. at 1119.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1119-20.
111. Leyva, 732 So. 2d at 1120.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Leyva, 732 So. 2d at 1120.
117. Id. at 1121.
118. Id. at 1121-22.
[Vol. 24:35
52
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
1999]
Fourth District Court of Appeal stated that "[n]ot every violation of a pretrial
order in limine should automatically result in a new trial." 9 The Fourth
District followed the "principle that in order to grant a new trial for improper
comments in closing argument, the trial court must find that the argument
was 'highly prejudicial and inflammatory." ' 12 Durin voir dire, the jury had
already learned that Ronald Samess was a doctor." Although plaintiff's
comments violated the pretrial order, the Fourth District found that the brief
references to the fact that the owner of the defendant vehicle was a doctor
was not so "highly prejudicial or inflammatory" as to require a new trial.122
5. Invoking Sympathy to Inflate the Recovery of Damages
In Knoizen v. Bruegger,'2 Ms. Bruegger suffered severe and debilitat-
ing injuries when her motorcycle collided head-on with an automobile. 124
Ms. Bruegger's injuries included five major pelvic fractures, vaginal
lacerations, a broken femur, and an open wrist fracture. Additionally, she
lost physical support for her bladder and suffered a prolapsed bladder and
uterus.
During closing argument, Ms. Bruegger's attorney argued that the
injuries were the "most devastating injury a woman can suffer' 26 and the
injuries were devastating to her family and children. 127 He argued that the
jury should not leave Ms. Bruegger alone to deal with the injuries she
suffered. 28 Bruegger's attorney said "[d]on't leave her bare and naked, like
this accident has already left her, and her children and her family. Don't
leave hdr like that." Knozien's counsel objected and argued that the
remarks were improper attempts to invoke jury sympathy and an attempt to
inflame the passions of the jury.3 0 The trial court overruled Knozien's
objection.13'
119. Id. at 1121.
120. Id. (quoting Grushoff v. Denny's, Inc., 693 So. 2d 1068, 1069 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. (1997)).
121. Leyva,732So.2dat 1122.
122. Id
123. 713 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
124. Id. at 1071.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1072.
127. Id.
128. Knoizen, 713 So. 2d at 1072.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal found that testimony that the
accident had a devastating effect upon Ms. Bruegger and her family
supported the closing argument.132 The court found the closing argument
was only "marginally objectionable."'' 33 The court noted that "[a]ttorneys
are given broad latitude during closing, but they must confine their argument
to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions
from the facts and evidence."' 34 The Fifth District also found that the
appellant failed to establish the argument was so "'pervasive, inflammatory,
and prejudicial to preclude the jury's rational consideration of the case.' ' 135
6. The Fourth District Court of Appeal Explains the Requirement for a
Contemporaneous Objection
In Murphy v. International Robotics Systems, Inc.,131 Judge Klein
explained why the Fourth District Court of Appeal did not agree with other
district courts when they reverse cases because of improper, but unobjected-
to, closing argument of counsel. 137 The court stated that its explanation was
made "in the hopes that a litigant considering an appeal to this court, whose
best hope for reversal is unobjected-to argument of counsel, will carefully
consider whether it is worth the cost.
138
In Murphy, defense counsel accused one of the plaintiffs "of wanting to
cash in a lottery ticket in this litigation and suggest[ed] that if the jurors
awarded appellant damages based on a phony consultancy agreement they
would be accessories, after the fact, to tax fraud."' 39 At oral argument, the
court asked why plaintiffs' counsel did not object. 4° Plaintiffs' counsel
responded that it was "his practice not to object because the jury might hold
it against his client."'
4
'
The court stated "improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument in a
civil case is [not] something which is so fundamental that there should be an
132. Id.
133. Knoizen, 713 So. 2d at 1072.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Fla., N.A., 666 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)).
136. 710 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 722 So. 2d 193 (Fla.
1998).
137. Id. at 587 n.1.
138. Id. at 588.
139. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
140. Id.
141. Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 588.
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exception to the rule requiring an objection." 142 The Fourth District relied
upon the Supreme Court of Florida's explanation in Castor v. State:
The requirement of a contemporaneous objection is based on
practical necessity and basic fairness in the operation of a judicial
system. It places the trial judge on notice that error may have been
committed, and provides him an opportunity to correct it at early
state of the proceedings. Delay and an unnecessary use of the
appellate process result from a failure to cure early that which must
be cured eventually.
143
The Fourth District Court of Appeal pointed out that the contempor-
aneous objection rule requires that an objection be made at the time of the
remarks.144 "If the [trial] court sustains the objection, there must be a motion
for mistrial in order to preserve the issue on appeal." 45 However, "the
motion for mistrial can be made later, at the close of argument in order to
give counsel time to think about whether to seek a mistrial."' 4  The court
noted that the last time the Supreme Court of Florida reversed for a new trial
based on unobjected-to closing argument was in 1956.'47 Further, the court
noted that the last time the Supreme Court of Florida considered the issue in
a civil case was in 1961. 48
The Fourth District then stated, "[tihere is an exception to the
contemporaneous objection rule, for errors which are deemed fundamental
and which can thus be raised for the first time on appeal."1 49 The Supreme
Court of Florida has defined fundamental error as "'error which goes to the
foundation of the case, or goes to the merits of the cause of action,' which
appellate courts should apply 'very guardedly.
'
"
150
The Fourth District stated that its refusal to allow improper, unobjected-
to closing argument of counsel to be raised for the first time on appeal was
consistent with the supreme court.151 The court noted that improper
argument is a nationwide problem: "no other courts in this country allow
improper argument to be raised for the first time on appeal in civil cases,"152
142. Id. at 589.
143. Id. (quoting Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1978)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 589.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 590.
150. Id. (quoting Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970)).
151. Murphy, 710 So. 2d at 591.
152. Id.
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and "few courts have even addressed the issue of whether it could be raised
for the first time on appeal." 153 Following the Fourth District's opinion, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal and the Third District Court of Appeal have
followed the contemporaneous objection rule.1 54
B. Criminal Cases
1. Foul Blows vs. Hard Blows
In Berger v. United States, 55 Justice Sutherland delivered an opinion
condemning improper argument:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 56
153. Id.
154. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 731 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(citing Gaines v. Amerisure, Ins. Co., 701 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997))
(stating that "a review of the record shows that defense counsel failed to object to the majority of
the allegedly improper comments, thereby not preserving them for appellate review"); Fravel v.
Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (noting "[t]his ruling will remand
[sic] lawyers to raise timely objections when confronted with improper argument and create
predictability with regard to the future disposition of similar cases by this court"); Kelly v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 720 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that although
some comments made during State Farm's closing argument "were indeed improper, no
contemporaneous objections were made, and we do not find the comments as a whole constitute
fundamental error").
155. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
156. Id. at 88; see also Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1998); Craig v. State,
685 So. 2d 1224, 1229 (Fla. 1996); Miller v. State, 712 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1998); Cochran v. State, 711 So. 2d 1159, 1163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); DeFreitas v. State,
701 So. 2d 593, 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Hampton v. State, 680 So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Lozano, 616 So. 2d 73, 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Rosso
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2. Community Conscience Arguments
In Del Rio v. State,157 the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree
murder, attempted second degree murder with a firearm, attempted first
degree murder with a firearm, and burglary of an occupied dwelling with an
assault and with a firearm. 15  The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed
Del Rio's conviction and sentence because the trial court provided curative
instructions, and overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt was
presented at trial.159 However, the court wrote its opinion specifically to
address the prosecutor's improper comments during closing argument.'6
During closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the city as a place
where "death is cheap."'16 He also commented on the jurors' personal stake
in the matter when he said "[t]he law protects all of us or the law protects
none of us.' 62 The prosecutor further stated that "[i]n the south, we saw it
when it happened to blacks. In Germany we saw it when it happened to the
Jews.' 63 The Third District repeated that "counsel should avoid impassion-
ed and prejudicial arguments which impermissibly appeal to the jury's
'community conscience' or sense of 'civic responsibility."' 164 The court
strongly disapproved of the yrosecutor's conduct in the case and sent the
opinion to The Florida 
Bar..i
3. Leading the Jury to Believe the Defendant Has the
Burden of Proving His Innocence
In Thomas v. State,166 the jury found the defendant guilty of tampering
with evidence. 167 The defendant was a passenger in an automobile driven by
v. State, 505 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Clausell v. State, 455 So. 2d 1050,
1054 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), panel decision approved, en banc decision quashed, 474 So.
2d 1189 (Fla. 1985); Boatwright v. State, 452 So. 2d 666, 667-68 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Harden v. State, 303 So. 2d 679, 680 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1974); Rolle v. State, 268 So. 2d
541, 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1972); Marsh v. State, 202 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1967).
157. 732 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1999).
158. Id. at 1100.
159. Id. at 1102.
160. Id. at 1101.
161. Id.
162. Del Rio, 732 So. 2d at 1101.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1102 n.1.
166. 726 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
167. Id. at 369.
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his girlfriend. 168 The police stopped the car in the middle of the road with its
lights off and engine running.169" The only defense witness at trial was the
defendant's girlfriend. 17 She testified at trial that she and Thomas were in
the area to take a busboy with whom she worked home.
171
The defendant's appeal centered upon the prosecutor's remark during
the rebuttal portion of her closing argument when she said "[t]hey told you
that she had gone there into this unknown neighborhood to drop off a
busboy. Where is this busboy today? I don't know."'172 Defense counsel
objected and moved for a mistrial. 3 The trial court immediately gave a
curative instruction and later denied the motion for mistrial.' 74
Commenting on the defendant's failure to call a witness may be cause
for reversal because such comments may lead a jury to believe the defendant
has the burden of proving his innocence. 175 Although the Fourth District
Court of Appeal has frequently taken a strong position against such
comments, there are exceptions to the rule. 176 However, these exceptions are
limited to circumstances in which defense counsel "opens the door" and
thus, allows the prosecutor to comment in rebuttal.'7 The Supreme Court of
Florida has stated:
[TI]his Court has applied a narrow exception to allow comment
when the defendant voluntarily assumes some burden of proof by
asserting the defenses of alibi, self-defense, and defense of others,
relying on facts that could be elicited only from a witness who is
not equally available to the state. A witness is not equally available
when there is a special relationship between the defendant and the
witness.
178
The Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded the phantom busboy in
Thomas did not have a special relationship with the defendant. 179 Further,
the court concluded that "[a]lthough the defense raised the subject of the
busboy and placed in issue its explanation for the otherwise suspicious
168. Id. at 369.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 370.
171. Thomas, 726 So. 2d at 370.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Thomas, 726 So. 2d at 370.
177. Id.
178. Ial at 371 (quoting Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 1991)).
179. Id. at 371.
[Vol. 24:35
58
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Tobin
circumstances leading up to the incident," the prosecutor's comment was
impermissible. °80 However, the court held that because the trial court
immediately gave a curative instruction, the prosecutor's impermissible
comment did not warrant reversal.' 8 '
4. Personal Attacks on the Defendant
In Copertino v. State, the defendant was convicted of five counts of
manslaughter by culpable negligence and six counts of culpable
negligence.1 83 He appealed on numerous grounds, including prosecutorial
misconduct. 84 During closing ar.ment, the prosecutor characterized the
defendant as "young Mr. Hitler." The court addressed the prosecutor's
remark and stated:
We understand the human tendency to identify with the victims of
such senseless conduct and their families, as in this case where so
many young people died. Prosecutors must nevertheless steel
themselves against such emotions and direct their energies to
presenting the state's case within the law. They are not given the
right to voice the same emotions understandably expressed by the
families of the victims.
186
The court then noted that the prosecutor's trial conduct suggested a
personal interest in winning, rather than detached advocacy for the State.'
87
Although the Fourth District Court of Appeal found the remark was
improper, it held that "[t]he state's evidehce in this case is so compelling that
the jury returned the only verdict possible."' 88189
In Gore v. State, the defendant had been found guilty of first degree
murder and armed robbery and was sentenced to death by the trial court after
a unanimous jury recommendation. 9° During closing argument of the guilt
phase, the prosecutor referred to the defendant and said:
180. Id. at371-72.
181. Thomas, 726 So. 2d at 372.
182. 726 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999), review denied, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla.
1999).
183. Id. at 332.
184. Id.
185. Id. at334.
186. Id.
187. Coppertino, 726 So. 2d at 334 n.2.
188. Id. at 334.
189. 719 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1998).
190. Id. at 1198.
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You know, Ladies and Gentlemen, there's a lot of rules and
procedures that I have to follow in court, and there's a lot of things
I can say or can't say, but there's one thing the Judge can't ever
make me say and that is he can never make me say that's a human
being.1
91
The Supreme Court of Florida stated that "engag[ing] in vituperative or
pejorative characterizations of a defendant or witness" is clearly improper
for the prosecutor.1 92 Because of the collective effect of the prosecutor's
improper questioning of the defendant during cross-examination and the
improper closing argument the supreme court reversed the case and
remanded it for a new trial. 19 The supreme court noted that the prosecutor's
'over zealousness in prosecuting the State's cause worked against justice,
rather than for it."'
1 94
5. Commenting on Defendant's Right to Remain Silent
In State v. Hoggins,195 the defendant was convicted of attempted first
degree murder with a firearm, armed robbery, aggravated assault with a fire-
arm, and resisting arrest without violence.1 9 The defendant based his appeal
in part on the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument. 197 During
closing argument, the prosecutor argued the defendant did not tell his
version of events to the police on the night he was arrested:
Now, when Mr. Hoggins gives his story-When you remember
the story that he gave the other day, remember one thing, that the
police arrived at that apartment to conduct a search. It was then
that they found him hiding in the upstairs bedroom in the apartment
of his girlfriend. Remember, he doesn't tell them that story at that
time.
Now, when they bring him downstairs and have him confronted
face to face with the victim, who is so outraged.... saying "You
tried to kill me," and that victim when confronted with him tries to
191. Id. at 1201.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1202-03.
194. Gore, 719 So. 2d at 1203 (quoting Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084, 1091 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
195. 718 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1998).
196. Id. at 764.
197. Id. at 762.
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go after this man, he never mentioned his story. [Objection
overruled].
Mr. Hoggins did not give them that story. Ronnie Hoggins,
never did at that point say anything like, "Man, I didn't try to shoot
you. I didn't rob your store. I just found that money and stuff and
picked it all up and ran into the apartment."
198
During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized that the
defendant had failed to come forward with an exculpatory explanation prior
to trial:
Not once does this Defendant give the police the count [sic] that he
came up with when he took the witness stand today. He gave this
statement under oath, but never anytime previous to today did he
ever say this story to the police about how he came across this
money and stuff.... Having been advised of his constitutional
right he never mentioned one time this story he has said here
today.
199
No objection was made to the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument.200 On
appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and held that the
prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's custodial, pre-Miranda
silence and violated the due process guarantees of article I, section 9 of the
Florida Constitution. 201  The Fourth District recognized a conflict and
certified a question to the Supreme Court of Florida.202 The Supreme Court
of Florida rephrased the question:
DOES FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 9,
PREVENT THE IMPEACHMENT OF A TESTIFYING
DEFENDANT WITH THE DEFENDANT'S SILENCE
MAINTAINED AT THE TIME OF ARREST BUT PRIOR TO
THE RECEIPT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS?
203
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the affin-mative
and explained how Florida courts differ from the United States Supreme
Court on the right to remain silent:
198. Id. at 764.
199. Id.
200. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d at 764 n.3.
201. Id at 764.
202. Id.
203. Id at 762 (emphasis in original).
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Florida courts reach a different conclusion than does the United
States Supreme Court on the issue of postarrest, pre-Miranda
silence for two reasons. First, unlike the United States Supreme
Court, Florida courts have recognized that the defendant does not
waive his or her right to silence at the time of arrest by taking the
stand in his or her own defense. Regardless of whether evidence of
post arrest silence is introduced in the state's case-in-chief or for
impeachment purposes, the same test applies. If the comment is
fairly susceptible of being construed by the jury as a comment on
the defendant's exercise of his or her right to remain silent, it
violates the defendant's right to silence.
2 4
The Supreme Court of Florida held "[t]he comments at issue... were
fairly susceptible of being interpreted as comments on Hoggins' silence and
therefore clearly violated his right to remain silent." 5
6. Personal Attacks on Defense Counsel
Florida courts do not condone personal attacks on defense counsel
because they are an improper trial tactic that can poison the minds of the
jury.220
In Del Rio v. State,m the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder with a firearm, attempted second degree murder with a firearm,
attempted first degree murder with a firearm and burglary of an occupied
dwelling with an assault and with a firearm.2°8 The Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentence but wrote an opinion
specifically to address the improper comments made by the prosecutor.
2W
204. kIL at 769.
205. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d at 769.
206. See Cochran v. State, 711 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Landry v.
State, 620 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Ryan v. State, 457 So. 2d 1084,
1089 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1984); McGee v. State, 435 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Westley v. State, 416 So.
2d 18 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Melton v. State, 402 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Hufham v. State, 400 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Simpson v. State, 352 So.
2d 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1977); Thompson v. State, 318 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App.
1975); Cochran v. State, 280 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
207. 732 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
208. Id.at 1101.
209. Id. (the prosecutor denigrated the city as a place where "death is cheap" and
commented upon his own and the jurors' personal stake in the case when he said "thie law
protects all of us or the law protects none of us and how [i]n the south, we saw it when it
happened to blacks. In Germany we saw it when it happened to the Jews.").
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During closing argument, the prosecutor attacked the integrity of defense
counsel when he referred to defense counsel and said "[s]ee this man here
who claims to be a lawyer in good standing in Miami, Florida and that is the
same guy who is going to get up when I sit down and try to tell you what the
evidence showed."21 The Third District Court of Appeal stated that it "will
not condone inflammatory and prejudicial remarks attacking the integrity of
opposing counsel. 21' The Third District cautioned the prosecution about
improper comments and sent a copy of its opinion to The Florida Bar for
investigation.212
In Barnes v. State,213 defense counsel argued there was a lack of
214
objective evidence linking the defendant to the crime. Defense counsel
told the jury a guilty verdict would have to rest on eyewitness identification
and the testimony of the defendant's former defense counsel hadand he estiony215
compromised the identification. In response, the prosecutor characterized
the former defense counsel's testimony as "the mercenary actions of... a
hired gun, hired by the-. 216 Defense counsel objected and requested the
prosecutor's remark be stricken.217 The trial judge instructed the jury to
ignore that last comment.218 Ignoring the judge, the prosecutor immediately
continued his argument and said "-who was hired to go over there and
defend this guy.,,219 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and held
that the prosecutor's argument was highly improper and affected the jury's
deliberations "in spite of a sustained objection and the curative
instruction.
''
=
The Fourth District was troubled by the way the trial judge granted the
motion to strike and was concerned about the insufficiency of the curative
instruction. 221 The court said the trial judge's statement, "[i]gnore the last
210. Id. at 1102.
211. Id. See also Owens Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Morse, 653 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fa.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (referring to opposing counsel as "a master of trickery"); Sun
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Fields, 568 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (commenting that
opposing counsel lied and committed a fraud upon the court and jury); Jackson v. State, 421 So.
2d 15, 16 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (referring to opposing counsel as a "cheap shot
artist").
212. Del Rio, 732 So. 2d at 1102 n.1.
213. 743 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
214. Id. at 1106.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Barnes, 743 So. 2d at 1106.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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comment" was ambiguous and vaporous. 22 The court stated "[w]hen a
judge grants a motion to strike . . it is important that the fact of granting the
motion be made unmistakably clear to the jury." 3 The court continued by
adding that it is "very important that the precise comment to be stricken be
identified in a way that will leave no room for doubt about what the jury
must ignore." 224 The court explained the proper method for handling this
type of objection:
When it is made to appear that a prosecuting officer has
overstepped the bounds of that propriety and fairness which should
characterize the conduct of a state's counsel in the prosecution of a
criminal case, or where a prosecuting attorney's argument to the
jury is undignified and intemperate, and contains aspersions,
improper insinuations, and assertions of matters not in evidence, or
consists of an appeal to prejudice or sympathy calculated to unduly
influence a trial jury, the trial judge should not only sustain an
objection at the time to such improper conduct when objection is
offered, but should so affirmatively rebuke the offending prosecut-
ing officer as to impress upon the jury the gross impropriety of
being influenced by improper arguments.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal then directed its attention to
attorney professionalism.226 The court observed that the prosecutor's prior
misconduct required a new trial in four other cases.2 7  Because the
prosecutor had persisted in improper conduct, the court called for sanctions
when it referred the matter to The Florida Bar and stated: "[w]ith the fourth
rebuke of prosecutor Milian by this court, we hope that the disciplinary
organs of The Florida Bar will finally bring their compelling powers to bear
on this lawyer who either refuses or is unable to limit his trial tactics to that
which are ethical and proper. ' 2
28
222. Id. at 1107.
223. Barnes, 743 So. 2d at 1107.
224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting Deas v. State, 161 So. 729, 731 (Fla. 1935)) (emphasis in original).
226. Id. at 1108.
227. Id.; See Cochran v. State, 711 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Knight v.
State, 672 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Klepak v. State, 622 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Landry v. State, 620 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
228. Barnes, 743 So. 2d at 1109.
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7. Disclosing the Length of the Sentence
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a) provides that "[t]he
presiding judge shall charge the jury only on the law of the case at the
conclusion of argument of counsel. Except in capital cases, the judge shall
not instruct the jury on the sentence that may be imposed for the offense for
which the accused is on trial."2 9  The Supreme Court of Florida has
construed this rule literally: "[T]he jury need only be instructed as to the
possible penalty when it is faced with the choice of recommending either the
death penalty or life imprisonment. As to offenses in which the jury plays
no role in sentencing, the jury will not be advised of the possible
penalties."230 Thus, neither the defense nor the prosecutor is permitted to
disclose the length of the sentence for the crime charged or for any lesser
included offenses.
In Legette v. State,231 the defendant was charged with second degree
murder, and the jury found him guilty of manslaughter. The trial court
informed counsel it would instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of
manslaughter, battery, and improper exhibition of a weapon.2 33 During closing
argument, the prosecutor told the jury that battery was a misdemeanor.2 3 4 The
defense objected and moved for a mistrial, which was overruled by the trial
court. 23 5
The court stated that allowing a prosecutor to "inject the length of
sentence into closing argument [was] contrary to the policy behind the 1984
amendment to rule 3.390(a), that the jury should decide a case in accordance
with the law and the evidence and disregard the consequences of its verdict." 36
However, the court found that the reference to the misdemeanor was not
prejudicial pursuant to section 924.051(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.37
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but wrote an
opinion discussing the prosecutor's closing argument.23' The Fourth District
said "[t]he reference to a misdemeanor suggested to the jury that the sentence
for battery was relatively minor when compared to second degree murder and
229. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.390(a).
230. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1345 (Fla. 1990).
231. 718 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
232. Id. at 878.
233. Id. at 880.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Legette, 718 So. 2d at 881.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 878-79.
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manslaughter." 39 The court discussed the reasons for the 1985 amendment to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a). 240 Before 1985, the jury was
allowed to consider the issue of sentence length.241 The Fourth District found
two reasons for the amendment: "to 'minimize the potential for jury sympathy
based on the defendant's possible sentence' [and] to harness the jury's exercise
of its pardon power.,
242
8. Bolstering the Credibility of Police Officers
In Freeman v. State,243 the defendant was convicted of carrying a
concealed firearm and sentenced to two years of probation.244 At trial, the
testimony of the State's witnesses was in direct conflict with the defense
witnesses' testimony concerning whether the firearm discovered in the
defendant's automobile was concealed from the police officers.245 Duringclosing argument, the prosecutor stated:
... So that's the question. Who do you want to believe here? Do
you want to believe the officers or do you want to believe Mr.
Freeman?
Ladies and gentlemen, I'm here to tell you that you should believe
the officers. Why should you believe the officers? Simply because
they're police officers, because they're sworn to uphold the law,
because they're trained observers, because they have no reason to
lie."'6
The court reasoned that because the credibility of the State's witnesses
was crucial in determining the factual dispute about concealment of the
weapon, the prosecutor's argument was clearly improper and was not247
harmless error. The prosecutor later referred to facts not in evidence andthe defense objected. Although the defense had made no objection to the
239. Id. at 880.
240. Id.
241. Legette, 718 So. 2d at 880.
242. Id. (quoting Limose v. State, 656 So. 2d 947, 949 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
243. 717 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
244. Id. at 105.
245. Id. at 106.
246. Id. at 105.
247. Id. at 105-06.
248. Freeman, 717 So. 2d at 106.
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first offending argument,249 the court found the prosecutor's collective
comments were "so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial."' 0
In Sinclair v. State,2 51 the defendant was convicted of attempted first-
degree murder, robbery, and armed burglary. 2  Although the Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence, it wrote
an opinion to admonish the prosecutor's improper comment on the veracity
of a detective who testified . The prosecutor stated, "Detective Shotwell,
you have to determine if he is the kind of detective you want to believe or
not. Do you [sic] want to put his career on the line and for whatever
motivations as lead-."' 54 The defense objected and the trial court gave a
curative instruction.25 The Fourth District stated that it has "repeatedly
condemned comments that the jury should believe a police officer because
the officer would not put his or her career on the line by committing
perjury." 6 The court then explained why this type of argument is patently
improper:
First, although such comments may not in some instances constitute
an affirmative statement of the prosecutor's personal belief in the
veracity of the police officer, they do constitute an inappropriate
attempt to persuade the jury that the police officer's testimony
should be believed simply because the witness is a police officer.
Second, such comments make reference to matters outside the
record and constituted [sic] impermissible bolstering of the police
officer's testimony. 7
The Fourth District concluded that because the trial court sustained the
objection and gave a curative instruction, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied the motion for mistrial based upon the improper
comment.5 8
249. Id. at 105.
250. Id. at 106.
251. 717 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
252. Id. at 100.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Sinclair, 77 So. 2d at 100.
257. I& (quoting Cisneros v. State, 678 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
258. Id. at 101.
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9. Bolstering the Credibility of the Victim
In Lewis v. State,259 the defendant was found guilty of armed robbery
with a weapon and armed car jacking with a weapon and was sentenced to
fifteen years in state prison.26 He appealed his conviction and sentence and
argued "that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for mistrial based on
improper arguments made by the prosecutor during closing argument." 261
Although the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and
sentence, it noted that the prosecutor's closing argument was extremely
disturbing.262 During closing argument, the prosecutor improperly and
repeatedly vouched for and bolstered the testimony of the victim:
And, he was honest. He didn't exaggerate. He didn't ie. He
didn't go in and say, "[y]eah, that's the guy," because, you know
he's a nice kid. That's just the type of person he is. As a matter
of fact, even when he was describing the gun, he said, "look, it was
used in a manner that I believed it was a gun." But he's not going
to come out and say, yeah, man, a hundred percent it's a gun,
because that's the type of person he is.
Don't let that confuse you. Don't release him into society. Don't
let him walk simply because [the victim] is super honest or
super accurate.
Don't reward him because Peter [the victim] is a super honest
guy and would not come in here and exaggerate and would not
come in here and lie.
263
The court said vouching for the credibility of the victim was improper, but
the error was harmless considering the overwhelming evidence of guilt.264
259. 711 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 725 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.
1998).
260. Lewis, 711 So. 2d at 206-07. See also Deluca v. State, 736 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
261. Id. at 207.
262. Id.
263. Id. (emphasis in original).
264. Id. at 208.
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10. Ridiculing the Defense Theory
In Miller v. State,265 the defendant was convicted of burglary of a
dwelling, petit theft, and attempted burglary.2 s He appealed and claimed
inter alia that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial
based on improper arguments the prosecutor made during closing
argument.26 7 During trial, the defendant asserted the defense of voluntary
intoxication.268 The State and the defense presented witness testimony that
supported the voluntary intoxication defense.269 During closing argument,
the prosecutor stated:
PROSECUTOR: Voluntary intoxication. Let's talk about this.
Their defense is the defense of lack of responsibility. That's
simply what it is. He has the nerve to tell you he drank twenty-one
beers. No one tied him down, no one forced him to do it-
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I object, this is an instruction
on the law.
THE COURT: Overruled. This is argument.
PROSECUTOR: No one forced him to drink those twenty-one
beers he claims to have drunk that night, but still is able to at least
walk. But yet, because he chose to drink in a reckless manner he's
not guilty. Where's the responsibility for your actions?
This is not a case about lack of intent, it's a question of lack of
responsibility. For when he tells you that he was voluntarily
intoxicated, "I'm so drunk I don't know what I'm doing, I don't
know what is right from wrong," who did the drinking? And who
forced him to drink?7 °
The Fourth District said the prosecutor's comments improperly
expressed personal opinion of the defense theory.27' The court stated a
defendant has a "fundamental right to present a defense.., and to have the
jury properly instructed on any legal defense supported by the evidence. 272
The court went on to say "[t]hese rights stand for naught if the prosecutor
265. 712 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
266. Id. at 452.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Miller, 712 So. 2d at 452-53.
271. Id. at 453.
272. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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can ridicule a defense so presented, denigrate the accused for his temerity in
raising the issue, and misstate the law in contradiction of the judge's
instructions, as the prosecutor in this case did. 273 The court concluded that
the prosecutor's misconduct was a "foul blow" and deprived the defendant
of his fundamental right to a fair trial.
2 74
11. Improper Penalty-Phase Arguments
"[P]rosecutorial misconduct in the penalty phase must be egregious to
warrant vacating the sentence and remanding for a new penalty phase
proceeding." 27 In Urbin v. State,276 the defendant was found guilty of first-
degree murder and robbery and was sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the conviction but reversed the death sentence
based on proportionality. 8 Although the defense had failed to object to the
prosecutor's penalty-phase argument and the issue was moot because of the
proportionality reversal, the Supreme Court of Florida said it was obligated
to acknowledge and disapprove of improprieties in the prosecutor's closing
penalty-phase argument. 279-
The Supreme Court of Florida was particularly concerned that the
prosecutor had invited the jury to disregard the law. 0 The prosecutor
improperly asserted that if the defendant received a life sentence, they might
still release him some day."' The prosecutor argued:
I anticipate that the defense lawyer is going to argue for you-
argue to you to recommend the life sentence. They're going to
argue that life without parole is what you ought to recommend.
And I submit to you today now that is the state of the law, life
without parole. We all know in the past laws have changed. And
we all know that in the future laws can change. The law now is
life without parole. 
2
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359 (Fla. 1988).
276. 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998).
277. Id. at 413.
278. Id. at 418.
279. Id. at 418-19.
280. Id. at 420.
281. Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 420.
282. Id. at 420 n.10 (emphasis added).
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The court said the prosecutor was "encourag[ing] the jury to reject the
only lawful alternative to the death penalty, even if they believed that to be
the right recommendation, based on a reflexive fear that, regardless of the
law, [the defendant] might someday be eligible for parole. ' 3 The court
found the prosecutor's "ignore the law" argument had absolutely no place in
a trial.284 The prosecutor aggravated the matter more when he argued:
[M~y concern is that some of you may be tempted to take the easy
way out, to not weigh the aggravating circumstances and the
mitigating circumstances and not want to fully carry out your
responsibility and just vote for life.... I'm going to ask you not be
swayed by pity or sympathy. I'm going to ask you what pity, what
sympathy, what mercy did the defendant show [the victim]. ... I'm
going to ask you to follow the law. I'm going to ask you to do your
duty.28
5
The Supreme Court of Florida noted that the prosecutor's argument was
similar to a case in which the First District Court of Appeal had condemned
the argument as "an impermissible attempt by the prosecution to instruct the
jury as to its duties and functions."' 6 The prosecutor went beyond the
evidence when he stated the "victim was shot while 'pleading for his
life." '287 The court found that this type of argument was an impermissible
emotional appeal and constituted a "subtle 'golden rule' argument."' ' 8 The
prosecutor put his own words in the victim's mouth by saying "[d]on't hurt
me. Take my money, take my jewelry. Don't hurt me." The court found
these imaginary words were an attempt by the prosecutor to "'unduly create,
arouse and inflame the sympathy, prejudice and passions of [the] jury to the
detriment of the accused."' 2
The court then addressed the prosecutor's verbal attack on the
defendant's mother.291 The prosecutor called the defendant's mother a
"mistress of excuses" three times and criticized her because she never
expressed any concern, remorse, or sorrow to the victim's family.29 The
283. Id. at 420.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 421.
286. Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 421 (citing Redish v. State, 525 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1988)).
287. Id. at 421.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. (quoting Barnes v. State, 58 So. 2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1951)).
291. Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 421.
292. Id. at 421.
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court explained that "[t]hese attacks could only serve to prejudice [the
defendant] for any animosity that may have been aroused in the jury for
[defendant's] mother, hence essentially turning the substantial mitigation of
parental neglect against [defendant]." 293 The court also found the prosecutor
improperly concluded his argument by stating:
If you are tempted to show this defendant mercy, if you are
tempted to show him pity, I'm going to ask you to do this, to show
him the same amount of mercy, the same amount of pity that he
showed [the victim] on September 1, 1995, and that was none.29
4
Mercy arguments are impermissible because they are "'an unnecessary
appeal to the sympathies of the juror calculated to influence their sentence
recommendation.",
295
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, despite warnings, admonitions, and appellate court
reversals, misconduct continues, showing that some trial attorneys ignore the
requirement for professional and ethical conduct in the courtroom.2 9 To halt
unethical conduct, appellate courts appear more willing to take serious
action against the attorney and forward instances of misconduct to The
Florida Bar for disciplinary proceedings. 297
Judge Altenbernd recently proposed a solution to misconduct during
closing argument:
298
[T]he state attorneys, the public defenders, and the circuit court
judges, at a statewide level, need to create a continuing legal
education videotape for prosecutors and a separate video tape for
defense attorneys, demonstrating improper closing arguments that
are against the rules and should never be made. Each new attorney
who practices in criminal court should be required to view these
tapes before the attorney is allowed to try a case. When an attorney
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. (quoting Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 1989)).
296. See Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 422.
297. See Barnes v. State, 743 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Del Rio v. State,
732 So. 2d 1100, 1102 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Izquierdo v. State, 724 So. 2d 124, 125
n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
298. Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Altenbemd, A.CJ.,
specially concurring).
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violates the rules for the first time in closing argument, the trial
judge should be encouraged to require the attorney to view the tape
again. After two or three viewings, if an attorney still cannot argue
within the rules, other more serious sanctions should be imposed
either by a supervising attorney or by the trial court. Given the
seriousness of these trials and the ramifications of appellate court
reversals, the public, the victims of crime, and the defendants
deserve no less. 299
"'If attorneys do not recognize improper argument, they should not be
in a courtroom. If trial attorneys recognize improper argument and persist in
its use, they should not be members of The Florida Bar.' ' 300 "[Y]ou can win
your cases, you can win the tough ones, but you have to do it with dignity
and with honor .... We are a noble and honorable profession."30 1
299. Id. at 897.
300. Id. (quoting Luce v. State, 642 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Leblue, J.,
specially concurring)).
301. Honorable Gerald Kogan, Keynote Address at the Nova Law Review Annual
Banquet (Mar. 29, 1996), (emphasis added), reprinted in Honorable Gerald Kogan, Keynote
Address at the Annual Nova Law Review Banquet Mar. 29, 1996, 24 NOVAL. REV. 1, 4 (1996).
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I. HIRING
A. State of Florida as Employment Agency
Who would have guessed that the State of Florida would take out a help
wanted advertisement for exotic dancers? Exhibitionists willing to relocate
to Stuart and dance at a nightclub were urged to send a r~sum6 to the
Department of Labor/Bureau of Workforce Program Support, according to
an article in the Miami Herald.I Under federal law, before an employer is
entitled to hire someone from another country, the employer must make a
1. John Pacenti, Strippers Wanted: State Runs Unusual Employment Ad, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 16, 1999, at 5B.
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finding that no Floridian is suitable for the job.2 If the efforts of the Florida
Department of Labor are unavailing, the strip club's application goes to the
United States Department of Labor, which decides whether to approve
certification for a work visa.3 If given the green light, only then, can the club
request that the Immigration and Naturalization Service approve a foreign
employee.4
B. Negligent Hiring
A school in Davie, Florida is being sued for failing to run a criminal
background check on a volunteer who turned out to be a convicted
pedophile. According to reports the Miami Herald, the school was unaware
of the volunteer's criminal record.6 Similar charges had been raised against
the same volunteer at a public school program for autistic children. The
School Board noted that its own policy only requires those "who work one
on one, unsupervised with children to be fingerprinted." Florida law
requires public school teachers to be fingerprinted in order to run
background checks. 9 If fingerprint tracing reveals that a teacher has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, the teacher must be removed
from any position involving direct contact with students.'
0
While many employment checks now include a routine review of
criminal records compiled by the National Crime Information Center, an
employer's failure to check up on applicants does not invariably reflect gross
negligence.11 As a practical matter, employers are advised to conduct back-
ground investigations as a strategy for averting liability stemming from
negligent hiring. Liability under Title 42 of the United States Code § 1983,12
The Civil Rights Act, may lie only upon the exercise of some governmental
policy.' 3 Liability does not rest wholly on a showing of a master-servant
relationship, also known as respondeat superior.14
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Shari Rudavsky, Families Sue Man Accused of Sex Abuse Suits: Davie School,
Nova Negligent, MAMI HERAm. (Broward), May 7, 1999, at 1A.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. FLA. STAT. § 231.02(2)(a) (1999).
10. Id.
11. Stokes v. Bullins, 844 F.2d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1988).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
13. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 168 (6th Cir. 1985).
14. Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987).
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II. HOURS AND WAGES
A. Fair Labor Standards Act
1. Constitutionality of FLSA Extension to Public Sector
Under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution,
federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits by individuals against states for
violating federal law.15 However, in 1996, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
16
the Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment bars Congress from
subjecting states to suits in federal court for violating acts of Congress
passed pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitu-
tion.17 The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 8 enacted under the Com-
merce Clause, authorizes federal court suits by state employees.' 9 Since
Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Circuit, among other courts, has ruled that it
lacks jurisdiction over state employees' FLSA claims against a state.20
In 1999 the Supreme Court ruled that states have sovereign immunity in
state courts similar to their Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal
courts.21 In 1992, ninety-six state probation and parole officers sued the
State of Maine in federal court for violating the FLSA by not giving them
premium pay for overtime.2 In light of Seminole Tribe, the workers' suit
was dismissed, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal.23 The public employees then turned to the Maine courts for
relief.24 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the judgment of the
Superior Court of Cumberland County, deciding that the State enjoyed
sovereign immunity in its own courts, and likewise dismissed the suit. The
15. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment recites: 'The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
16. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
17. Id. at 44.
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997 & Supp. 1998).
19. Id. § 202.
20. Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d 677, 678 (lth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
2297 (1998).
21. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2263-68 (1999).
22. Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37,41 (st Cir. 1997).
23. Id. at 40-41.
24. Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998), cert. granted, Alden v. Maine, 119 S.
Ct. 443 (1998), af'd, Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
25. Id. at 175-76.
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Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the lower courts and
affirmed.-
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority in Alden v. Maine27 stated
that the Eleventh Amendment did not govern the case.2 At the same time,
he made clear the principle that state immunity "is demarcated not by the
text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the
constitutional design., 29 In his dissent, Justice Souter warned that 4.7
million state employees were now barred from suing their employer in both
state and federal court.30 Although the federal government can still sue in
state court, the labor department is ill equipped to take up the slack left by
Seminole Tribe and Alden.
2. Minimum Wage Issues
Thousands of Haitian migrants earned less than $100 for up to sixty-
hour workweeks, picking beans in the vegetable fields of South Dade
County.31 According to an article in the Miami Herald, many of these
farmworkers hope to convince a federal court judge in Miami that they are
owed three million dollars in back minimum wages. 2 Six hundred twelve
workers filed a class action suit in 1990, but their case is only now being
heard. -33  The farmers contend that they did provide minimum-wage
payments to contractors, who then paid the workers less than minimum
wage. In depositions, the contractors conceded that they never kept any
records. 35 In 1996 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the growers not the labor
contractors, were the actual employers of the migrant workers.~ As a result,
the farmers bear the burden of obeying federal wage and hour laws.37 The
case could take a year to reach a decision. 8
26. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2269 (1999).
27. Id. at 2240.
28. Id. at 2254.
29. Id. at 2243.
30. Id. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing State Government Employment Data:
March 1997 (visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http:llwww.census.gov/pub/govs/apes/97stus.txt>).
31. David Lyons, Migrant Workers Take Wage Dispute to Court, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 14, 1999, at lB.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Lyons, supra note 31, at lB.
37. Id.
38. Id.
1999]
79
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
The Miami-Dade County Commission voted twelve to zero on May 11,
1999 to enact a "living wage" ordinance, requiring Miami-Dade County, and
companies that furnish services to the County, to pay employees at least
$8.56 per hour with health benefits, according to a report in the Miami
Herald.39 The ordinance will raise the salaries of 1760 full-time and part-
time public employees working for the county. 4° The law, to be phased in
over several years, becomes fully effective in October, 2002.41 Miami-Dade
joins twenty-six other cities across the nation that have adopted similar
laws.42
President Clinton has proposed raising the minimum wage by one
dollar, to $6.15, by September, 2000.4 3 Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan
Greenspan, opposes the increase. 44 The pros and cons of such an increase
were debated recently in the Miami Herald.
3. Independent Contractors v. Employees
FLSA, the Act governing minimum wage and overtime pay, was
amended by Congress in 1974 to cover the vast majority of state and local
government employees. 46 In Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County,47 a
juror alleged that failure to compensate jurors for jury duty amounted to a
FLSA violation. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the suit, ruling that there
is no employment relationship between a juror and the county. 49 The circuit
court applied the "economic reality" test to determine whether an
employment relationship existed. 0 Moreover, the court made clear that the
issue of employment status under the FLSA is a question of law.5 Miami-
39. Don Finefrock, Living Wage is Approved for Dade, MIAMI HERALD, May 12, 1999,
at lB.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Jared Bernstein, Raise the Minimum Wage? Working Poor Will Benefit, MIAMI
HERALD, May 10, 1999, at 15A.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
47. 139 F.3d 817 (llth Cir. 1998).
48. Id. at 818.
49. Id. at 819.
50. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 31-33 (1961);
Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434,439 (1 lth Cir. 1994)).
51. Brouwer, 139 F.3d at 818 (citing Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 205 ( l1th
Cir.1997)).
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Dade County clearly falls within the FLSA's definition of public employer.52
The court cited an array of differences between public employees and jurors,
including the following: 1) jurors are selected involuntarily from voter
registration lists; 2) jurors enjoy no sick or annual leave, nor job security,
nor social security or pension benefits; 3) jurors do not voluntarily give their
labor to the state, but are forced to serve; 4) jurors are not paid a salary,
instead, they are entitled to a statutorily set sum no matter how many hours
they serve; and 5) the state lacks the power to fire jurors for poor
performance, but must accept their verdict.
5 3
4. FLSA Exemption Section 13(a)(1) Exemption for Executive,
Administrative, and Professional Workers
Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA carves out a minimum wage and overtime
pay exemption for any employee working "IN A BONA FIDE EXECU-
TIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, OR PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY." 4  The
basic test for measuring whether an employee is salaried is found at 29
C.F.R. § 541.118(a). 55 Under this Department of Labor regulation,
[an employee will be considered to be paid "on a salary basis"
... if under his employment agreement he regularly receives each
pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined
amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount
is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or
quantity of the work performed. 6
There was a split among the circuit courts over whether dockin must
have actually occurred, or whether mere potential was enough. The
Supreme Court settled the issue in Auer v. Robbins5 8 in 1997.59 Auer upheld
the Secretary of Labor's regulation in 29 C.F.R. § 541.118, making clear that
public employees, to win exemption from overtime pay, must not face salar
reductions because of variations in quantity or quality of work performed.
However, Auer left several loose ends, but the Supreme Court recently
52. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994 & Supp. HI 1997).
53. Brouwer, 139 F.3d at 819.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).
56. Id.
57. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,460 (1997).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 452.
60. Id. at 463-64.
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denied certiorari in Davis v. City of Hollywood,61 an Eleventh Circuit case
arising in Florida.62 Davis raised the question whether the "window of
correction" spelled out in regulations covering deductions made
inadvertently would be lost, even if the employer reimbursed the employee
for such deductions and promised to comply in the future.63
5. Prohibited Employer Acts Under the FLSA
FLSA makes it unlawful for any person to deal in any manner with
goods which were produced by employees whose pay did not conform with
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act,64 or to violate the
minimum wage and overtime rules themselves. 65 Tyler v. State66 raised the
question whether this provision of the FLSA is violated when an employee is
denied the right to prove his case of fraudulent denial of overtime in court.
67
B. Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA") 6 8 aimed at ensuring that employees
doing equal work should be paid equal wages, regardless of sex. 69 In 1999,
Congress took up a bill, the Paycheck Fairness Act,70 designed to strengthen
the FLSA by allowing for compensatory and punitive damages and putting
gender based wage bias on an equal footing with race or ethnicity based
wage discrimination.71 The proposed bill would also prohibit employers
from punishing workers for sharing salary information with their
coworkers. 72 Moreover, Congress is considering reintroducing the Fair Pay
Act73 aimed at barring pay bias on grounds of sex, race, or national origin for
work in "equivalent" jobs.74
61. 120 F.3d 1178 (1lth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Davis v. City of Hollywood, 118 S.
Ct. 1827 (1998).
62. Id. at 1178.
63. Id. at 1180.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
65. Id. § 215(a)(2).
66. 718 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, Tyler v. Chiles, 119 S.
Ct. 340 (1998).
67. Id. at 812.
68. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (prior to amendment).
69. Id.
70. S. 74, 106th Cong. (1999).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. H.R. 1271, 106th Cong. (1999).
74. Id.
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III. INVASION OF PRIVACY
A. Public Employee Drug Testing
In Cox v. McCraley,75 Cox worked for the Osceola County School
Board as a lead painter.76 After working there for eleven years, Cox received
a letter from his supervisor, Whitman, stating "that he had a 'reasonable
suspicion' that Cox had violated School Board policy regarding drug and/or
alcohol abuse." Three options were offered to Cox: 1) undergo drug
testing; 2) _oin an employee assistance program; or 3) hand in his
resignation. When Cox elected to take the drug screening test, he was told
that this option had been mistakenly included, and that it was no longer
available.75 Although Cox completed his annual contract, he was not
reappointed.80
Cox filed a grievance, and after conducting a full evidentiary hearing,
the School Board ruled "that there was no reasonable suspicion of drug use
by Cox ..... 81 At the same time, the Board made clear that it was powerless
to change the decision not to reappoint Cox.8 2 Cox appealed the Board's
ruling to Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, which sustained the
Board's decision. 3
In his lawsuit in federal district court, Cox claimed that the defendants
committed an "unwarranted invasion of [his] fundamental right to
privacy .... ,, 4 Cox sued under § 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code,
claiming violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.85 Cox also invoked the corresponding sections
of the Florida Constitution, and a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Florida common law.
86
In its opinion, the federal district court agreed that Cox was entitled to
rely on § 1983 to raise violations of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy
75. 993 F. Supp. 1452 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
76. Id. at 1454.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Cox, 993 F. Supp. at 1454.
81. Id. at 1454-55.
82. Id. at 1455.
83. Cox v. School Bd. of Osceola County, 669 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
84. Cox, 993 F. Supp. at 1455 (alteration in original) (citing Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
1999]
83
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
and his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. s7  However,
before a city is liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege municipal
liability based upon an officially promulgated policy or an unofficially
adopted custom. 8  Cox's claim of a municipal policy, the letter Whitman
wrote to Cox raising a suspicion of drug or alcohol abuse, establishes, at
most, a claim that such is an unofficially adopted custom of the SchoolBoard. 89 Custom will support municipal liabilityonly if it is so entrenched
and long standing that it carries the force of law. The federal district court
concluded that Cox failed to state a claim against the School Board under §
1983.91 Assuming arguendo, that Cox had stated a § 1983 claim, his privacy
claim under the Fourth Amendment was unavailing. 92 Cox fell short of
alleging that anything "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" was at
stake. 9  Cox's due process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments suffer the same fate; absent a property interest in
reappointment, no procedural due process violation took place.94 Even so,
the Board offered Cox a full evidentiary hearing.95
Turning to Cox's federal claims against his former supervisors in their
individual capacity, the court made clear that Cox failed to prove that the
defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Cox of a right conferred
by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.96 The court concluded
that "government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to
qualified immunity from civil damages if their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."9 The court ruled that Cox's supervisors "were
acting within the scope of their authority and did not violate any clearly
established law of which a reasonable person would have known. ' 98 Cox's
complaint was dismissed with prejudice.99 In addition, the court declined
supplemental jurisdiction over Cox's state law claims. 1°°
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)).
89. Cox, 993 F. Supp. at 1456.
90. Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)).
91. Cox, 993 F. Supp. at 1456.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Cox, 993 F. Supp. at 1457.
97. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1457-58.
100. Id. at 1458.
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B. False Light Invasion of Privacy
Apart from constitutional protection of privacy found either in the
Fourth Amendment or in the penumbras the Bill of Rights, privacy founded
on state constitutions, statutes, and common law has been invoked by public
employees as a separate cause of action sounding in tort. 101 To state a claim
of tortious invasion of privacy, the intrusion must be unreasonable or
offensive and must outweigh the employer's need to pry.1°2 Claims of
invasion of privacy committed by public employers are often defeated either
by statutory or common law public official immunity.
103
In Harris v. District Board of Trustees,1°4 coordinators of a criminal
justice program run by a community college sued for invasion of privacy
after they lost their jobs.' °s  The court sustained the former public
employees' claim that the community college had presented the workers in a
false light. 106 Similarly, the Miami Herald recently reported on a case
involving public employment and invasion of privacy. 107 Andrew Greene
ran against School Board member Miriam Oliphant in 1992, but Greene's
prospects dimmed amid news reports that he had received counseling for
psychological problems. 08 In 1997 a jury awarded Greene $600,000 for
invasion of privacy and $250,000 for negligence.' 9 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal handed down an opinion in June, 1999 affirming the jury's
award of $850,000 to the former School Board candidate.110 The jury agreed
with the former teacher that his employer had no right to release Greene's
confidential psychological records to the news media without his consent."1
At the same time, state law limits claims against public entities to $100,000
101. See Harris v. District Bd. of Trustees, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
102. See id. at 1329.
103. See id.
104. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fa. 1998).
105. Id. at 1322.
106. Id. at 1329.
107. Daniel de Vise, Judgment Against Schools Upheld Candidate's Files Leaked to
Media, MmAI HEA (Broward), June 19, 1999, at 3B.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing School Bd. of Broward County v. Greene, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1392
(4th Dist. Ct. App. June 16, 1999) (the opinion cited in the article was later withdrawn and
superseded on denial of reh'g by School Bd. of Broward County v. Greene, 739 So. 2d 668
(4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
111. Id.
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for negligence. 12 It is up to the state legislature to approve any higher sum,
which seems unlikely."
3
IV. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, no
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."'" 4 This ban on compelled testimony covers evidence that might be
admissible against a public employee in a criminal proceeding. 115 A public
employee who confesses to self-incriminating evidence of criminal behavior
when threatened with dismissal from employment may invoke the privilege
in defense. 16  The privilege may not be invoked, however, when the
compelled testimony will not be relied upon in a criminal proceeding."
7
In United States v. Veal," s Veal, Camacho and other police officers,
were members of the Street Narcotics Unit ("SNU") of the Miami Police
Department. 19 The Chief of Police received a letter in which an anonymous
informant warned that unidentified drug dealers had met at Seventh Avenue
and N.W. Thirty-Second Street, in Miami and had contracted to kill
Camacho. 12 The police knew this address was the home of Mercado, a drug
dealer. On their way to a sting operation, Veal and other SNU members
stopped at Mercado's house, approached Mercado, who was outside, and led
him into his house.122 Soon, police cars and a fire rescue unit arrived in
response to calls for assistance from Camacho.1'3 Despite emergency
medical efforts, Mercado died at the scene. 24 Pictures taken of Camacho
once he returned to the police station showed a long rip in the front of
Camacho's shirt.'2 These pictures, plus a butcher knife (allegedly retrieved
from the crime scene) and a bag of crack cocaine (allegedly seized from
Mercado) were placed in the lieutenant's cabinet.126
112. De Vise, supra note 107, at 3B (referring to FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1999)).
113. Id.
114. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
115. See id.
116. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
117. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,438-39 (1956).
118. 153 F.3d 1233 (1lth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2024 (1999).
119. Id. at 1236.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Veal, 153 F.3d at 1236.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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A Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBr') investigation led to federal
civil rights charges against Camacho, Veal and other police officers for
violating Mercado's civil rights. 27 The district judge found the statements
concerning the circumstances of Mercado's death within the scope of
Garrity v. New Jersey,12 and granted the officers' motion to suppress the
statements.1 29 The officers were acquitted of conspiracy in the civil rights
trial, and the jury deadlocked on the other charges. 130 In July of 1993 a
federal grand jury in South Florida indicted Camacho, Veal, and two other
police officers for conspiring to obstruct justice, for perjury, and for giving
false statements. 131  The defendants once again moved to suppress their
statements, which had been suppressed under Garrity in the civil rights
trial.132 The judge denied those motions, and both Camacho and Veal were
convicted and received prison sentences.
1 33
On appeal, Veal challenged the district court's refusal to suppress their
statements after Mercado's death, since the same judge had suppressed those
statements under Garrity in the civil rights trial.1 4 In Garrity, the Supreme
Court made clear that the Fifth Amendment applies to police officers facing
interrogation by other law enforcement officers and that "incriminating
statements made under threat of termination for remaining silent are
inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution concerning the matter of
inquiry absent a knowing and voluntary waiver."' 35
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately ruled that Garrity and the Fifth
Amendment do not protect false statements from subsequent prosecutions:
When an accused has been accorded immunity to preserve his right
against self-incrimination, he must choose either to relinquish his
Fifth Amendment right and testify truthfully, knowing that his
statements cannot be used against him in a subsequent criminal
prosecution regarding the matter being investigated, or continue to
assert the privilege and suffer the consequences. There is no third
option for testifying falsely without incurring potential prosecution
for perjury or false statements.136
127. Id. at 1238.
128. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
129. Veal, 153 F.3d at 1238.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Veal, 153 F.3d at 1238-39.
135. Id. at 1239 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)).
136. Id. at 1241.
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V. FRAUD CASES TIED TO DOWNSIZING
In July of 1999 a supervisory claims examiner for the Department of
Veterans Affairs ("VA") in Florida, who stole $615,451 by writing up a false
claim in her fianc6's name, was sentenced to thirty-three months in prison,
according to a news report in the Washington Post. 37 Investigators say Joy
Cheri Brown, a supervisory claims examiner for the VA, falsely granted a
100% disability claim to her fianc6, a St. Petersburg police officer, who had
served in the military during Desert Storm.138 By the time the scheme was
detected, Brown had granted her fianc6 payments totaling $519,981, and
awarded him a $5011 monthly payment for a fake injury.13 The inspector
general for the VA attributed the fraud to staff reductions that left the VA
more vulnerable; the VA's benefits staff has been cut by twenty percent
since 1993.14° The VA's inspector general referred to the case as "the
dangers inherent in downsizing.
141
VI. REGULATION OF OFF-DUTY BEHAVIOR
At times, the public employer may fairly stake a claim in the off-duty
behavior of its employees to achieve a smoothly running agency or to
preserve its image of integrity and honesty.142 Arguably, the employer's
stake is greatest when crimes are committed while the public employee is
off-duty.143 For example, in Castilleja v. City of Jacksonville,144 while off-
duty and in his own car, Castilleja, a Jacksonville police officer, hit and
damaged a fence and sign at a trailer park, and left the scene without
reporting the incident to the authorities.' 45 Additionally, he did not leave the
statutorily mandated information with the trailer park management or
owners. The next day, an eyewitness reported Castilleja's tag number to
the police.147 Although he initially lied, Castilleja eventually came clean and
137. Bill McAllister, Fraud Cases Wony VA IG; Report on Convictions Cites a Down
Side to Downsizing, WASH. POST, July 20, 1999, at A17.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Castilleja v. City of Jacksonville, 738 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
143. See id.
144. 738 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
145. Id. at 335.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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admitted his role in the accident.1' s For this, Castilleja received two
noncriminal traffic citations: one for leaving the scene without leaving
information, and one for careless driving.
1 49
As a result of this incident, Castilleja received "notice of immediate
suspension with termination to follow."5 After a plenary evidentiary
hearing, the Jacksonville Civil Service Board ruled that the punishment was
at odds with the City's charter and that it was manifestly unjust.15' On
appeal, the circuit court reversed the Board's ruling as unsupported by
competent substantial evidence.152 On appeal, Castilleja claimed that the
lower court had improperly reweighed the evidence and substituted its
judgment for the Board's.153 The court of appeal agreed1 4 The lower
court's scope of review was confined to: 1) whether the Board afforded due
process; 2) whether the basic tenets of the law were observed; and 3)
whether the Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law were grounded
in competent substantial evidence. 55 The First District Court of Appeal
concluded that the circuit court failed to determine whether the Board's
rulings were supported by competent substantial evidence, and instead
reviewed the record to see if the Sheriff's decision was supported by
competent substantial evidence. 56 The circuit court erroneously sat as a new
Board and reweighed the evidence in the case.157 As for Castilleja's request
for backpay, the court of appeal ruled that his request for postponement
should not result in his employer having to pay for time he did not work.
58
An article in the Miami Herald reported on a moonlighting case
involving a Hollywood police officer that was caught working an off-duty
security job during his regular patrol shift.159 As punishment, the officer was
suspended for six months from performing twenty dollars an hour
moonlighting assignments and his eligibility for promotion or transfer was
withdrawn for one year1 6° The officer was cleared of criminal wrongdoing,
148. Id. at 335-36.
149. Castilleja, 738 So. 2d at 336.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Castilleja, 738 So. 2d at 336.
155. Id. (citing Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 337.
158. Id.
159. D. Aileen Dodd, Hollywood Officer Under Investigation: Violations of Off-Duty
WorkPolicy Probed, MIAMu HEAI (Broward), Dec. 3, 1998, at lB.
160. Id.
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however. 161 The Hollywood Police Department conducted a probe into off-
duty jobs after the Miami Herald ran its own investigation into the
practice. 162 The newspaper's probe yielded many examples in which officers
were scheduled to be in two places at once.1 63 Hollywood's off-duty policy
was run as a "buddy-buddy" or "clique" system often at the cost of offending
minorities and female officers. 164 The report recommended that the Depart-
ment assign off-duty work through a rotation system. 65 Before any changes
can occur, however, the City must bargain with the police union over the
issue, and the union is known to be hostile to a rotation system.
66
VII. FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 167 all eligible
state and local government employees are entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid
leave in a twelve month period: 1) for birth or adoption of a child or
placement of a foster child; 2) to care for a spouse, child or parent with a
serious health condition; or 3) for the employee's own serious health
condition. 68 Leaves taken in response to a "serious health condition"
include time laid up in a hospital, hospice or residential medical care
facility. 169  170
In Wright v. Department of Children & Families, Wright, a former
employee of the Department of Children and Families, was unexpectedly
absent from work.1 r His illnesses included an abscessed tooth, gastritis,
hepatitis A, bronchitis, and acute arthritis." 2 Wright notified his supervisor
of his illnesses and furnished medical certification for these absences.
1 73
Wright was disciplined for his use of approved leave. 74 Wright argued that
161. Corey Dade, Officer's Off-Duty Job While On Duty No Crime: Policeman May Still
Face Action, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Jan. 28, 1999, at IA.
162. Id.
163. Corey Dade, Fix Off-Duty Work Policy, Cops Advised, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Dec. 11, 1998, at lB.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (1994).
168. Id. § 2612.
169. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(1) (1998).
170. 712 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
171. Id. at 831.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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the Department's imposition of discipline for the use of approved sick leave
violated the FMLA.
75
Wright worked in a health care facility with a skeleton staff.1 76 Among
his daily duties, Wright had to bathe, change, dress, and feed special needs
patients. 177 Wright's absences forced the agency to assign scarce staff to fill
the gap. 178 For this reason, Wright's absences undermined the Department's
ability to furnish adequate health care services to patients. 79 The Third
District Court of Appeal concluded that the Department had cause to
discipline Wright for excessive absenteeism.1
80
Under the FMLA, an employee who seeks leave for medical reasons
must establish that he suffers from a "serious health condition. 18 ' The
FMLA defines this term to cover an illness that involves inpatient care at a
medical facility or "continuing treatment by a health care provider."' 82 The
Third District Court of Appeal concluded that Wright did not establish that
he sustained a qualifying "serious health condition" as required by the
FMLA. 1 3 The court ruled that the hearing officer's findings of fact were
grounded upon competent, substantial evidence.1
The question has been raised whether FMLA suits against state
employers may be brought in federal courts. 85 In Driesse v. Florida Board
of Regents, 1 6 the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida ruled that FMLA suits against state employers in federal court are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.'
7
VIII. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Tort Actions and Exclusivity
Employers originally agreed to no-fault liability under workers' com-
pensation statutes in exchange for immunity from tort liability for injuries or
175. Wright, 712 So. 2d at 831.
176. Id. at 832.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Wright, 712 So. 2d at 832.
181. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (1994).
182. Id. § 2611(11)(a), (1).
183. Wright, 712 So. 2d at 832.
184. Id.
185. See Driesse v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
186. 26 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
187. Id. at 1331.
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diseases that employees suffer in the course of their employment. 18 Like
every other jurisdiction, Florida's workers' compensation statute preempts
state tort claims covered by workers' compensation.1
8 9
In Dade County School Board v. Laing,190 Ronald Laing was involved
in an incident while he was working as a teacher at Hialeah High School. 9'
As he was leaving a classroom, a golf cart driven by the school custodian,
Joe Rodriguez, hit him. 92 At Hialeah High, custodians and security guards
drive golf carts to cross the school grounds.193 After his injury, Laing
applied for, and was granted, workers' compensation benefits. 94 All the
same, Laing also brought a personal injury lawsuit against the School
Board.' 95 The question for the Fourth District Court of Appeal was whether
the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statute precluded
Laing's state tort claim.1
96
Whether Laing could sue the School Board in tort turned on whether he
was involved in "unrelated works" when the accident occurred.'9 If he was,
then workers' compensation did not preclude his state tort claim against the
School Board. 98 Section 440.11(1) of the Florida Statutes carves out an
exception to workers' compensation immunity when employees are
"operating in the furtherance of the employer's business but they are
assigned primarily to unrelated works within private or public employ-
ment."1 99 Laing claimed that, because his job as a teacher and Rodriguez's
role as a custodian were "unrelated," the exception is triggered, thus piercing
the School Board's immunity.
200
Whether an employee is involved in "unrelated works" turns on the
following factor as framed by the court: "[W]hether the co-employees are
involved in different projects," and "[t]hus, the focus is upon the nature of
the project involved, as opposed to the specific work skills of individual
employees."
201
188. See United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966).
189. FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1999). However, immunity from suit for governmental
employees flows from FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(1) (1999).
190. 731 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
191. Id. at 20.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Laing, 731 So. 2d at 20.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (1999).
200. Laing, 731 So. 2d at 20.
201. Id. (citing Vause v. Bay Med. Ctr., 687 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
Abraham v. Dzafic, 666 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
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The trial court found that the teacher and custodian were engaged in
"unrelated works" when the accident occurred and thus, Laing's tort claim
against the School Board could proceed.2 2
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court.2 3 The court
reasoned that just because employees perform different duties it does not
invariably mean that they are involved in "unrelated works."2 4 The court
concluded that the teacher and custodian were co-employees undertaking
education related services for students at school when the accident
occurred.205 Both were part of a team in promoting education at the
school. & As a result, the teacher and custodian were not engaged in
"unrelated works" and, therefore, the teacher's state tort claim wasorecluded
by the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statute.
B. Injuries Arising from Employee Misconduct
An alternate route around the exclusivity provision of workers'
compensation is to show that injuries sustained stemmed from the intentional
misconduct of a co-employee. For example, in Castellano v. Raynor, °
Gina Castellano worked as a secretary at Graham Elementary School.210 On
January 27, 1995, Mark Raynor, a physical education teacher also employed
at the school, tossed a football at Castellano, causing injuries. 2  As
employees of the Hillsborough County School Board, both employees were
immune from suit unless they acted "'in bad faith or with malicious purpose,
or in a manner exhibiting a willful and wanton disregard of human rights,
safety, or property.' '' 212
Here, Castellano and Raynor were friends and coworkers.213 On the day
in question, Raynor was waiting for his next class to assemble on the
football field and absent-mindedly tossed a football to some students who
214passed by. Raynor saw Castellano leaving a building, called her name,
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing Johnson v. Comet Steel Erection, Inc., 435 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
205. Laing, 731 So. 2d at 20.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Castellano v. Raynor, 725 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
209. 725 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
210. Id. at 1198.
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(a) (1999)).
213. Id
214. Castellano, 725 So. 2d at 1198.
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and threw the ball "underhanded in a slow arc toward her for her to
catch. ' '215 Inadvertently, the ball hit Castellano in the jaw and upper chest.2 6
Raynor immediately apologized, especially when he afterwards noticed that
Castellano was carrying student files.217 Although Raynor knew Castellano
had jaw problems, no evidence shows that Raynor intentionally tossed the
ball at her head.21 8 Apparently, Castellano detected no ill will, iven that she
applied for and was awarded workers' compensation benefits. 1
The trial court ruled that Raynor was immune from suit and the Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed. 2  In support of this conclusion, the
district court cited the holding in Castro v. Allstate Insurance Co.,22'
wherein a police officer playfully tickled another officer's ear with the
antenna of his hand-held radio, and the second officer abruptly and
unexpectedly turned his head, forcing the antenna into his ear canal and
rupturing his ear drum.22 The Third District Court of Appeal found no
evidence of intent to injure the second officer and reversed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the first officer's homeowner's
insurance company, which had tried to characterize the injury as
intentional.223 Similarly, in this case, Raynor's culpability, at most, rises to
the level of negligence, far below the level of culpability needed to make
him liable.
224
C. Relation of Injury to Employment
Workers' compensation benefits are awarded only for injuries or
diseases arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of
employment.2  While workers' compensation statutes are liberally con-
strued in favor of compensating the injured, some accidents that take place
while the public employee is off-duty are too remote for coverage under the
law.226 For example, in City of North Bay Village v. Millerick,2 an off-duty
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1199.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Castellano, 725 So. 2d at 1199.
220. Id.
221. 724 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
222. Id. at 134.
223. Id. at 135.
224. Castelano, 725 So. 2d at 1199.
225. FLA. STAT. § 440.091 (1999).
226. See City of North Bay Village v. Millerick, 721 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1998), review denied, 733 So. 2d 516 (1999).
227. 721 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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police sergeant, Millerick, was drinking at the Polo Club, a bar in North
Miami Beach, at 5:00 a.m. when he struck up a conversation with Billy
Martino, a man suspected to be involved in selling illegal drugs223 They
ended up fighting, but Millerick left after Martino shouted to other bar
patrons that Millerick was a police officer.229 Later, in the parking lot, two
men accosted Millerick, but Millerick was able to escape in his car. While
driving toward North Bay Village, Millerick sensed the two men in their car
were following him.23 As he sped away, Millerick lost control of his car,
crossed over the median into oncoming traffic and collided with a car
232traveling in the opposite direction. The driver of the other car died, and
Millerick was grievously injured. 33
While Millerick admitted that he had been drinking throughout the
evening of the accident, he denied that he was drunk.23 4 Millerick applied
for workers' compensation benefits, but the case went unresolved for six
years after the initial hearing on the issue of coverage..25  Finally, on
February 17, 1998, the Judge of Compensation Claims awarded Millerick
disability benefits." In support of this award, the judge ruled that Millerick
had been engaged in his primary duty as a police officer when he was
injured. 37 Florida has a special rule governing police officers' actions when
it comes to scope of employment.2 38 "[A] police officer who was discharg-
ing a primary law enforcement responsibility 'shall be deemed to have been
acting in the course of employment' regardless of the officer's duty status at
the time."239 However, evidence that a police officer was prepared to
discharge a law enforcement duty falls short of ustifying an injury as arising
in the course of the officer's employment. h °  Here, the alleged law
enforcement nexus comes from the encounter between Millerick and
Martino.241 The First District Court of Appeal found that this encounter did
not arise from a desire to execute a legitimate law enforcement function;
228. Id. at 1230.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1231.
231. Id.
232. Millerick, 721 So. 2d at 1231.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Millerick, 721 So. 2d at 1231.
238. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 440.091 (1997)).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1232.
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Millerick's injuries were sustained during a night of social drinking.242 This
aim was not altered because Millerick started arguing with a man who turned
out to be a potential suspect.243 In sum, the bar fight did not take place
"under circumstances reasonably consistent" with the manner in which an
officer's primary responsibility would be performed. 244 Even more remote
was the nexus between the bar incident and the causeway accident.245 These
two incidents may be wholly unrelated.2 46 The First District Court of Appeal
concluded that Millerick was not entitled to recover workers' compensation
benefits.2 47
D. Attorneys' Fees
In Volusia County Fire Services v. Eaby,248 Alan Eaby was working as a
paramedic when he was exposed to the hepatitis C virus during the scope
and course of employment. 9 The public employer conceded the condition
was a compensable, occupationally contracted disease 50 The employer later
admitted that Eaby was temporarily and totally disabled.251 Eaby sought
attorney's fees provided under workers' compensation law. 2 2 The Judge of
Compensation Claims granted attorney's fees, finding that the employer had
denied a requested benefit, namely permanent total disability benefits.253
Having denied a claim, the employer was bound to file a notice of denial. 54
Instead of investigating the claim, the employer built a "wall of willful
ignorance.
'2 55
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the award of
attorney's fees. 56 According to the court, the employer is not bound to file a
notice of denial when it pays one of two alternative claims for indemnity
benefits made in a single petition. 7 The employer paid the temporary total
242. Millerick 721 So. 2d at 1232.
243. Id.
244. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 440.091(2) (1997)).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Millerick 721 So. 2d at 1232.
248. 725 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
249. Id. at416.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 440.34(3)(b), .192(8) (1995)).
253. Eaby, 725 So. 2d at 417.
254. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.192(8)).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 416.
257. Id. at 417.
[Vol. 24:73
96
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Sanchez
disability claim and rejected the claim for permanent total disability.2 Eaby
had not reached maximum medical improvement as of the date of the
petition for attorney's fees. 9
E. Setoffs, Tie-ins with Other Statutes, and Disqualifications
In Heric v. City of Ormond Beach,2° William Heric worked as a city
firefighter.61 While on vacation, Heric suffered a heart attack.262 The
employer agreed to pay medical and indemnity benefits. 263 The governing
collective bargaining agreement addressed the issue of how benefits were to
be paid. 2& Under the agreement, claimants were entitled to recover full pay
and disability benefits for up to 1008 hours, which comes out to ninety days
for firefighters.2 5 In the event the cap is exhausted, claimants may seek an
extension of "full pay" status. M In the face of a petition, the city must
convene a panel, which makes a recommendation to the city manager who
bears ultimate authority over claimant's petition.267 If the petition is turned
down, the agreement makes clear that "[t]he employee shall, after utilizing
the employee's annual Personal Leave Time and the employee's Sick Leave
Bank, revert to normal workers' compensation benefits.
'' 68
Heric exhausted his 1008 hours, petitioned the city for a "full pay"
status extension, and received full pay through deductions from his sick and
personal leave banks until he returned to work on June 2, 1997.269 At the
same time, Heric sought temporary total disability or temporary partial
disability benefits. 270 The hearing focused on whether Heric was entitled to
benefits for the period after he had exhausted his sick leave and personal
leave.271 The hearing judge denied benefits, citing the collective bargaining
agreement, which calls for binding arbitration of such claims as the sole
source for a remedyY 2 Florida law favors such alternative dispute
258. Eaby, 725 So. 2d at 416.
259. Id.
260. 728 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
261. Id. at 1247.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Heric, 728 So. 2d at 1248.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Heric, 728 So. 2d at 1248.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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resolution systems agreed upon by the parties for resolving workers'
compensation benefits disputes. As long as the benefits themselves are
undiminished, private arbitration conforms to Florida law.274
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal ruled that the judge's
finding, that the collective bargaining agreement did not diminish Heric's
right to workers' compensation benefits, was in error.275 According to the
court, Florida law leaves no doubt that the agreement is nonbinding if it tries
to regulate the method of recovering workers' compensation benefits.
z 76
Thus, the agreement undermined Heric's right to benefits by forcing him to
exhaust his personal and sick leave benefits before recovering workers'
compensation benefits. 77 On remand, the judge was instructed to hold a
hearing on the merits of Heric's claim for benefits for the period in
* 278question. At the same time, the court concluded that the employer may
seek to offset against the leave pay awarded to Heric the amount by which
the sum of leave pay and workers' compensation benefits exceeds Heric's
average weekly wage.279 Similarly, the judge has discretion to reduce
Heric's sick leave and personal leave benefits by a fraction equivalent to the
offset accorded the employer.280
IX. HEALTH BENEFITS
Some states and many local subdivisions of the state provide dependent
health benefits to "spousal equivalents" of its public employees. These so-
called "domestic partnership" laws meet with opposition on many
fronts. For example, on December 9, 1998 the South Florida Water
Management District postponed a vote to grant insurance benefits to
unmarried, partners of its employees in the face of protest by the Christian
Coalition. The District would have been the first Florida agency to offer
282domestic partnership benefits. Governor Jeb Bush reportedly opposes
273. See FLA. STAT. § 440.211 (1999).
274. Id. § 440.211(2).
275. Heric, 728 So. 2d at 1249.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1249-50.
279. Id. at 1250.
280. Heric, 728 So. 2d at 1250.
281. Lori Rozsa, District Puts Off Vote on Partner Benefits, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 10,
1998, at 6B.
282. Id.
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granting benefits for unmarried partners. 3 One board member commented
that unelected public officials should not be setting social policy. 2
A month after Miami-Dade commissioners narrowly passed a human
rights ordinance, Broward Countybegan considering a sweeping domestic
partnership law in January, 1999.2s Besides offering insurance benefits to
domestic partners of county employees, the proposal required independent286
contractors doing business with the county to do the same. Heterosexuals
living in unmarried partnerships would also qualify under the proposal.287
Moreover, unmarried adults could extend their insurance benefits to an
elderly parent or other blood relative living in the same household.28 8 A
public hearing was set for January 26, 1999.2 9
An editorial in the Miami Herald endorsed the proposed domestic
partnership law, but noted that in order to avoid violating Florida's Defense
of Marriage Act,290 the proposal defined partnerships as two single people
who share expenses and consider themselves a family. 91 As the editorial
pointed out, this definition encompasses a person who wants to register his
ill aunt in order to cover her under his county health insurance.
292
Even before the public hearing, however, the Broward County
Commission considered dropping the provision requiring companies doing
business with the county to offer domestic partnership benefits to their
293employees. Instead, three commissioners were said to be recommending
that companies that do offer such benefits be granted bonus points when they
294bid on county contracts. It turned out that the county's budget office
discovered that most private companies that would be affected by the
ordinance would be exempt because they are regulated by the federal
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Lisa Arthur, Broward Poised to OK Partner Benefits: Not Even Gay Meccas Such
as Key West or Miami Beach Have Laws as Sweeping, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Jan. 17,1999,
at lA.
286. Under the proposal drawn up by the county attorney's office, "companies that do
$50,000 or more in business with the county would have to provide benefits to domestic
partners and relatives of gay and unmarried employees." Jacqueline Charles, Domestic
Partners Plan Faces Revisions, County Contractors May Get Exemption, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Jan. 24, 1999, at 1BR.
287. Arthur, supra note 285, at 1A.
288. Id.
289. Charles, supra note 286, at 1BR.
290. FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (1999).
291. Half a Partnership Broward Effort, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Jan. 17, 1999, at
2L.
292. Id.
293. Charles, supra note 286, at 1BR.
294. Id.
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Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").295 For this
reason, the ordinance would unduly burden the few companies not covered
by ERISA. 296 The preference system is already in place for women and
minorities who bid on county contracts. 297
Opposition to the proposed ordinance mobilized immediately.298
Concerned Citizens for Broward claimed that the proposal undermines the
institution of family and sanctions gay marriages. In response, the Presi-
dent of the Broward County AFL-CIO, Dan Reynolds, pointed out that most
domestic partners are heterosexuals.3°
Despite opposition, the Broward County Commissioners passed the
domestic partnership ordinance on January 26, 1999, by a vote of six to
one. 30 1 Broward's ordinance was modeled after similar ordinances in Miami
Beach, Key West, and San Francisco. 302 The final version of the ordinance
included a preference system for awarding bonus points to private companies
intent on doing business with the county and who offer domestic partner
benefits. 303 About ninety percent of the county's contractors would be
exempted because their health insurance plans are governed by ERISA. °4
Almost immediately, Wally Lowe, a Broward resident, filed suit
challenging the legality of Broward's ordinance. 305 Before trial, Broward
Circuit Court Judge Robert Andrews heard oral arguments on whether Lowe
had standing to bring his lawsuit. 306 The county attorneys ar§ued that Lowe
lacked standing since he was not affected by the ordinance. At the same
hearing, Lowe asked the court to issue a temporary injunction to prevent
implementation of any part of the ordinance pending the outcome of his
suit.3°8 Meanwhile, the County Commissioners considered eliminating bio-
logical relatives from the ordinance after the County's insurer announced
that the law would increase rates by thirty percent. 309 In late March, 1999
295. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Charles, supra note 286, at 1BR.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Jacqueline Charles, County OKs Domestic Partner Law, 6-1, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Jan. 27, 1999, at lB.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Jacqueline Charles, County Wins Postponement in Suit Challenging Domestic
Partners Plan, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Mar. 18, 1999, at 2B.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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Broward County's Director of Human Resources recommended that the
ordinance limit the number of partners that can be added during the year
(permitting a change in partners only once every six months) and also
recommended omitting blood relatives from the ordinance.3'0 The blood
relative provision had the potential of raising insurance rates dramatically
because, hypothetically, employees could bring someone very ill into the
pool.311 By this time, Judge Andrews ruled that Lowe did have standing to
challenge the ordinance under state law.31 Judge Andrews heard oral
arguments on April 21, 1999, while a public hearing was pending on an
amended version of the ordinance.313 At the hearing, Lowe's lawyers argued
that the ordinance conflicts with Florida's Defense of Marriage Act, which
bans same-sex marriages, and therefore, the County had exceeded its home-
rule authority.314 On April 27, 1999, a public hearing was held and the
Commigsioners voted to scale back the ordinance by dropping the blood
relatives provision.315 In May of 1999, Judge Andrews ruled in favor of the
county, and Lowe filed an appeal.
316
Finally, Broward County's sweeping new domestic partnership law
took effect on July 12, 1999. 3rW The ordinance, as amended, extended health
insurance benefits to the unmarried partners-homosexual or heterosexual-
of county employees, provided the employees register their partners with the
county.
318
X. PENSION AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS
The first bill Governor Jeb Bush signed into law was the Police and
Firefighters Pension Act of 1999, 319 amending the law governing the
310. Jacqueline Charles, Tighten Domestic Partners Ordinance, County Human
Resources ChiefAdvises, MIAM HERALD (Broward), Mar. 23, 1999, at 2B.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Jacqueline Charles, Hearing Today on Suit vs. Domestic Partner Plan, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Apr. 21, 1999, at 6B.
314. Jacqueline Charles, Domestic Partner Law Attacked in Court, MiAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 22, 1999, at 3B.
315. Jacqueline Charles, Commission Amends Domestic Partner Law, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), Apr. 28, 1999, at 2B.
316. Jacqueline Charles, Broward Judge: Domestic Partnership Law Legal, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), May 1, 1999, at 3B.
317. Jacqueline Charles, Partners in Life, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), July 13, 1999, at
IA.
318. Id.
319. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-1.
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disbursement of disability benefits and retirement benefits for public
employees.320
A panel that governs the Florida Retirement System announced in
December, 1998 that for the first time in years, Florida's primary pension
plan is "fully funded on an actuarial basis." 321 This means the state can meet
their pension obligations as thousands of public employees retire over the
coming years. 32 According to an editorial in the Miami Herald, the Florida
Retirement System's assets amount to eighty-five billion dollars-sixty-one
percent invested in United States stocks, and twenty-six percent invested in
bonds.3z Meanwhile, the state senate is reviewing whether to allow state
employees to opt for a "defined contribution plan" akin to the 401(k) plans
prevalent in the private sector.
32
A recurring issue in public pension law is whether retired public
employees who return to public employment must surrender their pension
benefits while they work. According to an unofficial opinion issued by
Attorney General Gerry Hammond in a May 10, 1999 letter to Plantation
City Attorney Don Lunny Jr., and reported in the Miami Herald, Plantation
City officials can continue to collect retirement benefits when they reenter
public employment. 326 According to this unofficial opinion by Assistant
Attorney General Hammond, "it would appear that the city may not deny a
retired officer simultaneous payment of retirement benefits and a salary for
re-employment with the city.' 27 Even so, Plantation is free to adopt an
ordinance forcing the surrender of pension benefits if the retiree rejoins the
public workforce.
32
The question of the legal impact of changing public pension law arose
in the case of Bean v. State.329 The case was triggered by a change in the,, ,, 33 "
statutory definition of "joint annuitant" in 1995. George Bean worked for
the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority for many years. 331 He retired
on July 1, 1996 with over thirty-four years of creditable service with the
320. Don Edgar, Act I First Bill, MIAMI HERA.D, Mar. 13, 1999, at 5B.
321. Editorial, A Windfall's Fallout, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 6, 1998, at 2L.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See generally William T. McGee, Plantation Councilman Can Collect Both Pension
and Salary, State Lawyer Says, MAHvHERAL (Broward), May 26, 1999, at 3B.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. 732 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
330. See FLA. STAT. § 121.021(28) (1995). Compare FLA. STAT. § 121.021(28)
(1993), with FLA. STAT. § 121.021(28) (1995).
331. Bean, 732 So. 2d at 392.
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State.332 George and Shirley Bean divorced in 1983. 333 At that time, the
State assured George that he could designate both a former wife and a
current wife as joint annuitants so long as Shirley was financially dependent
on him.334 In addition, George agreed to pay Shirley alimony equal to forty
percent of his gross income. - Shirley qualified as a "joint annuitant" until
the term was redefined in 1995.4 Shirley did not, however, qualify as a
"joint annuitant" under the new statutory definition. 337 In light of these
facts, the court reversed the order of the Division of Retirement and held that
George had a vested right to designate Shirley as a "joint annuitant. 3   In
support of this conclusion, the court said the key was that George had
reached his normal retirement date before the statutory definition was
339
changed. It was irrelevant that he had not yet retired when the new
definition took effect.
340
XI. DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE
A. Just Cause
In order to discipline or discharge most public employees, a public
employer must have a business justification known as "just cause. 3 41 What
constitutes "just cause" under civil service bears a striking resemblance to
"just cause" found in collective bargaining agreements negotiated between
public employers and unions representing government employees.342
Discipline and discharge cases are arguably the largest source of employee
grievances.343 In the public sector, who decides whether to discipline an
employee is a key question.344 Usually, the employer decides in the first
instance, and the employee is entitled to contest the discipline before a
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Until 1995, the "definition of 'joint annuitant' included a person who was
financially dependent for at least one-half of his or her support from the retiring member at the
time of that member's retirement." Bean, 732 So. 2d at 392 (citing FLA. STAT. §121.091(6)(d)
(1993)). This option was dropped in 1995. See FLA. STAT. § 121.091 (1995).
337. Bean, 732 So. 2d at 392.
338. Id. at 392-93.
339. Id. at 392.
340. Id.
341. FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 60k-4.010(4)(b) (1995).
342. See id.
343. See generally FLA. STAT. § 110.227 (1999).
344. Id.
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neutral decision-maker. 345 Either a civil service commission or an arbitrator
holds a hearing and decides whether the employer, indeed, had just cause to
support the discipline. 346 The losing party at that point either appeals to the
Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC") or to a state court to
review the civil service commission or arbitrator's decision.347
Many legal questions can be raised upon review, such as: 1) did the
commission or the arbitrator apply the proper evidentiary standard (usually a
preponderance of the evidence instead of the higher clear and convincing
standard); 2) did the punishment fit the crime; 3) were mitigating factors
given proper weight; and 4) does the arbitrator's decision violate public
policy?
Many of these issues were raised in cases reviewed by Florida circuit
courts of appeal in 1998-99. For example, in Mathis v. Florida Department
of Corrections,34 the Department of Corrections ("DOC") tried to dismiss
Earnest Mathis, a career service employee with the DOC.3 49  Mathis
challenged the proposed discharge by timely filing a notice of appeal with
PERC. 0 PERC reduced the dismissal to a sixty-day suspension, ordered
Mathis reinstated, and ruled that he was entitled to back pay for the time he
was out of work without ever spelling out the amount of back pay owed to
him.351 When negotiations stalled, Mathis filed a petition for issuance of a
computation of back pay.352 PERC denied the petition as late.353 On appeal,
the court ruled that PERC had no authority to deny Mathis any back pay
merely because he failed to meet PERC's deadline, which was not dictated
by statute or rule.35 4 In support of this conclusion, the court noted Mathis's
good faith efforts to settle the issue with DOC and lack of any prejudice
against DOC.
355
Several disciplinary cases involve prison guards, or so-called
correctional officers. 356 The Miami Herald reported the case of a Miami-
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. FLA. STAT. § 110.227(5)(b).
348. 726 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
349. Id. at 390.
350. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 447.207(8) (1995) (stating that PERC "shall hear appeals
arising out of any suspension, reduction in pay, transfer, layoff, demotion, or dismissal of any
permanent employee in the State Career Service System").
351. Mathis, 726 So. 2d at 390.
352. Id. at 391.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 392-93.
355. Id. at 393.
356. See Ana Acle & Manny Garcia, Inmate Says Guard Forced Her to Have Sex,
MIAMi HERALD, July 7, 1999, at 7B.
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Dade correctional officer who had been disciplined with pay for reportedly
forcing an inmate to perform oral sex on him in a jury room at the county
courthouse. 357 Although not criminally charged, the eight-year veteran was
relieved 6f duty. 58 The Miami Herald reported that DNA taken from semen
found on the victim's breast tested positive.359 Police detectives seized the
guard's clothing-even the red underwear that the inmate had minutely
described.36  Sources predicted the guard would be dismissed if the story
361were true, whether or not he was criminally charged. The article pointed
out that if the incident had taken place just three weeks later, the guard could
have faced an automatic third-degree felony.362 A new Florida law, effective
July 1, 1999, treats sex between a correction officer and a prisoner as a363
felony even if it is consensual. 3 In earlier cases in 1998-99, one guard was
fired after a prisoner became pregnant with the officer's baby." Another
female guard was dismissed after reportedly performing oral sex on male
inmates. 
365
Disciplining prison guards for beating inmates is a recurring issue.366
The most recent incident allegedly took place in July, 1999 when nine
guards were suspended pending a murder investigation into the suspicious
death of a known troublemaker, Frank Valdez, a death row inmate on X
Wing, the toughest hold for the toughest inmates at the Florida State Prison
in Starke, Florida.367 Two dozen state investigators and FBI agents were
investigating the death.368 The Florida Department of Law Enforcement,, . 369
(FDLE") is in charge of the case. The DOC is encouraging the guards to370cooperate. Valdez's death has triggered numerous tips and grievances
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Acle & Garcia, supra note 356, at 7B.
362. Id.
363. Id. (citing S. Res. 1788, 1999 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1999) (amending FLA. STAT. §
944.35(3)(b) and creating FLA. STAT. § 951.221)).
364. Acle & Garcia, supra note 356, at 7B.
365. Id.
366. See generally Guards Allegedly Beat Inmate to Death, WASH. PoST, July 22, 1999,
at A9.
367. Phil Long & Steve Bousquet, Big Law-Enforcement Team Investigating Death of
Inmate, MAm HERAD, Aug. 5, 1999, at 9B.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
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from inmates across the state.37 1 The FBI agents, meanwhile, are working on
federal civil rights issues.372
On August 6, 1999 three correctional officer recruits were dismissed as
part of the Valdez investigation.373 In light of their probationary status, no
grounds were given for their dismissal. Moreover eleven guards were
suspended with pay in the wake of the Valdez death. 375 But, one of these
correctional officers will return to work at the prison owing to his change of
376heart to cooperate with the investigation. News reports indicate that one
of the guards implicated in the Valdez death has a history of allegations of
abuse of inmates. 7  Six complaints by inmates over a five-year period were
found in the personnel file of this guard.378 After one of these grievances
was confirmed, the guard was suspended "for 60 days without 3Pay for
inappropriate use of force" after putting down an inmate skirmish. 79 Even
so, this guard was named Officer of the Month for June 1997.380
In Dalem v. Department of Corrections,381 Anthony Dalem was
promoted to correctional officer lieutenant.382 While serving as the shift
supervisor, he responded to a radio alert that fighting had broken out in the
prison dormitories.383 Although Dalem arrived after the fight had been
broken up, officers Krueger and Arpan testified that Dalem beat inmate
Wayne Green, although Green offered no resistance. 384 Among other things,
Dalem allegedly kicked Green in the chest several times and once in the
neck, and stood on top of a footlocker, and twice jumped onto Green's
385back. Later, Dalem denied he was even at the scene. The DOC accused
Dalem of abuse of an inmate, willful violations of rules and regulations, and
giving false testimony.387 An evidentiary hearing was held before PERC.1
88
371. Id.
372. Long & Bousquet, supra note 367, at 9B.
373. Steve Bousquet, 3 Correctional Recruits Fired in Valdez Case, MiAMI HERALD, Aug.
6, 1999, at lB.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Steve Bousquet, Guard Accused Repeatedly of Abuse, MLAWI HERALD, Aug. 7, 1999,
at lB.
378. Id.
379. ld.
380. Id.
381. 720 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
382. Id. at 575.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Dalem, 720 So. 2d at 575.
387. Id. at 576.
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The hearing officer found that the DOC had reasonable cause to discharge
Dalem for his beating of Green and then lying about his role.38 9 Dalem filed
an appeal with PERC, which affirmed the hearing officer's ruling.
390
On appeal, Dalem argued that the hearing officer applied the
preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing
standard.391 The court concluded that the hearing officer properly applied
the right standard for termination hearings.392 Dalem also argued that the
hearing officer's decision was not supported by competent substantial
evidence and that he failed to consider relevant mitigating factors.393 The
court rejected both of these arguments. 394
The question of what mitigatory criteria PERC may consider in
reviewing discipline meted out to a public employee arose in Nordheim v.
Department of Environmental Protection.395 Gregory Nordheim worked as a
pilot for the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP").396 In 1991
he sustained injuries in a serious aircraft accident while he was performing
several tasks at the same time.397  Although the plane was destroyed,
Nordheim was not disciplined.398 Nordheim caused another accident while
39flying surveillance in March, 1997. He failed to lower the landing gear
and the plane sustained $5416 worth of damage because he was trying to do
too many tasks at once. 4w DEP at first demoted Nordheim to the rank of
boat officer, but changed the demotion to a dismissal when it became
apparent that Nordheirn was physically unable to perform the duties of boat
officer in light of his injuries.4
Nordheim appealed his dismissal to PERC, which held a three-day
hearing.402 The hearing officer ruled that DEP had cause to fire Nordheim
for negligence and that no statutorily prescribed mitigatory criteria applied to
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Dalem, 720
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. 719 So. 2d
(Fla. 1999).
396. Id. at 1213.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Nordheim,7
401. Id. at 1213-
402. Id. at 1214.
So. 2d at 576.
1212 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 729 So. 2d 393
719 So. 2d at 1213.
-14.
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reduce his dismissal. 40 3 Upon review, PERC found there were offsetting
factors and reduced the punishment from a dismissal to a ninety-day
suspension. 4 As for the mitigation criterion that PERC found relevant,
"action taken with respect to similar conduct by other employees, 4 °5 PERC
concluded that the hearing officer improperly restricted Nordheim's
evidence dealing with earlier incidents of negligence that did not result in
discipline. 4°  For this reason, PERC ruled that Nordheim's punishment
amounted to disparate treatment by his employer. 
4W
On appeal, the court reversed PERC's ruling because PERC refused to
take into account its own case of Jackson v. Department of Juvenile
408Justice, which made clear that a new aWncy is not bound by earlier
disciplinary actions taken by its predecessor. The three employees PERC
compared to Nordheim all sustained accidents with DEP's predecessor, the
410Florida Marine Patrol. The court ruled that PERC abused its discretion in
refusing to take into account the rule in Jackson and that the decision was
"[i]nconsistent with officially stated agency policy or a prior agency
practice" not accounted for by PERC. 1 The issue of mitigation grounded
on the lack of discipline of former workers for analogous misconduct was
raised before the hearing officer.412 The court remanded the case to PERC to
reconsider the hearing officer's findings and to take into account the rule in
Jackson.413
In Cephas v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,414 John
Cephas worked for the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services ("HRS' 2 as an interviewing clerk for a program that issued checks
for buying food. In this capacity, Cephas issued four checks to Tawanda
Baker, a client of the program.41  Later, Baker applied for an apartment,
indicating she was a HRS employee and that Cephas was her supervisor.
40
In verifying Baker's employment, the leasing agent spoke to a male who
403. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 447.208(3)(d) (1995).
404. Nordheim, 719 So. 2d at 1214.
405. FLA. STAT. § 447.208(3)(d)2.
406. Nordheim, 719 So. 2d at 1214.
407. Id.
408. 12 F.C.S.R. 163 (1997).
409. Nordheim, 719 So. 2d at 1214.
410. Id.
411. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 120.68(6)(e)3 (Supp. 1996)).
412. Id.
413. Id. at 1215.
414. 719 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 729 So. 2d 390 (Fla.
1999), and review denied, 729 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1999).
415. Id. at 8.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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identified himself as Mr. Cephas and represented that he was Baker's
supervisor and that Baker was an able employee.418 The next day, unable to
reach Baker at home, the agent called the HRS office in Plant City and
learned that Baker did not work there.4 19 It turns out that Cephas was not
Baker's supervisor, and based on these facts, HRS dismissed Cephas for
misconduct.420 On appeal to PERC, the hearing officer affirmed HRS'sI -421
action and PERC ratified the recommendation.
On appeal, the court ruled that the evidence was not adequate to support
a finding of misconduct because the leasing agent never nailed down
Cephas's identity as the person whom she talked to about Baker.422
According to the court, telephone conversations are only reliable evidence if
"'the identity of the person with whom the conversation was had is
established by direct evidence, facts or circumstances."' 423 In short, HRS
could not assume the person who answered Cephas's phone was in fact
Cephas without corroborative facts.
424
When a public employee is disciplined "for cause," what kinds of
defenses may the employee raise to undercut the employer's case? In Doyle
v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation,425 Elizabeth Doyle
worked as a special agent with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco ("ABT"), an arm of the Department of Business and Professional
Regulation.4 6 Doyle's coworker accused her of unbecoming conduct and
sexual harassment, and Doyle was placed on administrative leave.427 In an
interview, Doyle denied ever using vulgar language, but later amended her
answer to admit she used "common squad room language. ' 428 ABT fired
Doyle: 1) "for lying," 2) for "unbecoming conduct," 429 and 3) "for using
418. Id.
419. Cephas, 719 So. 2d at 8.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. (quoting Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 374 (Fla. 1981)).
424. Cephas, 719 So. 2d at 9 (citing Mack v. Widrowicz, 556 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
425. 713 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
426. Id. at 1041.
427. Id. at 1042.
428. Id.
429. Id. n.2 (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61-2.010 (1990)). The code defines
unbecoming conduct as:
Any willful action or conduct by an employee which impedes the
Department's efforts, brings discredit on the Department, impairs the
operation or efficiency of the Department or any employee, impairs the
employee's ability to perform his or her job, or results in the reluctance or
refusal on the part of others to work with the employee.
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vulgar or abusive language." 430 PERC convened a formal hearing,431 and
Doyle raised the defense of condonation, asserting that the agency condoned
vulgar and sexually explicit language in the ABT offices.432 Moreover,
Doyle stated that ABT workers regularly posted on their office walls
sexually explicit, pornographic and vulgar signs, pictures, and jokes.433
PERC's hearing officer agreed with Doyle's defense of condonation to the
improper language charge.4M Before Doyle could be disciplined for using
vulgar language, the agency owed her notice that future use of such improper
language was grounds for discipline.435 The hearing officer ruled that Doyle
met her burden of proving the defense of condonation and that the agency
lacked just cause to discipline her for abusive language.436 Left intact,
however, were four other charges of unbecoming conduct, but the hearing
officer nevertheless reduced the discipline to a sixty-calendar-day
suspension.
437
PERC remanded the case to the hearing officer to clarify the lying
438charge. The hearing officer ruled that "when Doyle denied using vulgar or
sexually explicit language at the office in front of other employees, during
the investigation, she was lying to Harris." 439 PERC affirmed the hearing
officer's findings but agreed with the agency that lying during an internal
investigation about her job-related conduct warranted Doyle's dismissal. 440
On appeal, Doyle alleged due process violations which the court
rejected in light of the 1998 Supreme Court decision in La Chance v.
Erickson44 which held that due process does not encompass the right of the
employee "to 'put the government to its proof' by falsely denying the
charged conduct, or 'a right to make false statements with respect to the
charged [mis]conduct,' in an agency investigation." 442 In response, Doyle
contends that article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution grants stronger
Doyle, 713 So. 2d at 1043 n.2 (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-2.010).
430. Id. at 1042-43.
431. Id. (according to FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (1995)).
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Doyle, 713 So. 2d at 1043.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 1044.
438. Id.
439. Doyle, 713 So. 2d at 1044.
440. Id.
441. 522 U.S. 262 (1998).
442. Doyle, 713 So. 2d at 1044 (quoting La Chance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266
(1998)) (internal citations omitted).
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due process protection than the United States Constitution.443 Sidestepping
Doyle's argument altogether, the court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence that Doyle ever lied.444 Doyle's later explanation of her denial of
ever using vulgar language raised facts implicating her condonation
defense. 445 So, as the court phrased it, Doyle's "denial was merely a legal
conclusion or a matter of personal opinion which should not be punishable
as a lie."446  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on caselaw
interpreting perjury. 4  In this context, Doyle's "denial was merely an
assertion of her legal defense-a legal conclusion or a matter of personal
opinion-not a statement of fact." In sum, "'[recise questioning is
imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury."' The court remanded
the case to PERC for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.450
In City of Tallahassee v. Big Bend Police Benevolent Association,51 the
City fired Thomas Maureau, a lieutenant in the Tallahassee Police
Department, for engaging in alleged sex acts while on duty and then lying
about it.452 Under a collective bargaining agreement, Maureau was entitled
to file a grievance and go to arbitration. At the conclusion of an
evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator upheld only one of the City's charges,
lying, and reinstated Maureau after a four-month suspension without pay.
454
The Ci y appealed and urged the trial court to overturn the arbitrator's
award. The trial court was unable however, to find any statutory grounds
for vacating the arbitrator's award.45  Florida law provides that:
(1) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an[arbitrator's] award when:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means.
(b) There was evident partiality ....
443. Id. at 1045 (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992)).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Doyle, 713 So. 2d at 1045.
448. Id. at 1046.
449. Id. (quoting Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973)).
450. Id.
451. 710 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
452. Id. at 214-15.
453. Id. at 215.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Big Bend, 710 So. 2d at 215.
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(c) The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of her or his
jurisdiction exceeded their powers.
(d) The arbitrators... refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence
material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing,
contrary to the provisions of s. 682.06, as to prejudice substantially
the rights of a party.
(e) There was no agreement or provision for arbitration subject
457to this law....
On appeal, the City argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
erroneously adopting a clear and convincing evidentiary standard instead of
the preponderance of the evidence standard. 458 The First District Court of
Appeal ruled that even if true, adoption of the stricter standard falls short of
legal grounds for vacating the arbitrator's award under section 682.13(1), of
the Florida Statutes.459 The court also rejected the City's claim that
reinstating Maureau violated public policy because police officers must
possess good moral character. 6  Since the arbitrator found insufficient
evidence of a romantic relationship with another police officer, public policy
was not violated.
461
A concurring opinion by Judge Booth made clear that arbitrators are not
free to adopt the heightened burden of proof in disciplinary cases, but he did
not think the issue had been preserved below.
462
B. Misconduct by Public Officials
In Hamidullah v. Burke,463 Governor Lawton Chiles suspended Miami-
Dade County District Two Commissioner James C. Burke from his seat on
the Miami-Dade County Commission, pursuant to article IV, section 7 of the
Florida Constitution. Burke had been indicted on federal public
corruption charges.465 He resigned and a special election was held to fill the
vacancy on the commission. Despite his indictment and suspension,
Burke declared himself a candidate for his old seat, prompting voters to go to
457. FLA. STAT. § 682.13(1) (1999).
458. Big Bend, 710 So. 2d at 215.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 216.
463. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D675 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1998).
464. Id. at D675-76.
465. Id. at D676.
466. Id. at D675.
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court to stop him from running.467 The circuit court for Dade County refused
to stop Burke from running.
46 -
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
ruling.469 Nothing in the state constitution or in Florida's statutes renders
Burke ineligible to run for office.470 Absent constitutional or statutory
prohibition, only the legislature is authorized to set eligibility standards for
public office.47  The court refused to encroach on the power of the
electorate, of the Governor, and of the legislature.472 The court rejected the
argument that article IV, section 7 of the Florida Constitution dictates that a
suspended official may not run for his office until acquitted.473 At most, that
provision empowers the Governor to suspend a public official indicted for a
crime until he is acquitted.474 To be sure, the court noted that the Governor
still has the power to suspend Burke again should he win the election.
475
Defamation of political candidates uttered by anyone during campaigns
received attention from the Florida Legislature in 1999.476  The House
Judiciary Committee debated the relative merits of a proposed bill that
would hold "all persons accountable for the truthfulness of their statements
regarding candidates." 477 The bill, proposed by Representative Bill Posey,
R-Rockledge, would set up an administrative agency to oversee truth and
would "put those who falsely claim that a candidate violated this law at peril
of criminal felony charges." 47 In an editorial, the Miami Herald criticized
the bill as flawed in two respects: "It is of dubious constitutionality, and it
fails to deal with some of the ugliest aspects of campaigns, such as clever
distortions and ethnic or racial pandering."479 The editorial regarded the bill
as weakening the current United States Supreme Court standard for libel by
holding someone liable for making statements they should have known were
false." v Under the federal standard, actual malice, and not mere negligence
must be proved.481
467. Id. at D675-76.
468. Hamidullah, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D675.
469. Id. at D676.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Hamidullah, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D676.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Editorial, A Threat to Free Speech Campaign Reform Bill, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
24, 1999, at 18A.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 255 (1964).
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482In United States v. Starks, community health aides working for IRS
and the president of a drug treatment provider were convicted for violating
483the anti-kickback provision of the Social Security Act. When they started
working at HRS, the public employees were warned about accepting any
outside employment giving rise to a conflict of interest and were told to
report any outside employment to HRS.4 4 The public employees agreed to
refer patients to the drug treatment business for $250 per patient without
reporting their referral arrangement to HRS. 485 At trial, some of the referrals
testified that the HRS employees threatened that HRS would take away their
babies if they did not go in for treatment for their drug addictions.486 In sum,
the two HRS employees referred eighteen women and were paid $323,023 in
Medicaid payments.487 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida sentenced Starks to two concurrent terms of thirty months
488
of home detention.
On appeal, the HRS employees argued that the jury should have been
instructed that, because of the Anti-Kickback statute's mens rea component,
the employees had to have known that their referral arrangement violated the
federal statute before they could be convicted.4 9 The Eleventh Circuit's jury
instruction for the term "willfully" reads: "The word willfully, as that term
is used from time to time in these instructions, means the act was committed
voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law
forbids, that is with a bad purpose, either to disobey or disregard the law." 490
The Eleventh Circuit also cited the Supreme Court decision in Bryan v.
United States,491 which made clear that a jury may find a defendant guilty of
willfully violating a statute if it thinks "'that the defendant acted with an
evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his
conduct was unlawful.' ' 492 In other words, the willfulness requirement does
not amount to an exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no
excuse; knowledge that behavior is unlawful is enough.493 The giving or
taking of kickbacks for medical referrals is clearly illegal, indeed, close to
482. 157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998).
483. Id. at 835; see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994).
484. Starks, 157 F.3d at 836.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 837.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Starks, 157 F.3d at 837.
490. Id. at 837-38.
491. 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
492. Starks, 157 F.3d at 838 (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998)).
493. Id. (citing Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 195 (1998)).
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malum in se.494 The court upheld the trial court's jury instruction on the
meaning of the word "willful." 495
As for the vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must define the crime
with a degree of clarity to put ordinary people on notice what behavior is
banned.496- The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Anti-Kickback statute
was not vague, citing Supreme Court criteria: "whether the statute (1)
involves only economic regulation, (2) provides only civil, rather than
criminal, penalties, (3) contains a scienter requirement mitigating vagueness,
and (4) threatens any constitutionally protected rights. ' 497- Applying these
factors, the court reasoned that the Anti-Kickback statute regulates only
economic behavior and does not violate any constitutional rights.498 In sum,
the IIRS employees had adequate notice that their behavior was unlawful.499
Another case drawing a distinction among classes of public employees
was Service Employees International Union v. Public Employees Relations
Commission.50 Patricia O'Brien worked as a deputy court clerk in Orlando
when she was fired, allegedly because she "reported and was paid for more
hours than she actually worked on repeated occasions." 50 1 By contrast
O'Brien contends she was terminated because of her union activities.
O'Brien filed an unfair labor practice charge with PERC, which sustained
her discharge.
5 0 3
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal framed "the issue [as]
whether a deputy court clerk is in fact a 'public employee"' under article I,
section 6 of the Florida Constitution and section 447.203(3) of the Florida
Statutes.5 4 The Clerk of Court appoints, rather than employs, deputy
clerks.505  Earlier precedent judged deputy court clerks not to be public
employees.5°  The court grudgingly agreed, but urged the state supreme
court to address the question.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 839.
496. Id.
497. Starks, 157 F.3d at 839 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S.
489,498-99 (1982)).
498. Id. at 840.
499. Id.
500. 720 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 732 So. 2d 328
(Fla. 1999).
501. Id. at 291.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Service Employees Int'l Union, 720 So. 2d at 291.
506. Id. (citing Federation of Pub. Employees v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n,
478 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
507. Id.
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C. Whistle-blowing and Retaliatory Discharge
Florida has enacted a Whistle-blower's Act, 508 aimed at protecting
public employees who report or disclose employment-related wrongdoing,
usually by management. 5u9 The law shields employee disclosure of past,
present, or otential wrongdoing by supervisors, coworkers, or public
employers.
Several cases raised the question whether the whistle-blower has
exhausted administrative channels of relief.51 The Florida Whistle-blower'sAct, provides, in part:
Within 60 days after the action prohibited by this section, any local
public employee protected by this section may file a complaint with
the appropriate local governmental authority, if that authority has
established by ordinance an administrative procedure ... Within
180 days after entry of a final decision by the local governmental
authority, the public employee who filed the complaint may bring a
civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction. If the local
governmental authority has not established an administrative
procedure by ordinance or contract, a local public employee may,
within 180 days after the action prohibited by this section, bring a
512
civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction.
In City of Miami v. Del Rio,513 a City of Miami police officer "blew the
whistle" on his superiors over the legality of certain orders by disclosing the
alleged wrongdoing to other public agencies, including the state attorney.
51 4
In response, Del Rio alleges that his superiors retaliated against him.515 Del
Rio went to court, suing the City, the Chief of Police, and three of his
superior officers, for violations of the Whistle-blower's Act.516 Del Rio
claimed he had exhausted all administrative remedies.1 7
On appeal, Del Rio changed his argument, alleging that there was no
administrative remedy since the board he went to denied him a hearing by
508. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187 (1999).
509. See id.
510. See id.
511. See City of Miami v. Del Rio, 723 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998),
review denied, 733 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1999).
512. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(8)(b).
513. 723 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
514. Id. at 300.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
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delay tactics and, therefore he was free to bypass the administrative route518
and go directly to court. For its part, the City contends that its code
established an administrative board519 with the power to hear whistle-blower
complaints, but that Del Rio abandoned his complaint before the board
rendered its decision. s5 In other words, Del Rio failed to exhaust his
administrative remedy and forfeits the right to go to court.521 The Third
District Court of Appeal ruled that the Civil Service Board met the
requirements of the Whistle-blower's Act, and therefore, Del Rio must first
exhaust his remedy before the Board.52 The Board delayed its proceedings
to secure additional information from Del Rio who, instead of complying
with the board's request, abandoned his petition and filed for judicial
relief.523 Del Rio's suit was deemed premature.
524
In Dinehart v. Town of Palm Beach,5 Mary Dinehart worked in the
finance department of the Town of Palm Beach and took part in an
investigation of her supervisor, but the town council decided against firing
the supervisor.52 In the aftermath, Dinehart was transferred to another
department, which prompted her suit against the town under the public
Whistle-blower's Act.527 The circuit court for Palm Beach County granted
summary judgment in favor of the Town because the Town had set up an
administrative procedure for reviewing whistle-blower claims, and Dinehart
had failed to go through that board.5
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal framed the issue as
whether Dinehart had exhausted her administrative remedies before filing
suit.529 Dinehart argued that the Town's administrative procedure did not
meet the legal requirements set out in section 112.3187(8)(b) of the Florida
Statutes.53° Under the town's procedures, employees must first discuss their
complaint with their immediate supervisor unless the complaint deals with a
suspension, demotion, or dismissal.531  Next, workers should take their
518. Del Rio, 723 So. 2d at 300.
519. Id. at 300. "The City contends its Civil Service Board ... as set forth in section
36(a), Miami, Fla., Charter, meets the requirements of [the Whistle-blower's Act]." Id. (citations
omitted).
520. Id. at 301.
521. Id.
522. Del Rio, 723 So. 2d at 301.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. 728 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
526. Id. at 360.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 361.
529. Id. at 362.
530. Dinehart, 728 So. 2d at 361 (citing FLA. STAT. § 1 12.3187(8)(b) (1995)).
531. Id.
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grievance to the department head.532 Third, employees should appeal to a
grievance resolution board.533 If the complaint deals with a suspension,
demotion, or dismissal, however, workers must "proceed directly to the
grievance resolution board," which then "submits its recommendation to the
town counsel for action. 534
It is clear from the face of the Whistle-blower's Act that the legislature
left the details of the procedure up to the town, so long as complaints are
heard by a panel of impartial decision-makers, and the procedure otherwise
abides by due process. The court concluded that even though the town's
procedure did not guarantee an impartial panel, its procedure duly satisfies
the Act's criteria. Moreover, the town's procedure requires findings by
the grievance committee to be submitted to the town council.537 In sum,
Dinehart failed to exhaust the administrative remedies.538
In Harris v. District Board of Trustees,539 coordinators of a criminal
justice program run by a community college, who were fired, sued the
college, and its president, among others, claiming that their termination was
in retaliation for their whistle-blowing acts.54° The alleged wrongdoing
involved irregularities and departures from law and policy going on in the
college's Criminal Justice Training Program. 5 4 Shattler was the program's
manager.542 The plaintiffs alleged that he took no action in response to their
complaints, so they took their case to the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement ("FDLE"). 543 During FDLE's investigation of the program,
Buckley, the director of the division of career and special programs fired
Harris, allegedly on financial grounds.544 Other acts of retaliation include:
unwarranted criticism; verbal abuse; searches through personal papers, such
as a diary; and negative performance evaluations.5
The Federal District Court for the Middle District of Florida reached
the following conclusions: 1) the plaintiffs established that the college
president had violated their First Amendment rights; 2) the plaintiffs' speech
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. Dinehart, 728 So. 2d at 361.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 362.
539. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
540. Id. at 1319.
541. Id. at 1322.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. Harris, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
545. Id.
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touched on matters of public concern; 3) the college president was not acting
within the scope of her discretionary authority to trigger qualified immunit"
4) the time for filing a lawsuit under the Florida Whistle-blower's Act
began when the plaintiffs read a newspaper interview in which they were
blamed for problems in the program; 5) the persons in their individual
capacities are not liable under the state whistle-blower law; 6) the plaintiffs
satisfied the whistleblower's act when they sent their memo to FDLE, since
it supervised the criminal justice instruction; 7) the plaintiffs also established
false light invasion of privacy (the newspaper account is arguably highly
offensive to a reasonable person and the supervisor made his comments with
a reckless disregard for their truth); 8) the plaintiffs did not state a § 1983
claim; and 9) the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against a community
college.5
4 7
However, not all retaliation cases implicate a whistle blower's act. For
example, in Barron v. Public Health Trust,548 Joseph Barron refused to lend
his hand in an alleged altering and discarding of patient care plans and other
medical records when he worked for the Public Health Trust because he
believed such conduct to be illegal.549 Barron shared his concerns with the
Vice President of Satellite Services for the Trust.550 Retaliation took the
form, Barron alleged, of the transferring of one of his subordinates to
another department, and of threatening to force Barron to work at night,55
After Barron returned to work, following an approved medical leave, the
director refused to accommodate Barron's impaired condition. 52 Barron
regarded this refusal as a constructive discharge that left him no choice but
to resign his job with the Trust.5 5 3
Barron sued the Trust in the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida alleging free speech violations under § 1983 of title 42 of the United
States Code and article I, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.55 4 Defendant
Reardon claimed qualified immunity from suit given that Barron's speech
did not bear on a matter of public concern.555 He also claimed that Barron's
speech rights were outweighed by his employer's interest in running an
efficient agency, and that the alleged retaliation did not qualify as an
546. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187 (1999).
547. Harris, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1324-30.
548. 22 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
549. Id. at 1369.
550. Id.
551. ld.
552. ld.
553. Barron, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70.
554. Id. at 1370.
555. Id.
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cc,,556
"adverse employment action under the First Amendment. The court only
addressed whether the alleged retaliation constituted adverse employment
action under the First Amendment.
557
The federal district court concluded that the alleged acts of retaliation
did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action under the First
Amendment.55 8 Transferring one of Barron's subordinates and threatening
to force Barron to work at night are not manifestly illegal retaliation under
the First Amendment.55 9 As for the constructive discharge, Barron volun-
tarily resigned when his supervisor properly refused to accommodate his dis-
ability.5 6 Barron's supervisor never suggested that Barron resign, nor did he
threaten to terminate him.561 In sum, Barron's working conditions were not
so intolerable that he had no choice but to quit.562 For purposes of qualified
immunity, Reardon's actions did not clearly amount to adverse employ-
ment.563 Reardon's codefendant, Ward, enjoyed an even stronger claim to
qualified immunity because, at worst, Ward failed to end Reardon's alleged
acts of retaliation:5 64 Since Reardon is entitled to qualified immunity, a
fortiori, so is Ward 5 65
In Dade County Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Town of Surfside,566 the
police union filed an unfair labor practice with PERC, alleging that the
Town of Surfside fired Officers Marchese and Casabo for engaging in pro-
tected activity, specifically, their support of a union-sponsored survey deal-
ing with the Town's police department. 567 At PERC's hearing, one witness
testified that the dismissed officers coerced and intimidated other officers,
568
unlawfully disrupted the investigation, and lied to the investigators. The
police chief made clear that he did not discharge the officers for engaging in
protected activity.569 The hearing officer concluded, and PERC's final order
affirmed, that the officers were dismissed for cause.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Barron, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1370.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 1371.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Barron, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
564. Id. at 1373.
565. Id.
566. 721 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
567. Id. at 746.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 746-47.
570. Id. at 747.
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On appeal, the police union claimed that the hearing officer accorded
undue weight to hearsay evidence. 571 Rejecting this argument, the Third
District Court of Appeal ruled that the documents at issue were not introduc-
ed to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only to prove the employer's
state of mind in firing the officers.572 The dismissals were upheld.573
An article in the Miami Herald reported on a couple of retaliation cases
involving public employees.5 74 In one, Florida's Department of Environ-
mental Protection ("DEP") reached a settlement with a public employees'
union entitling workers to express professional opinions without fear of
retaliation.575 Moreover, DEP agreed to lobby for legislation aimed at
protecting public employees against intimidating lawsuits by developers. 76
Another article in the Miami Herald reported on a lawsuit filed by a City of
Miramar Police Captain against the City.577 The police captain alleged that
he was demoted after he told the Miami Herald that a high profile company,
which had made campaign contributions to city commissioners, was awarded
a towing contract, even though it overcharged residents.578 The City denied
the charge, claiming that the demotion was wholly a fiscal decision.
D. Procedural Due Process
When is a public agency required to process an employee's grievance?
This issue was addressed in Soto v. Board of County Commissioners580 Soto
was a county employee who sued the county for refusing to process a
grievance he had filed.58 ' According to the county's own grievance
procedure, any violation of personnel regulations would trigger the grievance
procedure.582 The reviewing court made clear that "[w]here a governmental
agency provides that employee disputes shall be resolved through a
grievance process, the agency is bound to fully comply with its own rules
571. Dade County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 721 So. 2d at 747.
572. L
573. Id.
574. Environmental Employees Settle Dispute with State, MIAMI HERAlD, Apr. 14, 1999,
at5B.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. Caroline Keough, Miramar Police Captain Sues City Over Demotion, MIAI
HALD (Broward), Mar. 31, 1999, at 2B.
578. l
579. Id.
580. 716 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
581. 1l at 864.
582. Id.
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and policies." 583 The regulations also contain an anti-retaliation provision,
and Soto claims that he was denied a promotion because of an earlier
grievance that he had filed.584 The Fifth District Court of Appeal issued a
writ of mandamus to force the Board of County Commissioners to process
Soto's grievance in accordance with its own procedures.
585
Is due process violated if PERC refuses to consider an appeal that is un-
timely filed? In Ford v. Public Employees Relations Commission,586 PERC
affirmed Ford's dismissal as a probation officer.587 Ford's court appeal of
588PERC's decision was dismissed because it was late. So, Ford asked PERC
to allow him to file a belated appeal589 PERC turned Ford down, asserting
that only an appellate court can authorize a belated appeal.59 0
On appeal, citing Supreme Court of Florida precedent, 51 the court
recognized egregious circumstances preventing a litigant from filing on time
and that either PERC or an appellate court was authorized to permit the
belated appeal.592 For example, due process is violated if PERC's order had
been entered, but never transmitted to the litigant, and the time to file an
appeal expires.593 But, the court affirmed PERC's dismissal of Ford's
untimely appeal, an9way, because Ford never alleged that his counsel did
not receive notice.
E. First Amendment
1. Free Speech: Matters of Public Concern
Public employees need not check their constitutional rights of free
speech at the workplace door.595 Whether speech by a public employee is
583. kIL (citing Fredericks v. School Bd. of Monroe County, 307 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975)).
584. Id. at 864.
585. Soto, 716 So. 2d at 865.
586. 717 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
587. Id. at 150.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Ford, 717 So. 2d at 150 (citing Millinger v. Broward County Mental Health Div.,
672 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1996)).
592. Id.
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Picketing v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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entitled to First Amendment protection however, often turns on whether it is
speech on a matter of public concern.
An article in the Miami Herald reported on a tenured Florida State
University ("FSI') psychology professor, who came under fire after it
surfaced that he wrote a glowing introduction to My Awakening, the
autobiography of David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan grand wizard and
state representative in Louisiana.597 The right to free speech and academic
freedom is pitted against the impulse to censor views repugnant to most
people who make up the FSU commumity. 98 FSU's president is on record as
a defender of free speech in an academic community.599 Some have accused
the professor of "racial harassment" of African-American students, but a
review of the professor's rading record turned up no evidence of bias
against minority students. Although the professor's specialty is genetic
research involving mice, his racial views have been dismissed as "junk
science." In an editorial, the Miami Herald dismissed the professor's
racial views as claptrap and an embarrassment to FSU, but made clear that
the First Amendment and academic freedom protect him. 60
In Huerta v. Hillsborough County,a6 3 Henry Huerta worked for
Hillsborough County for seventeen years as Executive Manager of the Office
of Consumer Affairs and Child Care LicensingY' 4 On June 9, 1991, the
Tampa Tribune quoted Huerta in an article that criticized the County's
childcare licensing program.6 5 Two days later, Huerta was dismissed, and
he sued the County and Pat Gray Bean, the person who fired him.6
On apeal, the issue turned on whether Bean was entitled to qualified
immunity. Under the law "a government official.., is entitled to
qualified immunity from civil suit in the performance of discretionary
functions when the official's conduct does not violate any clearly established
statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person should have
596. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.
597. Herald Staff, The Right to Be Wrong On Controversial Issues, MIAHI HERAIZ, Apr.
6, 1999, at 18A.
598. ld.
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. The Right to Be Wrong on Controversial Issues, supra note 597, at 18A.
603. 720 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
604. Id. at 276.
605. Id. at 276-77.
606. Id. at 277.
607. Id.
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known. ' 608 The trial court ruled that under this standard, Bean was entitled
to qualified immunity.609 On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court's grant of qualified immunity to Bean.10
The appellate court's decision stemmed from its conclusion that
Huerta's speech touched on a matter of public concern. 61' At that point, the
employee's interest in speaking freely must be weighed against the
employer's interest in running an efficient agency. Applying the
Pickering v. Board of Educationl balancing test, the court left no doubt that
Huerta's First Amendment right outweighed any employer interest.
614
Huerta spoke on the issue of licensing and inspection of day care
facilities. Not only was Huerta the executive manager for child
care licensing and qualified to make an informed opinion on the
issue as it existed in Hillsborough County, but the subject is also
one of public importance affecting numerous families in the
County. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
statements made by Huerta were false or that they in any way
impeded the proper performance of his duties .... [T]here is
nothing to suggest that the termination was justified in light of any
competing social interests.
615
In Martin v. Baugh,616 Martin worked for the City of Birmingham as a
communications technician who was concerned about the bidding process to
617upgrade the City's communications system. Martin shared his concerns
with a member of the City Council, Blake, and the Birmingham chapter of
the Fraternal Order of Police ("FOP"). 618 Later, Martin testified in a suit that
arose between two bidders over the city rigged bidding process. 619 Martin
never cleared his whistleblowing with his supervisor, Baugh. Upon
learning of Martin's disclosures, Baugh accused Martin of insubordination
608. Huerta, 7
(1982)).
609. Id.
610. Id. at 278.
611. Id.
612. Id.
613. 391 U.S. 5
614. Huerta, 72
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
20 So. 2d at 277 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
63 (1968).
:0 So. 2d at 278.
Id.
141 F.3d 1417 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 870 (1999).
Id. at 1419.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and urged him to resign.621 Martin also received a reprimand, and some of
his duties were assigned to a coworker.622 Depressed by this turn of events,
Martin took a leave of absence.6  Martin then sued the City, the Mayor, and
Baugh, alleging that his disclosures were protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 624 Among other things, the district court ruled that
Baugh was not entitled to qualified immunity.
On appeal, the sole issue concerned Martin's claim for damages against
Baugh in his individual capacity. To receive the protection of qualified
immunity, Martin must prove that his First Amendment right Baugh violated
was "clearly established" when Baugh disciplined him.627 The court
concluded that Martin fell short of his burden on this issue.628 The court
pointed out that there is a presumption of qualified immunity, and Martin
had to prove that: 1) the speech touched on a matter of public concern; and
2) "the value of the speech outweighs its potential for disruption of
government workplace efficiency. 629
The court made clear that a defendant in a First Amendment suit would
"rarely be on notice that his actions are unlawful., 630 No authority suggests
that a person in Baugh's position would obviously have known that Martin's
speech was constitutionally protected.631 It is almost impossible for a
reasonable person to judge before trial how a court will assess the array of
632factors that go into whether speech is protected. In sum, it was not plainly
manifest when Baugh disciplined Martin that his First Amendment rights
were being violated. Baugh is entitled to qualified immunity.634
In Badia v. City of Miami,635 Badia worked for the City of Miami
636Department of Public Works. Among other claims, Badia alleged that the
City and Wally Lee, the former director of the department, violated her First
Amendment rights by retaliating against her after she filed a charge of
621. Martin, 141 F.3d at 1419.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Id.
625. Id. at 1420.
626. Martin, 141 F.3d at 1418.
627. Id. at 1420.
628. Id.
629. Id. (citing Goffer v. Marbury, 956 F.2d 1045, 1049 (11th Cir. 1992)).
630. Id.
631. Martin, 141 F.3d at 1420-21.
632. Id. at 1420.
633. Id. at 1421.
634. Id.
635. 133 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1998).
636. Id. at 1445.
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637discrimination. Lee claimed qualified immunity, but the district court
rejected Lee's claim, ruling that a genuine issue existed over whether
discrimination motivated Lee's treatment of Badia and the elimination of her
638 639job. Lee appealed.
Badia's First Amendment claim came down to whether the "speech"
was a matter of public concern. 40 Precedent dictates that the court focus on
the "content, form, and context." 641 In the words of the court, "[i]f it is
unclear whether Badia's complaints were of the kind held to involve a matter
of public concern, then Lee's alleged actions did not violate clearly
established First Amendment rights and he is entitled to qualified
immunity." 642 Badia cites precedent that treats an employee's federal court
testimony in a discrimination suit as speech on a matter of public concern.
643
The court pointed to a split of authority over whether a formal employment
discrimination complaint rises to the level of speech on a matter of public
concern. 6U In light of this lack of consensus on the issue, the right deemed
violated here could not have been clearly established for purposes of
qualified immunity. 645 In short, Lee's alleged actions did not violate clearly
established First Amendment rights, so he is entitled to qualified
immunity. W
In Morris v. Crow,64 7 the issue also turned on whether a public
employee's speech touched on a matter of public concern. 648 Deputy Sheriff
Morris was dismissed after an investigation into two incidents of
misconduct.64 9 Morris claimed that he was terminated due to statements he
made in an accident report, and in his deposition testimony involving the
investigation of a codeputy's traffic accident, in which a citizen was
killed.- ° Morris's accident report mentioned that the officer was driving
over 130 miles per hour in a 50 miles per hour zone and that the officer
637. Id.
638. Id.
639. Id.
640. Badia, 133 F.3d at 1445.
641. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
642. Id.
643. Id. at 1446.
644. Id.
645. Badia, 133 F.3d at 1446.
646. Id.
647. 142 F.3d 1379 (11th Cir. 1998).
648. Id. at 1381.
649. Id.
650. Id.
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failed to switch on "an emergency blue warning light in violation of sheriff's
office policy. 651
On appeal, the issue was whether Morris's speech can be "'fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.' '' 652 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether
"speech that occurs in the course of and as part of an employee's ordinary
duties is protected. 653 Relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court
focused on "'whether the speech at issue was made primarily in the
employee's role as citizen, or primarily in the role of employee."' 65a Forced
to choose, the court concluded that Morris's report stemmed primarily from
his role as employee: "[tihere is nothing in the record to indicate that
Morris's purpose in writing the accident report was to bring to light any
wrongdoing or to do any more than accurately report an accident in the
course of his employment."655 As for his deposition testimony, Morris was
subpoenaed to testify about the accident: "[t]he mere fact that Morris's
statements were made in the context of a civil deposition cannot transform
them into constitutionally protected speech." 656 For this reason, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that Morris's statements were not
protected speech under the First Amendment.
657
Gonzalez v. Lee County Housing AuthoritY 8 dealt with the same issue:
Whether public employee speech touched on a matter of public concern.
659
Specifically, whether a letter from an employee of a county housing
authority to her supervisor, claiming that she was forced to engage in
discriminatory housing practices, constituted speech on a matter of public
concern. 660 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that it did not; therefore, the
supervisor was entitled to qualified immunity.6
1
651. Id.
652. Morris, 142 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
653. Id.
654. Id. at 1382 (quoting Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 1993)) (internal
citations omitted).
655. Id
656. Id. at 1383.
657. Morris, 142 F.3d at 1383.
658. 161 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 1998).
659. Id. at 1292.
660. Id. at 1293.
661. Id. at 1298.
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2. Freedom of Association
In Blanco v. City of Clearwater,662 Blanco was a police officer with the
Clearwater Police Department. 663  Blanco was discharged after an
investigation into whether he was involved in a long-term sexual relationship
with a seventeen-year-old girl.664 Blanco was found to be in violation of a
department regulation which provides:
[N]o employee shall engage in conduct on or off-duty which
adversely affects the morale or efficiency of the department; nor
shall any employee engage in conduct on or off-duty which has a
tendency to destroy public respect for the employee and/or the
department and/or destroy confidence in the operation of the
municipal service.
665
In court, Blanco invoked his constitutional right to intimate association,
among other rights.6 66 Again, whether some of the defendants were entitled
to qualified immunity turned on whether the law was clearly established that
an adult has a constitutional right to engage in a sexual relationship with a
minor.667 At most, one earlier case ruled that "'dating is a type of associa-
tion that must be protected by the First Amendment's freedom of
association. ' , 668 But, one case does not make for a clearly established law;
therefore, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
66 9
The Miami Herald recently reported on a case that holds out the
potential for implicating public employees' freedom of association. 67° In
January, 1999 thirty-one people were arrested in a police operation sting at a
private club where members took part in consensual sexual activities in front
of each other.671 Among the thirty-one arrested were two public high school
teachers who were suspended without pay by the Broward School Board on
August 3, 1999, pursuant to a state administrative rule that enables school
districts to discharge public employees "convicted of a crime involving
662. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
663. Id. at 1318.
664. Id.
665. Id. (quoting CLEARWATER, FLA., POLICE DEP'T reg. 213.15).
666. Id.
667. Blanco, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
668. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984)).
669. Id.
670. Beth Reinhard & Daniel de Vise, Teachers in Sex Club Raid Suspended, MIAMI
HERALD (Broward), Aug. 4, 1999, at lB.
671. Id.
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moral turpitude." 672 The article pointed out that the case raises "questions
about whether the private lives of teachers should have any bearing on their
public roles in the classroom."673 While some board members felt that the
teachers' dismissal amounted to an invasion of their privacy, another
claimed that it was permissible to "hold teachers to a high moral
standard. 674 In the face of public opinion critical of the board's discipline,
the board is weighing whether to take another vote. 675 News accounts cite
two earlier cases that frame the strict moral guidelines for teachers. 676 In
1981 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the revocation of teaching licenses of two
Lee County teachers for growing marijuana in their gardens.677 Similarly, in
1975 the Eleventh Circuit sustained the termination of a Miami-Dade teacher
who was sexually abusing his stepdaughter.67
XI[. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
One unemployment compensation case involving a public employee
bears mention. In Philemy v. Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services,679 Philemy worked for HRS as a behavioral program associate.80 In
the course of her duties, Philemy discovered bruises on the back of a resi-
68168dent. The bruises looked like the imprint of a key.682 Although she wrote
down her observations, Philemy failed to report the abuse to the abuse
registry in accordance with HRS policy.683 After she was fired, Philemy
appealed her termination to PERC, which sustained the dismissal.
Later, Philemy applied for unemployment compensation. 68 At first, her
claim was approved since the claims examiner deemed that her termination
"was for reasons other than misconduct connected with work.' 686 HRS
672. Id.
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. Daniel de Vise & Connie Piloto, Teacher Discipline Sparks Big Outcry Board to
Reconsider Sex-Raid Suspensions, M HIHERAM (Broward), Aug. 5, 1999, at IA.
676. Beth Reinhard, Suspension of Two Teachers Prompts Debate, MAMI HERALD, Aug.
8, 1999, at lB.
677. Id.
678. Id.
679. 731 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
680. Id. at 65.
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. Id.
684. Philemy, 731 So. 2d at 65.
685. Id. at 66.
686. Id.
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appealed and the appeals referee concluded that Philemy was terminated for
misconduct relating to her job.687
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and reinstated
Philemy's unemployment compensation benefits. 688  Under Florida law,
"misconduct" that will disqualify a claimant is defined as:
(a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an
employer's interests as is found in deliberate violation or disregard
of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect
of his or her employee; or
(b) Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as
to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design or to show
an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests
or of the employee's duties and obligations to his or her
employer.
689
All doubts must be resolved in favor of the claimant and the employer bears
the burden of proving misconduct. 69 A cause sufficient for job termination
is not invariably misconduct that will bar unemployment compensation691..benefits. Here, Philemy notified a coworker, recorded her findmigs n a
log, and posted a note on the bulletin board recording her concerns. 69T Even
though she was negligent in failing to call the abuse registry and to notify
her supervisor, her negligence did not amount to misconduct for purposes of
unemployment compensation eligibility.693
Xm. PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES, AND UNION ELECTIONS
On May 20, 1999 the Supreme Court of Florida handed down a
landmark decision embracing the fundamental right of government attorneys
to bargain collectively over the terms and conditions of their employment. 694
Back in 1993, the State Employees Attorneys' Guild ("SEAG") filed a
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. FLA. STAT. § 443.036(29) (1999).
690. Philemy, 731 So. 2d at 66 (citing McKnight v. Florida Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 713 So. 2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
691. Id. at 66 (citing Betancourt v. Sun Bank Miami, N.A., 672 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Fla. 1999)
[hereinafter "Chiles II"].
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petition with PERC, seeking certification as a bargaining unit of attorneys
who work for the State of Florida.695 PERC scheduled an evidentiary
hearing.696 In response, the State asked the Supreme Court of Florida to stop
PERC from hearing SEAG's petition, arguing that only the state supreme
court could regulate the practice of law.6  The court refused to issue a writ
of prohibition because PERC is not a "court.' 698  Two months later,
Governor Chiles signed into law a bill aimed at barring attorneys working
for the state from bargaining collectively.699 In light of the new law, PERC
dismissed SEAG's petition.70D The lawyers' union appealed PERC's
dismissal, calling into question the constitutionality of the new law.0 The
district court sustained PERC's dismissal . SEAG brought suit in circuit
court challenging the law's constitutionality under article I, section 6 of the
Florida Constitution.703 The circuit court struck down the law, ruling that it
encroached upon the right of government lawyers to bargain c
The First District Court of Appeal 
affirmed. 70  t
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that the new law was
unconstitutional.706 The court relied on article I, section 6 of the Florida
Constitution, which is aimed at protecting the right of public employees to
bargain collectively, as evidence that the people of Florida had foreclosed
this debate. °7 In reaching this result, the court applied strict scrutiny
analysis under which the state must come forward with a compelling state
interest for denying government lawyers the right to bargain collectively.
70 8
Moreover, the law must achieve that "'compelling state interest in the least
intrusive means possible."' 709 The State argued that "government attorneys
695. Id. at 1031.
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. Id. (citing Chiles v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 630 So. 2d 1093, 1094
(Fla. 1994)).
699. "An act relating to public employees." Ch. 94-89, § 1, 1994 Fla. Laws 309, 310
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 447.203(3)G) (Supp. 1994)).
700. Chiles II, 734 So. 2d at 1032 (citing 20 F.P.E.R. 25151 (1994)).
701. Id.
702. Id. (citing State Employees Attorneys Guild v. State, 653 So. 2d 487,489 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 714 So. 2d 502,507-08 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) [hereinafter "Chiles r"], affd by 734 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1999).
706. Chiles II, 734 So. 2d at 1036.
707. Id.
708. Id.
709. Id. at 1033 (quoting State Employees Attorneys Guild v. State, 653 So. 2d 487,
488 (Fla. lstDist. Ct. App. 1995)).
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must give complete confidentiality, fidelity and loyalty to the State and local
government while conducting its legal affairs. 710 In sum, according to the
State the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship would be under-
mined if the attorney were entitled to continuously sue the state to enforce
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. However, the court found
that the State introduced no evidence that the law was needed to protect the
asserted state interest.712 No evidence supported the State's conclusion that
"government employed attorneys would abandon their ethical obligation of
confidentiality, fidelity and loyalty" by joining a labor union.713 Moreover,
the experience of other states in which government lawyers are entitled to
bargain collectively has produced no "apparent harm to the attorney-client
relationship."" 4 Attorneys who work for the federal government also are
entitled to bargain collectively with no apparent ill effect.71 5
The State also claimed that collective bargaining would entail
compartmentalizing its legal staff to minimize the risk of conflict.716 The
court's response was that such an administrative burden did not rise to the
level of a compelling state interest.717  Moreover, the court ruled that
collective bargaining by state-employed lawyers did not infringe upon the
court's jurisdiction over lawyer discipline. If other states are any guide,
collective bargaining can be framed to accommodate both the government's
interests in assuring loyalty and competence in their attorneys, and the
attorneys' constitutional right as public employees to bargain collectively."19
In support of this conclusion, the court cited the position of the American
Bar Association and of The Florida Bar Board of Governors, which
recognizes that attorney collective bargaining is not inherently incompatible
with the attorney-client relationship.72°- At the same time, the court warned
that the rules regulating The Florida Bar and a lawyer's duty of loyalty take
precedence over a lawyer's collective bargaining activities, and any breaches
will lead to discipline by the court under article V, section 15 of the Florida
Constitution.
7 21
710. Id.
711. Chiles 11, 734 So. 2d at 1034.
712. Id. at 1034.
713. Id.
714. Id.
715. See id. at 1034-35.
716. Chiles I, 734 So. 2d at 1035.
717. Id.
718. Id.
719. Id. at 1036.
720. Id. (citing MODELCODI OFPROFESSIONALRESPONSiBIUTr EC 5-13 (1980)).
721. Chiles I, 734 So. 2d at 1037.
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An article in the Miami Herald reported that a public school teachers'
union filed a grievance over class sizes, and teachers at Western High School
followed the lead.722 The action was noteworthy since it was the first time
that the teachers' union filed a grievance over class size 723 School district
rules stipulate that, on average, teachers should handle no more than 198
students a day.724 For schools with block scheduling, classes that run twice
as long, the number is ninety-nine students.2 With an enrollment of 3675,
Western High School was running at double its capacity. 726 Although the
school added portable classrooms, the union claimed that the school violated
health and safety standards by crowding too many students into each
portable classroom.727 The issue of overcrowding came to a head at Walter
C. Young Middle School, but was settled when teachers agreed on extra pay
to teach additional classes.728 As the School Board saw it, however, the
issue was not grievable since the collective bargaining agreement was silent
on the question of class size, unlike most contracts between school boards
729
and teachers' unions.
In City of Safety Harbor v. Communications Workers of America,730
PERC had certified the Communications Workers of America ("CWA") as
the exclusive bargaining representative for a bargaining unit.731 According
to PERC, the bargaining unit, composed wholly of nonprofessional
employees, included the classification "Recreation Leaders IL" even though
the parties regarded that classification as professional.
7 32
On appeal, PERC's ruling was reversed and the court ordered a new
election. At issue was the proper interpretation of the statute defining the
term "professional employee." 7  The introductory clause of the statute
recites that a professional employee must be engaged in work "in any two or
more" of the following four enumerated categories.735 PERC read the fourth
722. Daniel De Vise, Broward Teachers Score on Crowding But Union Files New
Grievance, MIAMI HERALD (Broward), Feb. 4, 1999, at IA.
723. Id.
724. Id.
725. Id.
726. Id.
727. DeVise, supra note 722, at 1A.
728. Id.
729. Id.
730. 715 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
731. Id. at 266.
732. Id. (citing Communications Workers of Am. v. City of Safety Harbor, 22 F.P.E.R.
27125 (1996)).
733. Id.
734. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 447.203(13) (1995)).
735. FLA. STAT. § 447.203(13)(a) (1999). The four categories stated in the statute are:
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category of the definition, the "specialized intellectual instruction" category,
as a threshold requirement.736 The court ruled that PERC's treatment of
section 447.203(13)(a)4 of the Florida Statutes as a threshold was error.737
PERC's reliance on the analogous federal statute, the NLRA,7 38 and the
analogous statutes of other states was ill advised.739 Unlike those statutes,
employees in Florida qualify as "professional" based on meeting "any two or
more" of the four listed criteria.74° The other statutes omit this modifying
language. 741 Since Safety Harbor's Recreation Leaders II met the first two
criteria of section 447.203(13)(a), they qualified as "professional
employees."
742
Once PERC certifies a union as the exclusive bargaining representative
of a defined bargaining unit, the public employer and the union must bargain
in good faith over the terms and conditions of employment. 743 In Hills-
borough Area Regional Transit Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union
Local 1593,74 the Regional Transit Authority and the Transit Union filed
unfair labor practice charges with PERC. 745 After a hearing, PERC ruled
that the Transit Union had not bargained in bad faith. The Transit
1. Work predominantly intellectual and varied in character as
opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work;
2. Work involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment
in its performance;
3. Work of such character that the output produced or the result
accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time;
and
4. Work requiring advanced knowledge in a field of science or
learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized
intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a
hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education, an
apprenticeship, or training in the performance of routine mental or physical
processes.
Id.
736. City of Safety Harbor, 715 So. 2d at 267.
737. Id.
738. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1994) provides that a professional must be engaged in work
calling for knowledge of an advanced type ordinarily secured via higher education.
739. City of Safety Harbor, 715 So. 2d at 267.
740. Id. at 267 (citing FLA. STAT. § 447.203(13)(a)).
741. Id. at 267-68.
742. Id. at 268.
743. See Hillsborough Area Reg'l Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local
1593, 720 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
744. 720 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
745. Id. at 1161.
746. Id.
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Authority appealed.747  The court sustained PERC's judgment that the
Transit Union had not bargained in bad faith74s "'[W]hether a party bar-
gains in good or bad faith is a factual determination based on the circum-
stances of the particular case.' 74 9 Even in the face of evidence that may
support a contrary view, the court felt compelled to accept PERC's
conclusion.
XIV. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Section 1981
Section 1981 of title 42 of the United States Code, enacted to police the
Thirteenth Amendment, supports only claims allegin racial discrimina-
tion.75' In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District,7 the Supreme Court
ruled that § 1981 would not support a suit against a state employer.753 In
1991, however, Congress amended section 1981 by adding subsection (c),
making clear that "[t]he rights protected by this section are protected against
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination.' 754 A split has emerged
among the circuit courts over whether section 1981(c) statutorily overrules
Jett and opens up an implied private right of action against municipalities. 755
In Cason Enterprises, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, Cason
Enterprises, Inc. ("CEr') entered into a contract with the Miami-Dade Water
and Sewer Department for the purchase of bulk granular potassium
permanganate ("GPP") with an option by the County to purchase potassium
permanganate ("PP") in liquid form.7 57 Later, the County purchased drums
of dry PP from another supplier, claiming that CEI refused to sell PP in
drums.758 In 1995 the County ordered GPP in bulk.759 CEI was unable to
747. id.
748. Id.
749. Hillsborough, 720 So. 2d at 1161 (quoting Duval County Sch. Bd. v. Florida Pub.
Employees Relations Conm'n, 353 So. 2d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
750. Id.
751. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
752. 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
753. Id. at 738.
754. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) (1994).
755. See Cason Enters. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla.
1998).
756. 20 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
757. Id. at 1335.
758. Id.
759. Id. at 1336.
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supply the ordered bulk product.7 ° CEI was found to be in default and the
761contract was canceled in 1996. CEI sued the County for alleged violations
762of section 1981 of title 42 of the United States, among other claims. The
court ruled that "[p]roof of intentional discrimination is required in order to
establish liability under § 1981 .,,763 Moreover, "[1liability under § 1981 is
personal in nature and cannot be imposed vicariously. ' 7 4
B. Title VII and Equal Protection via § 1983
1. Definition of Public Employer under Title VII
765The Eleventh Circuit, in Lyes v. Riviera Beach, established a new test
to determine whether a public employer has the requisite number of
employees to fall within Title VII's coverage. 766 The court focused on "the
presumption that governmental subdivisions denominated as separate and
distinct under state law should not be aggregated for purposes of Title
VII." .' 76 7 This presumption, however, is rebuttable "where one entity exerts
or shares control over the fundamental aspects of the employment
relationships of another entity, to such a substantial extent that it clearly
outweighs the presumption that the entities are distinct., 768 Evidence of such
control includes: 1) interrelation of operations; 2) centralized control of
labor operations; 3) authority to hire, transfer, promote, discipline, or
discharge; and 4) the obligation to pay or the duty to train the plaintiff.769
2. National Origin Discrimination
National origin discrimination in the public sector can be challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.770 In Buzzi v. Gomez,771 the
plaintiffs were former and current officers of the Metro-Dade Police
760. Id.
761. Cason, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1336.
762. Id. at 1337.
763. Id.
764. Id.
765. 166 F.3d 1332 (11 th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
766. Id. at 1345.
767. Id.
768. Id.
769. Id.
770. See Buzzi v. Gomez, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
771. 24 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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Department ('MDPD").772 The plaintiffs claimed that their former super-
visor, Lieutenant Gomez, a Cuban-American male, hatched a scheme to
systematically transfer them from, or sometimes, bar their transfer into,
assignments at the Airport District because they were not Cuban, while
employing less qualified Cuban transferees. 773 Gomez was also accused of
harassing non-Cuban officers from the Airport District to force their
transfers to other districts.7 74 The Air4,ort District is a coveted assignment,
posing low risk and much overtime. Plaintiffs claimed that they were
victims of national origin discrimination by virtue of their non-Cuban
heritage, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.776 Defendant Carlos Alvarez was also sued because, as the
Assistant Director of the MDPD, he did not remedy the situation.
777
Eventually, Division Chief Paull met with Buzzi, who related evidence• • • 778
of a hostile environment on grounds of national origin. The Professional
Compliance Bureau ("PCB") conducted an investigation, which led to
Alvarez removing Gomez from his post.779 PCB's report sustained several of
the allegations, concluding that Gomez had acted unprofessionally and that
he failed at times to follow standard procedures for transfers. 78 PCB's
report stopped short of accusing Gomez of national origin discrimination.7 l
PCB did not investigate Alvarez.782 Dissatisfied with PCB's report, the
plaintiffs filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC, which led to a §
1983 suit being filed in federal court, naming Gomez and Alvarez, among
other defendants.
783
The court framed the issue as whether Alvarez was entitled to qualified
immunity from plaintiffs' § 1983 suit.784 Violations of § 1983 occur when a
person acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects ... any citizen.., to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."765
772. Id. at 1355.
773. Id.
774. Id.
775. Id.
776. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1355.
777. Id.
778. Id. at 1357.
779. Id.
780. Id.
781. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1357.
782. Id.
783. Id.
784. Id. at 1358.
785. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Proof of a violation requires a showing of intent.786 "A defendant may be
liable only for an affirmative act or 'deliberate indifference' to a risk where
the deprivation of a federal right is a 'plainly obvious consequence' of the
,,787defendant's inaction. The court concluded that Alvarez was entitled to
788qualified immunity as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court framed the test for judging whether a public official
is entitled to qualified immunity.789 "'[G]overnment officials ... generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. ' '' 790 A government official
performing discretionary functions is shielded if "'a reasonable official
could have believed his or her conduct to be lawful in light of clearly
established law and the information possessed by the official at the time the
conduct occurred.' ' 79 1  Entitlement to immunity is the rule, not the
exception.792 The Eleventh Circuit's formulation of the test is two-fold.793
"First, the defendant must prove that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority" when the misconduct occurred. 9  If the defendant
satisfies this prong, then the plaintiff must prove that the defendant "violated
clearly established law based upon objective standards," in other words, that
the plaintiff's rights were so clear that a reasonable government official
would have understood that his acts violated the plaintiffs rights.795
Applying this test, the court concluded that Alvarez acted in his
discretionary authority so the burden shifted to the plaintiffs, who failed to
meet their burden of demonstrating that Alvarez "'violated clearly
established constitutional law."' 79 6 In short, the plaintiffs failed to show that
when Alvarez failed to act, the "law was developed in such a concrete and
factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government
actors, in Alvarez's place, that what he was doing violated federal law.
'797
786. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
787. Id. (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 398 (1997)).
788. Id. at 1359.
789. Id.
790. Id. at 1359-60 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
791. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (quoting Hardin v. Hayes, 957 F.2d 845, 848 (11th
Cir. 1992)).
792. Id.
793. Id.
794. Id. (citing Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950, 953 (11 th Cir. 1995)).
795. Id. (citing Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 995 (1 1th Cir. 1995)).
796. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (quoting Sammons v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1533, 1539
(11th Cir. 1992)).
797. Id. (citing Braddy v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797,
801 (1 1th Cir. 1998)).
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The evidence demonstrated that once Alvarez received concrete information
of a hostile environment at the Airport District, he immediately authorized
an investigation.798  When the fruits of the investigation pointed out
misconduct, he "summarily relieved Gomez of his command." 799 Without
some case precedent holding that an official, akin to Alvarez, had a duty to
halt the transfers of personnel, Alvarez enjoyed discretion to decide whether
plaintiffs' grievances required his immediate attention. 800 For Alvarez to
lose his immunity, it would have to be demonstrated that his "'acts or
omissions were the cause-not merely a contributing factor-of the
constitutionally infirm condition."'
801
3. Relationship Between Title VII and § 1983 Claims
In Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale,8 2 Johnson, an African-American
male, worked for the City of Fort Lauderdale Fire Department.803 In 1994,
Johnson sued the City, a former Fire Chief, and four supervisors under Title
VII, and §§ 1981 and 1983, alleging an equal protection violation, and
claiming racial harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.8°4 In response,
the defendants argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1991805 left Title VII as
the sole remedy for public sector employment discrimination.
80 6
The Eleventh Circuit surveyed the views of other courts on whether the
1991 Act left Title VII and § 1981 as the exclusive remedies for public
sector employment discrimination.807 The Fourth Circuit and several district
courts have rejected defendants' argument that such exclusivity is implied
from 1) "the Act's inclusion of a savings clause related to § 1981" and
conscious exclusion of an analogous savings clause for § 1983; and 2) the
Act's overall remedial scheme. Turning to the Act's legislative history,
the court pointed out that while the language is ambiguous at best, the fairest
798. Id. at 1361.
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Buzzi, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 (quoting LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1538
(lth Cir. 1993)).
802. 148 F.3d 1228 (llth Cir. 1998).
803. Id. at 1229.
804. Id.
805. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)).
806. Johnson, 148 F.2d at 1229.
807. Id.
808. Id. (citing Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1994); Stoner v.
Department of Agric., 846 F. Supp. 738,740-41 (W.D. Wis. 1994)).
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conclusion is that Congress did not intend to limit § 1983's scope.8°9 In
short, the omission "sheds little light" on Confress's aim to preserve or
preempt § 1983 remedies for municipal workers. I° In support of its ruling
the court noted that the legislative history of Title VII evinces congressional
intent to preserve, not to preempt, "§ 1983 as a parallel remedy for
unconstitutional public sector employment discrimination. ' 8" In light of
this conclusion, the court affirmed the district court's order denying the
defendants' motion to dismiss Johnson's § 1983 claims.812
4. Relationship Between Title VII and Collective Bargaining
In United States v. City of Hialeah,813 the federal government accused
the City of Hialeah of discrimination against African-Americans in hiring
firefighters and police officers in violation of Title VII.814 The parties
entered into a consent decree including a provision granting retroactive
competitive seniority to thirty new African-American workers. 815 The
district court refused to approve this part of the consent decree because it
would violate contractual seniority rights of the incumbent employees, rights
enshrined in the parties' collective bargaining agreements. 816 This case can
be framed as an effort to adopt affirmative action via a consent decree that is
blocked by claims of reverse discrimination.1 7
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that affirmative remedial
goals cannot be achieved in a consent decree proceeding if rights of a
818nonconsenting third party are affected. Before such affirmative action can
be adopted there must be a trial on the merits or a valid summary
judgment.813 A prima facie case of discrimination alone will not warrant
depriving an objecting party's right to a full adjudication of its arguments on
the merits in a trial. 82 One party to a collective bargaining agreement cannot
rely on a nonconsensual Title VII consent decree to relieve itself of its
809. Id. at 1230.
810. Id. (quoting Stoner v. Department of Agric., 846 F. Supp. 738, 741 (W.D. Wis.
1994)).
811. Johnson, 148 F.3d at 1230.
812. Id. at 1231.
813. 140 F.3d 968 (llth Cir. 1998).
814. Id. at 971.
815. Id.
816. Id.
817. Id.
818. City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d at 975.
819. Id. at 977.
820. Id. at 978.
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obligations, which the other party negotiated and bargained to secure.821 At
the same time, the court made clear that if a Title VII violation is found after
trial, collectively bargained seniority rights may have to be modified as part
of the remedy.8s
5. Affirmative Action
Court ordered affirmative action in the form of a consent decree was the
subject of an article in the Miami Herald.82 Twenty-two years ago, the City
of Miami was ordered by a federal court to improve its record in hiring and
promoting minorities in its work force.824 In response, the city rewrote its
hiring and promotion exams to eliminate racial bias. In addition, the City
adopted rules that accorded lower ranked minorities oppfortunities to fill
vacancies that would otherwise go to non-Hispanic whites.
In 1999, the United States Justice Department urged a federal judge to
end the court order in light of the fact that today, roughly half of Miami's• • 827
employees are Hispanic and thirty percent are African-American. As for
the police department, the court would continue to oversee exams for the
ranks of captain and below for about a year.82  Departments other than
police and fire departments have dropped exams for hiring and promotions
altogether, relying on more flexible hiring practices.8
29
Ward Connerly, who spearheaded the campaign to end affirmative
action in government hiring in California, has turned his attention to
Florida.83 According to a New York Times article, Connerly hopes to amend
the Florida Constitution to bar affirmative action that is based on race, sex,
or ethnicity, in government hiring and contracts.831 The article cited a poll
showing that eighty-four percent of over 600 voters reached by telephone
would vote for a ban on affirmative action. 32 To get his initiative on the
821. Id. at 983.
822. Id.
823. Tyler Bridges, U.S. Moves to Lift City of Miami Hiring Order, MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 12, 1999, at lB.
824. Id.
825. Id.
826. Id.
827. Id.
828. Bridges, supra note 823, at lB.
829. Id.
830. Rick Bragg, Affirmative Action Ban Meets a Wall in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1999, at A16.
831. Id.
832. Id.
1999]a
141
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
833ballot next year, Connerly must sign up 430,000 registered voters. Next
the Supreme Court of Florida must review the proposed ballot language.
Governor Jeb Bush, a critic of the measure, dismissed Connerly's crusade as
divisive. s35 According to the Miami Herald, however, retirees from
Homestead and Margate have added their support to building contractors
836
who favor the measure.
Meanwhile, according to an editorial in the Miami Herald, the Miami-
Dade County Commission voted in February, 1999 to reaffirm a minority
set-aside program for professional contracts.837 Citing Supreme Court prece-
dent eroding the legal grounds for minority set-asides, the editorial warned
that "20-year-old set-aside programs must be adapted to today's realities." 38
An article in the Miami Herald also reported that eleven African-
American city employees sued the City of Fort Lauderdale, alleging that they
were denied promotions on account of their race.839 The lawsuit claims that
the City promoted three white males in the Public Works Department over
senior African-American workers.8 °
6. Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment
In May 1999, five female law professors resigned from Florida State
University's law school, alleging sexual harassment.941 According to the
Miami Herald, one of the professors claimed that "harassment is tolerated on
several levels at the school" although the women did not single out any
particular person.8
42
An editorial in the Miami Herald reviewed claims of sexual harassment
among Pembroke Pines city employees. 3 The editorial criticized the city
for allowing accused harassers to retire.84 It also urged cities to create
"clear channels for reporting harassment, quick investigations and discipline
833. Id.
834. Id.
835. Bragg, supra note 830, at A16.
836. Lesley Clark, Retirees Join Fight vs. Affirmative Action, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), July 14, 1999, at 10B.
837. Editorial, A Phyrrhic Victory, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 8, 1999, at 10A.
838. Id.
839. Brad Bennett, Workers Accuse Fort Lauderdale of Racial Bias, MIAMI HERALD
(Broward), July 15, 1999, at lB.
840. Id.
841. FSU Professors Cite Harassment, MIAMI HERALD, May 8, 1999, at 5B.
842. Id.
843. Editorial, The Toll of Harassment, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 4, 1999, at 28A.
844. Id.
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of offenders," otherwise, they would have to continue paying out public
funds to settle harassment suits. 
45
While not a public employment case, the Blockbuster hair length case
arose in South Florida and only ended when the Supreme Court refused to
review the case.846 Four men claimed that Blockbuster singled them out
because of their hair length.847 Left intact was the Eleventh Circuit's rulin
that different hair length rules for men and women do not violate Title VII.
Blockbuster's policy required male employees to wear their hair within two
inches of their collar, while women's hair length went unregulated.849 In the
past, the Supreme Court has sustained grooming standards for police officers
who were not permitted to wear facial hair or wear their hair long.
850
In Department of Business & Professional Regulation v. Balaguer,51
Ray Balaguer and a woman were finalists for a promotion to the rank of
sergeant in the Department's Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco.852 After Balaguer was passed over for the promotion, he filed a
petition with the Commission on Human Relations, claiming gender and age
discrimination. 853 After an administrative hearing, the law judge ("AL")
found that the Department had committed unlawful gender discrimination
and the Commission adopted this judgment as its own, ordering the
Department to stop discriminating and to promote Balaguer to sergeant.
4
On appeal, the court made clear that it would not disturb the ALl's findings
unless they were clearly erroneous. 5 After reviewing the record, the court
concluded that there was no evidentiary support for the AL's critical
findings of fact.85 6
In Hazel v. School Board of Dade County,857 Hazel served as Student
Activities Director for Northwestern High School. 8  Clarke became
Principal in 1995.859 Hazel claimed that Clarke sexually harassed her by
845. Id.
846. Harper v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 509 (1998); see also Elaine Walker, Supreme Court Won't Hear Blockbuster Hair-Length
Case, MMI HaA, Nov. 17, 1998, at C1.
847. Harper, 139 F.3d at 1386.
848. Id. at 1387.
849. Walker, supra note 846, at Cl.
850. Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
851. 729 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
852. Id. at 537.
853. Id.
854. Id.
855. Id.
856. Balaguer, 729 So. 2d at 538.
857. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
858. Id. at 1351.
859. Id.
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making comments about her physical appearance, staring at her in a sexual
manner, and propositioning her for sex. Hazel also claimed that Clarke
threatened that she would regret not having sex with him. 86 After putting
him off multiple times, Hazel alleged that Clarke retaliated against her by
eliminating her job and reassigning her other duties to other teachers without
informing Hazel. 862 Later, Hazel shared her concerns with a former principal
of the school, Koonce.863 As a School Board administrator, Koonce spoke
with Clarke about Hazel's allegations.' 64 Clarke was also accused by other
female employees of sexual harassment. 865 The School Board never talked
to Hazel about her grievance or disciplined Clarke.866 Hazel claimed that
Clarke stepped up his harassment after he learned that she had
complained. 7 In 1996, Clarke demoted Hazel (involuntarily transferred her
to a classroom teaching position) even though she had received the highest
possible performance rating the year before.
Later, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission allowed Hazel
to bring suit against the School Board and Clarke, in his individual
capacity. 869 The district court focused on the prima facie case for "quid proquo sexual harassment," in which a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the employee belongs to a protected class; (2) the employee
was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment
complained of was based on sex; (4) the employee's reaction to the
harassment complained of affected tangible aspects of the
employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment; and (5) respondeat superior.870
The court noted that quid pro quo sexual harassment can be explicit or
implicit. 871 The closer the connection "between a discussion about job
benefits and a request for sexual favors, the more likely that there has been
860. Id.
861. Id.
862. Hazel, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
863. Id.
864. Id.
865. Id. at 1352.
866. Id.
867. Hazel, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.
868. Id.
869. Id.
870. Id. at 1353 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (1 Ith Cir.
1982)).
871. Id.
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an 'implicit' conditioning by the harasser." 72 Also relevant is how often the
advances were made, the length of time over which the advances took place,
and the strength of the connection between the advances and the discussion
of job benefits or detriments.873 After weighing all of these factors, the court
concluded that Hazel made out a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual
harassment under Title VII.874 On Hazel's Title IX claim, however, the court
ruled that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination
claims on grounds of sex in federally funded educational institutions. s75
Finally, the court held that Hazel had failed to state a § 1983 claim against
the School Board or the principal.
876
7. Religious Discrimination
Religious discrimination in the workplace may be contested under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") 877 under Title VII, and under
both prosN s of the First Amendment, as free speech and as free exercise of
religion. This array of challenges were all cogently analyzed in Gunning
87980v. Runyon, a case involving a federal employee working in Florida.80 In
Gunning, the postal employees voted in favor of playing a Christian radio
station over the station loudspeakers, but the post office turned off the
station radio altogether and instead allowed employees to wear headsets or
have small radios at their workstation.88
1
Gunning went to federal court, challenging the post office's decision to
turn off the religious radio station under Title VII, the First Amendment, and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.112 Under Title VII, the court
analyzed Gunning's claim under both the disparate treatment framework and
the reasonable accommodation framework.9s 3 To establish a prima facie
case of disparate treatment discrimination, plaintiff must show that "(1) he is
a member of or practices a particular religion; (2) he is qualified to perform
the job at issue; (3) he has suffered some adverse employment action; and
(4) someone outside the protected class of which he is a member was treated
872. Hazel, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1353.
873. Id.
874. Id.
875. Id.
876. Id. at 1355.
877. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
878. See Gunning v. Runyon, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1423 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
879. Id.
880. Id. at 1425-26.
881. Id. at 1426.
882. Id.
883. Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1427.
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differently. '' 88 Gunning failed to meet the third element because he
introduced no evidence as to any adverse employment action under Title
VI. 885 "Inconvenience and loss of enjoyment of life ... are not cognizable
under Title VII absent some adverse employment action. Even if
Gunning could make out a prima facie case, allowing employees to use
walkmans, and other private listening devices, constitutes a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory rationale that rebuts the presumption of discrimination. 887
As for the reasonable accommodation framework under Title VII, a
plaintiff's prima facie case entails: "(1) a bona fide religious belief conflict-
ing with an employment requirement; (2) that he informed his employer of
the religious belief; and (3) that he was discharged or otherwise penalized
for failure to comply with the conflicting requirement." 888 The court found
that Gunning established none of these elements because listening to
Christian music was not a tenet of his religion, he did not notify his
employer of such belief, and he did not suffer any adverse employment
action. 889 Moreover, even assuming Gunning made out a prima facie case,
allowing employees to wear headphones "constitute[s] a reasonable religious
accommodation under Title VII."'
The Post Office argued that Gunning's First Amendment freedom of
religion claim was precluded by Title VII. The court agreed, citing Brown
v. General Services Administration, 89 where the Supreme Court ruled that
Title VII is the exclusive remedy for federal employment discrimination.893
For this reason, Gunning's properly cognizable "constitutional claim of
religious employment discrimination... [was] cognizable only under Title
VII.
, 8 94
Turning to Gunning's free speech claim, the court concluded that it was
not precluded by Title VII since it was not an employment discrimination
claim.895 Adopting public forum analysis, the court ruled that the Post
Office was a non-public forum, the most restricted, where the employer is
free to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker
884. Id. at 1428 (citing Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1993)).
885. Id.
886. Id. at 1429.
887. Id.
888. Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1429-30 (citing Beadle v. Hillsborough County
Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11 th Cir. 1994)).
889. Id. at 1430.
890. Id.
891. Id.
892. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
893. Brown, 425 U.S. at 835.
894. Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1431.
895. Id.
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identity, so long as they are "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are viewpoint neutral."896 Applying this framework, the court
found that music interferes with an orderly and productive workplace en-
vironment and that the decision to deny access to the public address system
for recreational music was reasonable in light of the purpose of the postal
service.Y Moreover, the decision was not viewpoint based, that is, it was
not based upon the employer's opposition to the message of the music.8 98 In
effect, the government has the right simply to close the forum altogether.899
The RFRA restored the "compelling interest" test as the appropriate
method for analysis of free exercise claims.m Although the Supreme Court
struck down the RFRA as unconstitutional as applied to the states,9°1 and
even though its constitutionality as applied to the federal government is far
from clear, the court assumed, for purposes of analysis, that the Act was
valid.9°2 To establish a claim under RFRA, the plaintiff must prove that "he
possesses a religious belief and ... that governmental action or regulation
imposes a burden on the free exercise of his religion." 9 3 If so, the burden
shifts to thf government to come up with a compelling state interest for the
regulation. Listening to Christian radio is not a tenet of Gunning's Baptist
faith, nor would failure to listen to the radio station burden the practice of
his faith.95 Indeed, Gunning is still free to listen to the radio station of his
choice via headphones. 9°w But, even if Gunning makes out a prima facie case
under the Act, the Post Office's interest in avoiding a violation of the
Establishment Clause constitutes a compelling state interest sufficient to
rebut Gunning's prima facie case.Y
896. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 806 (1985) (internal quotations omitted)).
897. Id.
898. Id. at 1432.
899. Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1432.
900. Id. at 1433 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994)).
90i. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
902. Gunning, 3 F. Sjpp. 2d a. 1432-33.
903. Id. at 1433.
904. Id.
905. Id.
906. Id.
907. See Gunning, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1433.
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C. Age and Disability Discrimination
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,9°8 the only issue before the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and now before the Supreme Court which
heard oral argument in October, 1999, is whether Congress properly
abrogated the states' sovereign immunity when it passed the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 99 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 91° Two district courts have ruled that Congress
properly overrode the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity for both Acts,
but one district court granted the State's motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment grounds.912
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress's power to abrogate exists only under section five of the
913 914Fourteenth Amendment, not pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In light
of this case, the Kimel court set out two elements that must be met before
Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated: 1) Congress must spell
out "a clear legislative statement" of its intent by "'making its intention
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,"' and 2) Congress must
have invoked its enforcement powers granted in section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
915
As for the ADEA, the court sidestepped the second element because the
Act does not satisfy the first prong: the lack of unmistakably clear
legislative intent.916 Although a weak case of intent can be stitched together
908. 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999), and cert.
granted by 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept.
28, 1999) (No. 98-791, 98-796).
909. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
910. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12, 101-12,213 (1994).
911. MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ala. 1996),
aff'd by Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119
S. Ct. 901 (1999), and cert. granted by 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999), and petition for cert. filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 98-791, 98-796).
912. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
913. The enforcement provision in section five of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
914. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57-73 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
915. Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1430 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 62-63 (1996)).
916. Id. at 1431.
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from disparate language in the Act, the court made clear: "For abrogation to
be unmistakably clear, it should not first be necessary to fit together various
sections of the statute to create an expression from which one might infer an
intent to abrogate. '917 The words "the Eleventh Amendment or the States'
sovereign immunity" cannot be found anywhere in the ADEA.918 Even in
the face of Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, the court pointed out
that there are forms of relief, other than direct suits by citizens in federal
coUrt.
919
By contrast, the ADA contains a clear statement of intent to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity: "'A State shall not be immune under the
eleventh amendment... ."'m Moreover, unlike the ADEA, it is also
manifest from the face of the statute itself, that Congress relied upon its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers when it enacted the ADA: one
purpose of the act was "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority,
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment."921 In sum, the
ADA satisfies both elements for abrogation to prevail, while the ADEA
cannot even pass muster under the first element. Chief Judge Hatchett wrote
in his separate opinion that he believed that Congress abrogated the states'
sovereign immunity in both Acts,9"2 while Circuit Judge Cox took the exact
opposite position, concluding that Congress lacked constitutional power to
abrogate the states' immunity under either Act.9
2. The Overlap Between the ADEA and § 1983
In Hornfeld v. City of North Miami Beach,924 Hornfeld was a sixty-year
old woman who had worked for the City for ten years.9' In 1996, John
Asmar, Hornfeld's supervisor, cut back on Hornfeld's job duties, driven by
an imminent downsizing by the City. m  Asmar offered plaintiff an early
retirement incentive package.927 Plaintiff claimed that she had no time to
weigh her options and accepted the package because she was told that she
would be discharged if she turned it down and that a younger, less
917. Id.
918. See id.
919. Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1431.
920. Id. at 1433 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994)).
921. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994).
922. Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1434 (Hatchett, C.., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
923. Id. at 1444 (Cox, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
924. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
925. Id. at 1361.
926. Id.
927. Id.
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experienced employee would take over her job.928 Plaintiff brought both a
1983 claim, alleging a violation of equal protection, and an ADEA claim. 
9
The City contested plaintiff s entitlement to raise the two claims together.
930
The federal district court framed the issue as whether the ADEA served
as plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 931 In ruling that plaintiff was entitled to
bring both actions, the court relied on Supreme Court precedent "disfavoring
repeals by implication. 932  According to the Supreme Court, "[i]mplicit
repeals of statutory rights are recognized only 'when the earlier and later
statutes are irreconcilable.' ' 933 For example, the weight of authorityholds
that claims arising under Title VII may complement § 1983 claims. The
court pointed out that Title VII is the law that "most closely parallels the
ADEA. 93 5 By contrast, Congress expressly spelled out that the ADEA is
the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging age discrimination.
936
Even so, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that her ADEA claim
is "not based on the same substantive rights as her concurrent § 198391,937
claim. In other words, to maintain both claims, plaintiff must aim at pro-
tecting independently conferred rights.938 In this regard, the court pointed to
differences between ADEA and equal protection rights: "[u]nilke the ADEA,
not all arbitrary treatment is deemed to offend the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the clause protects against age discrimination, the elderly are not a
suspect class, and governmental action that disadvantages them is constitu-
tional if it passes the rational basis test. 9 39 Moreover, under equal protec-
tion, "class membership is irrelevant in assessing an ADEA violation."
Thus, the court concluded that the ADEA and § 1983 "may be used as com-
928. Id.
929. Homfeld, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
930. Id. at 1362-63.
931. See id.
932. Id. at 1363 (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442
(1987)).
933. Id. (quoting St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S.
772, 788 (1981)).
934. E.g., Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 148 F.3d 1228, 1231 (1lth Cir. 1998).
935. Hornfeld, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1365 (quoting EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 607
(7th Cir. 1982) (internal quotations ommitted)).
936. Id. at 1365 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)). But Congress implicitly left other
remedies open to non-federal employees. Id.
937. Id. (citing Johnson, 114 F.3d at 1091).
938. See id.
939. Hornfeld, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
940. Id. at 1368 (citing O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308
(1996)).
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plementary forms of relief for employment discrimination in the public
sector.,
94 1
3. Adapting Title VII's Burden Shifting Framework to ADEA Cases
In Bogle v. Orange County Board of County Commissioners,942 a
former correction officer sued the county, his former employer, for age
discrimination in violation of the ADEA and the Florida Human Rights Act
of 1992.943 Given that plaintiff's case of age bias was wholly circumstantial,
the court adopted Title VII's McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework
to weigh plaintiff's ADEA claim.944  The prima facie case of agediscrimination consists of showing:
(1) that he was a member of the protected group of persons
between the ages of forty and seventy; (2) that he was subject to an
adverse employment action; (3) that a substantially younger person
filled the position... from which he was discharged; and (4) that
he was qualified to do the job for which he was rejected. 945
If plaintiff met this burden, the county then had to come up with a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to fire the correction officer.94 6 In
this regard, the county introduced previous disciplinary sanctions and
plaintiff's failure to comply with several policies and procedures.947 After
the county met its burden, the plaintiff had to show that the county's
proffered reasons were pretextual. 948 On this score, the court ruled that
plaintiff lost because he failed to come up with any evidence that would have
entitled a reasonable jury to disbelieve the county's grounds for plaintiff's
termination. 949
In Mize v. School Board,950 plaintiff worked as a teacher of industrial
arts.9 In 1996, plaintiff was told that he would not be re-appointed for the
941. Hornfeld, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1368.
942. 162F.3d 653 (lth Cir. 1998).
943. FLA. STAT. § 760.10 (1999).
944. Bogle, 162 F.3d at 656 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1983)).
945. Id. at 656-67 (quoting Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432
(1998) (alteration in original), reh'g denied, 144 F.3d 57 (11th Cir. 1998), and cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 405 (1998)).
946. Id. at 657.
947. Id.
948. Id. at 658.
949. Bogle, 162 F.3d at 661.
950. 10 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
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1996-1997 school year in light of low student enrollment in the engineering
classes in the drafting department.95 2 He was, however, put on a countywide
relocation list and indeed was offered a job teaching art to kindergarten
classes and elementary students, even though he never taught these levels
before.953 Mize sued his former employer under the ADEA, under Florida's
Civil Rights Act of 1992,954 and under an alleged breach of the collective
bargaining agreement.95 The court only addressed the ADEA claim.
95 6
The federal district court spelled out the prima facie case for age
discrimination when the plaintiff was not replaced. The plaintiff must show:
(1) that he was in a protected age group and was adversely affected
by an employment decision, (2) that he was qualified for his current
position or to assume another position at the time of the discharge,
and (3) evidence by which a fact finder could reasonably conclude
that the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of age in
reaching that decision.
957
Except for this departure from the Mcdonnell Douglas framework, the Title
VII burden shifting analysis is the same.958 Here, since it was not clear
which test to apply,959 the court first applied the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, concluding that plaintiff met his burden on all four elements.
96°
Alternatively, the court applied the Jamison framework and found that
plaintiff failed to prove the third element, and thus defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.961 Under either framework, the employer was
able to meet its burden of supplying a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the reassignment,962 and plaintiff fell short of his burden of proving that
951. Id. at 1316.
952. Id.
953. Id.
954. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(1) (1999).
955. Mize, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
956. Id. at 1318. Since the other claims were matters of state law, the court dismissed
them for lack of federal jurisdiction, after dismissing the ADEA claim. Id.
957. Id. at 1317 (citing Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996)).
958. See id.
959. Id. The confusion arose due to a factual dispute over whether plaintiff's position
was eliminated. Id.
960. Mize, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. The court assumed that reassignment or demotion
counts as a termination under this framework. Id.
961. Id. at 1318.
962. Id. at 1317.
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defendant's stated reasons were a pretext.963 Therefore, the School Boardwas entitled to summary judgment under either framework.964
4. Disability Discrimination
In Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation
District,965 Bledsoe worked as a resource technician for four years until he
was dismissed in 1992.966 During his tenure with the Palm Beach County
Soil & Water Conservation District ("District"), Bledsoe injured his knee
and filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits.967 At the same time,
he asked his supervisor to accommodate his inability to walk for long
stretches.968 As an accommodation, the District offered Bledsoe a job as
resource conservationist, but he declined the offer, so the District fired
him.96 9  As part of the settlement of his workers' compensation claim,
Bledsoe waived his rights to sue his employer for any other claims, except
for future medicals, attorneys' fees, and the like. 
970
Nevertheless, Bledsoe sued the District and Palm Beach County under
the ADA, claiming a disability and alleging that his employer's refusal to
accommodate his disability (his inability to walk for long distances) was the
reason for his termination. 971 In defense, the District raised Bledsoe's
release executed as part of his claim for workers' compensation benefits.972
The district court ruled that the County was not Bledsoe's employer but
litigation continued against the District alone.9 3 The court ruled that the
District fell short of the minimum number of employees required to be
covered under Title I of the ADA, so Bledsoe amended his complaint,
switching from Title I to Title HI liability.974 The District argued that Title II
does not cover employment and again raised the release signed by975 976
Bledsoe. The district court entered summary judgment for the District.
963. See id.
964. Id. at 1318.
965. 133 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 140 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 1999), and
cert. denied, Palm Beach Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Bledsoe, 119 S. Ct. 72 (1998).
966. Id. at 818.
967. Id.
968. Id.
969. Id.
970. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 818-19.
971. Id.
972. Id.
973. Id.
974. Id.
975. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 818-19.
976. Id. at 819.
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On appeal, two issues were raised: 1) the validity of the release, and 2)
whether Title I covers employment. 977 On both counts, the court reversed
the ruling of the district court.978 Relying on Supreme Court precedent
governing Title VII, the court made clear that an employee can waive his
"'cause of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement
agreement' ' '979 if "'the employee's consent to the settlement was voluntary
and knowing.' ' '980 In this regard, the court set out from earlier Eleventh
Circuit precedent, the factors that weigh on whether a release is knowing and
voluntary:
[T]he plaintiff's education and business experience; the amount of
time the plaintiff considered the agreement before signing it; the
clarity of the agreement; the plaintiffs opportunity to consult with
an attorney; the employer's encouragement or discouragement of
consultation with an attorney; and the consideration given in
exchange for the waiver when compared with the benefits to which
the employee was already entitled.98
1
Applying these factors, the court ruled that a jury question was raised over
whether Bledsoe voluntarily and knowingly released his ADA claim.982
As for the second issue, whether Title II of the ADA covers
employment, the court relied on earlier Eleventh Circuit decisions implying
that Title II does indeed cover employment. 98 3  Moreover, the statutory
language of Title I, the Department of Justice's regulations, 984 and other
courts' position on this issue, weighed in favor of concluding that Title II
does cover employment.985 Title II bars public entities from excluding
disabled individuals from "services, programs, or activities. ' 6 The term
"public entity" expressly encompasses state and local government.9 7  In
977. Id.
978. Id.
979. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974)).
980. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 819 (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 52 n.15).
981. Id. (quoting Puentes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 86 F.3d 196, 198 (1lth Cir.
1996) (quoting Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 635 (11 th Cir. 1995)).
982. Id.
983. Id. at 820 (citing Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1528-29 (1lth
Cir. 1997); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11 th Cir. 1996)).
984. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b)(1) (1998). "For purposes of [Title II], the requirements of
title I of the Act... apply to employment in any service, program, or activity conducted by a
public entity if that public entity is also subject to the jurisdiction of title I [i.e. employs fifteen
or more employees]." Id.
985. See Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 820-25.
986. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
987. Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 821 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)).
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sum, the weight of authority holds that Title II states a cause of action for• - 988
employment discrimination.
In Seaborn v. Florida Department of Corrections,9  plaintiffs, all
African-Americans employed by the Tallahassee Community Correctional
Center, suffered from a skin condition known as pseudofolliculitis barbae
("PFB") that made shaving painful.990 The Correctional Center made an
exception to its "No Beard Policy" for plaintiffs' skin condition.99' Even so,
plaintiffs alleged that they faced discrimination and were passed over for
992promotions because they wore beards. Plaintiffs sued their employer
under the ADA.993 The district court ruled that plaintiffs' skin disorder did
not rise to the level of a disability under the ADA because PFB did not
substantially limit their ability to work.994
On appeal, the State of Florida asserted for the first time that it was
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiffs' ADA claims. 995
Because such a claim is jurisdictional, the court allowed Florida's immunity
defense but concluded that it was constrained by Eleventh Circuit precedent
that states lack Eleventh Amendment immunity from ADA claims.996
Turning to the merits, the court sustained the lower court's ruling dismissing
plaintiffs' ADA claims on grounds that PFB did not substantially limit their
ability to work.997
988. Id. at 825.
989. 143 F.3d 1405 (1lth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1038 (1999).
990. Id. at 1406.
991. Id.
992. Id.
993. Id.
994. Seaborn, 143 F.3d at 1406.
995. Id.
996. Id. at 1407 (citing Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th
Cir. 1998)).
997. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the November 1998 election, Florida voters provided mixed signals
with respect to environmental issues.' For the first time this century a
republican governor, Jeb Bush, was elected along with republican majorities
in both the house and senate.2 Throughout the election campaign, Bush had
been criticized by environmentalists because of his ties to oil and real estate
development interests.3 At the same time, voters passed Florida Constitution
Revision 5, making it a legislative duty to make adequate provision for
conservation and protection of natural resources and allowing for the issuing
of bonds for environmental conservation.4
However, during the first half of 1999, Governor Bush pleased many of
his environmental critics with his appointment of David Struhs to head the
Department of Environmental Protection,5  his water management
6appointments, and his appointment to lead the Environmental Forever
Program.7 In addition, his opposition to off shore oil drilling, commitment to
Everglades restoration, and the passage of the Florida Forever Program have
8been applauded . With this background in mind, this article will discuss the
changes to Florida law and Florida environmental programs due to the
Florida Constitutional revisions, Florida case law, and statutory changes
during the time period July 1998 through July 1999.
1. Tom Friedler, Floridians Adore Jeb, but Want Buddy's Platforn, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 5, 1998, at 29A.
2. A Glance at Jeb Bush's Agenda, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Jan. 3, 1999, at 8A;
Mark Silva, et al., Bush Rallies a Friendly Crowd, Mar. 3, 1999, at IA.
3. See, e.g., Shirish Date, Environment Pulls Buffett to MacKay, PALM BEACH POST,
Oct. 29, 1998, at 14A; Excerpts from Bush, MacKay Radio Debate, ST. PETERSBURG TImEs, Oct.
14, 1998, at 12A; Cyril T. Zaneski & Mark Silva, MacKay Stressing Protection of Nature, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 28, 1998, at lB. But see, Bush Looks Good in Green, ST. PETERsBERG TIMFS, Feb.
6, 1998, at 18A (comparing Bush's 1998 environmental platform with his 1994 failed election
campaign).
4. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7(a); art. VII, § 11 (e); art X, § 18 (amended 1998).
5. Zy Zaneski, Environmental Chief. Change Starts Within, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 27,
1999, at lB.
6. Mark Silva, Water Management Appointments Get General Thumbs.Up, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 6, 1999, at 5B.
7. Cy Zaneski, Bush Chooses Activist for Florida Forever Program, MIAMI HERALD,
July 17, 1999, at lB.
8. See, e.g., Cyril T. Zaneski & Phil Long, Bush Takes Stand for Glades Restoration,
Seeks Right Price Tag, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 22, 1999, at 4B; Craig Pittman, Bush Reaffirms Well
Opposition, ST. PETRsBtuRG TMEs, Jan. 16, 1999, at IB; Neil Santiniello & Robert McClure,
Bush Already Getting EnvironmentalAward, SuN SeNTINEL Jan. 16, 1999, at 6B.
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I. FLORIDA CONSTITUTION REVISIONS
There were two proposed Florida constitutional revisions relating to
environmental issues on the November 1998 ballot.9 Only one, Revision 5,
passed.'0  Revision 10 was narrowly defeated.1  Revision 10's
environmental related provisions included an option for local tax districts to
exempt property used for conservation purposes and to allow for increased
citizen access to local officials on the subject of public hearings.12
Revision 5 passed in a landslide with over seventy percent of the voters
voting in favor of the revision. 13 Amending Florida Constitution Article I, §
7(a), Article IV § 9, Article VII, § 11 (e)-(f), Article X, § 18, and Article XII, §
22, Revision 5 makes it a duty to pass adequate laws for the conservation and
protection of natural resources, requires the creation of the Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Commission through the merger of the Game and Fresh Water
Fish Commission and the Marine Fisheries Commission, allows for the
issuance of bonds to finance conservation and related projects, and restricts the
sale of state lands designated for conservation purposes.! As discussed below,
9. See Proposed Constitutional Amendments and Revisions to be Voted on Nov. 3,
1998 (available at <http://elections.dos.state.fl.us/1998eleclamendments/intro.htm>).
10. See id.
11. See i.
12. Id. at 18. The ballot title and summary for Revision 10 was:
LOCAL AND MUNICIPAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS AND
CITIZEN ACCESS TO LOCAL OFFICIALS
Broadens tax exemption for governmental uses of municipal property;
authorizes legislature to exempt certain municipal and special district
property used for airport, seaport, or public purposes; permits local option tax
exemption for property used for conservation purposes; permits local option
tangible personal property tax exemption for attachments to mobile homes
and certain residential rental furnishings; removes limitations on citizens'
ability to communicate with local officials about matters which are the subject
of public hearings.
Id.
13. See Proposed Constitutional Amendments and Revisions to be Voted on Nov. 3,
1998 (available at <http://election.dos.state.fl.us/1998elecamendments/intro.htm>). See also,
Zaneski, supra note 5 at lB.
14. Revision 5's ballot title and summary were:
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND CREATION OF
FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION
Requires adequate provision for conservation of natural resources; creates
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, granting it the regulatory and
executive powers of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission and the
Marine Fisheries Commission; removes legislature's exclusive authority to
regulate marine life and grants certain powers to new commission; authorizes
1999]
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Revision 5 resulted in a number of statutory changes during the 1999 Florida
Legislative Session.
15
mH. THE DRYCLEANING SOLVENT CONTAMINATION CLEANUP ACT
A. Overview
In 1995, the Florida Legislature enacted the Drycleaning Solvent
Contamination Cleanup Act ("the Act") to address the management and
cleanup of current and former drycleaning sites. 16 The Act limits liability
and provides for immunity for owners and operators of eligible sites.
Cleanups are funded through a state-funded cleanup program administered
by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection ("FDEP"2-' 8
Voluntary cleanups are allowed 19 and encouraged through tax incentives.
2
An important legislative modification to the drycleaning program
became effective during the past year.21 Pursuant to legislation passed by the
1998 Legislature, the FDEP stopped accepting cleanup program applications
22
on December 31, 1998. Therefore, any previously undiscovered
contamination or new releases will no longer be eligible for the limited
. .. .. . .23
liability and immunity provisions of the program.
B. Case Law
In two cases decided this year, Miami-Dade County tested the limits of
-- 24
the Act's liability and immunity provisions. In Metropolitan Dade County
bonds to continue financing acquisition and improvement of lands for
conservation, outdoor recreation, and related purposes; restricts disposition of
state lands designated for conservation purposes.
Proposed Constitutional Amendments and Revisions to be Voted on Nov. 3, 1998 (available
at <http://election.dos.stat.fl.us/l1998elecamendments/intro.htm>).
15. See infra pages 161-62, 164-74.
16. Ch. 95-239, § 3, 1995 Fla. Laws 2125, 2127-38 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 376.3078
(1995)).
17. See FLA. STAT. § 376.3078(3) (1999).
18. See id. § 376.3078(2).
19. Id. § 376.3078(11).
20. Id. § 199.1055(1)(a)1-2.
21. See id. § 376.3078(3)(a)5.
22. FLA. STAT. § 376.3078(3)(a)5 (1999).
23. See id.
24. See Metropolitan Dade County v. Chase Fed. Hous. Co., 737 So. 2d 494 (Fla.
1999); Metropolitan Dade County v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 714 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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v. Chase Federal Housing Co.,25 Dade County appealed final summary
judgments in favor of several shopping center owners where drycleaning
solvent contamination was discovered. Dade County had sued the shopping
center owners to enforce a cleanup, to recover costs for the installation of
water mains, to impose penalties, and to seek attorneys' fees and
administrative costs.27
The suit arose from the 1991 discovery of contamination in private
drinking water wells in the Suniland area of Dade County.2 Subsequent
environmental assessments determined that the contamination was
emanating from several shopping centers with drycleaner tenants.29
Following the issuance of notices of violation by Dade County, the shopping
centers conducted remediation of their property but did not address offsite
migration of the contamination. Over the next two years, Dade County
incurred considerable expense in the installation of water mains and
conducting environmental investigations.
On appeal before the Third District Court of Appeal, Dade County
argued that the Drycleaning Chemical Cleanup Program was not intended to
be retroactive, and thus did "not apply to actions to recover expenditures
made by the County prior to the enactment of the immunity provisions." 32
The court rejected this argument and found the Act's grants of immunity
retroactive and, as such, precluded Dade County's actions against the
shopping center owners.
However, the district court certified the following question to the
Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of great public importance:
ARE SUBSECTIONS 376.3078(3) AND 376.3078(9), FLORIDA
STATUTES (1995), WHICH PROVIDE TO ELIGIBLE
ENTITIES CONDITIONAL IMMUNITY FROM CERTAIN
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTIONS BY STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND AGENCIES, INTENDED
BY THE LEGISLATURE TO APPLY RETROACTIVELY,
THUS PRECLUDING ACTIONS AGAINST IMMUNIZED
ENTITIES FOR THE RECOVERY BY A GOVERNMENT FOR
25. 737 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1999).
26. Id. at 498-99.
27. Id. at 496-97.
28. Id. at 496.
29. Id.
30. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So. 2d at 497.
31. Id
32. Metropolitan Dade County v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 705 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 3d
Dist Ct. App. 1998).
33. Id: at 675.
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ENFORCEMENT AND REHABILITATION COSTS
EXPENDED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THESE
SUBSECTIONS?
34
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the
affirmative. 35 Using a two-prong test the court found that the legislature
intended to apply the statute retrospectively and that retroactive application
was constitutionally permissible.
In Metropolitan Dade County v. Department of Environmental
Protection,3 7 Dade County appealed an administrative hearing final order
approving the eligibility of a property owner, Sekoff Investments, Inc.
("Sekoff'), to participate in the Florida Drycleaning Contamination Cleanup
Program. Dade County contended that "Sekoff had committed gross
negligence... because Sekoff was 'in willful violation of local law
... regulating the operation of drycleaning facilities,' for failure to comply
with the County's cleanup requests." 39 "The County maintained that this
gross negligence disqualified Sekoff from participating in the Cleanup
Program and enjoying statutory immunity from County enforcement
efforts."'
4
The suit arose out of drycleaning chemical contamination discovered on
Sekoff's property. 41 Dade County issued a Notice of Violation and Orders
for Corrective Action ("NOV") on March 15, 1994 for the presence of
drycleaning solvents in the septic tank and storm drain/soakage pit located
42
on the Sekhoff property. In response to the NOV, Sekoff hired an
environmental consulting firm and commenced assessment activities.43
During this same time period, the Florida Drycleaning Solvent
Contamination Cleanup Act became effective.44  Sekoff continued to
conduct assessment activities, removed the contents of the septic tank and
34. Id. at 676.
35. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So. 2d at 496.
36. Id. at 499. The court made two inquiries. They were: 1) whether there is clear
evidence of legislative intent to apply the statute retrospectively; and, if so, 2) whether retroactive
application is constitutionally permissible. Id.
37. 714 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1998).
38. Id. at 513-14.
39. Id. at 514 (citing Fla. Stat. § 376.3078(3)(c) (1997)).
40. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 376.3078(3) (1995) (precluding sites found to be grossly
negligent from being eligible for the program)). Section 376.3078(3)(c) defines grossly negligent
as a willful violation of local law. See FLA. STAT. § 376.3078(3)(c) (1995).
41. See Metropolitan Dade County, 714 So. 2d at 514.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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storm drain, and advised Dade County that it would apply for participation in
the Drycleaning Solvent Contamination Cleanup Provram as soon as the
FDEP promulgated the necessary implementation rules. 5
The site was found eligible for the program on June 11, 1996 and Dade
County filed its request for an administrative hearing.46 Relying on the
definition of "willful" in Thunderbird Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Reed,47 the
hearing officer concluded that "Sekoff's actions were not unreasonable and
not willful in view of the legislature's enactment of section
376.3078."48 The FDEP adopted the order recommended, and affirmed
Sekoff's eligibility.49
The Third District Court of Appeal approved the order noting that an
amendment to the Act defined "gross negligence" as the "willful violation of
[a] local ... rule regulating the operation of drycleaning facilities .... ,"0
The court further found that the property owner's attempts at compliance
demonstrated that it did not willfully violate the county's code.51
IV. THE PETROLEUM CLEANUP PROGRAM
A. Overview
There have been several petroleum cleanup programs enacted by the
state including the Early Detection Incentive Program ("EDIP"), 5 the
Abandoned Tank Restoration Prgran ("ATRP"), 3 the Petroleum Cleanup
Participation Program ("PCPP"), and the Florida Petroleum Liability and
Restoration Insurance Program ("FPLRIP").55  These programs are now
closed to eligibility for new sites placing the cost for the cleanup of new, or
newly discovered discharges on the site owner or other responsible party.
56
Under these programs, cleanup costs are to be paid for out of the Inland
45. Id. at 515.
46. Metropolitan Dade County, 714 So. 2d at 515.
47. 571 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (willful "requires intent and
purpose that the act or condition take place").
48. Metropolitan Dade County, 714 So. 2d at 515.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 516 (citing FLA. STAT. § 376.3078(3)(c) (1995)).
51. Seeid.
52. FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(9) (1999). EDI eligibility ended December 31, 1988. See id.
53. Id. § 376.305(6).
54. Id. § 376.3071(13). Eligibility ended December 31, 1998. Id.
55. FLA. STAT. § 376.3072. (1999). Discharges eligible for coverage ended December
31, 1998. See id. § 376.3072(2)(d)2.e.
56. Glenn R. MacGraw, PG, New Legislation Shifts More Financial Responsibility for
Petroleum Cleanup to Site Owners, FLOPDA SPECFIER, July, 1999, at 14.
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Protection Trust Fund.57 Legislative changes in 1995 converted all cleanups
under these programs into a preapproval or state administered program based
on priority ranking. 8
Recognizing that "the inability to conduct site rehabilitation in advance
of a site's priority ranking ... may substantially impede or prohibit property
transactions or the proper completion of public works projects," the
Preapproved Advanced Cleanup Program ("PACP") was established. 9
Under the PACP, responsible parties may apply for cleanup funding in
advance of the site's priority ranking if the responsible party is willing to
enter into a cost sharing arrangement.60 Voluntary cleanups, with no state
funding obligations, are also allowed.
61
B. Petroleum Program Cases
Environmental Trust v. Department of Environmental Protection62 is a
consolidation of four administrative hearing appeals relating to forty-five
reimbursement applications submitted to the FDEP for work performed
between July 1994 and February 1995. Environmental Trust and Sarasota
Environmental Investors ("the investors") had advanced capital for the
remediation projects.64 FDEP denied part of their applications for reim-
bursement for cleaning up petroleum contamination and an administrative
law judge authorized FDEP's use of "incipient non-rule policies to deny the
applications."' 65 Also part of this consolidated case is FDEP's appeal of an
order by another administrative law judge invalidating a new rule adopting
the policies approved in the above case and an award of attorneys' fees.
In each of the forty-five applications, the investors had advanced capital
for remediation work at the various sites through a factoring arrangement.
67
57. FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(2)(a) (1999).
58. See FLA. STAT. §§ 376.3071(5), (12), .30711 (1999).
59. RLA. STAT. § 376.30713(1)(a) (1999).
60. Id. § 376.30713(1)(c)-(d).
61. See id. § 376.3071(11) (1997).
62. 714 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
63. Id. at 495.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Environmental Trust, 714 So. 2d at 495.
The cost of the work was financed in each case by a factoring arrangement.
Generally, factoring is the process of purchasing accounts receivable at a
discount. In these cases, the factoring company advanced capital at a
discounted rate to the subcontractor, the contractor, and an investment
company like Environmental Trust or Sarasota Investors, and then applied for
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In addition to this financing arrangement, at least thirty of the projects
included a fifteen percent markup for a final site inspection performed by a
general contractor who did not otherwise participate in the remediation
activities. 68 The FDEP stated its position denying the applications in an
April 21, 1995 memorandum and an October 20, 1995 internal electronic
mail.6 9 In the April 21, 1995 memorandum, the FDEP said that the factoring
arrangement amounted to the payment of interest, a non-reimbursable
expense.70  The October 20, 1995 electronic mail established the FDEP
policy that general contractor markups would only be allowed if they were
related to an "integral management function in the rehabilitation of a site.
' 71
The investors filed for administrative hearings on the application
denials pursuant to sections 120.57(1) and 120.535, of the Florida Statutes.72
The administrative law judge found in favor of the FDEP allowing the use of
the policies as unadopted rules for which the FDEP had initiated rulemaking
procedures as soon as "practical or feasible."
73
Before the dismissal of the investors' petitions, the FDEP published
notices of proposed policies on factoring and contractor markup policies.74
These rules were challenged in a separate action from the above petitions, by
Environmental Trust and other investment companies.75 The administrative
law judge in this second case found the rules invalid and awarded costs and
attorney fees to the Environmental Trust and the other investment
companies.
76
The FDEP appealed these orders and the First District Court of Appeal
consolidated them with the investors' appeal for hearing.77 The court ruled
in favor of the FDEP by finding the FDEP's denial of the factoring charges
and contractor markups proper under the existing rules and statute.78  In
reimbursement from the state based on the face amount of the invoices
submitted at each level of the process. As a result, the cost of the discount for
providing investment capital to the contractor, subcontractor, and investment
company, was passed along to the state as a part of the cost of the
rehabilitation.
Id. at 495-96.
68. See id. at 496.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Environmental Trust, 714 So. 2d at 496.
72. Id. at 496. See FA. STAT. §§ 120.57(1), .535 (1995).
73. Environmental Trust, 714 So. 2d at 496.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 496-97.
76. Id. at 497.
77. Id at 495.
78. Environmental Trust, 714 So. 2d at 497.
1999]
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addition, the court found that the FDEP's revised rule was valid and that it
could be applied retroactively. 79 The court reasoned that "if [a] rule merely
clarifies another existing rule and does not establish new requirements"
then it falls within an exception to Florida's general prohibition against the
promulgation of retroactive administrative rules.8 '
The court's pronouncement of this exception caused significant
controversy.82 In response, the 1999 Florida Legislature amended section
120.54(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes to include a prohibition against an
agency adopting retroactive rules even if intended to clarify existing law
unless expressly authorized by statute.83 This amendment is discussed more
fully below.8
In a subsequent decision, Florida Department of Environmental
85Protection v. Environmental Corporation of America, Inc., the Second
District Court of Appeal dismissed a federal civil rights claim brought
against three individual FDEP employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The suit
was brought by Environmental Corporation of America, Inc. which alleged
that the FDEP's revised reimbursement rules violated "clearly established
law against retroactive rule-making" depriving the plaintiff of a vested
86property right. Citing Environmental Trust, the Second District Court of
Appeal found the revised rule a mere clarification of existing rules which fell
within the exception to the prohibition against retrospective administrative
rules. Therefore, the court found the government employees had a qualified
immunity as their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.
C. Petroleum Program Statutory Changes
A few legislative changes occurred during the 1999 Legislative Session
affecting the petroleum program. First, the Legislature has allowed for the
continuation of the Preapproved Advanced Cleanup Program by eliminating
79. See id. at 498.
80. Id. at 500.
81. Id. at 499-500. In its analysis, the court relies on federal, and not state court, cases
stating that both Florida and federal courts apply the same principle that "an administrative rule
generally has only prospective application." Id. at 499.
82. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Sellers, The Environmental Trust:, Will the Exception
"Swallow the Rule?" FLA. B. ENVT'L & LAND USE L. SEc. REP. (1999).
83. Ch. 99-379, § 4, 1999 Fla. Laws 3788, 3792-93 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
120.54(1)(f) (1999)).
84. See infra pp. 167-69.
85. 720 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
86. Id. at 274.
87. Id.
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88
an October 1, 1999 program deadline. Second, funding has been provided,
in advance of a site's priority ranking, for free product recovery 9 In
addition, the Legislature has established that "[t]he department shall select
five sites eligible for state restoration funding assistance... each having a
low-priority ranking score.., for an innovative technology pilot program."
9
Fourth, the FDEP has been given authority to enter into site
rehabilitation agreements for the cleanup of mixed eligibility sites with
eligible discharges and non-eligible discharges on a cost-sharing
basis.91 The law also establishes a timeframe for a responsible party to
complete negotiations with the FDEP for cost sharing arrangements. If
negotiations are not complete within 120 days, the site is to be deemed
ineligible.93  All liability protections afforded by the program would be
revoked resulting in the property owner, operator, or other responsible party
liable for the complete cost of rehabilitation. 94
Perhaps the most important statutory modification impacting the
transfer of sites currently participating in the Petroleum Cleanup
Participation Program, is the elimination of Florida Statutes Section
376.3071(13)(g)(5). 95 This section, in effect, attached program eligibility to
the property owner which resulted in the loss of the site's program eligibility
when a property transfer occurred.96 This potential cause for loss of
eligibility has now been removed.
88. Ch. 99-376, § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws 3734, 3736-37 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
376.30713(7) (1999)).
89. Id. § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3734-35 (codified at FA. STAT. § 376.3071(5)(c) (1999)).
90. Id. § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3736 (codified at FA. STAT. § 376.30711(8) (1999)).
91. Id. § 4, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3737 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 376.30714(1)(d)-(e)
(1999)).
92. Id. § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3735 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 376.3071(13)(c) (1999)).
93. Ch. 99-376, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 3734, 3735 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
376.3071(13)(c) (1999)).
94. See id.
95. See id. Section 376.3071(13)(g)(5) of the Florida Statutes stated:
Any person who knowingly acquires title to contaminated property shall not
be eligible for restoration funding pursuant to this subsection. The provisions
of this subsection do not relieve any person who has acquired title subsequent
to July 1, 1992, from the duty to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that he or she undertook, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry
into the previous ownership and use of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability, as
required by s. 376.308(1)(c). The provisions of this subparagraph do not
apply to any person who acquires title by succession or devise.
FA. STAT. § 376.3071(13)(g)(5) (1997).
96. See Ch. 99-376, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 3734, 3735 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
376.3071(13) (1999)).
1999]
166
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
V. OTHER 1999 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES OF INTEREST
A. The Administrative Procedure Act
The Florida Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") governs the
rulemaking authority of state agencies.97 Prior to 1996, the APA was
interpreted to allow an agency to adopt a rule if it was "reasonably related to
the purpose of the enabling legislation and [was] not arbitrary and
capricious., 98  In 1996, however, revisions to the APA's rulemaking
provisions specifically rejected the "reasonably related" test. 99
Subsequent to the 1996 APA Amendments, several appellate decisions
were questioned as to whether they met "the spirit and the letter of the
law."'00 Two of these cases related to environmental matters and were
decided within the past year; Environmental Trust,10 1 discussed above, and
St. Johns River Water Management District v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land
Co.10 2 In Consolidated-Tomoka, the St. Johns Water Management District
appealed an administrative law judge's invalidation of a series of its
proposed rules relating to the designation of two areas as hydrologic
basins. 03
As the proposed rules would result in more restrictive development and
permitting requirements, affected property owners challenged the proposed
97. See FLA. STAT. § 120 (1999).
98. Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., More APA Reform: The 1999 Amendments to Florida's
Administrative Procedure Act, Fla. B. J., July/August 1999, at 78. See also Frank E. Matthews,
APA Reform Refined, FLA. B. ADMIN. L. SEC. NEWSLEE, Mar. 1999, at 1.
99. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(8), 120.536(1) (1997), which provided:
A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to allow an
agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is also required. An
agency may adopt only rules that implement, interpret, or make specific the
particular powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. No agency shall
have authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the
purpose of the enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious, nor
shall an agency have the authority to implement statutory provisions setting
forth general legislative intent or policy. Statutory language granting
rulemaking authority or generally describing the powers and functions of an
agency shall be construed to extend no further than the particular powers and
duties conferred by the same statute.
Id.
100. Frank E. Matthews, APA Reform Refined, FiA. R. ADMIN. L SFC. NEwsLmrrE,
March 1999, at 1.
101. Environmental Trust v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 714 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
102. 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
103. Id. at 75.
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rules.1°4 Discussing the 1996 version of the APA, the administrative judge
concluded that the rules "were invalid as a matter of law" in that they were
not within the "particular powers and duties granted by the enabling statute,"
they exceeded "the agency's grant of rulemaldng authori," and "they
enlarge[d], modif[ied] or contravene[d] the law implemented."
On appeal, the First District upheld the proposed rules finding them "a
valid exercise of delegated legislative authority."0 6  In reaching this
conclusion, the court found the term "particular powers and duties" in
section 120.52(8) ambiguous."17 Looking at two possible interpretations, the
court chose the less restrictive alternative and concluded that "particular"
meant "that the powers and duties must be identifiable as powers and duties
falling within a class." 108
In part to address the judicial decisions in Environmental Trust and
Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co., the 1999 Legislature again amended the
APA.109 This law has been received with mixed reactions due to its potential
effect on existing environmental regulations. 11° As indicated in section one
of chapter 99-379, Laws of Florida, the language added to sections 120.52(8)
and 120.536(1) of the Florida Statutes... is "intended to reject the class of
104. Id. at 75-76.
105. Id. at 76.
106. Id. at 81.
107. Consolidated Tomoka Land Co., 717 So. 2d at 79.
108. Id. at 80.
109. Ch. 99-379, § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws 3788, 3790 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)
(1999)). This amendment has been criticized by environmentalists and was initially opposed by
DEP Secretary David Struhs, however, Mr. Struhs later reversed his position and supported the
bill's passage. See Julie Hauserman, DEP Chief Warns Against Rules Bill, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, June 17, 1999 at 1B; Julie Hauserman, New Law will Ease State Rules Battles, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, June 18, 1999 at 1B; Editorial, A Bad Sign Series, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs,
June 25, 1999 at 16A.
110. See Julie Hauserman, DEP Chief Warns Against Rules Bill, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
June 17, 1999 at 1B; Julie Hauserman, New Law will Ease State Rules Battles, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, June 18, 1999 at IB; Editorial, A Bad Sign Series, ST. PETERSBURG TaIms, June 25, 1999
at 16A. See also, Lawrence E. Sellers, APA: Legislation Clarifies Agency Rulemaking Authority
and Terrell K. Arline, The Environmental Impacts of the Administrative Procedures Act Bill,
THE FLA. B. ENvTL & LAND USE L SEc. REP., Vol. XX, No. 3, June 1999 at 8-9.
111. Sections 120.52(8) and 120.536(1) of the Florida Statutes, are modified as follows:
A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to allow an
agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is also required. An
agency may adopt only rules that implement or interpret the specific powers
and duties granted by the enabling statute. No agency shall have authority to
adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the
enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious or is within the
agency's class ofpowers and duties, nor shall an agency have the authority to
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powers and duties analysis."'1 12 Further, the Law rejects the exception to
retroactive rules enounced in Environmental Trust"13 by adding language to
section 120.54(f) prohibiting retroactive rules intended to clarify existing
law.'
14
The legislature has included a provision to shield those rules that may
exceed rulemaking authority from attack until proper legislation can be
passed or they can be repealed. 1"s Each agency is to provide a list of rules
that exceed the new standards to the Administrative Procedures Committee
by October 1, 1999.1 6 The committee shall provide a cumulative list to the
legislature so that the legislature can determine whether legislation
authorizing the identified rules should be enacted during the 2000 Regular
Session.it7 Rule challenges are allowed after July 1, 2001. 118
In addition to the above, the law modifies the definition of agency to
include regional water supply authorities and to remove water control
districts from the definition. The law provides that district school boards
implement statutory provisions setting forth general legislative intent or
policy. Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or generally
describing the powers and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend
no further than implementing or interpreting the specific powers and duties
conferred by the same statute.
FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(8), 120.536(1) (1999) (emphasis added).
112. Ch. 99-379, § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws 3788, 3789 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)
(1999)). See also Florida House of Representatives as Further Revised by the Committee on
Governmental Rules and Regulations Final Analysis (June 30, 1999) <http'//www.leg.
state.fl.us/session/1999/Housebills/analysispdf/HB0107Z.GRR> (staff analysis stating that the
amendment rejects the class of powers test in Consolidated-Tomoka).
113. Florida House of Representatives as Further Revised by the Committee on
Governmental Rules and Regulations Final Analysis (June 30, 1999) <http:\\www.leg.state.fl.us/
session/1999/HousefbiUs/analysis/pdf/HBO107Z.GRR> (staff analysis).
114. Ch. 99-379, § 4, 1999 Fla. Laws 3788, 3793 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(f)
(1999)).
An agency may adopt rules authorized by law and necessary to the
proper implementation of a statute prior to the effective date of the statute,
but the rules may not be effective until the statute upon which they are based
is effective. An agency may not adopt retroactive rules, including retroactive
rules intended to clarify existing law, unless that power is expressly
authorized by statute
Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3792 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.536(2)(b) (1999)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Ch. 99-379, § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws 3788, 3792 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.536(2)(b)
(1999)).
119. Id. § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3789 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1) (1999)).
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need only adopt rules pursuant to section 230.22(2) of the Florida
Statutes.'7° Further, the law clarifies the burden of proof for a rule
challenge.121 Finally, the law requires that when an agency rejects or
modifies
a conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule, the
agency must state with particularity its reasons for rejecting or
modifying such conclusion of law or interpretation of
administrative rule and must make a finding that its substituted
conclusion of law or interpretation of administrative rule is as or
more reasonable than that which was rejected or modified. 22
B. The Florida Forever Program
Two main laws were passed during the 1999 legislative session relating
to the Florida Forever Program.1 3 Chapter 99-247 is entitled the Florida
Forever Program and contains provisions related to a variety of
environmental matters.124 This includes the creation of a land acquisition
program, and the Florida Forever Act,1's allowing for the continuance of
certain submerged land leases,'2 the creation of the Florida Forever
Advisory Counsel'27 and the Acquisition and Restoration Council,12s
120. Id. § 7, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3794 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.81(l)(a) (1999)).
121. Id. § 5, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3793 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.56(2)(a) (1999))
(stating that "[t]he petitioner has the burden of going forward. The agency then has the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority as to the objections raised").
122. Id. § 6, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3793 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (1999)).
123. 1999 Fla. Laws chs. 99-246, 247. Several other laws were also enacted which
addressed affected statutes relating to agencies other than the DEP. See 1999 Fla. Laws chs. 99-
246,292,353,391.
124. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-247.
125. Ch. 99-247, § 21, 1999 Fla. Laws 2446, 2484-94 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 259.105
(1999)).
126. Id. § 9, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2458-59 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 253.03 (1999)). This
amendment will not effect the seven stilthomes known as Stiltsville located in the Biscayne
National Park. However, the House of Representatives did adopt a resolution urging for
Stiltsville to be listed in the National Register of Historic Places. 1999 HR 9217.
127. Ch. 99-247, § 14, 1999 Fla. Laws 2446,2474-77 (codified at FIA. STAT. § 259.0345
(1999)). The seven-member counsel will report annually on the progress of the program and
make recommendations on goals and procedures. Id.
128. Id. § 16, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2477-78 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 259.035 (1999)). The
nine-member council, composed of the Secretary of the DEP, representatives from the
Department of Community Affairs, the Fish and Wildlife Commission, Division of Historic
Resources, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and four members appointed
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requiring a two thirds vote by the Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund prior to the sale of land purchased for conservation
purposes, 129 allowing for the issuance of permits for certain coastal
armoring,130 creating the Florida Greenways and Trails Council within the
FDEP, 13 and allowing for payment in lieu of taxes to government certain
entities where the state's land acquisitions result in a loss in ad valorem tax
revenue. 132
The Florida Forever Act is a continuation and expansion of the Florida
Preservation 2000 Act land acquisition program, scheduled to expire on July
1, 2000.133 The Florida Forever Program was enacted in accordance with
134Florida Constitutional Revision 5. As the program was one of Governor
Jeb Bush's campaign issues, it was a priority during the 1999 legislative
session. 35 Under the Florida Forever Program, bonds up to $300 million per
year, totaling three billion dollars over a ten-year period, may be issued for
the acquisition of environmentally significant lands and for water resource
development projects.136
Unlike its predecessor, the Florida Forever Program allows for
alternative uses of acquired land including water resource development
projects, water supply development projects, stormwater management
projects, linear facilities, and sustainable agriculture and forestry.137
"[L]inear projects can not include petroleum product pipelines, paved roads,
by the governor, will assist the board of trustees in reviewing program recommendations and
plans. Id.
129. Id. § 10, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2460 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 253.034(6) (1999)). This
amendment conforms with Florida Constitution Revision 5 which requires a restriction on the
sale of lands purchased for conservation. See supra note 13.
130. Ch. 99-247, § 4, 1999 Fla. Laws 2455, 2466 (codified at FIA. STAT. § 161.085(2)
(1999)).
131. Id. § 25, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2495-98 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 260.0142 (1999)).
132. Id. § 38, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2515 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.59(10)(b) (1999)).
133. FLA. STAT. § 259.101 (1999).
134. Ch. 99-246, 1999 Fla. Laws 2444-45 ("[C]reating the Florida Forever Trust Fund;
providing sources of moneys; providing purposes and requirements; providing duties of the
Department of Environmental Protection; providing a contingent effective date."). See also Ch.
99-247, 1999 Fla. Laws 2446-2515.
135. See Associate Press, Bush Commits $3 Billion for Land, PALM BEACH POST, June 6,
1999 at 5A (Governor Bush called the law "a validation of Florida's long-standing commitment
to the environment."); Wetherell, 1999 ELULS Legislative Report: A Summary of Environmental
and Land Use Legislation Considered in the 1999 Regular Session, TIM FLA. B. ENVTL & LAND
USEL. SEC. REP., Vol. XX, No. 3, June 1999 at 1.
136. Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Fla. Senate Bill CS/SB 908,
Part I, <http://www.leg.state.fl.us/session/1999/Senatelbills/analysis>.
137. FLA. STAT. § 253.034 (1999).
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rail corridors or other facilities for motorized vehicles ... ,138 Another
major difference between the two programs is that the Florida Forever
Program has slated twenty-five percent of its bond proceeds to community-
based, urban open spaces, parks, and greenways with an emphasis for
projects in low-income or otherwise disadvantaged communities. 139 The
Florida Forever Program also provides for a greater emphasis on alternatives
to fee simple acquisitions.14°
The second major bill related to the Florida Forever Program creates the
Florida Forever Trust Fund.141 The purpose of the fund is to provide sources
of moneys and requirements to support the Florida Forever Act. The fund is
administered by the FDEP.142
C. Creation of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
In accordance with Florida Constitution Revision 5, the legislature
created the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. 43 The commission
is formed through a merger of the Game and Freshwater Fish Commission
and the Marine Fisheries Commission.'" In addition, certain FDEP
responsibilities were transferred to the new commission including the
Bureau of Environmental Law Enforcement, the Bureau of Administrative
Support, the Bureau of Operational Support, and the Office of Enforcement
Planning and Policy Coordination within the Division of Law
Enforcement. 45 The law specifically states that the FDEP will no longer
have any responsibilities for boating safety.146 The Division of Marine
Resources within the FDEP is also transferred to the new commission
"except for... [t]he Bureau of Coastal and Aquatic Managed Areas which is
138. Id.; See also Kent Wetherell, 1999 ELULS Legislative Report: A Summary of
Environmental and Land Use Legislation Considered in the 1999 Regular Session, THE FLA. B.
ENVirL & LAND USE L. SEC. REP., Vol. XX, No. 3, June 1999 at 1 (linear facilities can include
electric transmission lines and pipelines).
139. Ch. 99-247, § 21, 1999 Fla. Laws 2446, 2484-85 (codified at FLA STAT. §
259.105(2)(a)5, (3)(c) (1999)). See also Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement,
Fla. Senate Bill CS/SB 908, Part III, § 1 (discussing the creation of section 259.202 of the
Florida Statutes) <http://www.leg.state.fl.us/session/1999/Senate/bills/analysis>.
140. Ch. 99-247, § 19, 1999 Fla. Laws 2446, 2481 (codified at FLA STAT. §
259.041(11)(a) (1999)).
141. Id. § 21, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2484 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 259.105(1) (1999)).
142. Id.
143. FLA. CONS. art IV, § 9.
144. Ch. 99-245, §§ 2-3, 1999 Fla. Laws 2251, 2257 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.06(2)
(1999)).
145. Id. § 4, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2257 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.06(2) (1999)).
146. Id.
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assigned to the Division of State Lands at the Department of Environment
Protection."' 47 The FDEP does retain the Office of Environmental Investiga-
tions, the Florida Park Patrol, and the Bureau of Emergency Response which
are assigned to the FDEP's Division of Law Enforcement.
The commission n'. t provide adequate due process to parties "whose
substantial interests" are affected by its actions.149  However, the new
Commission will have both constitutional and statutory duties and
responsibilities. The law "encourages the commission to incorporate the
provisions of [s]ection 120.54(3)(c) [of the Florida Statutes in the exercise]
of its constitutional duties., , 150 However, it mandates that the performance of
the commission's statutory duties are in accordance with section 120.151
D. Total Maximum Daily Loads
The Florida Watershed Restoration Act 5 2 was passed to comply with
the Federal Clean Water Act.153 In addition, this act is intended to address a
lawsuit filed on April 22, 1998 on behalf of the Florida Wildlife Federation,
Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida, Inc., and Save our
Creeks, Inc. alleging that the "defendants, EPA and its Administrator, Carol
Browner, have not enforced Florida's adherence to the Clean Water Act."'
154
Under the act, DEP is assigned as the "lead agency. 155 The act requires the
identification of water bodies that are not meeting water quality standards
and a process for determining the maximum amount of pollutant that the
water body can assimilate or 'Total Maximum Daily Load" ("TMDL"). 156
147. Id. § 5, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2258 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.06(2)(a) (1999)).
148. Id. § 6, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2258.
149. Ch. 99-245, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 2251, 2255 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.331(6)(a)
(1999)).
150. Id. § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2255 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.331(6)(b) (1999)).
151. Id. § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2255-56 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.331(6)(c) (1999)).
152. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-223.
153. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d), 1315(b) (1994).
154. Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Implementation of Water
Quality Standards (Mar. 22, 1999) <http:l/www.leg.state.fi.us.session/1999/Senatebills/
analysis/pdf/SB2282.html>; see also, Philip Moffat, The Florida Watershed Restoration Act:
Total Maximum Daily Loads, TuE FLA. B. ENVTh. & LAND USE L. SEC. REP., Vol. XX, No. 3,
June 1999, at 12. (Both citations provide good discussions on the background of the Act).
155. Ch. 99-223, § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws 1389, 1391 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 403.067(1)
(1999)).
156. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-223. The act defines 'Total maximum daily load" as:
the sum of the individual wasteload allocations for point sources and the load
allocations for nonpoint sources and natural background. Prior to
determining individual wasteload allocations and load allocations, the
maximum amount of a pollutant that a water body or water segment can
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The DEP must submit a list of surface waters or segments for which TMDL
assessments will be conducted and establish a priority ranking and
schedule. 157 The act does not require that assessments be conducted on all
709 waters currently listed,158 but that assessments conducted are based ontheir priority ranking. 159
E. Everglades Restudy
The Comprehensive Review Study of the Central and Southern Florida
Project ("restudy") "is an investigation to determine specific operational and
structural changes that can be made to restore South Florida ecosystems,
enhance water supply, and maintain flood control within the South Florida
region.' 6 The restudy is being conducted by the US Army Corps of
Engineers as directed by the Federal Water Resources Development Acts of
1992 and 1996."' In an effort to "support the restudy through a process
concurrent with Federal Government review," statutory amendments were
enacted. 162  First, the South Florida Water Management District is
established as the local sponsor of the restudy. 163 The DEP, however, must
approve any project component prior to its submission to Congress.164 The
Executive Office of the Governor must review all proposed expenditures for
project components.165
assimilate from all sources without exceeding water quality standards must
first be calculated.
Id. § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1390 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 403.031(21) (1999)).
157. Id. § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1391 (codified atF.A STAT. § 403.067(2) (1999)).
158. Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Implementation of Water
Quality Standards at 3 (Mar. 22, 1999) <http:llwww.leg.state.fl.us.sessionl1999/Senatelbillsl
analysis/pdf/SB2282.html>.
159. Ch. 99-223, § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws 1389, 1392 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 403.067(3)
(1999)).
160. Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Bill CS/SB 1672 (Mar.
30, 1999) <http://www.leg.state.fl.us.sessionl1999/senate/bUllslanalysislpdf/SB2282.html>
(summarizing US Army Corps of Engineers, Overview Central and Southern Florida Project
Comprehensive Review Study (Oct. 1998)).
161. Id.
162. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-143.
163. Ch. 99-143, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 820, 820-823 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
373.1501(4) (1999)).
164. Id. § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws at 823-24 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.026(8)0,) (1999)).
165. Id. § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws at 824 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.026(8)(d) (1999)).
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F. One Stop Permitting
In 1996, Florida created an "expedited permitting process intended to
facilitate the location and expansion of certain types of economic
development projects." Although permits were issued faster under the
program, it was under-utilized. 167 In an effort to increase usage of the
program, the 1999 amendments create a statewide "one-stop permitting
system" with incentives for local governments to integrate their permitting
with the state's system.168  A one-stop permitting internet site is to be
established by the Department of Management Services by January 1,
2000.169
G. Environmental Compliance Costs of Private Utilities
Since 1996, there have been a number of administrative petitions and
rule challenges related to the Florida Public Service Commission's ("PSC")
policies and the recovery of environmental compliance costs.' 70 In Florida
Public Service Commission v. Florida Waterworks Ass'n, 171 the First District
reversed an administrative hearing judge's order and found a PSC rule on the
treatment of contributions-in-aid-of-construction in relation to margin
reserves valid.172 With respect to the recovery of expenditures made for
environmental compliance, the administrative judge had found the rule
"invalid for failure 'to provide a mechanism for full-cost recovery of capital
improvements required by governmental regulations. '"7 3 The district court
disagreed, however, and found that the rule did "not purport to include or
exclude any particular type or class of expenditure."17  Amendments to the
Water and Wastewater System Regulatory Law clarify the issue by making
166. Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Bill CS/SB 662 (Mar. 18,
1999) <http:/www.leg.state.fl.us.session/1999/Senatelbins/analysis/pdf/SB2282.htnm>; See FLA.
STAT. § 403.973 (1999).
167. Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Bill CS/SB 662 (Mar. 18,
1999) <http:/www.leg.state.fl.us.session/1999/Senatelbillsanalysis/pdf/SB2282.html>.
168. Ch. 99-244, §§ 5-6, 1999 Fla. Laws 2237, 2243-45 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§
288.1092-.1093 (1999)).
169. Id. § 4, 1999 Fla. Laws at 2241-43 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 288.109 (1999)).
170. See Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Bill CS/SB 1352 (Mar.
17, 1999) <http://www.leg.state.fl.us.session/1999/Senatebils/analysis/pdf/SB1352.htmul>.
171. 731 So. 2d 836 (Fla. lstDist. Ct. App. 1999).
172. Id. at 836.
173. Id. at 844 (quoting Florida Cities Water Company v. State, 705 So. 2d 620, 623 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
174. Id.
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the PCS's approval of rates to allow for the full recovery of environmental
compliance costs mandatory.
17 5
VI. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CASES
A. Avatar Development Corporation v. State of Florida
Avatar Development Corporation and its vice president, Amikam Tanel,
were charged with first-degree misdemeanor violations of section 403.161 of
the Florida Statutes, for failure to comply with a dredge and fill permit.176
Specifically the corporate and individual defendants were charged with a
failure to notify the DEP at least forty-eight hours prior to dredgin activities
and for failure to install and maintain floating turbidity curtains. The trial
court dismissed the charges and certified the following question to the
district court: "Are Florida Statutes § 403.161(1)(b) or § 403.161(5)
unconstitutional as charged in the information?1 8
The district court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the charges and
found the statute constitutional stating that: 1) the statute did not violate the
State Constitution in prohibiting administrative agencies from imposing
sentences of imprisonment or other penalties except as provided by law; 2)
the statute did not violate the State Constitution prohibiting delegation of
legislative authority to administrative agencies; and 3) the statute did not
violate due process.
179
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the district court holding that
the statute was a proper delegation of legislative authority as the DEP's
authority to determine permit conditions was "limited to conditions
necessary to effectuate the Legislature's [sic] specific policy."180 Therefore,
the court found that "it is the Legislature [sic], and not the administrative
body, that has declared such acts unlawful based upon express legislative
policy."
181
175. Ch. 99-319, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 3410, 3410-3411 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
367.081(2)(a)2.c. (1999)).
176. Avatar Dev. Corp. v. State, 723 So. 2d 199, 200 (Fla. 1998). Section 403.161(1)(b)
of the Florida Statutes establishes any permit violation as a chapter violation. Id. Further,
section 403.161(5) provides that "[any person who willfully commits a violation specified... is
guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree." Id.
177. AvatarDev. Corp., 723 So. 2d at 200.
178. Id. at 201 n.3.
179. State v. Avatar Dev. Corp., 697 So. 2d 561,562 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
180. Avatar Dev Corp., 723 So. 2d at 207.
181. Id.
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B. Florida Department of Environmental Protection v. Allied Scrap
Processors
Florida Department of Environmental Protection v. Allied Scrap
Processors,82 is an action brought by the DEP to recover cleanup costs from
the generators of waste shipped to a former battery processing plant.18 3 The
DEP appealed a circuit court order granting a summary judgment in favor of
the generators finding that the Water Quality Assurance Act of 1983184 was
not intended to have retroactive application.18  The district court reversed
and remanded the case finding the law was retroactive.186 In its discussion,
the district court found that the state law was modeled after the Federal
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
and should be given the same retroactive construction. 1
7
1. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South Florida Water Management District
The Everglades Forever Act is a comprehensive program to address the
preservation of the Everglades. 188 The act grants primary responsibility for
the Everglades Construction Project to the South Florida Water Management
District ("the District"). 89 It requires that the District apply for certain
construction permits for flood control structures. 1 90 Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians v. South Florida Water Management District 191 is an appeal of a
DEP order granting the Water Management District a permit for the
continued use of thirty-seven such structures. 92 The district court affirmed
the granting of the permit finding that the record showed "that the South
Florida Water Management District met its burden of demonstrating
reasonable assurances that its schedules and strategies will 3provide
compliance with water quality standards" as required under the act.'9
182. 724 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
183. Id. at 151.
184. 1983 Fla. Laws ch. 83-310 (liability provisions codified at FLA. STAT. §§
376.308(1)(b), 430.727(4)(a) (1999)).
185. Allied Scrap Processors, 724 So. 2d at 151.
186. Id. at 152.
187. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675).
188. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592 (1999).
189. Id. § 373.4592(4)(a).
190. Id. § 373.4592(9)(k).
191. 721 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
192. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South Fla. Water Management Dist. No. 96-
1851, 1998 WL 216942 (Fla. Dep't. Envtl. Protection Apr. 20 1998).
193. Miccosukee Tribe ofIndians, 721 So. 2d at 390 (citing FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(9)(k),
(1) (1997)).
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2. Nelo Freijomel v. City of Stuart
Freijomel v. City of Stuart 94 is an appeal of a Florida Division of
Administrative Hearing order finding that the DEP's arsenic soil cleanup
goals were an illegal rule. 195 The Fourth District affirmed, without an
opinion, that the hearing officers finding that the DEP's use of certain health
based goals for arsenic in the evaluation of a permit aplication creates a196-
presumption of risk that the applicant must overcome. As such, the hear-
ing officer found the use of the arsenic goals in denying a permit application
a violation of section 120.54(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.197 The officer
concluded that the goals should be promulgated as a rule. 198
3. Miami Sierra Club v. State Administration Commission
In Miami Sierra Club v. State Administration Commission,'" the Miami
Sierra Club and the Tropical Audubon Society appealed a final order of the
Florida Administration Commission approving a reuse plan for the former
Homestead Air Force base in Dade County.2w The Third District found the
plan approval invalid stating: 'The final order cannot stand as it was error
for the Administration Commission to approve the plan based on the
premature action by Miami-Dade County. The County should not have
taken any action, or adopted any plan before the Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement ("SEIS") and the requisite management
plans were completed."
20 1
The court looked at the requirements of sections 288.975 and 288.976
of the Florida Statutes, and found that state agencies were compelled to use
"information analyses, and recommendations generated by the federal
environmental impact statement process.' '2°2 Reasoning that as the federal
government had decided that a SEIS was required, the court found that it was
improper for the state to approve the plan prior to completion of the SEIS. 2 3
The court also found the approval improper as the county had not completed
194. 718 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
195. City of Stuart v. Department of Envtl. Protection, No. 96-1112RU, 1996 Fla. ENV.
LEXIS 170 (Dec. 9, 1996).
196. Id. at 24.
197. Id. at 28.
198. Id. at 26. On Aug. 5, 1999, the DEP's Contaminant Cleanup Target Levels became
effective. See, FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 62-777.
199. 721 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
200. Id. at 289.
201. Id. at 830.
202. Id.
203. Id.
1999]
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certain management plans as required by section 163.3177(10)(e) of the
Florida Statutes.2°4 Finally, the court found the plan approval improper as it
did not 'consider the nature of the issues in dispute, the compliance of the
parties with the statute, the extent of the conflict between the parties, and the
comparative hardships and the public interest involved."'' 205
204. Miami Sierra Club, 721 So. 2d at 831.
205. Id. at 832 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 288.975(12)(d) (Supp. 1996)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved several issues of statutory
construction this past year, which had been festering in the appellate courts,
involving appeals in dependency and termination of parental rights cases and
dispositions in juvenile delinquency cases. The intermediate appellate
courts continued a more than decade long process of holding trial courts
accountable to comply with basic statutory provisions within chapters 39 and
985 of the Florida Statutes.
While the legislature did not make wholesale changes to the law
governing children either in the dependency system or in the juvenile
delinquency system, there were several substantial changes which are
referenced in this survey. One change involved adding harm from substance
abuse explicitly to the grounds for dependency and, ultimately, termination
of parental rights.!
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. Colgate University, 1967, Boston College Law School, J.D., 1970. The
author thanks Tracey McPharlin and Amy Bloom for their assistance in the preparation of this
article. This article covers cases decided through June 30, 1999.
1. Ch. 99-186, § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws 1001, 1010-12 (codified at FLA. STAT.
39.01(30)(g) (1999)).
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Detention Issues
Detention issues occur regularly in the appellate case law,2 and this year
was no exception. A significant issue involving use of detention for
incompetent juveniles arose in J.W. v. Department of Juvenile Justice.3 The
issue involved the ability of the trial court, to order the placement of an
incompetent child in secure detention.4 Without much analysis, the appellate
court held that, although the statutes offer little guidance in dealing with a
juvenile in J.W.'s circumstances, the trial court's order was consistent with
Florida law, met the needs of J.W., and ensured the safety of the public.5 The
court thus ruled that there was an adequate basis for the trial court to
conclude that "no less restrictive alternative to secure detention would
protect the safety of the public, especially small children." 6 The appellate
opinion is silent on what steps, if any, the trial court took pursuant to section
985.223 of the Florida Statutes to engage the Department of Children and
Family Services in finding an appropriate placement for the child, nor what
steps would be taken to develop a treatment plan for the child's restoration
to competency.7 It is hard to visualize how placement in detention
constitutes a remedy consistent with section 985.223 of the Florida Statutes
and Rule 8.095(a)(8) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, premised
as they are on rehabilitation.8
In a significant ruling on detention and pretrial practice, the Supreme
Court of Florida recently approved an amendment on an interim basis to the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure permitting juveniles to attend detention
hearings via audio-video devices.9 The court had initially ruled on the matter
in 1996 establishing the practice on an interim basis. 10 The court responded to
2. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REv. 819,
831-34 (1999); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NovA. L. REv.
179, 180-84 (1997); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L.
REv. 335, 348-53 (1992); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA
L. REV. 333, 339-43 (1991).
3. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1503 (1st Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 1999).
4. Id. at D1503.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See FLA. STAT. § 985.223 (1999); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095(a)(8).
9. Amendment to Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a), 24 Fla. L. Weekly
S196, S196 (Apr. 29, 1999).
10. See Amendment to Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a), 667 So. 2d 195
(Fla. 1996).
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the petition of several circuits and relied upon what it described as highly
favorable reports to order an amended rule of procedure containing the audio
visual approach for a period of ninety days from the date of the opinion after
which time the court held that it would determine whether further action was
necessary.1 It also directed the Juvenile Procedures Committee of the Florida
Bar to study the matter and make a recommendation concerning a permanent
rule. The positions of the parties, both favoring and opposing the rule, are set
forth in detail in the opinion.1 3 The benefits described included avoiding
humiliation of juveniles who are paraded through the courthouse and allowing
juveniles more time to attend classes and counseling sessions.14 There was
great support from the judiciary for continuance of the interim rule. 5 The
shortcoming, according to the court, was a hardship to the public defender in
allocating attorneys. 6 The countervailing considerations also relate to the
17depersonalization of the initial appearance process. Children who are seen
on television, it may be argued, are less likely to be viewed individually and
personally by the court.1 ' The court is thus unable to evaluate the personal
characteristics of the child.' 9
As noted earlier in this survey, the Florida Statutes provide for services to
juveniles who have been found incompetent to stand trial.20 In Department of
Children & Families v. Morrison,21 the trial court ordered a child charged with
first-degree premeditated murder who was adjudged incompetent to stand trial
to be committed to the Department of Children and Family Services for
placement in a secure facility where there would be no integration with adult
patients and where the child would be rehabilitated. 2 The Department
petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the circuit court was
without authority to order the child to a special mental health facility.23 The
appellate court agreed, finding that Florida law does not provide the trial court
with authority in a commitment order to order a defendant's placement in a
11. Amendment, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S198.
12. Id.
13. See id. at S196-99.
14. l at S197-98.
15. Id. at S197.
16. Amendment, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S198.
17. Id. at S197.
18. See id.
19. See id. at S199.
20. See supra Part ll.A. 1 1.
21. 727 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 741 So. 2d 1136 (Fla.
Aug. 19, 1999).
22. Id. at 405.
23. Id.
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specific facility or to issue instructions on the defendant's treatment. 24 The
appellate court ruled that the trial court can make a nonbinding
recommendation regarding placement?2 However, the court did differ with the
Department on the issue of housing and treating the indicted child separately
from adults.26 The court held that section 985.215(4) of the Florida Statutes
requires that when a child is prosecuted as an adult, including where indicted
as such, the child should be housed in a jail or facility separately from adult
inmates. 27 Finding an apparent contradiction in the provisions of chapter 985
of the Florida Statutes, the court sought to harmonize and reconcile them.2 It
concluded that it would be anomalous to say that section 985.215 mandated
separation of juveniles and adults when an indicted juvenile is held in jail, but
that section 985.225 commands that juveniles and adults be lodged together
when committed to a mental health facility.29 The court did not decide the
issue, finding that the Department was not given notice of the proceedings, and
that the trial court and the Department did not have an opportunity to address
the question of separate confinement for mental health treatment apart from
adults.
30
Under Florida law, in addition to pretrial detainees, a child committed to
the Department of Juvenile Justice awaiting dispositional placement who has
already been adjudicated, may be placed in secure detention for a short period
of time." In L.K.v. State,3 the court held that, notwithstanding the child's
acquiescence to a longer period of detention, the plain language of the Florida
statute precludes a trial judge ordering detention in excess of fifteen days after
commitment. 33
B. Adjudicatory Issues
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure contain detailed discovery
provisions,34 which have generated appellate decisions in the past.35 In a
recent case, a mother petitioned the appellate court to quash an order
24. Id.
25. Id. at 406.
26. Morrison, 727 So. 2d at 406-07.
27. Id. at 406. See FLA. STAT. § 985.215(4) (1999).
28. Morrison, 727 So. 2d at 406-07.
29. Id. at 407.
30. Id.
31. See . STAT. § 985.215(10)(a) (1999).
32. 729 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
33. Id. at 1011.
34. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.060.
35. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV.
333,344-45 (1991).
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denying her discovery of information in the possession of the medical
examiner and a law enforcement agency who were investigating criminal
36charges against her for the death of her infant child. The mother sought the
information as part of her preparation to defend the petition for dependency
of her other two children. 3? The sheriff's department moved for a protective
order, arguing that the information sought both from the office itself and the
medical examiner was exempt from disclosure under Florida law since it was
related to a current criminal investigation of the death of the mother's infant
child.38 The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the two other children
had been removed from the custody of their mother for over seventeen
months based upon the death of the infant.39 There had never been any
report or indication that the mother inflicted any type of injury upon the
children although the mother was a suspect because she was one of the many
individuals who had access to the infant.4° The court recognized that broad
discovery is provided under the juvenile rules because of the important
interests at stake.4' The court concluded that although the child's welfare
and best interest must remain paramount, the court was also obligated to
carefully safeguard fundamental liberty interests of the parent in the care,
custody, and management of the child. It then granted the writ of certiorari
and quashed the trial court's order.43
C. Dispositional Issues
Inexplicably, the trial courts have a problem with the proposition that
under Florida law, a child may not be sentenced to a juvenile commitment
for a period of time loner than the maximum sentence for an adult who
commits the same crime. Two recent cases are illustrative of the issue.45
Thus, in D.S. v. State,46 the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that it was
reversible error for the trial court to place a child on community control until
the youngster's nineteenth birthday where the maximum penalty for an adult
36. B.B. v. Department of Children & Family Servs., 731 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999).
37. Id. at 32.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 33.
40. Id.
41. B.B., 781 So. 2d at 34.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(d) (1999).
45. See D.S. v. State, 730 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); D.P. v. State, 730
So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
46. 730 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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charged with the same offense was shorter.47 Based on the facts of the case,
the child could only have been committed or placed on community control
for one year.48 In D.P. v. State,49 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed
the trial court's order committing a juvenile to a high risk facility for sex
offenders for a period not to extend beyond his nineteenth birthday, followed
by community control and aftercare to be planned by the Department of
Juvenile Justice and agproved by the court because it exceeded the
maximum adult penalty.
In an effort to provide a greater variety of, as well greater severity in
juvenile dispositions, Florida has instituted a serious offender program. 51
The habitual offender provisions of Florida law create procedures to be
followed in order to have a child placed in the serious or habitual juvenile
offender program.52 Such procedures include a requirement that the state file
a petition seeking serious or habitual juvenile offender placement, service of
such a petition on the child, the child's attorney, and a representative of the
Department of Juvenile Justice, and a reasonable time allowance for the
child to prepare a response.5 3 In D.A. C. v. State,54 the issue was whether the
court could authorize the prosecution of a child as a serious offender even
where the state attorney as prosecutor did not file a petition to do so.J The
appellate court held that the statute does not prohibit the trial court from
imposing habitual offender sentences unless the prosecutor files the petition
the classification. The rule permits, but does not require, the prosecutor to
file the petition and thus allows the court to prosecute habitual or serious
offenders in the absence of a filing by the prosecutor. 57 The statute also
58requires the court to decide if the child meets serious offender criteria. In
addition, the court held that there is no separation of powers problem
47. Id. at 400. See also J.D. v. State, 732 So. 2d 1135, 1135 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (finding error where the trial court imposed indefinite term of community control for
marijuana and cocaine possession).
48. D.S., 730 So. 2d at 400 (citing J.W. v. State, 709 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998)); V.W. v. State, 693 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); G.R.A. v. State, 688 So. 2d
1027 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of
Florida Law, 22 NOvA L. Ray. 179, 196 (1997) (discussing precisely the same problem).
49. 730 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
50. Id. at 415.
51. See FiA. STAT. § 985.31 (1999).
52. See FIA. R. Jtuv. P. 8.115(d).
53. Id.
54. 728 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Fla. Oct. 28, 1999).
55. Id. at 829.
56. Id. at 830.
57. Id. at 829-30.
58. Id.
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because the purpose of the juvenile proceeding is remedial in nature as
opposed to punitive.
5 9
An interesting dispositional issue arises when a child with a pending
juvenile delinquency case is the subject of a direct filed information,
charging him or her as an adult.60 In Medina v. State, 1 a child appealed
from the imposition of adult sentences on juvenile cases which would be
disposed of together with adult cases in the adult court.62 The appellate
court held that once transferred, post-adjudicatory juvenile cases still retain
their juvenile status, and thus the felony division judge or adult criminal
court judge did not have the authority to impose an adult sentence on a child
on these cases as to which the child has been adjudicated in the juvenile
division.
63
Florida's appellate courts are split on a technical issue of court
jurisdiction to extend the dispositional alternative of community control.64 In
N.W. v. State,65 the Second District Court of Appeal ageed with the Fourth
District Court of Appeal opinion in M.B. v. State that the statutory
provision that a child adjudicated delinquent for a second-degree
misdemeanor is subject to supervision and community control only for six
months where the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent.67 However,
where a child is not adjudicated delinquent, but rather has had the
adjudication withheld (a permissible alternative in Florida),68 the court may
impose a penalty that is harsher than the one that would be permitted if the
juvenile were adjudicated delinquent.69 The holdings in N.W. and M.B. are
contrary to the ruling of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in G.R.A. v.
State; thus, the court in N.W. certified the conflict with the Fifth District.
71
At both the adjudicative and dispositional stages of delinquency cases,
juveniles have an absolute right to counsel. 72 However, juveniles may, on
59. D.A.C., 728 So. 2d at 830.
60. See Medina v. State, 732 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
61. 732 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
62. Id. at 1154.
63. Id. at 1155.
64. N.W. v. State, 736 So. 2d 710,710 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
65. Id.
66. 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1997).
67. N.W, 736 So. 2d at 711.
68. See FLA. STAT. §§ 985.228(4), .23(4) (1999).
69. See id; M.B., 693 So. 2d at 1067.
70. 688 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1997).
71. N.W, 736 So. 2d at 711.
72. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); J.R.V. v. State, 715 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1998).
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occasion, be represented by a certified legal intern.73 In A.D. v. State74 the
record was silent as to whether the child knowingly and intelligently waived
the right to legal representation in return for representation by the intern.
75
Nor was there any showing or assertion that a supervising attorney was
present at the dispositional hearing.76 Therefore, the court was obligated to
quash the dispositional order and remand for further proceedings based on
Florida case law establishing that there must be approval by the minor of the
intern.77
Periodically, the appellate courts must review appeals on the ground
that the child's waiver of the right to remain silent and have an attorney
present during questioning should be suppressed because the waiver was not
knowing and intelligent.76 In T.S.D. v. State,79 a twelve-year-old with a
history of psychological problems, an IQ of sixty-two, and a third grade
reading level moved to suppress his confession.8 The court applied the
totality of circumstances approach, evaluating the child's intelligence,
education, experience, and his ability to comprehend the meaning and effect
of his statement, in finding that his confession was clearly not admissible.8'
Significantly, the court held that contrary to the State's assertion, the record
demonstrated that the child's prior exposure to the juvenile justice system
did not aid in his comprehension of his rights.82
73. See RULES REGULATING maE RA. BAR 11-1.2(a)--(e) (providing that a law student
may directly provide representation to individuals so long as the student is participating in a law
school credit-bearing clinical program coordinated by the law school and supervised by a lawyer).
74. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1494 (5th Dist. Ct. App. June 25, 1999).
75. Id. at D1494.
76. Id.
77. See id. (citing L.R. v. State, 698 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); In re J.H.,
580 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
78. See FLA. R. Jtrv. P. 8.165. See generally Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997
Survey of Florida Law, 22 NOVA L. REV. 179, 188 (1997); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992
Survey of Florida Law, 17 NovA L. REv. 335, 343-44 (1992); Michael . Dale, Juvenile Law:
1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV. 333,335-39 (1991).
79. 24 Fla. L. Weekly Dl149 (3d Dist. Ct. App. May 12, 1999).
80. Id.atDl149.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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D. Appellate Issues
The issue of the proper way to take up on appeal a challenge to the
adequacy of a plea colloquy arose in J.M.B. v. State. The appellate court
held that a juvenile may not challenge the voluntariness of his plea on direct
appeal without first moving to withdraw the plea.84 A criminal defendant
can contest the voluntariness of the plea after sentencing by filing a motion
under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, because the rule
does not apply in juvenile proceedings, the court held that the only remedy
for the juvenile under the circumstances of the case was the filing of a writ
of habeas corpus in the circuit court.86 Although the court in J.M.B. did not
explain whether the failure to appeal was significant, the Supreme Court of
Florida has held that the failure of the defendant to raise the issue of the
validity of a plea by appeal does not prohibit the individual thereafter from
seeking collateral relief if the issue had not been previously addressed and
ruled on.87
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Florida law provides that a parent who is served with a petition for
termination of parental rights must appear at an advisory hearing or in
another manner respond to the notice of the hearing.88 The failure to
respond or appear at an advisory hearing is deemed to constitute consent to
the petition to terminate parental rights." In J.B. v. Department of Children
& Family Services,90 the appellate court was asked to decide whether the
father had been denied due process of law by giving him only twenty-four
hours notice of the advisory hearing.91 The court held that twenty-four hours
was sufficient to meet the minimum due process requirements as an advisory
hearing in a termination of parental rights case is merely a preliminary step
in the process where no rights are finally adjudicated. 92 The court felt that a
83. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1485 (2d Dist. Ct. App. June 25, 1999).
84. Id. at D1485 (citing FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(2)(B)(iii)).
85. See FLA. R. CfAM. P. 3.850.
86. J.M.B., 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1485 (citing In re W.B., 428 So. 2d 309, 312 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
87. See Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898, 903 (Fla. 1979).
88. See FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(a) (1999).
89. Id. § 39.801(3)(d).
90. 734 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1999).
91. Id. at500.
92. Id.
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parent was not required to prepare for an advisory hearing and retain counsel
in advance and need simply appear and request a postponement. 93 Where the
father did not inform the court that he was not able to attend and did not
have an adequate excuse, the court rejected the claim that he was denied due
process. 94 Over a vigorous dissent, the majority held that while there is a
great deal at stake for the parents, there is also a great deal at stake for the
child, making it unfair to the child to delay the proceedings. 95 The dissent,
describing in detail the constitutionally protected interests in preserving the
family unit in raising children, argued that the abruptness of the resolution of
96such an important matter constituted inadequate notice of the hearing.
Recognizing that the father had no lawyer in the trial court until after the
cases had been remanded following an appeal and that the Department only
gave the father twenty-four hours notice of the termination proceeding, the
dissent concluded that the notice of hearing to terminate the father's parental
rights was constitutionally inadequate. 97
The courts have also been faced with the question of whether the
appearance by counsel at the advisory hearing is adequate to constitute an
98appearance so as to avoid a default termination of parental rights. In In re
E.L,99 the Second District held that appearance by counsel at an advisory
hearing avoids a default. 1°° Where the court previously had appointed an
attorney for the parent, it was not necessary for the parent to be present, as
her attorney could have told the court whether she consented to the
termination. 01
A third case involving the question of whether the failure to appear ma
result in a default judgment of termination of parental rights is In re B.A. g
In this case, the mother failed to appear at the adjudicatory hearing, and the
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. J.B., 734 So. 2d at 501-02.
96. Id. at 503-04.
97. Id. at 505. See also In re S.S., 735 So. 2d 576, 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999)
(holding that it was error to terminate parental rights because notice was inadequate where a
parent failed to appear at an advisory hearing, but attorney did attend, and where notice failed to
include the 1998 change which states, "FAILURE TO PERSONALLY APPEAR AT THIS
ADVISORY HEARING CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO THE TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THIS CHILD (OR CHILDREN)." .. STAT. § 39.801(3)(a) (1999)
(emphasis added)).
98. See In re M.A., 735 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999); In re S.S., 735 So. 2d
576 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999).
99. 732 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
100. Id. at 39.
101. Id. See M.A., 735 So. 2d at578-79.
102. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1086 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1999).
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court entered a default of consent to the termination petition.103 The
appellate court held that despite the mother's failure to appear at a prior
advisory hearing, the mother's court appointed lawyer was present at. the
advisory hearing and suggested that the mother may not have had the ability
to understand her duty to appear in court.104 The trial court did not enter a
default and granted counsel's request for a competency evaluation.10 5 The
case then proceeded and resulted in the adjudicatory hearing. 1°' Having
found that the case proceeded beyond the advisory stage and onto the
adjudicatory stage, the appellate court held that the trial court lacked
authority to enter a default.
M.E. v. Department of Children & Family Servicesl18 is a fourth case
involving the issue of failure to appear at an adjudicatory hearing of
termination of parental rights.1°9 Before the commencement of trial, the
mother's counsel advised the court of difficulty reaching the client but
informed the court that the client wished to defend against the termination
petition.110 The appellate court rejected the mother's contention that it was
required that she be personally served with notice of the termination of
parental rights trial date.' The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
provide that after service of the petition for termination of paternal rights
together with notice of an advisory hearing, all other pleadings and papers
must be served on each party or the party's attorney.' It is thus the parent's
obligation to remain in reasonable touch with the attorney regarding the
progress of the case.
13
Matters may have been rendered more complicated as a result of a
change in Florida law discussed in a fifth case involving the failure to
appear-In re S.S.1 4 In S.S., the mother did not appear at the advisory
hearing, but an attorney appeared on her behalf and pointed out that the
language in the notice did not conform to the amendments to the notice
statute which were effective October 1, 1998.15 Effective October 1, 1998,
the Florida law was changed to provide that the notification would include
103. Id. at D1086.
104. Id. at D1087.
105. ld.
106. Id.
107. BA., 24 Fla. L Weekly at D1087.
108. 728 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
109. Id. at 368.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing FA. R. Juv. P. 8.225(c)(3)).
113. ME., 720 So. 2d at 368.
114. 735 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
115. Id. at 577.
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the following language, "FAILURE TO PERSONALLY APPEAR AT THIS
ADVISORY HEARING CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO THE
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THIS CHILD (OR
CHILDREN). 'a 16 The issue the court did not have to decide in S.S. was
whether the 1998 amendments precluded an appearance by counsel with the
result that there would be a waiver and thus termination of parental rights."
17
There is a growing body of case law in Florida dealing with the
question of the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem in a dependency or
termination of parental rights proceedings."g In Vestal v. Vestal," 9 the trial
court failed to appoint a guardian ad litem at the outset of a termination of
parental rights case.12 The Vestal court noted that in several earlier cases
both the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal held that the failure to
appoint a guardian in a termination case is not fundamental error.121 In the
preceding cases which are cited in Vestal, the appellate courts found that the
trial court had sought a guardian but none was available, and based upon the
facts of those cases, there had been no harm to the parent.122 In E.F., the
child had been adequately protected, and the error in not appointing a
guardian was not fundamental.12 3 In Fisher, where a guardian had resigned
and efforts to replace the guardian were unsuccessful, the court held that the
child's rights had been adequately protected.124 In contrast, in Vestal, the
trial court made no attempt to appoint a guardian and, as a result, no
guardian was appointed, and there was very little involvement by the
Department.125 Thus, there was no testimony from third parties, such as a
guardian, with the result that the case was a credibility contest between an
ex-wife and ex-husband. 126 Under the circumstances of the case, the court
found that the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem was reversible error.127
Although Vestal upheld the right to a guardian ad litem under the facts of the
case, the problem with the opinion and the early cases is that the Florida
116. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(a) (1999) (emphasis added); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.505(b).
117. See S.S., 735 So. 2d at 577.
118. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law in Florida in 1998, 23 NovA L. REv. 819, 824-
25 (1999); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NoVA L. REv. 179,
209 (1997).
119. 731 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
120. Id. at 828.
121. Id. at 828-29 (citing Fisher v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 674 So.
2d 207 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re E.F., 639 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
122. Fisher, 674 So. 2d at 208; E.F., 639 So. 2d at 643-44.
123. E.F., 639 So. 2d at 644.
124. Fisher, 674 So. 2d at 208.
125. Vestal, 731 So. 2d at 829.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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courts are carving out an exception to the child's right to a guardian ad litem
where none exists. 128 The Florida statute is absolute on its face. 129 Section
39.807(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides as follows, "[t]he court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child in any termination of
parental rights proceedings and shall ascertain at each stage of the
proceedings whether a guardian ad litem has been appointed."13  This
mandatory language follows from the federal funding statute known as the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"), which provides for
guardians ad litem in Florida. 131 It is unclear why the courts disregard the
language of the statute and the applicability of federal law.
Under Florida law, cases involving termination of parental rights are
confidential and closed to the public. 32 The issue before the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Department of Children & Family Services v. Natural
Parents of J.B.133 was whether the statute closing all hearings throughout the
case to the public and the media was unconstitutional.'3 The appeals court
held that the mandatory closure statute was not unconstitutional under either
the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments and that termination ofparental rights
cases are not indistinguishable from criminal prosecutions. The Fourth
District Court of Appeals upheld the closure, finding no constitutional
violation.
136
Florida's termination of parental rights statute provides that termination
may be based upon a child's adjudication as dependent, the filing of the case
plan, and the finding that the child continues to be abused, neglected or
abandoned.37 The statute also provides that the failure of the parent to
substantially comply with the case plan for a period of twelve months after
the child has been adjudicated may constitute evidence of continuing abuse
and neglect or abandonment. Exceptions to this requirement occur when
the failure to substantially comply with the case plan results from either lack
of financial resources or when the Department fails to make reasonable
efforts to reunify the family. 139  In re K.C.C. '° dealt with the factual
128. Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 39.807(2)(a), .822(1) (1999) and Vestal, 731 So. 2d at
829 with Fisher, 674 So. 2d 208 and E.F., 639 So. 2d 644-45.
129. See id.
130. RL
131. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-19 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
132. FLA. STAT. § 39.809(4) (1999).
133. 736 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
134. Id. at 112.
135. Id. at 117-18.
136. Idat 118.
137. RA STAT. § 39.806(1)(e) (1999).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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question of what constitutes proper financial resources. 14 1 At issue was the
situation a father whose physical and mental problems precluded his
employment. 142 The father admitted to having no income at the time of the
dependency adjudication, but said that since the adjudication he had become
eligible for social security disability payment and an increase in his veteran
administration benefits.'4a He also attributed his failure to attend parenting
classes to the family's financial circumstances. 144 Thus, under the facts of
the case, the court found that it could not find by clear and convincing
evidence that his parental rights should be terminated.145
B. Appellate Issues
In W.J.E. v. Department of Children & Family Services,14s the question
was how far must counsel proceed in preserving the appellate rights of a
parent in a termination of parental rights case.14 - In W.J.E., as a matter of
caution, the father's court appointed lawyer filed an appeal without direction
from the client after the client was served with a summons for trial but did148
not appear. Counsel filed an order to protect the client's rights on
appeal. The lawyer was unable to contact the father to confirm his desire
to seek review.150 The appeals court held that by not responding to counsel's
efforts, the father had abandoned his appeal.' The appellate court ruled
that where counsel does not know the client's wishes, he or she should write
to the client at the last known address advising of the deadline for appeal and
seeking confirmation of the client's wishes. If the client does not respond
prior to the expiration of the appeal period, counsel has fulfilled his or her
ethical obligations and duties and therefore need not file the appeal.15 3
The Supreme Court of Florida recently cleared up confusion concerning
the timing of appeals from dependency and termination of parental rights
140. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1027 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 1999).
141. Id. at D1027.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at D1027-28.
145. K.CC., 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1027.
146. 731 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
147. Id. at 850.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. W.J.E., 731 So. 2d at 850.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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adjudications.' 54 The problem in two cases arose from the ambiguity in the
statute as to whether the appeal on the issue of either dependency or
termination of parental rights should be raised from the adjudicatory order or
from the dispositional order.155 In G.L.S. v. Department of Children &•• 156
Families, the supreme court held that an order which initially terminated
parental rights in a child dependency case ray be challenged upon appeal
from a subsequent final disposition order.' 57 While it was proper and
preferable to appeal from the earlier termination order, because of the
ambiguity in the statute, a termination order was subject to review from the
final disposition.158 In A.G. v. Department of Children & Family Services,'59
the court held that the same ambiguity existed in the dependency statute and
thus the issue of dependency could be raised on appeal from the later
dispositional order in a dependency case.
16 °
IV. STATUTORY CHANGES
A. Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights
The legislature continued to make changes to chapter 39 during the
1999 legislative session, focusing on a number of specific areas. For
example, the legislature amended the definitional language in section 39.01
of the Florida Statutes governing harm to the child to include exposure to
controlled substances and alcohol.161 In 1998, the legislature provided
parents the right to be represented by counsel and, if indigent, to be
162appointed counsel in dependency cases. This past year, the statute
governing shelter hearings was amended to provide that parents who appear
at the shelter hearing without counsel may have the shelter hearing continued
for up to seventy-two hours to enable them to consult legal counsel. 63
154. See G.L.S. v. Department of Children & Families, 724 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1998);
A.G. v. Department of Children & Family Servs., 731 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1999).
155. Id.
156. 724So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1998).
157. Id. at 1182.
158. Id. at 1185.
159. 731 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1999), on remand, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2199 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 22, 1999) (dismissing the appeal without prejudice).
160. Id. at 1261-62.
161. Ch. 99-186, § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws 1001, 1012 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30)(g)
(1999)).
162. Ch. 98-403, § 24, 1998 Fla. Laws 3081, 3122 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1)
(1999)).
163. Ch. 99-193, § 23, 1999 Fla. Laws 1103, 1131 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.402(5)(b)2 (1999)).
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Durin that time, the child may be continued in shelter care if granted by the
court.
In a further effort to articulate grounds for loss of custody as part of a
dependency proceeding, the court amended the statute provision governing
arraignment hearings.' When an individual appears for the arraignment
hearing and the court orders the individual to personally appear at the
adjudicatory hearing for dependency and provides appropriate information
about the time, date, and place of that hearing, then the individual's failure to
appear at the adjudicatory hearing constitutes consent to a dependency
adjudication. 66 This additional change in the statute leaves undecided the
issue of whether counsel's presence without the parent causes the same
result as described in several cases reported earlier in this survey.167
A highly significant change in chapter 39 is the passage of a set of goals
for dependent children in shelter or foster care. 168 While the goals do not
create rights, they articulate aspirational concepts for these children
including the right "to enjoy individual dignity, liberty, pursuit of happiness,
and the protection of their civil and legal rights as persons in the custody of
the state."
' 169
Finally, the legislature made a significant change in the methodology
for carrying out child protective services. 17° It amended Florida law to
provide that the sheriffs of Pasco, Manatee, and Pinellas counties shall
provide child protective investigative services and authorized the entry of a
contract between the Department of Children and Family Services and the
sheriff's departments of each county to carry out this task.
B. Juvenile Delinquency
The legislature recently broadened the crimes for which juveniles may
now be charged as adults. With its amendment to section 985.227 of the
Florida Statutes, the legislature continued to expand the list of crimes for
which a fourteen or fifteen-year-old child may be tried as an adult. 72 The
164. Id.
165. Id. § 29, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1137 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.506(e) (1999)).
166. Id.
167. See discussion supra Part .IA.
168. Ch. 99-206, § 5, 1999 Fla. Laws 1245, 1253-55 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.4085 (1999)).
169. Id.
170. Ch. 98-180, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 1601, 1605-07 (codified at Fla. Stat. §
39.3065(2) (1999)).
171. Id.
172. Ch. 99-257, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 2993, 2993-94 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
985.227 (1999)).
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statute now provides that a child may be charged as an adult for grand theft
of an automobile if the child has previously been adjudicated for grand theft
of a motor vehicle.173 The state attorney may file an information if in his or
her discretion he or she believes public interest requires adult sanctions.174
The criteria for discretionary direct filing of an information has been
amended to include the phrase "for the commission of, attempt to commit, or
conspiracy to commit" any of the crimes listed in section 985.227 of the
Florida Statutes.'75 Burglary with an assault or battery, possessing or
discharging any weapon or firearm on school grounds, home invasion
robbery, and carjacking have been added to the list of discretionary direct
file offenses. 76
Section 985.225 has been amended to require transfer of certain
juvenile felony cases to criminal court for prosecution as an adult in
instances where a guilty plea, nolo contendere, or a finding of guilt has not
been made.1"7 The same penalties will be applied to felony cases that were
transferred to adult court if the child is acquitted of all charged or lesser
included offenses in the indictment case. 178 A mandatory waiver application
has been added requiring the state attorney to request a waiver to prosecute
the child as an adult if the child is fourteen years or older and has previously
been adjudicated delinquent for a felony. 179
The legislature has also authorized law enforcement agencies and
school districts to establish pre-arrest diversion programs in cooperation
with the state attorney.'8 ° As part of the program, a child who allegedly
commits a delinquent act may be required to relinquish his driver's license
or refrain from applying for one.18' The state attorney may notify the
Department of Motor Vehicles to suspend the child's driver's license for a
maximum of ninety days if the child fails to comply with the program.182
Possession or discharge of a weapon or firearm at a school event or on
school property is now included as one of the offenses for which a child may
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Ch. 99-284, § 26, 1999 Fla. Laws 3087, 3119-20 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
985.227(1)(a) (1999)).
176. Id. at 3120.
177. Id. § 35, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3131 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.225(4)(b) (1999)).
178. Id.
179. 1d § 37, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3131-33 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.226(2)(b)1
(1999)).
180. Ch. 99-267, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 3022, 3023 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.3065
(1999)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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183be fingerprinted . The fingerprints may be given to the Department of Law
Enforcement to become part of the state criminal history records and may
used by criminal justice agencies. 184
A number of changes were also made relating to school children pos-
sessing weapons on school property or at school sponsored events.185 The
purpose of the amendments is to prevent children who have been charged
with possession of a firearm on school property from returning to the school
to cause injury. 186 The law requires placement of a child charged with
possessing or discharging a firearm in secure detention and that a probable
cause hearing is held within twenty-four hours once the state acquires
custody of the minor.187 At the hearing, the court may order the child to
remain in secure detention for up to twenty-one days, during which time the
child will receive "medical, psychiatric, psychological, or substance abuse
examinations," followed by a written report of examination findings. 88 The
state attorney may authorize the release of the minor before the probable
cause hearing where the child was wrongfully charged.1
89
Carjacking, home invasion robbery, and burglary with an assault or
battery are added to the list of offenses for which a youth, thirteen years of
age at the time of the disposition, _may be committed to a juvenile
correctional facility or juvenile prison. 90 "Juvenile correctional facilit[ies]"
or "juvenile prison[s]" replace the term "maximum-risk residential
program."'
191
Although a significant portion of recent legislation increases the child's
criminal accountability, the legislature created several projects that promote
child development while the child is in the custody of the Department of
Juvenile Justice. Emphasizing that education is the most significant factor in
the rehabilitation of a delinquent child, section 230.23161 of the Florida
Statutes now designates the Department of Education as the lead agency for
183. Ch. 99-284, § 14, 1999 Fla. Laws 3087, 3105-06 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
985.212(1)(b)13 (1999)).
184. Id. at 3106.
185. Id. § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3095-97 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 790.115 (1999)); Ma
§ 14, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3105-06 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.212(1)(b) (1999)).
186. House of Representatives Committee on Law Enforcement and Crime Prevention
Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement. Jan. 12, 1999. HB. 349.
187. Ch. 99-284, § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws 3087, 3097 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 790.115(4)
(1999)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 40, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3133-35 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.313(1) (1999)).
191. Id. at 3133.
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educational programs in the juvenile justice system. 192 The new law requires
extensive collaboration between the Department of Education and the
Department of Juvenile Justice to implement and/or expand effective
educational and technical programs for youth in the Department of Juvenile
Justice programs. 193 Public schools shall provide instruction for juveniles in
the Juvenile Justice programs194 and model procedures for the transition of
youth in and out of juvenile justice programs must be developed. 195
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida cleared up several conflicts among
Florida's district courts of appeals involving appeals from dependency and
termination cases and dispositional matters in delinquency cases this year.
The legislature made several substantial changes in the dependency and
termination field, although there were no wholesale changes. One
problematic area left unresolved by the legislature is the reduction, without
explanation, in the provision of guardians ad litem to children in
dependency and termination parental rights cases.
192. Ch. 99-284, § 48, 1999 Fla. Laws 3087, 3144 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
230.23161(1) (1999)).
193. Id. See also id. § 43, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3136-37 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
228.081(2) (1999)).
194. Id. § 42, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3135 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 228.051 (1999)).
195. Id. § 43, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3137 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 228.081(3)(b) (1999)).
Dale
198
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Florida Professional Responsibility Law in 1999: The Rules of the Game
Timothy P. Chinaris and Elizabeth Clark Tarbert
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCIION .............................................................................. 199
II. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CLIENTS ............................. 200
fTI. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ...... 228
IV. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THIRD PARTIES ...................... 250
V. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE FLORIDA BAR AND
THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM .......................................................... 261
VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 266
I. INTRODUCION
The year 19991 saw a number of changes and developments in Florida
professional responsibility law. This article surveys these developments by
reviewing: 1) relevant reported cases; 2) ethics opinions; 3) rules changes;2
and 4) disciplinary actions affecting lawyers and the practice of law in the
Sunshine State. These authorities are examined in the context of the various
relationships upon which a lawyer's professional life is built and within
which the lawyer typically operates.
Developments relating to the relationship between lawyer and client are
collected in Part II. A lawyer's relationship with judges and the judicial
system is discussed in Part lT. Part IV addresses the lawyer's relationship
and interaction with third parties, such as witnesses and other attorneys.
Finally, Part V looks at the lawyer's relationship with the lawyer disciplinary
* Associate Dean of Information Resources and Technology and Associate Professor
of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law, Jacksonville, Florida. B.S., 1977, Florida State
University; J.D., 1984, University of Texas; M.L.S., 1996, Florida State University.
** Florida Bar Ethics Director, Tallahassee, Florida. B.A., 1987, University of Florida;
J.D., 1990, University of Florida.
1. This article surveys professional responsibility developments in Florida from July 15,
1998 through June 30, 1999.
2. The rules of primary application in the area of professional responsibility are the
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC'), which are found in Chapter 4 of the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar.
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system operated by the Florida Bar3 under the authorization and control of
the Supreme Court of Florida.4
II. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CLIENTS
Perhaps the lawyer's most fundamental relationships are created and
maintained with the clients that he or she serves. Within this relationship,
ethical issues may arise relating to creation of the relationship, decision-
making authority of lawyer and client, communication with clients lawyer-
client confidentiality, conflicts of interest, fiduciary obligations, competence,
legal fees, and termination of the lawyer-client relationship.
In Keepsake, Inc. v. P.S.L. Industries, Inc.,5 the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida noted that the test in Florida for
determining whether a lawyer-client relationship exists "hinges upon the
client's reasonable subjective belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that
capacity with the intention of seeking professional legal advice."6 Keepsake
and P.S.I. entered an exclusive distributorship agreement regarding a
disposable camera that used technology developed by Keepsake.7 While
continuing to represent Keepsake in various matters, Keepsake's law firm
assisted P.S.I. in seeking intellectual property protection and also
represented P.S.I. in state court litigation relating to this technology.8 The
law firm's fee agreement with P.S.I. contained a conflict of interest
provision providing that circumstances could arise that would require the
firm to withdraw from the reresentation of both clients.9 The state court
litigation ended in late 1997. 
r  t
Keepsake and P.S.I. subsequently had a falling out, resulting in the law
firm filing suit against P.S.I. on Keepsake's behalf." P.S.I. moved to dis-
3. The Florida Bar is an official agency of the Supreme Court of Florida. In order to be
licensed to practice law in Florida, a lawyer must be a member of The Florida Bar. See RPC Rule
1-3.1; Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
4. The court has the "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the
practice of law and the discipline of persons [so] admitted." FLA. CoNsT. of 1968, art V, §15
(1972).
5. 33 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
6. Id. at 1036 (citing The Florida Bar v. Beach, 675 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 1996)); see
also Blackhawk Tenn., Ltd. v. Waltemyer, 900 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. Fla. 1995)(establishing test
for determining existence of a lawyer-client relationship); Brotherhood Mut. Ins. Co. v. National
Presto Indus., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 57 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Dean v. Dean, 607 So. 2d 494 (Fla 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 611 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
7. Keepsake, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
[Vol. 24:199
200
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Chinaris / Tarbert
qualify the law firm, and Keepsake's response surprisingly admitted that the
firm had "performed legal services" for P.S.L but refused to admit that this
performance had resulted in the formation of an attorney-client rela-
tionship. The court rejected this unusual position out of hand, ultimately
disqualifying the law firm.
13
Even with an understanding of the legal test for the establishment of a
lawyer-client relationship, application of that test is not always easy.14 The
court recognized this in Boca Investors Group, Inc. v. Potash,15 noting that,
at least in the disqualification context,1 6 there is a distinction between an
initial consultation regarding counsel's availability (characterized by the
court as a "job interview"), and a lawyer-client discussion that included
disclosure of confidential information.rs The latter creation of a lawyer-
client relationship, would require disqualification, while the former would
not. 1
9
Once a lawyer-client relationship has been established, communication
between the two parties is an essential ingredient for successful teamwork.
Failure to communicate effectively, or the failure to document such com-
munications, can create ethical problems for the lawyer. The lawyer in The
Florida Bar v. Frederickss suffered disciplinary consequences when a series
12. Keepsake, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
13. Id. at 1037 n.3. In a footnote, the court observed that the law firm's "implicit
distinction between 'little' and 'big' clients is without any legal or ethical support." Id.
Regarding other lawyers or law firms who have encountered legal or disciplinary difficulties as a
result of improperly attempting to distinguish between "real" clients and "other" clients, see, e.g.,
The Florida Bar v. Jasperson, 625 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1993) (lawyer who filed bankruptcy petition
for client and client's spouse, whom lawyer never met or advised, disciplined for violating rules
requiring communication with and effective representation of spouse/client); Smith v. Perry, 635
So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (lawyer who represented husband in personal injury
case and filed consortium claim for wife, whom lawyer had not met nor entered into employment
agreement with, was sued by wife for malpractice as result of lawyer's role in husband receiving
lion's share of settlement proceeds). See also Brennan v. Independence Blue Cross, 949 F. Supp.
305 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (lawyer who represented insured in medical malpractice case and insurer on
related subrogation claim disqualified from representing insured against insurer in later dispute
over future medical benefits; subrogation representation was more than mere courtesy and
established lawyer-client relationship with insured).
14. This is an area that presents potential pitfalls for unwary lawyers. See, e.g., Garner v.
Somberg, 672 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996), discussed in Timothy P. Chinaris,
Professional Responsibility: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NOVA L. REV. 231, 235 (1996)
[hereinafter "Chinaris"].
15. 728 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
16. See infra part III regarding disqualification cases.
17. Boca Investors Group, Inc., 728 So. 2d at 825.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 731 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1999).
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of regresentations went awry and the client filed a complaint with the Florida
Bar. The client's and the lawyer's recollections of the operative events
were quite discrepant, but neither could back up his version with any written
documentation. 22 The lawyer was found guilty of violating RPC 4-1.4,
23
RPC 4-1.3 (requiring diligent representation), and RPC 4-8.4(c) (prohibiting
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).24  The
lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for six months for violating
RPC 4-1.4, which requires that a lawyer keep a client informed about the
status of the case.
The allocation of decision-making responsibility between a client and a
lawyer within their professional relationship is also an ethical matter. RPC
4-1.2 26 contains a framework for considering this issue. The question was
discussed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in affirming a trial court's
denial of a motion for postconviction relief based on alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel in a criminal representation. Demurjian v. State28
concerned a petitioner who had been charged with first degree murder.29 He
contended that "he killed the victim in self-defense."'  At his trial,
instructions on lesser included offenses were given to the jury, but during the
21. Id. at 1250.
22. Id.
23. RPC 4-1.4, "COMMUNICATION" provides:
(a) Informing Client of Status of Representation. A lawyer shall keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information.
(b) Duty to Explain Matters to Client. A lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.
Id.
24. Federicks, 731 So. 2d at 1254.
25. RPC 4-1.4 (1993).
26. Subdivision (a) of Rule 4-1.2 of the RPC, "SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION,"
provides:
Lawyer to Abide by Client's Decisions. A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to subdivisions
(c), (d), and (e), and shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to
make or accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer,
as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client
will testify.
Id.
27. Demurjian v. State, 727 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 325.
30. Id.
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closing argument, petitioner's counsel used what is called an "all or nothing"
argument: the lawyer told the jury that his client wanted them to ignore the
lesser included offenses and to either convict him of first degree murder or
find him not guilty.3x He was convicted.32 In his post-conviction relief
motion, the petitioner alleged that he had never consented to the "'all or
nothing"' closing argument.33 The appellate court noted that this form of
litigation strategy was not uncommon in criminal defense cases, and stated
that "there is no requirement for counsel to obtain a client's consent for trial
strategy decisions."4 Whether the client consented to the "all or nothing"
approach was irrelevant, and the court concluded that counsel's performance
was not constitutionally deficient.35
A regularly recurring question facing many practitioners is the extent of
the duty to provide clients, or former clients, with copies of file material
generated during the lawyer-client relationship.36 This is a mixed issue of37
ethics and law, as indicated in RPC 4-1.16. This rule requires that, upon
the termination of employment, a lawyer turn over to the client "papers and
property to which the client is entitled" but permits the lawyer to "retain
papers and other property relating to or belonpng to the client to the extent
permitted by law. 38 In Donahue v. Vaughn, a former client filed a writ of
mandamus to compel his former lawyer to provide to him, free of charge,
"all records" in his case.40 The court denied the writ for several reasons, first
among them being the fact that
31. Id. at 326.
32. Demurfian, 727 So. 2d at 325.
33. Id. at 326.
34. Id. at 327.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Timothy P. Chinaris & Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Professional
Responsibility: 1998 Survey of Florida Law, 23 NOVA L. REV. 161, 169 (1998) [hereinafter
"Chinaris & Tarbert].
37. Subdivision (d) of RPC 4-1.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING
REPRESENTATION," provides:
(d) Protection of Client's Interest. Upon termination of
representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to
protect a client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of
fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers and other property
relating to or belonging to the client to the extent permitted by law.
Id.
38. Id
39. 721 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
40. Id. at 356.
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there is no duty upon a private attorney to give any of his
files to a client, save documents which are solely those of
the client and held by the lawyer. Pleadings, investigative
reports, subpoena copies, reports and other case preparation
documents are property of the lawyer. He is not required to
give that material to the client or make copies free of
charge.4'
Confidentiality is an essential part of the lawyer-client relationship.
This is recognized in both legal ethics42 and law. The ethical duty of
confidentiality requires that, with certain limited exceptions, a lawyer refrain
from voluntarily revealing any "information relating to representation" of a
client."4 This duty continues even after the lawyer-client relationship has
ended.45 In The Florida Bar v. Carricarte,46 a lawyer was disciplined for
41. ld. at 357.
42. RPC 4-1.6, "CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION," provides:
(a) Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client except as stated in sub-
divisions (1), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure to the
client.
(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
(c) When Lawyer May Reveal Information. A lawyer may reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to serve the client's interest unless it is information the client
specifically requires not to be disclosed;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and client;
(3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved;
(4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(d) Exhaustion of Appellate Remedies. When required by a tribunal to
reveal such information, a lawyer may first exhaust all appellate remedies.
(e) Limitation on Amount of Disclosure. When disclosure is mandated or
permitted, the lawyer shall disclose no more information than is required to
meet the requirements or accomplish the purposes of this rule.
Id.
43. In Florida the law of client-lawyer privilege is codified in FLA STAT. § 90.502
(1999).
44. RPC 4-1.6(a), supra note 42.
45. RPC 4-1.6, comment (1993).
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failing to honor this obligation.47 The lawyer had been house counsel for
corporations owned by members of his family.48 Following his termination
as counsel, the lawyer misappropriated trade secrets and disclosed them to
third parties.49 He also threatened to reveal additional confidential informa-
tion unless his former client authorized him to receive $25 000 "severance
pay" from funds being held in the lawyer's trust account.:° The Supreme
Court of Florida upheld the finding of the referee5' that the lawyer had
violated the basic duty of confidentiality expressed in RPC 4-1.6(a)5 2 and
had violated RPC 4-1.6(e)53 by revealing more confidential information than
was reasonably necessary at a hearing held as part of a suit that the former
client filed against the lawyer for disclosing the trade secrets.5
4
Two legal malpractice cases reflected the respect that courts accord the
principle of lawyer-client confidentiality and the cautious approach courts
often take when disclosure of confidential information is sought. Coyne v.
Schwartz, Gold, Cohen, Zakarin & Kotler, P.A.55 arose from an erroneous
title certification that affected a real estate development project.56 A law
firm's former clients sued the firm, alleging that they had suffered damages
as a result of the firm's negligence relating to the title certification. 7 The
clients had been sued by third parties when they began construction on the
project.58 The clients hired a second law firm to defend them in that suit,
which was ultimately settled.5 9 The clients, represented by the second law
46. 733 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1999).
47. Id. at 976.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 977.
50. Id.
51. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d at 977-78. The Supreme Court of Florida appoints a county
or circuit judge to preside as "referee" over the trial of disciplinary cases. RULEs REGULATING
THEFLORIDA BAR 3-7.6(a) (1993).
52. See supra note 42.
53. Id
54. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d at 978. Even when disclosure of otherwise confidential
information is authorized by one of the exceptions contained in RPC 4-1.6, the rule permits such
disclosure only "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary." RPC 4-1.6(b)-(c). The
limited scope of permissible disclosure is emphasized by RPC 4-1.6(e), which specifies that "the
lawyer shall disclose no more information than is required to meet the requirements or
accomplish the purposes of this rule." RPC 4-1.6(e)(1993). In Carricarte, the lawyer accused the
family corporation and their principals of crimes including tax evasion, insurance fraud, and
conspiracy. 733 So. 2d at 977.
55. 715 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
56. Id. at 1022.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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firm, then brought the malpractice action against the first law firm.6o The
first firm alleged negligence on the part of the second firm and sought pro-
duction of all correspondence between the clients and the second firm, con-
cerning the property.6 1 The trial court ordered production. The Fourth
Dis-trict Court of Appeal reversed the order, concluding that the information• 63 ttecet a
was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The fact that the clients had
hired a second law firm to represent them in connection with a matter in
which they had been represented by the first firm did not constitute a waiver
of the privilege as to communications between the clients and the second
firm.64 The possible relevance of the documents sought was not sufficient to
override the privilege.65
In Volpe v. Conroy, Simberg & Ganon, P.A., 6 insureds were defended
under a reservation of rights by a law firm hired by the insurance company.67
68The insureds also hired their personal counsel. The insureds later brought
a malpractice suit against the law firm for failing to give certain advice.69 In
defense, the law firm alleged that actions of their former client's personal
counsel had contributed to the clients' damages. 70 The law firm sought to
depose the personal counsel to ascertain if the advice in question had been
given by1 personal counsel, but the insureds asserted attorney-client
privilege. The trial court's order compelling production of this information
72
was reversed on appeal.
The appellate court pointed out that there was no evidence that the
insureds had intended to share all communications between them and their
personal counsel with the law firm hired by the insurance company."
Although the law firm and the personal counsel had represented the same
clients,
60. Coyne, 715 So. 2d at 1021.
61. Id. at 1022.
62. Id. at 1021.
63. Id. at 1023.
64. Id. at 1022.
65. Coyne, 715 So. 2d at 1023. See also Shafnaker v. Clayton, 680 So. 2d 1109 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The court in Coyne relied upon Shafnaker, wherein the First District
Court of Appeal also applied a narrow construction of the attorney-client privilege in a similar
situation. Id. at 1111.
66. 720 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
67. Id. at 538.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 539.
72. Id. at 540.
73. Id. at 539.
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it does not follow that the client cannot assert the attorney-
client privilege with respect to matters which may have been
discussed with one attorney but not with another. Parti-
cularly in an insurance representation context, the interest of
the insured in further pro-tecting his or her own position
may compel the insured to retain and communicate with a
personal attorney. The client has every right to assume that
the attorney will keep those communications confidential.74
The appellate court narrowly construed the lawyer-client dispute
exception to the privilege,75 considering it as not applicable under the facts
presented.76 The court also rejected the argument that the "joint defense"
exception77 to waiver of the privilege, applied to permit the law firm's access
to the communications between the clients and their personal counsel.78
Concluding that the joint defense doctrine was inapplicable, the court stated
that it "does not give a coparty the right to obtain disclosure of all
communications shared by a coparty with that party's own attorney."
79
Various types of conflicts of interest can arise in the lawyer-client
relationship. Several cases addressed one of the most common sources of
conflict questions, which is a lawyer's representation of a current client in a
matter that is adverse to the interest of one of the lawyer's former clients.
RPC 4-1.980 is the primary rule governing former client conflicts. It can be
difficult to precisely define and apply the operative terms of this rule. For
example, the rule prohibits a lawyer from representing a current client whose
interests are "materially adverse" to the interests of the lawyer's former
client in a "matter" that is the "same" as or "substantially related" to the
74. L at 539 (emphasis added).
75. See F-A STAT. § 90.502(4)(c) (1999).
76. Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 539-40.
77. See Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987). See generally, Susan K. Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint-Defense Doctrine from the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 TVx. L. REv. 1273 (1990).
78. Volpe, 720 So. 2d at 539.
79. Id.
80. RPC 4-1.9, "CONFLICTS OF INTEREST; FORMER CLIENT," provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or
when the information has become generally known.
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matter in which the lawyer represented the former client, unless the former
client "consents after consultation."8' Similarly, the rule also precludes the
lawyer from using "information relating to the representation '' 2 of the for-
mer client to the former client's disadvantage, unless one of the exceptions
to the confidentiality rule applies or the information is "generally known."
83
Two of these issues, the question of "consent after consultation" to a
former client conflict and the question of whether one matter is
"substantially related" to another, were addressed in The Florida Bar v.
Dunagan.84 In Dunagan, a lawyer represented a husband and wife in buying
a business and in litigation relating to that business.85 A year or two later,
the lawyer represented the husband against the wife in a divorce proceeding
in which ownership of the business was an issue.86 The wife consulted with
her new lawyer about the fact that her former lawyer now opposed
her.87 Her new lawyer told her that "there were better attorneys to be up
against" but never clearly advised her of her rights or that she might be
88prejudiced by the prior representation. The wife subsequently sued her
former lawyer for malpractice.8 9 A Florida Bar disciplinary case was also
instituted against the former lawyer.9° Charges against him included
violating RPC 4-1.9 by opposing his former client, the wife, in the same or a
substantially related matter without her consent after consultation. 9'
Regarding the issue of "consent after consultation," the lawyer asserted
that the wife's failure to object to his representation of the husband was
tantamount to the required consent.92 The court rejected this defense.93 The
lawyer had never consulted with the wife about the conflict question.
94
Furthermore, the court stated that the failure of the wife and her new lawyer
"to affirmatively object cannot be construed as 'consent after consultation'
as required by the rules." 95 The court went on to explain that the burden of
raising the conflict issue and securing consent after consultation belonged to
81. RPC 4-1.9(a), supra note 80.
82. See RPC 4-1.6(a), supra note 42 and accompanying text.
83. RPC 4-1.9(b), supra note 80.
84. 731 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1999).
85. Id. at 1238.
86. Id. at 1239.
87. Id. at 1241.
88. Id.
89. Dunagan, 731 So. 2d at 1239.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1240.
93. Id. at 1241.
94. Dunagan, 731 So. 2d at 1241.
95. Id.
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the lawyer and was "not the responsibility of the client or the client's new
attorney.,
96
The court also rejected the lawyer's contention that the divorce matter
in which he opposed the wife was not "substantially related" to the matters
in which he previously represented her.97 Noting that "[w]hether two legal
matters are substantially related depends upon the specific facts of each
particular situation or transaction[,]" the court concluded that there was a
substantial relationship between the matters. The ownership of the
business was clearly a material issue in the divorce case.
99
Keepsake, Inc. v. P.S.I. Industries, Inc.'0 also dealt with application of
the "substantially related" portion of RPC 4-1.9. 1 1 Keepsake's law firm had
also represented P.S.I. in connection with securing trademark and
international patent protection for a product that was the subject of a
distributorship agreement between P.S.I. and Keepsake.' The firm also
represented P.S.I. in state court litigation concerning the product and its
distribution. 3 The law firm referred to its representations of Keepsake and
P.S.I. as a "joint representation."'1 4  Subsequently the firm represented
Keepsake in suing P.S.I. for alleged breach of the distributorship
agreement. 1°5 In granting P.S.I.'s motion to disqualify the law firm from that
case, the trial court concluded that the pending suit was substantially related
to the law firm's prior representation of P.S.1.o6 The court noted that P.S.I.
had retained the law firm to help it perform obligations that it had under the
distributorship agreement, and that these actions were undertaken to protect
and advance P.S..'s interests.1°7 "Having undertaken to protect and advance
PSI's business interest, [the law firm] can not now, without consent,
represent an adverse party [Keepsake] in litigation regarding the extent of
and limitations on those interests."''1
8
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Freund v. Butterworth,10 9
held, in a habeas corpus case based on alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel, that the issue of whether a lawyer's prior representation is
96. ML
97. Id. at 1239.
98. M at 1240.
99. Dunagan, 731 So. 2d at 1240.
100. 33 F Supp. 2d 1033 (M.D. Fa. 1999).
101. Id. at 1035.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Keepsake, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
106. Id. at 1036.
107. Id. at 1037.
108. Id.
109. 165 F.3d 839 (1lth Cir. 1999).
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substantially related to a later representation 'is a mixed question of law
and fact.' '' . In this case, the court also addressed the applicability of the
provision in RPC 4-1.9(b)... that permits a lawyer to use otherwise
confidential information about a former client to the disadvantage of that
former client in a later, unrelated matter, even without the consent of the
former client 2 This provision allows such use of information as permitted
by RPC 4-1.6113 or when the information has become "generally known."'
1 4
The Eleventh Circuit appeared to construe this exception broadly under
the facts before it.15 The petitioner charged that his law firm at trial labored
under a conflict because the law firm had also represented a key potential
adverse witness in numerous prior, unrelated matters. 116  Petitioner
contended that the law firm's cross-examination of that witness would be
impeded by the ethical obligation in RPC 4-1.9(b), not to use confidential
information to the disadvantage of the witness (the former client).'1 7 The
court rejected the argument that RPC 4-1.9(b) was implicated, pointing out
that the "only arguably relevant information that the law firm knew" about
the former client was the existence of certain previous arrests and charges
against him.1 s  Relying on the "generally known" exception in RPC 4-1.9(b), the court stated that "[u]nder the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar,
110. Id. at 861.
111. See supra note 80, and accompanying text.
112. Freund, 165 F.3d at 865.
113. See supra note 42, and accompanying text.
114. Freund, 165 F.3d at 865.
115. Id. Other authorities seem to have taken a less expansive view of the "generally
known" exception. See Russakoff v. Department of Ins., 724 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1998); King v. Byrd, 716 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (declining to equate "public
record" with "generally known" provision of Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 4-1.9(b)).
See also Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 861-62 (W.Va. 1995) ("ethical
duty of confidentiality is not nullified by the fact that the information is part of a public record").
When applying the "generally known" exception in cases where the information in question is
a matter of public record, the focus of the inquiry should be on whether, but for the lawyer's
prior representation of that client, the lawyer would have known of the existence and location
of that information. A lawyer who, as in Freund, would be using public record information
that is available and known to any reasonably competent lawyer in that position should fall
within the scope of the "generally known" exception in RPC 4-1.9(b). On the other hand,
some bit of relevant but obscure information buried deep within the "public records" and not
known to anyone except the client's lawyer (or former lawyer) should not be considered
"generally known" for purposes of RPC 4-1.9(b).
116. Freund, 165 F.3d at 862.
117. Id. at 865.
118. Id. at 864. The court went on to note that the prosecutor's decision not to call the
law firm's former client to testify removed the possibility that the firm would cross-examine him
using protected confidential information. Id. at 865.
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the law firm's knowledge of those charges cannot be the basis of a conflict
of interest."1 19
Conflict of interest problems can also arise when a lawyer's personal
interest conflicts or potentially conflicts with the interests of a client.120 A
relatively unusual personal interest conflict was alleged in Herring v.
State.121 In a motion for post-conviction relief, a petitioner alleged that he
had received ineffective assistance of counsel because one of the assistant
public defenders who represented him at trial, Howard Pearl, had a conflict
of interest because Pearl was a special deputy sheriff.1 2 Attorney Pearl had
applied to become a special deputy sheriff in order to be authorized to carry
a concealed firearm for protective purposes. 123 The issue before the court
was whether the lawyer had an actual conflict of interest that resulted in the
rendition of ineffective assistance.12 The court concluded that "[t]he record
119. Il at864.
120. RPC 4-1.7, "CONFLICT OF INTEREST; GENERAL RULE," provides:
(a) Representing Adverse Interests. A lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation of that client will be directly adverse to the interests of
another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the lawyer's responsibilities to and relationship with the other client;
and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) Duty to Avoid Limitation on Independent Professional Judgment. A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's exercise of independent
professional judgment in the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or
by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
(c) Explanation to Clients. When representation of multiple clients in a
single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
(d) Lawyers Related by Blood or Marriage. A lawyer related to another
lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse shall not represent a client in a
representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is
represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after
consultation regarding the relationship.
Id.
121. 730 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1998).
122. Id. at 1266.
123. Id at 1267.
124. Id. at 1265.
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reveals no evidence suggesting that [petitioner]'s interests were impaired or
compromised as a result of Pearl's special deputy status.
' '125
A more conventional personal interest conflict was presented in The
Florida Bar v. Cox. 26 A lawyer co-owned a business with one of his clients,
and also was the business's general counsel.' 27 The lawyer represented
another client in connection with organizing a line of credit for this
business. 12 The lawyer did not disclose to the other client his interest in the
business, his position as its general counsel, or the fact that his co-owner was
also one of his clients.129 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the finding
that the lawyer was guilty of violating both RPC 4-1.7b), 13  which
proscribes personal interest conflicts, and RPC 4-1.8(a), governing
business transactions with clients. 32 The court observed that the lawyer's
independent professional judgment in the other client's representation was
limited by his own interests and by the resgonsibilities that he owed to the
client who co-owned the business with him.
125. Id. at 1268. Attorney Pearl's status as a special deputy sheriff has generated a
number of conflict claims in post-conviction litigation. See, e.g., Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So.
2d 1009 (Fla. 1999); Stano v. State, 708 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1998); Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d
688 (Fla. 1998); Swafford v. State, 636 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1994); Henderson v. Singletary, 617
So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1993); Jones v. State, 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1992); Wright v. State, 581 So. 2d
882 (Fla. 1991); Quince v. State, 732 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990); Harich v. State, 573 So. 2d 303
(Fla. 1990).
126. 718 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1998).
127. Id. at 790.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Supra note 120.
131. Subdivision (a) of Rule 4-1.8, "CONFLICT OF INTERESTS; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(a) Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client.
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest
adverse to a client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer's fee or
expenses, unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing to the client in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the
client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Id.
132. For these and a number of other violations, the lawyer was disbarred. Cox, 718 So.
2d at 794.
133. Id. at 792.
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Another variety of personal interest conflict was seen in The Florida
Bar v. Vining134 The lawyer purported to represent his client in one matter
while, at the same time, the lawyer was being sued by, and counterclaiming
against, the same client in another matter.135- The client did not consent to
this conflict.136  The lawyer was disciplined for, among other things,
violating RPC 4-1.7(b). 137
A lawyer's relationship with clients also implicates duties that include,
but can extend beyond, the standards set by the ethics rules. These are duties
imposed upon lawyers as a matter of law. They include fiduciary responsi-
bilities and duties of competent representation. Typically these legal duties
are articulated and enforced in the context of legal malpractice cases. Some
of the developments in the area of legal malpractice law are worthy of
special notice. 38
The close, personal, confidential nature of the lawyer-client relationship
has long been recognized by Florida courts in the context of actions for legal
malpractice. For example, lawyers' liability for malpractice ordinarily runs
only to persons who have privity of contract with the lawyer.139 The only
exception to the rule of privity is in a situation where the known intent of the
client was for the lawyer's services to benefit a third party.1'4 For this
reason, malpractice claims are not assignable.141 In National Union Fire
Insurance Co. v. Salter, 42 the court relied on these principles in concluding
that an insurance company that paid its insured's losses under the insurance
policy was not subrograted to the insured's right to recover on an alleged
legal malpractice claim against the insured's attorneys, whose negligence
allegedly caused the loss.1
As noted, a lawyer's duty to competently represent a client is an
intensely personal one. Even if multiple lawyers represent a client, each
lawyer must take care to see that proper representation is being provided. In
134. 721 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1998).
135. Id. at 1166.
136. Id. Quite to the contrary; during the course of the representation the client in fact,
discharged the lawyer. Id.
137. I& at 1170.
138. This article does not attempt to undertake a comprehensive survey of developments
in the area of legal malpractice. Rather, significant developments most directly relating to
lawyers' professional responsibility are reviewed.
139. See, e.g., Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d
1378 (Fla. 1998); Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberson Investments, N.V., 512 So. 2d 192 (Fla.
1987).
140. Angel, 512 So. 2d at 194.
141. See, e.g., Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle Agency, 701 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1997) (discussed in
Chinaris & Tarbert, supra note 36, at 164-67).
142. 717 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
143. Id. at 143.
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Spaziano v. Price,144 a person was injured during a scuba diving trip to the
Bahamas. Upon returning to his home in New Jersey, this person hired a
Philadelphia law firm to represent him in this matter. 45 The Philadelphia
law firm determined that the suit should be brought in Florida, and contacted
Florida lawyer Price to assist.146 The Philadelphia law firm was of the
opinion that the Florida four year statute of limitation on negligence actions
applied.1 47 This opinion turned out to be incorrect.148 In the ensuing legal
malpractice action brought by the client against Price, Price defended by
asserting that he was entitled to rely on the Philadelphia firm's opinion
concerning the limitations period. 149 Concluding that this contention was
"without merit," the appellate court observed that the Florida lawyer and his
firm were "required to bring to that representation the requisite knowledge
and skill to determine the appropriate statute of limitations."'' 50 The lawyer's
reliance on the Philadelphia firm's opinion did not relieve him of the duty
that he owed to the client.
Another, more conventional, defense raised by lawyers who are accused
of malpractice is that of judgmental immunity. The lawyer makes many
judgments in the course of the lawyer-client relationship. In making these
judgments, the lawyer has a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill.151
Nevertheless, the law recognizes that a lawyer's good faith decision, made
after diligent inquiry, regarding a fairly debatable or unsettled point of law is
not actionable as a breach of this duty, even if the lawyer's decision later
turns out to be incorrect.152 In DeBiasi v. Snaith,153 a client's chance to have
an unfavorable decision of an appellate court reviewed was lost when his
motion to certify a question was denied as untimely filed. 154 The client then
sued his lawyer for alleged malpractice.155  The lawyer defended on the
ground of judgmental immunity, arguing that the language of the procedural
rule in question 56 was ambiguous and thus provided him with the protection
144. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. May 19,1999).
145. Id. at D1224.
146. Id.
147. Id. at D1225.
148. Id.
149. Spaziano, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1225.
150. Id.
151. RPC 4-1.1, "COMPETENCE" provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Id.
152. See Crosby v. Jones, 705 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 1998), and cases cited therein.
153. 732 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
154. Id. at 15.
155. Id.
156. At issue was FLA. R. APP. PRoc. 9.330.
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of the judgment immunity doctrine. 157 Summary judgment was granted in
the lawyer's favor.15 8  The appellate court reversed.15 9  The lawyer's
contention that the procedural rule was ambiguous was not sufficient to
warrant the determination that, as a matter of law, his actions were clothed
with judgmental immunity. 16° No showing of diligent inquiry was made on
his part, and he apparently cited no law authorizing his interpretation of the
rule.61 Thus, on remand the lawyer would have to prove "the factual issue
of his good faith and diligent inquiry.
' 16 2
A novel but unsuccessful defense to a malpractice claim was raised by
the lawyer in Tarleton v. Arnstein & Lehr.16 A law firm, was sued by its
former client for alleged malpractice arising from the representation of her in
a dissolution of marriage action.'6 After trial, the jury entered a verdict
finding that the law firm was negligent in its representation and that its
negligence was responsible for seventy-five percent of the wife's claimed
damages; however, the jury found the wife to be comparatively negligent for
twenty-five percent of her damages.165 The court granted the firm's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denied the former client's
motion for entry of judgment. [6 The former client appealed, urging that the
trial court erred in denying her motion.167 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal made it clear that the defense of the former client's comparative
negligence was not available to the law firmm.' 68 "A client cannot be found to
be comparatively negligent for relying on an attorney's erroneous legal
advice or for failing to correct errors of the attorney which involve the
exercise of professional expertise."1 69 The relative sophistication of the
client "does not impose upon her the burden to second guess her attorney's
advice or hire a second attorney to see if such advice was proper."
1 70
A final consideration for lawyers in this area is the question of when the
statute of limitations for an alleged act of malpractice accrues. The Supreme
Court of Florida announced what it termed a "bright-line rule" in Silvestrone
157. Debiasi, 732 So. 2d at 15.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 16.
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id. at 16.
162. DeBiasi, 732 So. 2d at 16.
163. 719 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
164. Id. at 326.
165. Id. at 328.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Tarelton, 719 So. 2d at 328.
169. Id. at331.
170. l
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v. Edell. 71 The court held that, in cases that proceed to judgment, Florida's
two-year limitations period begins to run when the final judgment becomes
final. 72 To illustrate, the court noted that "a judgment becomes final either
upon the expiration of the time for filing an appeal or postjudgment motions,
or, if an appeal is taken, upon the appeal being affirmed and either the
expiration of the time for filing motions for rehearing or a denial of the
motions for rehearing."' 7 3 The newly announced rule was quickly applied by
the Third District Court of Appeal in Gaines v. Russo.
174
The applicable limitation period for claims of malpractice arising from
criminal defense representations also was addressed by the Supreme Court
of Florida. In Steele v. Kehoe,175 the court answered the question of whether
the defense lawyer's former client must be exonerated as a prerequisite to
176bringing a legal malpractice action against the lawyer. After reviewing
some policy considerations, the court followed the majority rule and held
that "a convicted criminal defendant must obtain appellate or post conviction
relief as a precondition to maintaining a legal malpractice action."'
'
Furthermore, the court held that the statute of limitations on the defendant's
malpractice claim did not begin to run until final appellate relief or post
conviction relief has been obtained.
178
Interestingly, the Second District Court of Appeal held that even per-
sons who are not lawyers may be held liable in a legal malpractice action.1
In Buscemi v. Intachai,80 a financial planner who held a law degree but was
not licensed to practice was sued by a former customer for giving allegedly
incorrect and damaging advice concerning the client's legal affairs.181 The
defendant asserted that, as a non-lawyer, he could not be held liable for
171. 721 So. 2d 1173, 1175-76 (Fla. 1998).
172. Id. at 1175-76.
173. Id at 1175 n.2.
174. 723 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
175. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S237 (May 27, 1999).
176. Id. at S237. There had been some disagreement among the district courts of appeal
concerning the correct rule. Compare Rowe v. Schreiber, 725 So. 2d 1245, 1250 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (stating "we agree with those courts that have required criminal defendants to
obtain post conviction relief or to set aside their convictions on appeal before pursuing an action
for legal malpractice against their defense attorneys"), with Martin v. Pafford, 583 So. 2d 736,
738 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding defendant "was not required to have succeeded in
obtaining collateral relief from her criminal conviction before she could civilly sue her attorney
for malpractice").
177. Steele, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S238.
178. Id.
179. Buscemi v. Intachai, 730 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
180. 730 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
181. Id. at 330.
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failing to give the proper legal advice. 182 Disagreeing, the appellate court
stated, "[a]ppellant overlooks the fact that whether a lawyer or not, if he
undertakes to give legal advice, he is subject to a standard of due care. '8 3
Fees, of course, are an essential aspect of the lawyer-client relationship.
The importance of being aware of and complying with the relevant rules of
ethics was highlighted in several cases decided over the past year. The
Florida. Bar v. Carson 84 concerned a lawyer who complained to the Florida
bar about the alleged failure of another lawyer to pay him a referral fee in a
personal injury case. .185  Upon investigation, it was determined that the
alleged agreement to pay a referral fee had not been reduced to writing and
that the lawyer had accepted other referral fees in the absence of written
agreements. This conduct was contrary to the relevant ethics rules, which
require any division of fee between lawyers not in the same firm to be
pursuant to a written agreement, signed by the participating lawyers and the
client, disclosing how the fee will be divided and providing that each
participating lawyer will accept joint legal responsibility for the case.187 The
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 737 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1999).
185. Id. at 1069.
186. Id. at 1071.
187. Subdivision (g) of RPC 4-1.5, 'TEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES," provides:
(g) Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(1), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer, or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the
representation and agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(3) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be
made and the basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
Id. Additional rules that apply to fee divisions in contingent fee personal injury-type cases are
set forth in subdivision (t(4)(D) of RPC 4-1.5, which provides:
(f) Contingent Fees. As to contingent fees:
(4) A lawyer who enters into an arrangement for, charges, or collects
any fee in an action or claim for personal injury or for property damages or
for death or loss of services resulting from personal injuries based upon
tortious con-duct of another, including products liability claims, whereby the
compensa-tion is to be dependent or contingent in whole or in part upon the
successful prosecution or settlement thereof shall do so only under the
following requirements:
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bar then turned the tables on the lawyer by instituting disciplinary
proceedings against him.18s  The lawyer was found guilty and ordered to
attend a practice and professionalism enhancement program.
In addition to presenting possible disciplinary problems,' 1 in 1995 the
Supreme Court of Florida clearly stated in Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis
19 1
that a fee agreement that does not comply with applicable ethics rules may
(D) As to lawyers not in the same firm, a division of any fee
within subdivision (f)(4) shall be on the following basis:
(i) To the lawyer assuming primary responsibility for the
legal services on behalf of the client, a minimum of 75% of the total fee.
(ii) To the lawyer assuming secondary responsibility for the
legal services on behalf of the client, a maximum of 25% of the total fee. Any
fee in excess of 25% shall be presumed to be clearly excessive.
(iii) The 25% limitation shall not apply to those cases in
which 2 or more lawyers or firms accept substantially equal active
participation in the providing of legal services. In such circumstances counsel
shall apply to the court in which the matter would be filed, if litigation is
necessary, or if such court will not accept jurisdiction for the fee division, the
circuit court wherein the cause of action arose, for authorization of the fee
division in excess of 25%, based upon a sworn petition signed by all counsel
that shall disclose in detail those services to be performed. The application for
authorization of such a contract may be filed as a separate proceeding before suit
or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint. Proceedings thereon may occur
before service of process on any party and this aspect of the file may be sealed.
Authorization of such contract shall not bar subsequent inquiry as to whether the
fee actually claimed or charged is clearly excessive. An application under this
subdivision shall contain a certificate showing service on the client and The
Florida Bar. Counsel may proceed with representation of the client pending
court approval.
(iv) The percentages required by this subdivision shall be
applicable after deduction of any fee payable to separate counsel retained
especially for appellate purposes.
Id.
188. Carson, 737 So. 2d at 1070.
189. Id. In 1994 the Supreme Court of Florida approved the creation of the practice and
professionalism enhancement program (sometimes known as "ethics school") "as an alternative to
existing sanctions," in order to "provide educational opportunities to members of the Bar for
enhancing skills and avoiding misconduct allegations." Florida Bar Re Amendments to Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, 644 So. 2d 282,283 (Fla. 1994).
190. See The Florida Bar v. Rubin, 709 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1998) (disciplining lawyer for
suing another lawyer on alleged verbal referral fee agreement, which did not comply with ethics
rules).
191. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995). "[W]e hold that a contingent fee contract entered into
by a member of The Florida Bar must comply with the rule governing contingent fees in order to
be enforceable." Id. at 185-86.
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be unenforceable. 192 Despite this significant statement from the supreme
court, more than one court has seemingly ignored the Chandris decision in
circumstances that call for its application. Eakin v. United Technology
Corp.193 is one such case.194 Former counsel for the plaintiff in a personal
injury action attempted to enforce their contingent fee agreement through a
charging lien.' 95 The plaintiff defended by contending that lawyers were not
entitled to a fee because the settlement proceeds from which the fee was to
be paid had never been distributed (the defendant had refused to pay the
agreed-upon settlement amount until there had been a resolution of various
liens asserted against the settlement).196 Theplaintiff also challenged the
underlying validity of the fee agreement.1 Plaintiff alleged that the
agreement violated The Florida Bar ethics rules thus was unenforceable. 198
Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that the agreement provided that the two
lawyers would divide the fee in a manner that would violate RPC 4-
1.5(f)(4)(D) (governing division of contingent fee between counsel in
personal injury matters). 199 Without even mentioning Chandris, the court
rejected Plaintiff's claim.200 The court purported to base its decision on
language in the RPC's Preamble, which states that the RPC are "not
designed to be a basis for civil liability."20' The court's rationale failed to
192. Id.
193. 998 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Fla 1998).
194. lId at 1422. Another such case is Miller v. Jacobs & Goodman, P.A., 699 So. 2d 729
(Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1997) (in suit by law firm against its former employee to enforce
provision of employment agreement that allegedly violated RPC 4-5.6(a), which prohibits
agreements restricting a lawyer's right to practice after termination of the employment
relationship, the court's decision failed to even mention Chandris in rejecting former employee's
argument that agreement was unenforceable as against public policy because it violated RPC 4-
5.6(a)).
195. Eakin, 998 F. Supp. at 1424.
196. Id. at 1425.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1428.
199. Id. See supra note 187.
200. Eakin, 998 F. Supp. at 1429.
201. Id. (emphasis omitted). The court quoted the following paragraph from the "Scope"
section of the Preamble to the RPC:
Violation of a rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The rules are
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be
a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can be
subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons.
The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for
sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does
not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has
1999]
219
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
recognize that, even though the RPC themselves are not standards governing
civil actions, agreements providing for violation of an ethical rule can
nevertheless be so contrary to public policy that the agreement is considered
void and unenforceable-as the Supreme Court of Florida expressly held in
Chandris. 2
Several cases of interest dealt with various aspects of contingent fees.
The definition of a "contingent fee" was addressed in Worobec v. Morse.
203
The lawyer and client entered into a fee agreement in two matters, collection
of promissory notes and partition. 204 Their agreement provided that the
money recovered in the partition action would be used to pay for all hours
worked by the lawyer in both cases, but that the lawyer would receive
nothing if nothing was recovered in the partition case.20 The appellate court
held that arrangement did not create a contingent fee in the promissory note
collection matter, because the fee was not contingent on outcome of that
(promissory note) case, and thus the contingent fee risk multiplier did not
apply2
The right of a lawyer who withdraws from a contingent fee
representation prior to occurrence of the contingency was discussed in
Calley v. Thomas M. Woodruff, P.A.20 The lawyer was hired to handle a
personal injury claim on a contingent fee basis, but withdrew prior to
conclusion of the case. 208 The client hired a new lawyer, who settled the
case.2°9 The original lawyer filed a charging lien and ultimately was
awarded fees by the trial court. 210 The general rule in Florida is that an
attorney who withdraws from a contingent fee case before the contingency
occurs forfeits all right to compensation, unless the withdrawal was
standing to seek enforcement of the rule. Accordingly, nothing in the rules
should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the
extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such duty.
Id.
202. Chandris, 668 So. 2d at 186.
203. 722 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). Regarding the definition of
"contingent fee," see also Seminole County v. Delco Oil, Inc., 669 So. 2d 1162, 1167 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (defining contingent case as "one where payment depends on winning and
collecting"); Quanstrom v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 519 So. 2d 1135, 1136 n. I (Fla. 5th Dist. CL
App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990) ("controlling substantive
character of a contingency fee agreement is the feature that the attorney gets paid in one event and
not in another.").
204. Morse, 722 So. 2d at 227.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 227-28.
207. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1999 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1998).
208. Id. at D1999.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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necessitated by the client's demand for illegal or unethical conduct by the
lawyer.211 The trial court in Calley awarded fees based on its finding that the
lawyer had withdrawn as a result of a "well-founded belief" that the client
would perjure himself at trial.212 The Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the fee award, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court's finding that the unethical conduct exception to the
general rule applied. 21 The lawyer had
made no attempt to inquire to confirm his suspicion that [the
client] intended to offer false testimony, nor did he take any
action to dissuade [the client] from offering false testimony.
In the absence of compelling evidence to show that the
client's conduct is criminal or fraudulent, a lawyer cannot
have a reasonable belief the client will lie without at least
214inquiring of the client.
Enforcement of a lawyer's claimed right to a fee, whether contingent or
non-contingent cases, typically generates litigation. This past year was no
exception. One of the most common and efficient means of enforcing a right
211. Faro v. Romani, 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1994).
212. Cal/ey, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1999.
213. Id.
214. IML at D1999-2000. Calley is also instructive regarding a lawyer's duty under RPC
4-3.3 when faced with a client who intends to offer false evidence or engage in a fraud on the
court. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of RPC 4-3.3, "CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL,"
provides:
(a) False Evidence; Duty to Disclose. A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) permit any witness, including a criminal defendant, to offer
testimony or other evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. A lawyer may
not offer testimony that the lawyer knows to be false in the form of a narrative
unless so ordered by the tribunal. If a lawyer has offered material evidence
and thereafter comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures.
(b) Extent of Lawyer's Duties. The duties stated in subdivision (a)
continue beyond the conclusion of the proceeding and apply even if
compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule 4-
1.6.
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to a fee is through the mechanism of a lawyer's charging lien.211 In Feldman
v. New Alliance Insurance Co.,2 6 a lawyer represented a client in a breach of
contract action against the client's insurer. Suit was filed just two weeks
after the subject auto accident occurred. 218  Not long thereafter the client
discharged the lawyer, who filed a charging lien for fees allegedly due
him." 9 The client settled the case with a new lawyer. 22  Neither the client
nor the insurer paid the fees claimed by the original lawyer, and the trial
court denied his motion for fees on the ground that the suit was filed
"prematurely" and did not help the client's case.221 The Third District Court
of Appeal reversed.222 The lawyer provided some legal services to the client
and established his charging lien for those services.23 Accordingly, the
matter was remanded for determination of the amount due the lawyer. 4
A high-profile case in which a charging lien was at issue was State v.
American Tobacco Co. This case centered around a dispute over
attorney's fees arising from the multi-billion dollar settlement in Florida's
litigation against the tobacco industry.226 A group o~rivate law firms had
contracted to represent the State in the litigation. A very favorable
settlement was reached with some of the defendants. The lawyers filed acharging lien on the date that the settlement agreement was approved by the
215. One of two common law liens available to lawyers in Florida, a "charging lien is [an]
equitable right to have costs and fees due an attorney for services in [the] suit secured to him in
[the] judgment or recovery in that particular suit." Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum &
Zaverik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 1983). The other equitable lien is called
a retaining lien, which is a possessory lien, asserted as security for payment of accrued but unpaid
fees or costs, that a lawyer has on papers, funds, and other property of his or her client that comes
into the lawyer's possession in the course of the lawyer's professional employment. See, e.g.,
Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1986); Wintter v. Fabber, 618 So. 2d 375
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Dowda & Fields, P.A. v. Cobb, 452 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984). Unlike a charging lien, which is case-specific, a lawyer may assert a retaining lien
over property relating to one case that he or she is handling for a client in order to secure the fee
owed by that client to the lawyer from another case. Mones, 486 So. 2d at 561.
216. 722 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
217. Id. at 939.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Feldman, 722 So. 2d at 939.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 723 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1998).
226. Id. at 264.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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court.229 Pursuant to the settlement agreement, millions of dollars were
deposited in an escrow account.2 30 The trial court, however, quashed the
charIng lien on the ground that the underlying fee contract was unenforce-
able. This order was subsequently reversed by the Fourth District Court
232of Appeal. On remand, the lawyers moved to enforce their charging lien,
and the State filed a writ of prohibition in the supreme court to prevent the
trial court from ordering disbursement of any funds to the lawyers.2 33 The
supreme court relied on the fee contract between the parties in reaching its
decision. a The contract specified that, when the settlement agreement
became final, all monies were to be distributed to the State.235 The lawyers'
right to their fees "ripens upon the payments being made pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement and those payments being transmitted to the State.
236
Accordingly, the court held that no charging lien could be imposed upon the
funds because such a lien "would be contrary to the contract for legal
services entered into" between the lawyers and the State.
237
The scope of an attorney's retaining lien was addressed in Boroff v. Bic
Corp.23 8  A lawyer represented the plaintiffs in a personal injury suit,
advancing costs and expenses of about $20,000 on his clients' behalf.239 The
defendant prevailed in the suit and obtained a costs judgment against the
lawyer's clients. 240 In a separate personal injury suit for the same clients, the
lawyer secured a recovery and had $4500 placed in his trust account.24 1
When the defendant in the first suit sought to garnish the lawyer's trust
account, the lawyer asserted a retaining lien for the costs owed from the first
suit and the fees owed from the second suit.242 The trial court recognized the
retaining lien, but permitted it to attach only to the fees owed to the lawyer
from the second suit. 43 The appellate court held that the lien should extend
to both fees and costs: "an attorney's retaining lien attaches to all property
229. Id. at 266.
230. American Tobacco Co., 723 So. 2d at 266.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 268.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. American Tobacco Co., 723 So. 2d at 268.
236. Id. at 267-69.
237. Id. at 268.
238. 718 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
239. Id. at 349.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Boroff, 718 So. 2d at 349.
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of the client that comes into the attorney's possession, to secure payment of
all debts-including fees and costs-owed by the client to the attorney."
244
An interesting fee-related issue was raised in Dadic v. Schneider.245 A
couple sued their former lawyer and his law firm for malpractice. 246 Among
the allegations was a count allegin legal malpractice through the charging
of excessive fees by the lawyer.24 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed a summary judgment for the lawyer, stating that "[n]o authority
supports a cause of action on this theory.""
Termination of the lawyer-client relationship can also raise ethical
issues. RPC 4-1.16249 sets forth the standards governing termination of a
244. Id.
245. 722 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
246. Id. at 922.
247. Id. at 923.
248. Ma
249. RPC 4-1.16, "DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION,"
provides:
(a) When Lawyer Must Decline or Terminate Representation. Except as
stated in subdivision (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a
client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct or law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the
lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) When Withdrawal Is Allowed. Except as stated in subdivision (c), a
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or
if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's
services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or
fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client falls substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that
the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) Compliance With Order of Tribunal. When ordered to do so by a
tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause
for terminating the representation.
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representation.250 One of the most basic principles in this area is that a
lawyer must withdraw (or attempt to withdraw) from the representation
when discharged by the client.251 Apparently, however, some lawyers do not
always understand or adhere to this basic principle. In Florida Bar v.
Vining,a52  lawyer was disciplined for several rules violations, including the
failure to comply with RPC 4-1.16 2 3 by withdrawing from representation
after his client discharged him. 4 The lawyer was representing the client in
connection with a certain building controlled by the client and in which the
lawyer happened to be a tenant.25 The lawyer represented the client in suing
another tenant. 6 While an appeal of the trial court's decision in that case
was pending, the client discharged the lawyer and four days later, sued the
lawyer's professional association for unpaid rent. Refusing to take no for
an answer, the lawyer continued to represent the client in the appeal-and
even participated in oral argument. The client complained to the Florida
Bar, which ultimately led to the lawyer's suspension from the practice of law
for six months.259 The supreme court noted that "Rule 4-1.16 requires a
lawyer to withdraw from representation if the lawyer 
is discharged.",ui
Application of the termination of representation rules in the criminal
context creates special concerns, however, particularly in view of the
constitutional obligation of the state to provide legal representation to
defendants who cannot afford to hire a lawyer.2 1 The Supreme Court of
Florida previously ruled that a trial court must grant a public defender's
motion to withdraw from a representation when the public defender certifies
(d) Protection of Client's Interest. Upon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time
for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which
the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not
been earned. The lawyer may retain papers and other property relating to or
belonging to the client to the extent permitted by law.
Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 721 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1998).
253. Id. at 1166. Specifically, the lawyer violated subdivision (a)(3) of RPC 4-1.16. See
supra note 249.
254. Vining, 721 So. 2d at 1164.
255. Id. at 1165.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1167.
258. Id. at 1168.
259. Vining, 721 So. 2d at 1170.
260. Id. at 1168.
261. U.S. CONsT., amend. VI.
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to the court that the interests of one client are so adverse or hostile to those
of another client that the public defender cannot represent the two clients
without a conflict of interest.262 The trial court has no discretion in this
situation; it is not permitted to reweigh the underlying facts and substitute its
conclusion for that of the public defender. 63 Despite this clear pronounce-
ment from the supreme court, in at least six reported cases, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed trial court orders denying public
defenders' motions to withdraw due to certified conflicts. 264 In one of these
265
cases, Reardon v. State, the appellate court appeared to invite the
legislature to change the result of the supreme court's controlling decision. 2 6
A trial court's order denying court-appointed criminal defense counsel's
motion to withdraw was affirmed on appeal in Thomas v. State.267 Counsel
moved to withdraw on eve of trial, stating that his law firm previously
employed the mother of one of the witnesses and previously represented
members of that witness's family in an unrelated civil case. The trial
court denied the lawyer's motion to withdraw.269 The defendant was
convicted, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.2 The appellate court
distinguished between conflicts of interest involving current or former
clients of a criminal defense lawyer and conflicts arising from the lawyer's
personal interests: l
The conflict in this case did not involve representation of
clients or former clients with competing interest. Rather the
conflict arose from a personal relationship not shown to
involve substantial emotional ties. In these circumstances,
prejudice is not presumed and the defendant must
262. Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994).
263. Id. at 998-99.
264. See Ross v. State, 730 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Terry v. State, 24
Fla. L. Weekly D406 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Sheffield v. State, 725 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999); Leslie v. State, 720 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Reardon v. State,
715 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Filan v. State, 720 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998).
265. 715 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that it was "bound to follow
Guzman," the court stated that "[a]ny change in which a public defender's certification of conflict
is treated by the trial courts and reviewed will have to come from the legislature").
266. Id. at 348.
267. 725 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
268. Id. at 1172-73.
269. Id. at 1173.
270. Id.
271. Id.
[Vol. 24:199
226
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Chinaris / Tarbert
demonstrate that he has been prejudiced in some way to
establish reversible error.
272
A case of interest involving a "nonwithdrawal" was Milane v. State.273
On appeal of his criminal conviction, the defendant asserted that the trial
court had erred by not replacing his public defender with private counsel.
274
Apparently, the defendant was concerned because another lawyer in the
public defender's office was representing, in another case, a person who was
a material witness against the defendant in his case.275 The public defender
had refused to certify conflict on these facts. 27 In affirming the conviction,
the appellate court noted that there was no indication that defense counsel's
cross-examination of the witness "was anything other than vigorous" and
that the defendant had failed to establish the existence of a conflict that
adversely affected his lawyer's performance. 2" While the court may have
correctly affirmed the conviction as a matter of law, it appears that the
defense counsel's apparent non-recognition of any conflict may have been an
incorrect application of the ethics rules.27 A lawyer's cross-examination of
a current client is considered a confli&t of interest.279 This conflict ordinarily
would extend to all lawyers within the law firmn pursuant to RPC 4-
1.10(a). 0
Finally, lawyers who have the good fortune to be elevated to a position
on the bench should take care to close out their practices in an orderly,
responsible fashion as contemplated by RPC 4-1.16. 2 A lawyer who
allegedly "virtually abandoned her law practice and neglected several client
matters during the time she ran for office as a county court judge" was found
guilty of violating a number of RPC and disciplined by the Supreme Court of
Florida. 2
272. Thomas, 725 So. 2d at 1173.
273. 716 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
274. ld. at 837.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Milane, 716 So. 2d at 837.
279. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-
367 (1992).
280. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.10, "IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION;
GENERAL RULE," provides: "(a) Imputed Disqualification of All Lawyers in Firm.
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when
any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by rule 4-1.7, 4-1.8(c), 4-
1.9, or 4-2.2." Id.
281. See supra note 249.
282. In re Hapner, 718 So. 2d 785, 786 (Fla. 1998). Among the rules violated were RPC
4-1.1 (competence), 4-1.3 (diligence), 4-1.4 (communicating with clients), 4-1.5(e)
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III. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
A lawyer's relationship with the system of justice is a more abstract, yet
critically important one. How does one have a relationship with a "system?"
In a practical sense, how are one's responsibilities to and within a "system"
determined and measured? For the lawyer, the answers to these questions
are probably best arrived at by considering their relationships with and
responsibilities to the two principal constituencies of the justice system,
judges and the public whom the system is designed to serve. Cases in 1999
addressed relevant issues such as the disqualification of a lawyer or law firm
from a litigated matter, the question of a lawyer's dual role as advocate and
witness, a lawyer's ability to comment publicly on matters in which he or
she is participating, the lawyer's obligation of candor owed to the court, the
conduct of lawyers during a trial, a lawyer's professionalism obligations, and
the question of proper argument to the jury.
Disqualification of a lawyer based on the fact that he had previously
represented the opposing party was addressed in Eplee v. Eplee.28 3 The
lawyer was representing the husband in a divorce action. 4 Sixteen years
earlier, while representing the same client in a criminal matter, the lawyer
had given legal advice to the client's girlfriend (who was now the wife in
this divorce action) concerning her possible claim of spousal immunity.2
The trial court granted the wife's motion disqualifying the lawyer based on a
finding that the prior advice to her created an attorney-client relationship.2 6
On petition for writ of certiorari the First District Court of Appeal quashed
the order of disqualification, concluding that there had been no assertion that
the lawyer had obtained any confidential information from the wife and no
showing that the prior legal advice was substantially related to the current287
case.
(communicating basis or rate of fee to client), 4-1.6(d) (confidential information), 4-3.3 (candor
toward a tribunal), and 4-8.4 (misconduct). Id. at 787.
283. 722 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1998).
284. Id. at 277-78.
285. Id. at 278.
286. Id.
287. Id. As a general rule, when a lawyer represents a new client whose interests are
materially adverse to those of his or her former client, a conflict of interest exists if either the two
matters are the same or substantially related or the lawyer possesses confidential information that
could be used to the disadvantage of the former client. RPC 4-1.9, supra note 80. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Harris Ins., Inc., 572 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1991).
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The imputed disqualification 288 of lawyers or law firms was addressed
in several cases. Russakoff v. State289 concerned an order disqualifying a law
firm. The law firm had represented a Health Maintenance Organization
("IMO") that subsequently went into receivership and was taken over by the
state's Department of Insurance.290 The Department sought to recover
certain funds from the HMO's former chief executive officer and sole
shareholder, who then hired the law firm to defend him.291 The trial court
granted the Department's motion to disqualify the law firm, "finding that the
law firm had represented [the HMO] in a related matter, and that, moreover,
the Department would certainly call as witnesses the lawyers who had
advised [the HMO] regarding this matter."292 The appellate court quashed
the order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
293
The court discussed the issues of conflicts resulting from the firm's
former representation of the HMO and from the possibility that firm lawyers
would testify as witnesses.294  Significantly, the court indicated that
screening of certain lawyers might prevent the law firm from being
disqualified under the former client conflict rule, RPC 4-1.9,295 stating that:
[t]he fact that there was an attorney-client relationship
between [the HMO] and [the law firm] would automatically
disqualify those individual lawyers from working on matters
that they handled or were directly related to matters that they
handled. Other lawyers in the firm, however, would be
disqualified only if any [law firm] lawyer would be called at
trial, or if confidences would be exchanged that would
disadvantage the [DepartmentJ.296
288. "Imputed disqualification" is the principle under which the conflict or
disqualification of one lawyer is deemed to apply to all lawyers practicing together in the
conflicted lawyer's firm. RPC 4-1.10(a) (1993).
289. 724 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
290. Id. at 583.
291. Id.
292. L
293. Id. at 585.
294. Russakoff, 724 So. 2d at 584-85.
295. Supra note 80.
296. Russakoff, 724 So. 2d at 584 (emphasis added). Regarding the issue of
disqualification due to the lawyers' testimony, the opinion correctly recognized that the mere fact
that a lawyer in the firm would testify as a witness would not automatically disqualify the entire
firm, but that any testimony of a firm lawyer that would involve confidential information would
create a disqualifying conflict for entire firm. Id. at 583. See RPC 4-3.7(b), infra note 338 and
accompanying text.
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The opinion's apparent support for the concept of screening to prevent
disqualification of a private law firm297 is unique in Florida. Decisions of
other Florida state and federal courts have declined to permit this practice,
which is not recognized in the RPC.
298
The principle of imputed disqualification becomes more difficult to
apply when lawyers move between law firms. The relatively simple rule of
"one lawyer's conflict is every lawyer's conflict" that ordinarily applies to
all lawyers practicing together in an organization299 is modified somewhat
when lawyers move between employers.300 School Board of Broward
County v. Polera Building Corp.301 concerned a lawyer who had worked on
some matters relating to his law firm's representation of a school board in
various cases.3 2 The lawyer then changed employers; he moved to another
law firm that represented a plaintiff in a suit against the school board.3°3 The
school board moved to disqualify the lawyer's new firm.3 4 Unfortunately
297. Screening is effective to avoid disqualifying conflicts of interest when lawyers move
from government employment to private practice, or vice versa. RPC 4-1.11 (1993).
298. See In re Outdoor Products Corp., 183 B.R. 645 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Birdsall v.
Crowngap, Ltd., 575 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Petrin, 516 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). RPC 4-1.10 contains no provision for
screening.
299. See subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.10, supra note 280.
300. Subdivisions (b) and (c) of RPC 4-1.10, "IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION;
GENERAL RULE," provide:
(b) Former Clients of Newly Associated Lawyer. When a lawyer becomes
associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the
same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with
which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose
interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had
acquired information protected by rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) that is material to
the matter.
(c) Representing Interests Adverse to Clients of Formerly Associated
Lawyer. When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm
is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests
materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated
lawyer unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by rules
4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
Id.
301. 722 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
302. Id. at 972.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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for the lawyer, the new firm reacted by terminating his employment. 30 5 The
trial court denied the motion to disqualify the new firm, based on affidavits
submitted by the parties.306  On petition for writ of certiorari, the court
quashed the order of disqualification because the trial court erred in basing
its decision on affidavits rather than holding an evidentiary hearing.? A
hearing is needed because the imposition of imputed disqualification in a
situation involving lawyers who change employment in the private firm
setting depends in large part on the factual issue of possession of
confidential information. The Polera court concluded that RPC 4-1.10(c)30 1
applies when a law firm responds to a motion to disqualify by terminating
the employment of its lawyer who is alleged to have a conflict.3 9 It then
specified that the trial court must make the factual determinations of whether
the lawyer with the alleged conflict had any confidential information and
whether the new firm gained any confidential information from that lawyer
before he was fired from the firm; a hearing is required for these
determinations.
310
The need for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling
on a disqualification motion was also recognized in Boca Investors Group,
Inc. v. Potash.31 1 The appellate court reversed an order of disqualification,
noting that the nature of the lawyer's meeting with the purported former
312
client was unresolved. This case is also noteworthy because, at least for
disqualification purposes, the court recognized the distinction between aninitial consultation regarding counsel's availability, which would not require
305. Id.
306. Polera Bldg. Corp., 722 So. 2d at 972.
307. Id. at 973. The court relied on Nissan Motor Corp. USA v. Orozco, 595 So. 2d 240
(Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1992).
308. See supra note 300.
309. Polera Bldg. Corp., 722 So. 2d at 973. The court relied on the Nissan case in
reaching this conclusion. Id. It would appear, however, that Nissan reached the wrong result. If,
in the type of factual scenario presented in both cases, the new law firm had not fired the
allegedly conflicted lawyer, the firm would have been governed by the more stringent rule
expressed in RPC 4-1.10(a), rather than the relatively lenient standard of RPC 4-1.19(c). It seems
inappropriate to allow the law firm to benefit by firing a lawyer that it knew or should have
known presented a potential conflict problem when hired. This type of conflict avoidance
strategy typically does not work with respect to current client conflicts. A lawyer or law firm
usually is not permitted to turn a current client into a "former" client through withdrawal and then
claim that it no longer has a conflict problem. See, e.g., Florida Ins. Guaranty Ass'n Inc. v. Carey
Canada, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See also Hilton v. Barnett Banks, Inc., No. 94-
1036-CIV-T-24(A), 1994 WL 776971, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 1994).
310. Pokra Bldg. Corp., 722 So. 2d at 973. These two issues track the requirements of
RPC 4-1.10(c). l
311. 728 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
312. Id.
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disqualification, and a discussion that included disclosure of confidential
information, which would result in the creation of a lawyer-client
relationship and thus require disqualification.3 3
A conflict arising from a lawyer's personal interest can also form the
basis of a motion to disqualify counsel. Lee v. Gadasa Corp.314 concerned
315
mortgage foreclosure litigation that began in 1987. In 1997, a motion was
filed to disqualify defense counsel from the case.3 16 The motion was based
on defense counsel's 1988 action to secure his fee by taking a junior
mortgage on the property that was the subject matter of the foreclosure
litigation. The movant alleged that the lawyer's conduct violated RPC 4-
1.8(i)317 and created a disqualifying conflict of interest. The trial court
granted the motion, but its order was reversed by the First District Court of
318Appeal. The appellate court stated that "the trial court may well have
319been justified in concluding that [the lawyer] had violated" RPC 4-1.8(i).
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the lawyer's "actions may merit
investigation by the Florida Bar," it concluded that disqualification was not
appropriate. 320 The lawyer's client had expressly waived any conflict of
interest3P2 1 and, perhaps most significantly, the movant had waited several
years after learning of the mortgage before filing the motion to disqualify.a2
313. Id.
314. 714 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
315. Id. at 611.
316. Id.
317. Subdivision (i) of RPC 4-1.8, "CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS; PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS," provides:
(i) Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Cause of Action. A lawyer shall not
acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of
litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses;
and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee.
Id.
318. Lee, 714 So. 2d at 612.
319. Id. This issue is one that has been quite controversial and generated a variety of
opinions by the authorities that have considered it. See, e.g., Rubel v. Brimacombe & Schlecte,
P.C., 86 B.R. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Burk v. Burzynski, 672 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1983); Arizona
State Bar Op. 86-11; Connecticut Bar Association Informal Op. 97-4; Georgia State Bar Op. 86-
7; Maine Board of Bar Overseers Op. 97; New Mexico Op. 1986-7; North Carolina State Bar Op.
186; Texas State Bar Op. 449; Virginia State Bar Op. LEO 1653; Bar Association of Nassau
County (N.Y.) 86-3.
320. Lee, 714 So. 2d at 612.
321. The court's opinion did not discuss the fact that RPC 4-1.8(i) contains no provision
for client waiver or consent. Compare subdivision (a) of RPC 4-1.8, supra note 131.
322. Lee, 714 So. 2d at 612.
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This delay led the appellate court to conclude that the movant had "waived
any right it mi'ght have otherwise had to seek [the lawyer's]
disqualification.
' '2-
Lawyers must be aware that the non-lawyers they employ can create
disqualification risks. An important case in this area was Koulisis v.
Rivers.324 A secretary working on a case for the defendant's law firn had
access to confidential and privileged information in the firm's files, attended
meetings at which the case was discussed, spoke with the client during
pendency of the suit, and so forth.325 During the litigation, the secretary left
the defense firm and began working for the plaintiff's firm. The plaintiffs
firm completely screened the secretary from the case.326 The trial court
denied the defendant's motion to disqualify the plaintiff's firm, concluding
that the firm had taken sufficient steps "to insure that there [was] no
impropriety. 327 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, applying the
same conflict rule that would apply if a lawyer had switched sides-Rule 4-
1.10(b). 328 In refusing to recognize any distinction between lawyers and
non-lawyers in this type of situation, the court went further than any of the
other Florida authorities that have addressed this issue.329
The court flatly stated that "[the secretary]'s desertion was akin to a
lawyer switching to an opposing firm in the middle of a lawsuit." 330  The
court noted that the secretary had access to confidential information while
employed by the defense firm and that she then began to work for the law
firm on the other side of same suit. In the court's opinion, nothing more was
required to support the disqualification of the hiring firm.331 The screening
procedures employed by the hiring firm did not save it from disqualification;
screening of lawyers is not recognized by RPC 4-1.10(b) and so was not
323. Id. Other Florida cases have reached similar conclusions concerning delay as
waiver. See, e.g., Concerned Parents of Jordan Park v. Housing Auth., 934 F. Supp. 406 (M.D.
Fla. 1996); Transmark, U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 631 So. 2d 1112 (Flalst Dist. Ct. App.); Balda v.
Sorchych, 616 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1993); Birdsall v. Crowngap, Ltd., 575 So. 2d
231 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
324. 730 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
325. Id. at 291.
326. Id.
327. lL
328. Id. at 293.
329. See City of Apopka v. All Comers, Inc., 701 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App.
1997); Esquire Care, Inc. v. Maguire, 532 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1988); Lackow v.
Walter E. Heller & Co., 466 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1985); Florida Bar Professional
Ethics Committee Op. 86-5 (1986). See also Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Buenaagua, 685
So. 2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1996); Tuazon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 641 So. 2d 417
(Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1994).
330. Koulisis, 730 So. 2d at 291.
331. Id. at 292.
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available to the non-lawyer employee under the view taken by the court.
Furthermore, the court rejected the idea that an evidentiary showing of unfair
advantage was necessary because it simply applied RPC 4-1.10(b), unlike
other cases that have required such a showing before ordering
332disqualification as a result of a non-lawyer's move between law firms.
An interesting aspect of the issue of non-lawyers and disqualification
from litigation was brought out in Caridi v. Inorganic Recycling Corp.333 A
corporation hired a person who used to be a lawyer, who was no longer
admitted to the bar of any state, to perform a "legal audit" of the
corporation.334 At the time, the corporation's principals believed that the
person was licensed to practice law and had given him information that
could be considered privileged under Florida law.335 Later, a dispute arose
among the corporation's principals. One side's counsel hired the ex-lawyer
to assist in the litigation. Consequently, that counsel was disqualified
because his client reasonably believed that he was a lawyer, and because of
the access to confidential information regarding the opposing side that was
enjoyed by the ex-lawyer as a result of his performance of the legal audit.336
The RPC3 37 recognize that it may be unethical for a lawyer to act as
both advocate and witness for a client in a matter.338 Violation of RPC 4-3.7
332. See All Comers, 701 So. 2d at 642; Esquire Care, Inc., 532 So. 2d at 740. The
Koulisis court certified conflict with these cases. 730 So. 2d at 293.
333. 715 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
334. Id. at 1072.
335. The Florida attorney-client privilege is codified in FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1997).
336. Caridi, 715 So. 2d at 1073.
337. Regarding the underlying rationale of RPC 4-3.7, see Scott v. State, 717 So. 2d 908
(Fla. 1998); Mansur v. Drage, 484 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
338. RPC 4-3.7, "LAWYER AS WITNESS," provides:
(a) When Lawyer May Testify. A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client
except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is
no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to
the testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
(4) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on
the client.
(b) Other Members of Law Firm as Witnesses. A lawyer may act as
advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be
called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 4-1.7 or 4-1.9
[concerning conflicts of interest].
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can lead to disqualification from litigation for the lawyer 39 and, in some
situations, the lawyer's firm.340 In Singer Island, Ltd. v. Budget
Construction Co.,341 the appellate court upheld a trial court's denial of a
motion to disqualify. The court emphasized the seriousness of
disqualification and its view that motions to disqualify based on allegations
that a party's lawyer will also be a witness should be regarded "with some
skepticism, because they sometimes are filed for tactical or harassing
reasons, rather than the proper reason, [RPC] 4-37.342 Courts have
disqualified lawyers and law firms on the ground of improper
communications with represented persons. 343 In this case, the trial court
correctly denied the motion to disqualify because, at the time the motion was
filed, the movant had alleged "only a possibility that disqualification might
be necessary," rather than waiting to file the motion after developing more of
a record to support the allegations that the subject lawyer would testify as a
witness.
344
Although disqualification motions are often interposed due to alleged
conflicts of interest, other ethical transgressions may form the basis of such
motions. In Pinebrook Towne House Associations, v. C.E. O'Dell &
Associates, Inc.,s45 an engineer met with a company's lawyers concerning the
company's potential claims against him. When litigation ensued, the
engineer retained a lawyer who asserted that disqualification was warranted
due to this allegedly improper communication.346 The trial court granted the
engineer's motion to disqualify the lawyers but on review the Second
District Court of Appeal quashed the order.347 The engineer knew that the
339. See, e.g., Larkin v. Pirthauer, 700 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1997);
Fleitman v. McPherson, 691 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL. App. 1997).
340. See, e.g., Springtree Country Club Plaza, Ltd. v. Blaut, 642 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th Dist.
CL App. 1994).
341. 714 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1998).
342. Ud at 652.
343. See, e.g., Rentclub v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla.
1992). See also Inorganic Coatings Inc. v. Falberg, 926 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1995);
Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Cronin v. Nevada
Dist. Court, 720 P.2d 1150 (Nev. 1989). In the instant case, the allegedly improper
communications were with an unrepresented person.
344. Singer Island, 714 So. 2d at 652.
345. 725 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
346. The movant apparently urged disqualification based on RPC 4-1.7, the general
conflict of interest rule, supra note 120, but the crux of the allegations seemed to concern the
communication issue rather than any conflict allegations. Perhaps the movants focused on this
language in the Comment to RPC 4-1.7 that states: "[w]here the conflict is such as clearly to call
in question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the
question." RPC 4-1.7 comment (1993).
347. Pinebrook Towne House Ass'ns, 725 So. 2d at 433-34.
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lawyers represented the opposing party, no documents provided to the
attorneys were confidential, and it was "undisputed that [the engineer] was
aware that these attorneys represented" the company, meaning that there was
no violation of RPC 4-4.3.348 The appellate court refused the engineer's
invitation to "craft a rule, similar to Miranda warnings, which would require
putting a potential defendant in a civil case on notice that anything he says
will be used against him."
349
A final case of interest in the disqualification arena dealt with the
authorization of an out-of-state lawyer to appear in a Florida court pro hac
vice.35 0  In Srour v. Srour,35 1 the out-of-state lawyer was admitted as co-
counsel with a Florida law firm. The opposing party moved to disqualify the
lawyer on the grounds of alleged failure to comply with section 2.060(b) of
the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration.s3 2 The district court withdrew
its grant of pro hac vice admittance not on this ground, however, but because
348. Id. RPC 4-4.3, "DEALING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSONS," provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
Id. Courts have disqualified lawyers and law firms on the ground of improper
communications with represented persons. See e.g., Rentclub v. Transamerican Rental Fin.
Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992); see also Inorganic Coatings, Inc. v. Falberg, 926 F.
Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Cronin v. Nevada Dist. Court, 720 P.2d 1150 (Nev. 1989). In the instant
case, the allegedly improper communications were with an unrepresented person. Pinebrook
TowneHouseAss'ns, 725 So. 2d at 433.
349. Pinebrook Towne House Ass'ns., 725 So. 2d at 433.
350. BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 1212 (6th ed. 1999) defines "pro hac vice" as: "For this
turn; for this one particular occasion. For example, an out-of-state lawyer may be admitted to
practice in a local jurisdiction for a particular case only." Id.
351. 733 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
352. Subdivision (b) of FLA. R. JuD. ADMN. 2.060 provides:
(b) Foreign Attorneys. Attorneys of other states shall not engage in a
general practice in Florida unless they are members of The Florida Bar in
good standing. Upon verified motion filed with a court showing that an
attorney is an active member in good standing of the bar of another state,
attorneys of other states may be permitted to appear in particular cases in a
Florida court. A motion for permission to appear shall be submitted with or
before the attorney's initial personal appearance, paper, motion, or pleading.
The motion shall state all jurisdictions in which the attorney is an active
member in good standing of the bar and shall state the number of cases in
which the attorney has filed a motion for permission to appear in Florida in
the preceding three years.
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the lawyer was a family member of one of the litigants.5 3 The appellate
court ruled that this decision was an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
"Although there is considerable discretion of the trial court in reference to
admitting lawyers to pro hac vice practice, the decision should not be
arbitrary. There is no prohibition against a lawyer representing himself, let
alone a family member.
354
As officers of the court, lawyers have an obligation not to impair the
fairness of proceedings in which they are involved by making prejudicial
extra judicial statements. 355 This duty is embodied in RPC 4-3.6, which
precludes a lawyer from making a public, out-of-court statement that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know "will have a substantial likelihood
of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. 356  Of course,
restrictions on a lawyer's right to speak publicly must be carefully
scrutinized in light of the First Amendment. 357 The United States Supreme
Court has held that the standard expressed in RPC 4-3.6 permissibly
balances the lawyer's free speech rights and the state's interest in providing
fair trials.Y A trial court that imposes restrictions or "gag orders" on
lawyers' rights to publicly comment on pending proceedings should do so
only after finding that such action is necessary to ensure a fair trial, and
narrowly tailoring the prohibition to bar only those statements that are
substantially likely to materially prejudice the trial.359  The court in
Rodriguez v. Feinstein360 did not make such findings to support its protective
order restricting the extra judicial statements of lawyers in a medical
malpractice case, and the order was quashed by the appellate court.
353. Srour, 733 So. 2d at 593.
354. Id.
355. RPC4-3.6 (1993).
356. RPC 4-3.6, 'TRIAL PUBLICITY," provides:
(a) Prejudicial Extrajudicial Statements Prohibited. A lawyer shall not
make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding due to its creation of an imminent and
substantial detrimental effect on that proceeding.
(b) Statements of Third Parties. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist
another person to make such a statement. Counsel shall exercise reasonable
care to prevent investigators, employees, or other persons assisting in or
associated with a case from making extrajudicial statements that are
prohibited under this rule.
Id.
357. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
358. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
359. Rodriguez v. Feinstein, 734 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
360. Id.
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A lawyer owes strict duties of candor toward the court before which he
or she practices, and is also obligated not to engage in misconduct that
would affect the outcome of the proceedings. Making false representations
to a court is one of the most serious professional offenses that a lawyer can
361 362commit. In Florida Bar v. Klausner, a lawyer who engaged in such
conduct was suspended from the practice of law for three years.363 In its
opinion, the supreme court indicated that, but for the referee's
recommendation of a suspension rather than disbarment, the lawyer would
have been disbarred.3 4
Lying to a court can also result in civil sanctions. A lawyer, found
guilty of such misconduct, was ordered to pay the attorney's fees that the
opposing party incurred due to the lawyer's failure to appear at a scheduled
deposition in Lathe v. Florida Select Citrus, Inc.365 In trying to excuse his
conduct, the lawyer falsely stated to the court that he had been ordered to
appear before another judge at the time in question. The lawyer then sought
a writ of certiorari to quash the court's prior order requiring him to pay the
opposing party's legal fees. Denying the writ, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal stated that "[i]t takes chutzpah to admit to lying to a court and yet
still seek review of an order imposing sanctions."
366
The courts condemed other forms of misrepresentation during the past
year. In Leyva v. Samess,367 an auto accident case, the plaintiffs' lawyer
violated an order in limine by referring to a defendant by his title of
"doctor."368 Plaintiffs' brief on appeal contained what the appellate court
characterized as "a gross misrepresentation" of the order in limine.3 69 The
court went on to issue this admonition to other lawyers who might appear
before it: "Attorneys should be aware that in this court's preparation for
determining cases on the merits, the record on appeal is thoroughly
reviewed. We cannot help but notice attorneys' distortions of the record in
their briefs. Such misrepresentations diminish the force and effect of the
argument made. 37°
361. See, e.g., The Florida Bar v. Rightmyer, 616 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1993); The Florida Bar
v. Dodd, 118 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1960).
362. 721 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1998).
363. Id. at 722.
364. Id. (Pariente, J., concurring with Wells, J., dissent urging disbarment).
365. 721 So. 2d 1247, 1247 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
366. Id.
367. 732 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
368. Id. at 1120.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1121.
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Another case in which a party's argument on appeal was criticized for a
lack of candor was Builder's Square, Inc. v. Shaw.371 The appellant's
counsel presented a number of contentions, some of which the court
described with terms such as "specious" and "disingenuous. 372  In an
attempt to reinforce the need for professionalism among lawyers, the court
sternly warned:
The fact that [appellant] has some legitimate issues to be
presented to this court does not give it license to add
specious ones. Nor does it give it the right to distort facts
and erroneously present a judge's statement. Perhaps the
only way to eliminate such issues is to refuse to respond to
all issues presented by the party at fault. The Appellant's
attorney, who appeared before the trial court, has an
otherwise well-respected reputation. We are hesitant to
single him out because he is not alone in presenting the
problems we have present. We do, however, remind all
counsel that they have a duty to the Bar and their profession,
as well as to their clients. We must begin to reevaluate how
many "bites of an apple" we, as an appellate court, are
willing to recognize, and we will not hesitate in the future to
sanction those that engage in the conduct this court has
faced in this cause.
In Rampart Life Associates, Inc. v. Turkish,374 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal again had the opportunity (or misfortune) to address misconduct
on the part of appellate counsel. The appellant appealed a non-final order
denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 376 While the
case was on appeal, appellant's lawyer moved to supplement the record with
a deposition taken after entry of the order being appealed. 377 The appellate
court denied the motion.378 Despite this, the lawyer included in her brief
information from the subject deposition (the information was placed in a
footnote). 379  The court struck the offending footnote and imposed a
371. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D653 (4th Dist. CL App. Mar. 10, 1999).
372. Iad at D653.
373. Id at D654.
374. 730 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
375. Id. at 385.
376. Id. at 384.
377. Id. at 385.
378. Id.
379. Turkish, 730 So. 2d at 385.
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monetary sanction on the lawyer, stating that her action had violated two
ethical rules, 8 0 RPC 4-3.5(a), and RPC 4-3.4(c).382
Lawyers are not the only professionals who have ethical obligations inthe coutroom.Sparks383• ,• .
the courtroom. Sparks v. State concerned a judge's duty to maintain
impartiality. 384 During a bench conference in a criminal case, the judge
pointed out the fact that the defendant had completed an affidavit of
indigence containing information that might have conflicted with his trial
testimony.385 The prosecutor then cross-examined the defendant, using the
386information the judge alluded. The affidavit was introduced into evidence
387
over a non-specific objection of defense counsel. Thus, the issue of the
partiality of the trial judge was raised for the first time on appeal. The
appeals court ruled that this issue constituted fundamental error that could
38838not be considered harmless. 8 The conviction was reversed.389
Tampering with witnesses is considered serious misconduct on the part
of a lawyer, and is prohibited by RPC 4-34(b). 9° The United States
380. Id.
381. Subdivision (a) of RPC 4-3.5, "IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE
TRIBUNAL," provides: "(a) Influencing Decision Maker. A lawyer shall not seek to
influence a judge, juror, prospective juror, or other decision maker except as permitted by law
or the rules of court." Id.
382. Subdivision (c) of RPC 4-3.4, "FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND
COUNSEL," provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules
of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists."
Id.
383. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D829 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1999).
384. Id. at D829.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Sparks, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D830.
389. Id. A dissenting opinion agreed with the majority that it is improper for a trial judge
to assume the role of advocate, but disagreed that the judge had crossed that line in this case.
Rather, the dissenting justice viewed the trial judge's conduct as a reasonable exercise of
judgment in addressing a case of perjury that arose during the trial. Id. at D831 (Padovano, J.,
dissenting).
390. Subdivision (b) of RPC 4-3.4, "FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND
COUNSEL," provides:
A lawyer shall not:
(b) fabricate evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness, except a lawyer may pay a witness reasonable
expenses incurred by the witness in attending or testifying at proceedings; a
reasonable, noncontingent fee for professional services of an expert witness;
and reasonable compensation to reimburse a witness for the loss of compen-
sation incurred by reason of preparing for, attending, or testifying at proceed-
ings.
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Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an interesting application of
this rule in United States v. Lowery.391 The defendants in separate criminal
cases moved to suppress testimony of their alleged co-conspirators that had
been obtained by the prosecution as a result of plea bargains. 92 They argued
that the plea agreements violated federal law against bribing witnesses393and
Florida ethics rule RPC 4-3.4(b),394 which prohibits a lawyer (in this case
the government prosecutor) from "offer[ing] an inducement to a witness.'051
Based on the reasoning in United States v. Singleton396 concerning the legal
issue and on the language of RPC 4-3.4(b) concerning the ethical issue, the
trial court granted the motion to suppress. 398
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Regarding the RPC 4-
3.4(b) question, the court noted that "[it is far from clear that Rule 4-3.4 9_
prohibits conduct leading to the type of agreements at issue in this case."
The court, however, did not decide the case on that ground. Rather, it ruled
that "a state rule of professional conduct cannot provide an adequate basis
for a federal court to suppress evidence that is otherwise admissible."
400
A civil case involving conduct that the appellate court described as
"witness tampering" was Jost v. Ahmad.4° A treating physician, who was a
testifying witness for the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case, was
contacted on the day he testified by the defendant hospital's insurance
carrier.402 Allegations were made that the contact was made with the
knowledge of defense counsel.4°3 The trial court declined to permit the
plaintiff's lawyer to investigate the matter and bring the existence of this
contact before the jury.404 This ruling was error, and the appellate court
reversed the jury's verdict for the defense and remanded the case for a new
trial.4
5
Id. (emphasis added).
391. 166 F.3d 1119 (11thCir. 1999).
392. Id. at 1119.
393. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1994).
394. RPC 4-3.4(b) (1993).
395. ld.
396. 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), reviewed en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
397. Lowery, 166 F.3d at 1121.
398. Id. at 1125.
399. Id. at 1124.
400. Id.
401. 730 So. 2d 708,710 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
402. Id. at 709.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 710.
405. Id. at 711.
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Other types of trial conduct involving lawyers were criticized in
reported decisions. In Harley v. Lopez,4°6 a lawyer represented personal
injury claimants who sued a county and lost at both trial and on appeal. 407
The county's motion for appellate fees and costs was denied by the trial
,, 408court for "failure to present expert testimony. The claimants' lawyer
objected to the county's expert affidavits for the first time at fees/costs
hearing.4Q 9 The county's motion for a continuance to allow it to produce its
expert was denied.410 Reversing the award, the Third District Court of
Appeal stated that "we believe that affirming the trial court's denial of
appellate fees in this instance would reward [the lawyer]'s 'gotcha' tactics,
tactics long abhorred by this court. 411
In Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc. ,42 a lawyer who filed a
meritless motion for rehearing, which ap Peared to be filed "solely as a tool
to express his personal displeasure" with the court's per curiam
affirmance, was deemed to have violated Rule 9.330(a) of the Florida Rules
of Appellate Procedure.414 The court denied rehearing, then referred the
lawyer to the Florida Bar by directing the court clerk to provide the Bar with
a copy of the court's opinion.415 Additionally, the court ordered the lawyer
416to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. After considering
the lawyer's response, the court imposed a monetary sanction of $2500.
4 17
A lawyer's motion to disqualify a judge can also create ethical
concerns. The Second District Court of Appeal expressed its displeasure
about the contents of certain motions in J & J Industries, Inc. v. Carpet
Showcase of Tampa Bay, Inc. 41  The court served notice that it expectscandor and ethical behavior on the part of lawyers who file such motions:
While it is not our role in reaching a decision-nor has it
been in this instance-to pass on the truth of the various
allegations counsel for [petitioner] has pleaded, we point out
406. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D878 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1999).
407. Id. at D878.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Harley, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D878.
412. 716 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1998).
413. Id. at 876.
414. Id.
415. The court stated that it was referring the lawyer to the Bar "pursuant to the
mandatory language contained in 5-H Corp. v. Padovano." Id. at 877 (internal citation omitted).
416. Id.
417. Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc., 718 So. 2d 376, 377 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
418. 723 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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this misleading and ethically suspicious excerpt from its
motion in the hope that counsel's reliance on disingenuous
accusations during proceedings to disqualify trial judges-
themselves largely insulated from inspection of their
reliability-will not always be shielded from public
scrutiny. 
19
Similarly, lawyers who behave inappropriately toward each other in the
context of litigation may suffer criticism from the bench. In Baitty v.
Weaver,420 a lawyer appealed an order directing her to pay fees and costs of
more than $76,000 to opposing counsel.421 The order was premised on the
trial court's finding that the lawyer misrepresented the truth to a Florida
court.4 The appellate court reversex. "he order, concluding that the record
did not support this finding.4 3 In dissenting, one justice added a "personal
observation" to the effect that lawyers s.ould think very carefully before
engaging in bitter litigation such as this based on alleged misstatements of
other lawyers.424 He noted that, while judges should not take lightly a
finding that a lawyer has lied to a court, "the image of lawyers calling one
another liars raises its own set of problems."
425
In the criminal defense arena, a criminal prosecutor's conduct was
considered questionable enough to warrant a referral to the Florida Bar for
investigation. 426 In Lewis v. State,427 the prosecution withheld material that
should have been turned over to defense counsel pursuant to Brady v.
Maryland.42s Noting that the trial court made no findings concerning
whether the failure to turn over the material was intentional or unintentional,
thi appeals court pointed out that an intentional withholding would violate
RPC 4-3.8(c), 429 which concerns the ethical duties of prosecutors, and turned
the matter over to the Florida Bar. 3°
419. Il at 284.
420. 734 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 585.
424. Id. at 586.
425. Baitty, 734 So. 2d at 586 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
426. Lewis v. State, 714 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
427. Id. at 1202.
428. 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963).
429. Subdivision (c) of RPC 4-3.8, "SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A
PROSECUTOR," provides:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(c) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
"mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the
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Another prosecutor's conduct was criticized in Dunstall v. State.431 A
defendant's conviction of sexual battery was reversed and remanded for a
new trial as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. 432 A certain writing was
referred to by defense counsel, and the state objected.433 At the ensuing
bench conference, defense counsel stated that he did not intend to try to
introduce the writing itself into evidence.434 The court ruled the writing
inadmissible. 435 Despite this ruling, the prosecuting attorney asked a witness
to produce the writing and, "incredibly enough, then proceeded to object
when the witness complied. 436  Based on this objection, the trial court
"erroneously struck the exculpatory testimony of the witness."437  A
concurring opinion termed the prosecutor's actions "unprofessional" and
commented that "she followed neither her oath of office438 nor the ideals and
goals of professionalism 439 of the Florida Bar."440
Every year numerous cases are decided on improper argument, and this
year presents a dizzying array, which ranges from reversal, despite a failure
to contemporaneously object and preserve the issue for appeal, to a "bright
line" decision, never to reverse without proper preservation of the issue at
trial. Although courts frequently find argument to be improper under the
RPC,44' courts have been reluctant to reverse a case without preservation of
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to
the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by
a protective order of the tribunal.
Id.
430. Lewis, 714 So. 2d at 1203. The conviction was not reversed because the information
that was withheld "did not have the probability of changing the outcome of [the] trial." Id.
431. 730 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
432. Id. at 822.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Dunstall, 730 So. 2d at 822.
437. Id.
438. Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, 72 FLA. B.J. 781 (Sept. 1998).
439. Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, 72 FLA. B.J. 779-80. (Sept. 1998).
440. Dunstall, 730 So. 2d at 823 (Thompson, J., concurring).
441. Most frequently, courts find a violation of RPC 4-3.4(e), "FAIRNESS TO
OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL," which provides that:
A lawyer shall not:
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
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the record by contemporaneous objection. The courts have, however,
continued their recent trend to comment on the inappropriateness of
attorneys' comments, apparently in the hope that pointing out these errors
will deter attorneys from making them.442
Thus, the Second District Court of Appeal refused to reverse the
conviction of a defendant despite the improper argument of the prosecutor.
443
The court, however, specifically stated that "our affirmance should not be
construed as approval of the remarks made by the prosecutor."444 The court
found that the state attorney improperly "vouched for the truthfulness of the
officers, told the jury to send [the defendant] a message, argued matters not
in evidence, and commented on [the defendant's] exercise of his right to a
jury trial.""445  Judge Alternbernd, in a concurring opinion, opined that
attorneys who practice criminal law should be required to review continuing
legal educations videotapes on improper arguments.
446
The Second District Court of Appeal also affirmed a conviction while
findingz that the prosecutor made an improper closing in Henderson v.
State.447 The court found that the prosecutor's remarks improperly shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant and expressed personal opinions about
the defendant's honesty.448  The prosecutor stated in closing that the
defendant "would not know the truth if it hit him up side the head" and
stated that the jury should find the defendant not guilty if the jury
"believe[d] what [the defendant] said on the witness stand," among other
improper remarks.4
49
The Fifth District Court of Appeal took a bright line approach to
improper argument, in stating that the court will not reverse cases if the error
is not preserved by contemporaneous objection, finding that lawyers have
failed to object as a tactical weapon.450 The court concluded that comments
by a plaintiff s attorney were improper because they "request[ed] the jury to
act as the conscience of the community and accus[ed] [the defendant], his
attorney, and his witnesses of committing perjury. 4  Nevertheless, the
442. E.g., id.
443. Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. This approach to prosecutorial misconduct was reiterated in Dunsizer v. State,
1999 WL 94970, at *1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1999), in which the court found that the
prosecutor argued facts not in evidence, stating that "[a]lthough it is proper for prosecutors to
argue inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence... they have no license to
argue fiction." Id.
447. 727 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999).
448. Id. at 285-286.
449. Id.
450. Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
451. Id. at 1034.
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court also suggested that attorneys fail to object as a tactical weapon, hoping
to gain a verdict in their favor, while believing that the appellate courts
would reverse the case based on improper argument if not.4 2 The court
further noted that attorneys are subject to discipline by the Florida Bar for
misconduct, and that courts and other attorneys have an obligation to report
such misconduct. 453 Two judges dissented, stating that the appellate courts
had just removed themselves from the fray of curbing attorney excesses in
argument, 454 and stating that prior courts were "content to uphold the honor
of its court and the integrity of the judicial process by merely denying the
unethical lawyer the benefit of his misconduct ' 45 5 in reversing cases for
improper comments.
The Supreme Court of Florida, on the other hand, does not share the
Fifth District's "bright line" rule and has been willing to reverse cases
without contemporaneous objection. In a scathing opinion, the Supreme
Court of Florida reversed a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct in a
death penalty case, finding that the argument constituted fundamental error
in Ruiz v. State.456 The court blasted a series of improper arguments by the
prosecutors in this case, stating that "[i]t is particularly improper, even
pernicious, for the prosecutor to seek to invoke his personal status as the
government's attorney or the sanction of the government itself as a basis for
conviction of a criminal defendant. 457 The court thus found improper the
prosecutor's statements, such as "what interest do we [ ] as representatives
of the citizens of this county have in convicting somebody other than the
person''458 and "what interest is there to bamboozle anybody about [the
defendant's] real role in this case, 4 5 9 implying that "[i]f the defendant
wasn't guilty, he wouldn't be here."460 The prosecutors in this case referred
to the defendant as "Pinocchio" 46' and then stated that "[t]ruth equals• ,,462 *,,n 6iv
justice. The court found that such argument invit[es] the jury to convict
[the defendant] ... because he is a liar." If these statements were not bad
452. Id. at 1035. Another case which chided attorneys for failing to object, in the hopes
of gaining a tactical advantage, is Simmons v. Swinton, 715 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
453. Fravel, 727 So. 2d at 1036.
454. See id. at 1040.
455. Id. at 1042.
456. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S157 (Apr. 1, 1999). Apparently, although the defense objected
to some of the prosecutor's remarks, it did not object to all of them. Id. at S 157.
457. Id.
458. Id. at S158.
459. Id.
460. Ruiz, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S158.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id. at S158.
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enough, one of the prosecutors also improperly sought to appeal to the
juror's personal sympathies by mentioning her father's role in the military
during Desert Storm. In response to the State's argument that many of the
comments were not the subject of contemporaneous objection, the court
stated that "[w]hen the properly preserved comments are combined with
additional acts of prosecutorial overreaching set forth below, we find that the
integrity of the judicial process has been comromised and the resulting
convictions and sentences irreparably tainted." 465" The court then referred the
prosecutors to the Florida Bar for possible disciplinary action.4
Many of the lower courts have followed the supreme court's example in
reversing cases for improper argument without objection. In Freeman v.
State,467 the Fifth District Court of Appeal, prior to its "bright line" ruling,
reversed a conviction after the prosecutor improperly bolstered the
credibility of its police witnesses by stating that the police should be
468believed merely because they are police officers. A prosecutor's personal
attack on the defense attorney was also the basis of a reversal in D'ambrosio
v. State.469  The Third District Court of Appeal appeared particularly
incensed with the statements of a prosecutor whose improper remarks were
before the court for the third time in Izquierdo v. State.47° Continuing a
trend, the court referred the attorney to the Florida Bar for investigation after
finding that "the improprieties committed by [the prosecutor] ... are both
breathtaking in their number, variety, and gravity and perhaps unprecedented
even in our long and dreary experience with this problem."471 The court
found that he improperly called the defense a "pathetic fantasy"47 - and
464. Id. at S158. The court stated the following about these remarks:
This blatant appeal to jurors' emotions was improper for a number of reasons:
it personalized the prosecutor in the eyes of the jury and gained sympathy for
the prosecutor and her family; it contrasted the defendant (who at that point
had been convicted of murder) unfavorably with [the prosecutor]'s heroic and
dutiful father, it put before the jury new evidence highly favorable to the
prosecutor, it exempted this new evidence from admissibility requirements
and from the crucible of cross-examination; and most important, it equated
[the prosecutor]'s father's noble sacrifice for his country with the jury's moral
duty to sentence Ruiz to death.
Rui 24 Fla. L. Weekly at 5158-59.
465. Id. at 5159.
466. Id.
467. 717 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
468. Id. at 105.
469. 736 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999); see also, Boyer v. State, 713 So. 2d
1133 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1998).
470. 724 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
471. Id. at 125.
472. Id.
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"improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy and emotions as, for example,
by asking it to consider the effects a crime such as this has on 'the water we
drink, the air we breathe, the ground our children play on."' 473 The court
then invited the trial court to consider dismissing the case for prosecutorial
misconduct after the reversal and remand.474
In Nigro v. Brady,475 the Fourth District Court of Appeal found that
preservation of the error by requesting a mistrial is not required in a motion
for new trial, even if the comments do not rise to the level of fundamental
error.476 The court found that the defense attorney badgered the witness by
asking questions to obtain inadmissible evidence. The court found that a
trial court has "broad discretion to set aside a jury verdict and grant a new
478trial," based on the improper comments even sua sponte. The court also
remarked on the deterrent effect such a ruling may have on attorneys who act
improperly. 479
A trial court can avoid reversal by properly admonishing a jury
regarding inappropriate remarks. Thus, the trial court who sustained an
objection for improper argument, admonished the prosecutor and gave a
curative instruction to the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks was
upheld in Sinclair v. State.us  The prosecutor in closing argument
improperly indicated that a police officer should be relied on because "the
officer would not put his or her career on the line by committing perjury." 48'
The court wrote specifically to reprimand the prosecutor, stating that "[i]t ill
becomes those who represent the state in the application of its lawful
penalties to themselves ignore the precepts of their profession and their
office." 4 2 Similarly, the supreme court found no error in a matter in which
the trial court gave a curative instruction to the jury when the prosecutor
called the defendant an "amoral, vicious, cold-blooded killer.' '483  In
concurring, Justice Pariente specifically pointed out several improper
remarks of the prosecutor to "send a message to the community" in stating
that a jury recommendation for life for a deaf defendant is "an insult to all
who have achieved greatness and lived law abiding and productive lives in
473. Id. at 125-126.
474. Id. at 126.
475. 731 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
476. Id. at 54.
477. Id. at 55.
478. Id. at 56.
479. Id.
480. 717 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
481. Id. at 100.
482. Id. at 101.
483. Hawk v. State, 718 So. 2d 159, 162 (Fla. 1998).
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spite of the same handicap."484  She also stated that the prosecutor's
statements, that mitigation evidence is "pathetic excuses," were "clearly
improper."
485
Failure to handle an objection properly, however, will result in reversal,
as evidenced by the case of Barnes v. State. 4 6 The prosecutor referred to
defense counsel as a "hired gun," 4V prompting the defense attorney to ask
that the remarks be stricken; the trial court responded by telling the jury to
"[i]gnore the last comment. ' 488 The appellate court pointed out that the
instruction was "quite ambiguous" because it could be referring to the
defense attorney's request that the remarks be stricken. 489 The appellate
court also stated that the trial court should specifically reprimand the
prosecutor and give a clear curative instruction, stating that "[f]or a curative
instruction conceivably to erase the palpable prejudice to the defendant in
this situation, the court should have condemned the comment in the clearest
and most unmistakable terms.,,490 Finally, the court referred the prosecutor
to the Florida Bar for investigation of improper conduct, noting that the
prosecutor had "persisted in this improper conduct for more than five. years
in spite of repeated disapproval of it by our court. 491
Other cases involving reversal include one in which the prosecutor
improperly referred to matters not in evidence in Jones v. State.492  A
prosecutor was also reprimanded for bolstering his expert witness by
inappropriately asking if the defense attorney had attempted to hire the same
493
expert in Milburn v. State. A reversal was also required where a
prosecutor attempted to introduce evidence of other crimes in violation of a
pre-trial ruling, and referred to those other crimes in closing argument.494
Based on a finding that "truth is a defense," the appellate court found
that no improper remarks had been uttered by the plaintiff's counsel who
stated that the opening statement of the defendant's attorney was "the most
unethical opening statement I have ever heard. 495 The court found that the
plaintiffs attorney had stated the truth, in finding that "[b]y calling the
484. Id. at 164.
485. Id. at 165.
486. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D458 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1999).
487. Id. at D459.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id. at D459.
491. Barnes, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D458.
492. 730 So. 2d 346 (Fa 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
493. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D851 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1999), withdrawn and
superceded on other grounds, 24 Fla. Weekly D1936 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1999).
494. Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1998).
495. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. McKenna, 726 So. 2d 361,363 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
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defendant's argument 'unethical,' plaintiff's lawyer was simply defending
himself and his client's case against a barrage of blatant improprieties by his
opponent. His comment was an accurate description of defense counsel's
tirade. ,
496
IV. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THIRD PARTIES
Most of the duties owed by a lawyer are to the client, including duties
such as competence, 497  diligence,498 confidentiality, 499 and loyalty.:5
Lawyers also owe special fiduciary obligations to clients regarding their
501property. Under some circumstances, lawyers also owe fiduciary
obligations to third parties regarding funds or property? °2  Thus, the
496. Id.
497. RPC4-1.1 (1993).
498. Id. at R. 4-1.3.
499. Id. at R. 4-1.6.
500. Id. at R. 4-1.7-1.12.
501. RPC 4-1.15, the safekeeping property rule, and Chapter five on trust accounting, set
forth the obligations of a lawyer toward client funds.
502. RPC 4-1.15 "SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY," states the following:
(a) Clients' and Third Party Funds to be Held in Trust. A lawyer shall
hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, funds and property of
clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a
representation. All funds, including advances for costs and expenses, shall be
kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is
situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person, provided
that funds may be separately held and maintained other than in a bank
account if the lawyer receives written permission from the client to do so and
provided that such written permission is received prior to maintaining the
funds other than in a separate bank account. In no event may the lawyer
commingle the client's funds with those of the lawyer or those of the lawyer's
law firm. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately
safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property,
including client funds not maintained in a separate bank account, shall be
kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of 6 years after
termination of the representation.
(b) Notice of Receipt of Trust Funds; Delivery; Accounting. Upon
receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an
interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as
stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds
or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon
request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting
regarding such property.
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(c) Disputed Ownership of Funds. When in the course of representation a
lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another
person claim interests, the property shall be treated by the lawyer as trust
property, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be
withdrawn within a reasonable time after it becomes due unless the right of
the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed, in which event the portion in
dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
(d) Compliance With Trust Accounting Rules. A lawyer shall comply with
The Florida Bar Rules Regulating Trust Accounts.
Id. RPC 4-1.15 Comment:
A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a
professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except
when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances.
All property that is the property of clients or third persons should be kept
separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if money, in 1
or more trust accounts, unless requested otherwise in writing by the client.
Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate money or
acting in similar fiduciary capacities.
Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's
fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without
paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the
fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client
into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds
should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt
resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the
funds shall be promptly distributed.
Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against
funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty
under applicable law to protect such third party claims against wrongful
interference by the client and, accordingly, may refuse to surrender the
property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to
arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party and where
appropriate the lawyer should consider the possibility of depositing the
property or funds in dispute into the registry of the applicable court so that
the matter may be adjudicated.
The obligations of a lawyer under this rule are independent of those
arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a
lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law
relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in
the transaction.
Subdivision (d) of this rule requires each lawyer to be familiar with and
comply with Rules Regulating Trust Accounts as adopted by The Florida Bar.
Money or other property entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose,
including advances for costs and expenses, is held in trust and must be
applied only to that purpose. Money and other property of clients coming
into the hands of a lawyer are not subject to counterclaim or setoff for
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Supreme Court of Florida disciplined an attorney for engaging in fraud and
misrepresentation by signing checks payable to his client and third-party
medical providers, depositing the funds into his trust account, failing to
advise the third party that he received a settlement check on its behalf, and
failing togay the third party the money owed in settlement in Florida Bar v.
Sweeney. .3  The referee found that the lawyer had received settlement
checks from an insurance company which were made out to both the client
and medical providers. 504 The attorney signed the checks, deposited them
into his trust account, and distributed the roceeds to himself, to the client,
and all but two of the medical providers. The referee specifically found
that the attorney did not intend to defraud the medical providers or Medicaid
after the attorney testified that he believed that Medicaid would pay the
providers 506 but found that the attorney had violated RPC 4-1.15(a)507 and
(b),508 4-8.4(a)509 and (c),510 and 5-1.1.*51 The supreme court agreed with the
referee's findings that the attorney violated the safekeeping property and
trust accounting rules, but additionally found that the attorney defrauded
Medicaid by failing to pay the medical providers from the settlement checks,
and suspended the attorney for ninety-one days.512
Attorneys may incur obligations, which they do not intend regarding the
rights of others, as evidenced by the case of Berger v. Silverstein, Silverstein
513& Silverstein. In Berger, the attorney represented a client in a personalinjury case on a contingent fee basis. The attorney and the client signed a
attorney's fees, and a refusal to account for and deliver over such property upon
demand shall be a conversion. This is not to preclude the retention of money or
other property upon which a lawyer has a valid lien for services or to preclude
the payment of agreed fees from the proceeds of transactions or collections.
Id.
503. 730 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1998).
504. Id. at 1270.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. RPC 4-1.15(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the
lawyer's own property, funds and property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's
possession in connection with a representation." Id.
508. RPC 4-1.15(b) states that "[u]pon receiving funds or other property in which a client
or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person." Id.
509. RPC 4-8.4(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not ... violate or attempt to violates the
Rules of Professional Conduct." Id.
510. RPC 4-8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from "engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." Id.
511. RPC 5-1.1 sets forth specific requirements regarding trust accounts.
512. Sweeney, 730 So. 2d at 1272.
513. 727 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
514. Id. at 313.
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letter of protection, agreeing to pay the client's physical therapist from the
recovery. 515 The attorney, after withdrawing his fees and costs from the
settlement, had insufficient funds to pay the therapist's bill.516 The physical
therapist then filed suit against the client and the attorney to recover his
fees.5 7 The trial court granted the attorney's motion foi summary judgment,
finding that the attorney's claim for fees had a higher priority than the physi-
cal therapist's claim for fees. 518 The Fourth District Court of Appeal over-
turned the trial court decision, finding that the case should not be treated as a
priority of lien case.5 19 The court found that the specific language of the
letter of protection 520 created a contract between the attorney and the physi-
cal therapist, requiring the attorney to pay the full amount owed to the physi-
cal therapist from the recovery before paying himself for fees and costs out-
standing.521 In a concurring opinion, Judge Nesbitt indicated that, although
the attorney had a charging lien for his costs and fees, "the effect of his
agreement with the therapist was to partially or wholly divest himself from
enforcing that lien."52 In light of this case, the prudent personal injury prac-
titioner who regularly issues letters of protection to medical providers and
others, should analyze the letters of protection he or she signs to ensure that
the language of the agreements does not create an unintended contractual
obligation.
An attorney owes some obligations to the opposing party, such as the
duty not to communicate with the opposing party without the consent of the
opposing party's lawyer.523 Interpretation of RPC 4-4.25M is often the subject
515. Id.
516. Id.517. Id.
518. Berger, 727 So. 2d at 313.
519. Id.
520. Id. The court quoted from the contract the specific language that the attorney would
"withhold [the necessary] sums from any settlement, judgment or verdict as [might] be necessary
to adequately protec' the physical therapist's fee. Id.
521. Berger, 727 So. 2d at 313.
522. Id. (Nesbitt, J., concurring).
523. RPC 4-4.2, infra note 524.
524. RPC 4-4.2, "COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL," provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior
consent, communicate with another's client in order to meet the requirements
of any statute or contract requiring notice or service of process directly on an
adverse party, in which event the communication shall be strictly restricted to
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of cases regarding attorney discipline, disqualification, and admissibility of
evidence. The meaning of RPC 4-4.2 as applied to corporate parties was
tested this year in the case of United States ex rel. Mueller v. Eckerd Corp.
5 25
The United States government and the State of Florida sued Eckerd
Corporation under the Federal False Claims Act 52 and the Florida False
Claims Act 27 on the theory that Eckerd's was not properly filling
prescriptions.52  The government sought to communicate ex parte with
pharmacists, technicians, and clerks employed by Eckerd's, stating that the
employees were non-managerial and had expressed interest in speaking with
the government. 529 The magistrate judge denied the government's motion
for ex parte interviews, from which the government appealed as to pharmacy
technicians and clerks. 3 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, upheld the magistrate's order denying the request for ex
parte contact.5 31 The court cited the comment to RPC 4-4.2, which states, in
part, that in dealing with organizations as parties, an attorney may not
communicate with an employee of the organization "whose statement may
constitute an admission on the part of the organization." 532 The court stated
that the technicians and clerks were involved in contacting health care
providers for refill information and in counting and packaging medicine.
533
In so doing, the court held that "[i]t is for the very reason stated in the
statutory description of the pharmacy technicians' duties that the statements
obtained in an ex parte interview would have a 'substantial likelihood' of
being used against the organizations in a later proceeding."5 34 The court
found that information from these employees would be used to establish the
government's claims regarding incomplete filling of prescriptions, stating
that these employees "would be precisely the employees who could verify
Eckerd's practices in regards to filling patients prescriptions."
535
A lawyer also has responsibilities to the opposing party when the
opposing party inadvertently discloses documents. In Abamar Housing &
that required by statute or contract, and a copy shall be provided to the
adverse party's attorney.
Id.
525. 35 F. Supp. 2d 896 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
526. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
527. FLA. STAT. §§ 68.01-.092 (1999).
528. Eckerd Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 897.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 899.
532. Id. at 898 (quoting RPC 4-4.2).
533. Eckerd Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d at 898.
534. Id.
535. Id.
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Development, Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady Decor, Inc.,536 an attorney was
disqualified for his failure to immediately notify opposing counsel and return
documents which were inadvertently disclosed by the other side.537 The court
found that disqualification of the attorney was appropriate, stating that the
"case demonstrates the effects of the inadvertent disclosure, the plaintiffs'
recalcitrance in rectifying the disclosure, and the unfair tactical advantage
gained from such disclosure. 538  The court added, however, that
disqualification will not always result from an inadvertent disclosure ofinformation.539 If an attorney immediately notifies the person who disclosed
the information and returns the documents, the attorney will not be
disqualified, having gained no unfair advantage.540In another disqualification case, the court chose not to disqualify an
attorney after the attorney misrepresented the law on work product privilege
to opposing counsel's investigator during deposition. 41 The attorney set a
deposition of the opposing counsel's investigator, who had been listed as a• 542
witness. At the deposition, the investigator asked the attorney if he was
inquiring into information protected by the work product privilege. The
attorney answered by stating that the privilege "has been waived because
[opposing counsel] listed you on his witness list. You are correct that
typically what an investigator does is work product." 544 The trial court
disqualified the attorney and awarded fees, finding that the attorney had
violated RPC 4-4.1,-54 which prohibits making false statements of fact or law
536. 724 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
537. Id. at 573.
538. Id. at 574.
539. Id. at 574 n.2.
540. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited to Florida Ethics Opinion 93-3,
stating that the opinion dictated disclosure of the receipt and immediate return of the documents.
Interestingly, the opinion merely requires notification of receipt of the inadvertently disclosed
documents; the opinion does not require their return. A prudent practitioner, however, will return
the documents to avoid the disqualification, which is the result in this case. Fla. Bar Professional
Ethics Comm. Op. 93-3 (1994).
541. 5500 North Corp. v. Willis, 729 So. 2d 508,514 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
542. Id. at 509.
543. Id. at 510.
544. Id.
545. RPC 4-4.1, '"RUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS," provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by rule 4-1.6.
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to a third party, and that the attorney had obtained privileged information. 46
The appellate court overturned the disqualification and the award of
attorney's fees, indicating that the attorney did not gain an "unfair
advantage" necessitating disqualification, although the attorney misrepre-
sented the law to the witness; the court specifically found that no informa-
tion protected by the work product privilege had been disclosed. 547 The court
also overturned the award of attorney's fees, finding that opposing counsel
did not obtain a protective order, did not attend the deposition, and did not
instruct his own investigator on proper areas of inquiry at the deposition.
548
The court admonished both attorneys in this case regarding their lack of
professionalism in stating "the circumstances of this case present a textbook
example of lack of cooperation between opposing counsel. We would
expect more civility from Beavis and Butthead than was displayed here by
[the attorneys]."549
Beyond being admonished for a mere lack of professionalism, lawyers
have been disciplined for their conduct toward opposing counsel and judges.
In Florida Bar v. Sayler,550 the Supreme Court of Florida publicly
reprimanded an attorney who sent a threatening letter to opposing counsel.5
The letter enclosed copies of articles about the murder of another lawyer
who practiced in the same area of law as the recipient, and quoted from the
articles.552 The court found that the sole purpose of the letter was to harass
53the opposing counsel, violating RPC 4-4.4 and 4-8.4(d). In another case,
the supreme court suspended an attorney who, among other violations,
accused opposing counsel of stealing the court file.554 In the same case, the
court also found that the attorney had impugned the integrity of a judge by
546. Willis, 729 So. 2d at 510-11.
547. Id. at 513.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 514.
550. 721 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1998).
551. Id. at 1155. The Supreme Court of Florida has also disciplined an attorney for
sending an insulting letter to the opposing party in Florida Bar v. Uhrig, 666 So. 2d 887, 888
(Fla. 1996). The letter was meant to disparage the opposing party, who was a member.of a
protected class under RPC 4-8.4(d). Id.
552. Sayler, 721 So. 2d at 1153-54.
553. Id. at 1154. RPC 4-4.4 provides that "[iln representing a client, a lawyer shall not
use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person." Id. RPC 4-8.4(d) states that "[a] lawyer shall not ... engage in conduct in connection
with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly,
or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against... other lawyers on
any basis." Id.
554. Florida Bar v. Nunes, 734 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1999). The court found that the attorney
had violated Rule 4-3.1, regarding filing frivolous proceedings, 4-4.4, supra note 553, and 4-
8.4(d), supra note 553.
[Vol. 24:199
256
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Chinaris / Tarbert
filing a motion which included statements indicating that the judge had made
a mistake in an order due to lack of experience and by filing a brief
indicating that opposing counsel was trying to "get away with" conduct
before a female judge that "he could not get away with from the two (2) [sic]
male judges. ', 5
The content of an attorney's communication with others is not the only
area of controversy; 1999 saw at least one case in which the method of
communication was a bone of contention in Pee v. Arnold H. Aaron, P.A.556
The Fourth District Court of Appeal overturned a trial court's order
requiring an attorney with a fax machine to accept documents faxed by the
opposing counsel.55 The attorney who was subject to the order filed for writ
of certiorari after losing his argument that he should not be required to
accept faxes from opposing counsel because "counsel constantly and
continually [sent]argumentative letters, non-emergency pleadings, and other
materials over the fax, which constantly and continuously interrupted his
working day., 55 8 The court found that, although Rule 1.080(b)(5) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure permits delivery by fax, it does not require
an attorney to have a fax machine. 59 Accordingly, an attorney who does not
wish to receive documents by fax cannot be required to do so.
560
Attorneys communicate not only with the court and opposing counsel,
attorneys also communicate with the public. Attorneys' communication with
561the public, in offering legal services, is the subject of regulation as well.
Regulation of attorney advertising was subject to constitutional challenge in
the case of Mason v. Florida Bar.562 Attorney Mason filed a yellow pages
advertisement for review with the Florida Bar563 The advertisement
included the information "'AV' rated, the Highest Rating Martindale-
Hubbell National Legal Directory."5 4  The Florida Bar opined that the
advertisement did not comply with RPC 4-7.2(j), which prohibits "self-
laudatory" statements. 65 The Florida Bar further indicated that the
advertisement would comply if the attorney included a statement that
555. Nunes, 734 So. 2d at 395. RPC 4-8.2(a) states that "a lawyer shall not make a
statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of ajudge." Id.
556. 719 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
557. Id. at 372.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. The rules regulating attorney advertising are RPC 4-7.1 through 4-7.8.
562. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
563. Id. at 1330. Attorneys must file non-exempt advertising for review under RPC 4-7.5.
564. Id.
565. Id. RPC 4-7.20) farther proscribes "statements describing or characterizing the
quality of the lawyer's services." Id.
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Martindale-Hubbell does not rate all lawyers and that the ratings are based
on confidential interviews. 66  The attorney challenged the rule on First
Amendment grounds and on the basis that the rule is unconstitutionally567
vague. The court found that the advertisement was commercial speech,
subject to the Central Hudson 56 test, requiring that regulation by the State
569must be "narrowly drawn" and advance a substantial state interest. The
court upheld the rule on the basis that The Florida Bar had shown substantial
interest in "ensuring (1) that lawyer advertisements are not misleading, (2)
that the public has access to relevant information to assist in the comparison
and selection of attorneys, and (3) that rating services have a strong incentive
to use objective criteria." 70 The attorney argued that the public understands
the rating system or has access to information which explains the rating
process, and therefore it could not be misleading.571 The court found that
Martindale-Hubbell is directed at the legal community, and that the public
was unlikely to research the ratings system. 72 The court also found that
requiring a brief disclosure was narrowly tailored to advance the government
interest, because it allows the attorney to convey the information. 73 The
court dismissed the attorneys "void for vagueness" argument, stating that
"only an attorney could be confused by that language. 574  The court
summarized its opinion by stating that "[t]his case is a tempest in a teapot
wherein Mr. Mason challenges the sensible requirement that if an attorney
characterizes his Martindale-Hubbell rating with the words 'the Highest
Ratings' then he must explain what that means to a public generally
unfamiliar with the Martindale-Hubbell rating system.,
575
Under the RPC, lawyers also have an obligation not to bring frivolous
proceedings.576 "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
566. Mason, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1330.
567. Id.
568. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
569. Mason, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-31.
570. Id. at 1331.
571. ld
572. Id.
573. Id. at 1332-33.
574. Mason, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
575. Id.
576. RPC 4-3.1 provides the following:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert
an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal or existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding,
or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may
nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the
case be established.
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or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law."577 Nevertheless, "a lawyer for the
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that
could result in incarceration, may ,... so defend the proceeding as to require
that every element of the case be established."578 This obligation can lead
not only to discipline by the Florida Bar, but also to sanctions by the trial
court. Thus, the Third District Court of Appeal upheld a monetary
sanction against a woman and her attorney for filing a frivolous subpoena in
Moakley v. Smallwood580  During the course of post-dissolution
proceedings, the former wife sought to compel production of a note that was
awarded to her in the divorce by issuing subpoenas to the former husband
and his attorneys. The motion itself stated that one of the attorneys did
not possess the note, and that attorney could not quash the subpoena because
there was little notice provided prior to the deposition.5 82 The appellate
court upheld the sanctions imposed, stating that the trial court found that the
attorney "was subpoenaed on short notice, for no good reason, to attend an
evidentiary hearing fifty miles distant."'5 83
Similarly, the Third District Court of Appeal ordered an attorney to
show cause why sanctions should not be imposed based on his abuse of the
appellate process in Banderas v. Advance Petroleum, Inc.5 4 In Banderas,
the attorney filed a motion for rehearing after the court issued a per curiam
opinion indicating that the opinion was "a travesty of justice" and a "cop-
out" and scolded the court for not writing an opinion explaining the
decision.5 85  The appellate court found the motion "frivolous and
insulting"58 6 and filed "solely as a tool to express his personal displeasure
with this Court's conclusion."5 7 Attorneys should be careful in statements
made to the court, whether oral or written, because in addition to the
Id.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. 730 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
581. Id. at 286.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 287.
584. 716 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
585. Id. at 877.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 877.
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sanctions the court can impose, the court may also refer the issue to the
Florida Bar for potential disciplinary action, as in this case.
88
An attorney's responsibilities do not come solely from the RPC. The
attorney also has a relationship with the state, which also regulates
attorneys' conduct. The State's regulation of attorney conduct was at issue
in State v. Falk. 9  Section 817.234(9) of the Florida Statutes, which
prohibits attorneys from soliciting car accident victims, was upheld against
an equal protection challenge.59 The state filed an information charging an
attorney with violating the statute, and the attorney filed a motion to dismiss
citing equal protection and free speech grounds; the motion was granted.591
The appellate court found a rational basis for the state's distinction between
car accident victims and other accident victims, indicating that the statute
appeared in a section entitled "[F]alse and fraudulent insurance claims."
The court stated that the legislature "may have concluded that the likelihood
of insurance fraud is greater with motor vehicles accidents" because car
insurance is required by law in the State of Florida, thereby denying the
equal protection claim. The court also found that, because the information
filed by the State did not specify any particular conduct, the trial court erred
in finding that the statute violated the First Amendment, because it could not
implement the "as applied" test;594 the appellate court therefore remanded
the case to the trial court to allow the state to amend the information, and the
defendant to renew his motion to dismiss.595
Other constitutional law developments were the subject of Chiles v.
State Employees Attorneys Guild.596 The Supreme Court of Florida struck
down section 447.203(3)0) of the Florida Statutes, which prohibited
attorneys employed by the state from engaging in collective bargaining
because it was constitutionally overbroad. 59  The court held that "we
emphasize that lawyers exercising their constitutional right to bargain
collectively may not violate the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar and must
give unqualified deference to the traditional duty of loyalty that a lawyer
588. Id. at 878. See also Timothy P. Chinaris & Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, 23 NOVA L.
REv. 161, 224-25 (1998) (discussing 5-H Corp. v. Padovano, 708 So. 2d 244 (1998)).
589. 724 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
590. Id. at 149. See also FLA. STAT. § 817.234(8) (1999). The chiropractic counterpart to
the statute prohibiting attorneys from soliciting car accident victims, was also upheld against First
Amendment and equal protection challenge in Barr v. State, 731 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
591. Falk, 724 So. 2d at 147.
592. Id. at 148. See also FLA. STAT. § 817.234 (1999).
593. Falk, 724 So. 2d at 148-49.
594. Id. at 148.
595. Id. at 149.
596. 734 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1999).
597. Id. at 1031.
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owes to a client. ' 98 The Supreme Court of Florida, in reaching its decision,
cited to Florida Ethics Opinion 77-15, 599 which states that mere membership
in a union is not an ethical violation
co
V. THE LAWYER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE FLORIDA BAR AND THE
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM
This section discusses the attorney's relationship to the Florida Bar and
the disciplinary system. Included within this section are discipline cases that
are not easily categorized within the attorney's relationship to clients, the
court and third parties. Also discussed are changes to the RPC.
One of the most egregious violations of the RPC is that of dishonesty.
Often violations involving dishonesty invoke the harshest penalties in
discipline cases. The Supreme Court of Florida ordered a ninety-one day
suspension in the case of Florida Bar v. Cibula 601 for conduct involving
dishonesty. 602 The attorney attended a hearing in his own case regardin
alimony.6 3 While under oath, the attorney testified regarding his income.
At the time he testified, he had already earned well over the amount of
income he admitted in the court proceeding, and he had overpaid his income
taxes, which the bar's expert witness testified can be used to conceal
income.605 The supreme court found that the attorney had committed a fraud
on the court and had engaged in dishonest or fraudulent conduct.W6
The court disbarred an attorney for fraudulent conduct in the case of
Florida Bar v. Vernell.co 7 The attorney was hired by a client for
representation in multiple matters, including an eminent domain case.608 The
attorney received funds from the state both prior to trial and after the verdict
in the trial for the client.6c 9 The client filed a complaint stating that the
attorney did not inform the client that he had received funds on the client's
598. Id.
599. Id. at 1036.
600. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 77-15 (1997).
601. 725 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1998).
602. Id. at 365. According to RPC 3-5.1(e), a ninety-one day suspension is particularly
severe because an attorney is required to show rehabilitation in order to be reinstated and may be
ordered to re-take the Bar exam. RPC 3-5.1(e) (1993).
603. Cibula, 725 So. 2d at 361.
604. Id.
605. Id. at 362.
606. Id. The court found that the attorney had violated RPC 4-3.3(a) and 4-8.4(c),
respectively. Id.
607. 721 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1998).
608. Id. at 706.
609. l
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behalf, and that the attorney had never discussed the issue of fees with the
client regarding any of the matters for which the attorney had been hired.
610
The attorney claimed that there was no fee agreed upon at the outset of the
attorney-client relationship because of the friendship between the two, and
that the amount of his fees in the matters exceeded the amount he received
on the client's behalf. 6 1 The referee found that, in addition to violating the
trust accounting and safekeeping property rules, the attorney had engaged in
conduct involving dishonesty and deceit, all relating to the misappropriation
of the client's funds. The supreme court upheld the referee's findings of
fact and disbarred the attorney, based on his prior disciplinary history and
the egregiousness of the offense.613
An attorney remains subject to the jurisdiction of the supreme court
even while under suspension. The Supreme Court of Florida undertook a
lengthy explanation of the basis of its jurisdiction over disbarred and
suspended attorneys in Florida Bar v. Ross. 14 The court explained that Rule
3-5.1(e) of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar specifically states that
attorneys are subject to discipline as members of The Florida Bar during the
period of the suspension. 6' 5 Both suspended and disbarred attorneys remain
subject to the court's contempt powers if they violate the court order
616imposing discipline. Thus, attorney Ross was disbarred for conduct
committed during the time period of his suspension from the practice of
law.617  Ross became involved in a dispute with his landlord regarding
property that was foreclosed on and purchased at a foreclosure sale.6a 8 The
landlord started proceedings to set aside the foreclosure, and filed an
affidavit stating that he did not receive notice of the sale.6 19 Ross offered to
sell the purchaser information which he claimed would rebut the affidavit
filed by the landlord. The purchaser's attorney declined to buy the
information but informed Ross that he would subpoena him for a
deposition. 681 The opposing counsel contacted Ross to tell him the date of
610. Id.
611. Id. at 707.
612. Vernell, 721 So. 2d at 706.
613. Id. at 709-10. In another case involving dishonesty, the supreme court denied
reinstatement to an attorney who was convicted of writing over 150 worthless checks during her
probation, including writing worthless checks after applying for reinstatement. Florida Bar v.
Roberts, 721 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1998).
614. 732 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1998).
615. Id. at 1040.
616. Id. at 1041.
617. Id. at 1043.
618. Id. at 1038-39.
619. Ross, 732 So. 2d at 1039 (Fla. 1998).
620. Id.
621. Id.
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his scheduled deposition and to determine what information he had.622 Ross
offered to evade service of the subpoena for the deposition, provided the
opposing counsel paid Ross several thousand dollars; the opposing counsel
declined.623 Ross eluded service of process by posting a notice at his
address, which stated that he was on vacation. 624  In light of this conduct,
the supreme court found that Ross had violated RPC 4-8.4(c), which
prohibits dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation, and disbarred him.
62
-
An attorney may also be disciplined for violating specific obligations to
the court and to the Florida Bar. Attorneys have duties during the discipline
process, and this year several cases were decided regarding those responsi-
bilities. 62 The supreme court thus suspended an attorney for not responding
to a court order to answer a subpoena duces tecum in Florida Bar v.
Kassier.627  Furthermore, the court suspended an attorney for failing to
respond to the Florida Bar regarding a complaint and for failure to appear at
her final hearing in Florida Bar v. Summers.628 Finally, the court suspended
an attorney for submitting false documentation in responding to the bar
regarding a complaint in Florida Bar v. Arango.629 A client had complained
that the attorney failed to act diligently in a representation, and the attorney
submitted a medical authorization from the client, correspondence between
the attorney and a medical provider, and notations in a log that indicated
work was being performed on the case, all of which the court found to be
false.6
30
The supreme court also considered the applicability of the RPC in
computing a suspension from another state in the case of Florida Bar v.
Shinnick. 1 An attorney was suspended from practice in Minnesota for
fraudulent conduct in business transactions not related to the practice of
law.632 The suspension was indefinite, but with the ability to apply for
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Ross, 732 So. 2d at 1039 (Fla. 1998).
625. Id.
626. See Florida Bar v. Summers, 728 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1999); Florida Bar v. Kassier,
730 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1998); Florida Bar v. Arango, 720 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1998).
627. 730 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1998). The attorney was also found to have issued worthless
checks. Id.
628. 728 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1999). The complaint to which Summers did not respond
involved a federal case which was dismissed because she did not follow the trial court's orders in
a forfeiture case as an Assistant United States Attorney. Her failure to appear at her final hearing
in the disciplinary case resulted in the referee finding her guilty of all charges by The Florida Bar.
Id.
629. 720 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1998).
630. Id. at 250.
631. 731 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1999).
632. Id. at 1265.
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633
reinstatement after six months. Because the attorney had begun to
practice before the suspension period had expired, the Florida Bar
prosecuted the attorney and the referee found that the respondent had
violated the RPC based on the Minnesota suspension. 634  The referee
recommended a suspension in Florida until the attorney was reinstated in
Minnesota nunc pro tunc to the date of suspension in Minnesota, which was
July 25, 1996.635The Florida Bar argued that the suspension was for longer
than ninety days, requiring proof of rehabilitation prior to reinstatement in
Florida.6 3 6 The attorney, on the other hand, contended that his suspension in
Florida was for under ninety days, because the six months in Minnesota had
expired prior to the entry of the referee's findings and recommendation.
637
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the attorney's suspension in
Minnesota was for longer than ninety days, pointing out that he had not been
reinstated in Minnesota at the time of the referee's hearing, and required
proof of rehabilitation.638
On a more positive note, the supreme court held that a Florida Bar
member who has been found not guilty of violations of the RPC cannot be
ordered to bear the bar's costs of prosecution. 639 At the final hearing, the
referee found that the attorney had not violated the Rules, but ordered that
she pay half of the costs of the bar for the disciplinary proceeding.' The
attorney appealed, arguing that the bar was not a "prevailing party" and
should therefore bear its own costs in the case.641 The supreme court agreed,
finding that:
[a] referee does not have discretion to recommend that a
respondent in a bar disciplinary proceeding pay any portion
of the Bar's costs pursuant to rule 3-7.6(o) when the referee
recommends that the respondent be found not guilty of any
of the charged offenses and recommends no discipline or
633. Id.
634. Id at 1266. RPC 3-4.6, states that a final disciplinary order in another jurisdiction
"shall be considered as conclusive proof of such misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding under
this rule." Id.
635. Shinnick, 731 So. 2d at 1266.
636. Id.
637. Id. at 1267.
638. Id.
639. Florida Bar v. Williams, 734 So. 2d 417,421 (Fla. 1999).
640. Id. at418.
641. Id.
264 [Vol. 24:199
264
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Chinaris / Tarbert
other sanctions, and where the Bar is otherwise not
successful in whole or in part.4 2
The court did note, however, that it was not addressing whether sanctions
could be imposed for lack of cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding.64 3
As in every year, the supreme court considered changes to the RPC.4
Many of the changes this year involved RPC 4-1.5, regarding fees. The
court amended RPC 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(ii) and 4-1.5(f)(4)(D)(iii) to allow
approval of a contingent fee contract in excess of the contingent fee schedule
and approval of a division of fees between attorneys not in accordance with
the schedule in "the court in which the matter would be filed" or the circuit
court of competent urisdiction, in the event that the former court will not
accept jurisdiction.645 Instead of requiring that attorneys file a separate
action in circuit court, it is now possible for attorneys to have these matters
heard in the court in which the underlying litigation takes place.64  The court
also amended the Statement of Client's Rights to indicate that a client may
be obligated to pay "costs and expenses" to the opposing party.647 The court
declined to change the percentages stated in the contingent fee schedule at
the bar's request, because the bar did not indicate the rationale for the
proposed rule change.?
The supreme court also amended RPC 4-3.4,649 adding two new
subdivisions, (g) and (h), regarding threatening criminal prosecution or
disciplinary action as leverage in a civil matter.650 The supreme court
adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970.61 Contained
within the code was Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 7-105, which stated that "[a]
lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter." When
the supreme court adopted the current RPC,653 the rules contained no
counterpart to DR 7-105. In the interim, the Professional Ethics Committee
of the Florida Bar published formal opinion 89-3, which stated that, although
642. Id. at 420.
643. Id. at 420.
644. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 718 So. 2d 1179 (Fla.
1998).
645. Id. at 1181.
646. Id.
647. Id. at 1181-82.
648. Id. at. 1180-81.
649. RPC 4-3.4 (1993).
650. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 718 So. 2d at 1182.
651. In re The Integration Rule of The Florida Bar, 235 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1970).
652. Disciplinary Rules, FLA. BJ. 65, 66 (Sept. 1970).
653. In re Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977. For the correct opinion,
see 507 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1986).
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the rules contain no express prohibition, attorneys may not "bring,
participate in bringing, or threaten to bring criminal charges against someone
solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter or if the primary purpose of
such action is harassment." 654  This rule change re-enacts the specific
prohibition previously expressed in DR 7-105. Although the Code of
Professional Conduct did not contain an express prohibition against bringing
a disciplinary action as leverage in a civil matter, the Professional Ethics
Committee of the Florida Bar issued formal opinion 94-5, which prohibits
lawyers from threatening to file a bar complaint "to obtain advantage in a
civil matter."6 55 The amendment to RPC 4-3.4 codifies this interpretation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct
VI. CONCLUSION
This past year saw continued development of the law of lawyers'
professional responsibility in Florida. It has become increasingly more
difficult for lawyers to sort out and prioritize the numerous responsibilities
to and relationships with various persons and entities. Fortunately, the
courts and the Florida Bar continue to provide guidance for the interested
attorney in the form of cases, ethics opinions, and rules changes. In the final
analysis, lawyers must not only avail themselves of these resources but must
also draw upon themselves to realize that commitment to their clients,
dedication to our system of justice, and service to the public are the
hallmarks of our honored profession.
654. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 89-3 (1989). In maing its decision,
the committee relied on Rule 4-3.1 of the RPC, which prohibits frivolous actions, 4-4.4, which
prohibits actions with "no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third
person," 4-8.4(c) which prohibits dishonest or deceitful conduct, and 4-8.4(d) which states that an
attorney shall not "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice." Id.
655. Fla. Bar Comu. on Professional Ethics, Op. 94-5 (1995). The committee used the
same rationale as in opinion 89-3, supra, note 654. In addition, the committee noted that
attorneys have an obligation to report attorneys who have violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct "that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness
as a lawyer" under Rule 4-8.3 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers judicial decisions and Florida legislation that
appeared between July 1, 1998 and June 30, 1999. Real estate law continues
to develop in interesting ways and the authors have selected the cases and
statutes that they think will be of particular interest to real estate
practitioners and others involved with Florida real estate law.I The authors
do not intend this survey to be all inclusive. 2 The general goal is to inform
the reader, but on occasion the authors felt compelled to voice disagreement
or hopes for the future.
II. ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. Eminent Domain
1. Statutory Changes
1999 Fla. Laws. ch 385 is a huge act relating to the Department of
Transportation. 3 Buried deep within this act are some significant changes to
provisions relating to attorneys' fees under the eminent domain statutes.
4
The most important changes are: section 73.015(4) of the Florida Statutes
will provide for attorneys' fees and costs when the parties reach agreement
without litigating;5 the condemnee will no longer be able to recover
1. Note that this article does not include zoning and land use because those are
covered in a different article.
2. When dealing with legislation, the authors strongly recommend reading the entire
act.
3. Under article ITI, section 5 of the Florida Constitution, a legislative act is limited
to one subject. If this act satisfies the one subject rule, then the rule is entirely meaningless.
4. For further discussion see the Eminent Domain section infra Part X. See also
Paul D. Bain, 1999 Amendments to Florida's Eminent Domain Statutes, THE FLA. B.J., Nov.
1999 at 68, 68-71.
5. Ch. 99-385, § 57(4), Fla. Laws 3820, 3878-79 (codified as amended FLA. STAT. §
73.015(4) (1999)).
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prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees and costs; 6 the modification of the
calculation of the benefit achieved by the attorney, which is the basis for
calculating attorneys' fees, to include nonmonetary benefits; and a schedule
to use in the calculating the fees from the benefit.7
2. Trial
8
Department of Transportation v. Skidmore. The district court found
that the decision the trial court made followed the correct approach for
calculating fees.9 The district court determined the benefits that had been
obtained for the clients, calculated the lodestar figure using the factors listed
in the statute,10 and then decided "whether to adjust that figure based on the
total benefits obtained."' However, the attorneys' fees were $900,000,
when the benefit obtained was only $1,225,000.12 The attorneys' fee were
equal to almost seventy-five percent of the benefit, in contrast to the norm
which was twenty-five to thirty-five percent.1 3 In fact, the client was not
entitled to keep all the money that the Department of Transportation had
deposited in the registry of the court at the beginning of this quick take
proceeding.' 4 These factors alone made the district court state, "we would
find ourselves hard-pressed to affirm this award."'15
In addition, other errors necessitated reversal. First, in calculating the
client's benefit, the court included the value of the Department of
Transportation's rebuilding of a pier, despite the fact that the client, and its
6. Id. Paul D. Bain questioned the constitutionality of this provision based on the
supreme court's reasoning in Boulis v. Florida Dep't of Trans., 733 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1999).
Bain, supra, note 4, at 70. Boulis is discussed infra text accompanying notes 333-43, that
prejudgment interest on costs is required by the Florida Constitution.
7. Ch. 49-385, § 60, 1999 Fla. Laws 3820, 3880 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 73.091
(1999)).
8. 720 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
9. Id. at 1129.
10. Id. at 1128.
The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions involved.
The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the cause.
The amount of money involved.
The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney.
The attorney's time and labor reasonably required adequately to represent the
client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client.
Id. (quoting RtA. STAT. § 73.092(2)(a)-(e) (1991)).
11. Skidmore, 720 So. 2d at 1129.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1130.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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attorney, had vigorously opposed the rebuilding.' 6 Second, in calculating the
number of hours expended by the attorneys, the court included the time that
they had spent litigating the question of whether their client improperly
filled in sovereignty lands.17 The district court held that to be a matter that
was merely incidental to the eminent domain proceedings and, therefore, not
compensable.
18
Finally, in taxing costs, the trial court was bound by the Statewide
Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs. 19 While "[t]he trial court may
deviate from the Guidelines depending on the facts of the case as justice may
require, ' 2° the trial court went too far here. It was error to include office
expenses such as postage, long distance calls, fax transmissions and delivery
* 21services. It was error to award computer research costs that should have
been considered as overhead.22 In addition, it was also error to include travel
expenses for experts and witnesses where the record did not reflect that they
had to travel from out of state.2 3 Furthermore, it was error to award the law
firm's surcharge assessed on other expenses.24
Teeter v. Department of Transportation.25 The condemnee sought
attorneys' fees under section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes.26 The trial court
awarded fees based solely upon the monetary benefits achieved for the client
under section 73.092(1), which provided, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this section, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award
attorneys' fees based solely on the benefits achieved for the client."27 The
trial court rejected the condemnee's additional request for fees under section
28 2973.092(2). The district court affirmed. Section 73.092(2) provided for
the payment of attorneys' fees where such fees have been "incurred in
defeating an order of taking, or for an apportionment, or other supplemental
proceedings."30 This case was settled before it went to trial.3 ' Utilizing the
plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation, the court concluded that
16. Skidmore, 720 So. 2d at 1129.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1130-31.
20. Id. at 1130.
21. Skidmore, 720 So. 2d at 1130.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1130-31.
25. 713 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
26. Id. at 1091; FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (Supp. 1994).
27. Teeter, 713 So. 2d at 1091; FLA. STAT.§ 73.092(1).
28. Teeter, 713 So. 2d at 1091.
29. Id.
30. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2).
31. Teeter, 713 So. 2d at 1091-92.
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section 73.092(2) simply did not apply to this situation.32 Furthermore, the
condemnee was not entitled to attorneys' fees for hours spent litigating the
attorneys' fees issue because that was not provided for by the statute.33
Judge Sharp concurred specially in order to urge the legislature to
reconsider the potential constitutional defects in the statute.34 Although
acknowledging that no constitutional issues had been raised in this case, she
noted that the statute was "fraught with problems and may be
constitutionally defective." 35 Under the Florida Constitution, the condemnee
is entitled to attorneys' fees, as part of the mandated compensation. 36 The
limit of the statute on attorneys' fees, based upon the nature of the
proceeding, may shortchange some future condenees.
37
3. Appellate
Department of Transportation v. Skinners Wholesale Nursery, Inc. 38
The land in this case was the subject of a "quick take. 39 The parties agreed
on all issues except business damages which went to trial.40 The Department
of Transportation's ("DOT") position was that business damages were
$130,000, but the final judgment awarded to the landowner was
$2,950,000.'41 Of course, the DOT appealed, but the landowner prevailed
again and the award was upheld.42 In calculating appellate attorneys' fees,
the trial court determined a reasonable hourly rate of $250 per hour.43 It
concluded from the evidence that 100.75 hours had been expended in the
case.44 The hours expended produced a lodestar fee of $25,187.50. 45 The
court then "applied what it described as a 'results obtained' enhancement in
an amount equal to 2.5% of the $2,950,000, the amount of the business
damages awarded at trial, or $73,750; and rounded the awarded fee to
$98,000." 6 The DOT appealed the addition of the enhancement and the
32. Id. at 1092.
33. Id.
34. Id. (Sharp, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. Teeter, 713 So. 2d at 1092 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a)).
37. See FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1999).
38. 736 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1998).
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id.
41. Id. at5.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Skinners Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 736 So. 2d at 5.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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district court reluctantly reversed, although it did not find the award to be
excessive.47
The use of the lodestar approach was the correct way to approach
appellate attorneys' fees. Moreover, applying an enhancement for results
obtained might be justified in the rare case where the quality of service and
the results obtained were exceptional. 48 However, it would be inappropriate
to use a risk multiplier because that is designed to compensate the lawyer for
the risk of not getting paid in a contingent fee case.49 In this eminent domain
proceeding where the condemning authority had appealed, attorneys' fees
were mandated by statute,50 so there was no risk that this attorney would not
get paid.51 Unfortunately, the trial court's order, and the evidence on which it
was based, considered the risk of losing on appeal as a factor in calculating
the enhancement. Thus reversal was requiredl33.
Seminole County v. Boyle Investment Co.54 In this condemnation case,
the county had appealed the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to the
landowner.55 The district court reversed the award of interest on the
attorneys' fees and the inclusion of expert witness fees, but affirmed on all
56other points. The county then opposed the landowner's motion for
appellate attorneys' fees, apparently on the theory that it had been the
prevailing party on the appeal.57 However, the district court concluded that
the legislature mandated landowners to receive reasonable appellate
attorneys' fees in all eminent domain cases, unless the appeal was filed by
the landowner and the appeal was unsuccessful. 58 The exception did not
apply to this case because the appeal had been filed by the county.59
47. See id. at 8-9.
48. See Skinners Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 736 So. 2d at 9.
49. See id. at 8.
50. Id. at 3; FLA. STAT. § 73.131(2) (1993).
51. See FLA. STAT. § 73.131(2) (1993).
52. Skinners Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 736 So. 2d at 8-9.
53. Id. at 9.
54. 724 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 732 So. 2d 328 (Fla.
1999).
55. Id. at 645.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 645-66.
58. Id. at 646. Section 73.131(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that "[t]he petitioner
[condemning authority] shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the appellate court,
including a reasonable attorneys' fee to be assessed by that court, except upon an appeal taken by
a defendant [condemnee] in which the judgment of the lower court shall be affirmed." RLA.
STAT. § 73.131(2) (1999).
59. Boyle Inv. Co., 724 So. 2d at 646.
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B. Landlord and Tenant
Florida RS, Inc. v. Nelson.60 The tenant brought suit claiming the
landlord had breached the lease by, inter alia, failing to pay interest on an
annual basis as required by statute.w1 The court rejected the tenant's motion
for certification of a class action, but the tenant prevailed on his original
claim and was awarded $30.70 interest on his security deposit.62 The court
then awarded the tenant, an attorney who represented himself with the aid of
another lawyer, attorneys' fees of $27,654.6
The district court reversed.64 By statute, attorneys' fees could be
recovered by the prevailing party in litigation concerning a residential lease.
65
However, the district court concluded that the tenant had not prevailed on the
attempt to have the class certified.6 Therefore, the tenant was not entitled to
attorneys' fees involved with that attempt.67 The tenant was entitled to
attorneys' fees for claims on which he prevailed that included only the
attorney's time spent on recovering interest on his security deposit.
68
I. BROKERS
A. Discipline and Licensing
Starr v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation.6 9 In
completing her application for a license, Starr failed to reveal that she had.
pled no contest to two separate misdemeanor charges, i.e., disorderly
intoxication and disorderly conduct.70  When that was discovered, the
Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("DBPR") revoked her
license.71 On appeal, she challenged the Department's right to inquire about
criminal conduct not a felony and not related to real estate transactions.72
The district court summarily rejected that claim and any argument
challenging the license revocation as being different from sanctions given to
60. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D57 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998).
61. Id. at D57; FA. STAT. § 83.49(9) (1995).
62. Nelson, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D57-58.
63. Id. at D57.
64. Id. at D58.
65. FLA. STAT. § 83.48 (1995).
66. Nelson, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D58.
67. Id. at D58-59.
68. Id.
69. 729 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
70. Id. at 1006.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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others for similar offenses or as being beyond the authority of the
Department.
73
White v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation.74 White
was both a broker and a building contractor. Buyers agreed to buy a lot in
Whisper Ridge Subdivision on which the broker would build their house.76
The purchase contract provided that the deposit would be held in escrow by
Les White Realty/Builders.77 However, the deposit was never put in the
escrow.78 White used the money to buy the lot in his own name.7 9 Then
White's construction financing disappeared, so the house was never built
and the lot never sold to the buyers. 0 White, however, refused to return
their deposit. 81 When the DBPR began disciplinary proceedings, White's
defense was that he acted only as a builder in this transaction, not as a
broker, so the DBPR had no basis for disciplining him.
82
The Real Estate Commission found otherwise and revoked his broker's
license. 83 The record revealed that, throughout the transaction, White had
represented himself as a licensed real estate broker.84 The purchase contract
indicated that White was acting as a broker and that the deposit would be
held in escrow by his realty company. 85 "Although the evidence at the
hearing disclosed White wore several 'hats' in this transaction, it supports
the Commission's conclusion that one of the hats worn was that of a licensed
real estate broker., 86 In that role, White had breached his statutory duties to
properly escrow the deposit money and return the deposit.87 In light of the
fact that White's license was already suspended at the time of this
transaction, the Commission was justified in revoking his license.88
73. Id. at 1006-07.
74. 715 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
75. Id. at 1130.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. White, 715 So. 2d at 1130.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1131.
83. Id. at 1130.
84. White, 715 So. 2d at 1130.
85. Id. at 1130-31.
86. Id. at 1131.
87. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 475.25(1)(d) (1999).
88. White, 715 So. 2d at 1131.
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B. Brokerage Agreements and Commissions
A.F.S. Services, Inc. v. Venturvest Realty Corp.8 9 Under the brokerage
agreement, the broker (actually a co-broker in this situation) would earn the
first half of its commission within thirty days after execution of the lease and
the second half thirty days after the first month's rent had been collected.90 A
commercial tenant was procured. 91 The tenant signed the lease and paid a
deposit covering security and prepaid rent.92 However, eleven days later, the
landlord and tenant signed a "Second Lease Addendum," increasing the
premises by approximately fifty percent.93 Eventually, the tenant defaulted
on its obligations under the amended lease.94
The broker claimed that it was entitled to its commission because it had
fully performed.95  The landlord, however, pointed out that the lease also
provided that, "[n]o commission shall be earned by Broker in the event of a
monetary default by Tenant."96 With the terms apparently in conflict, the
trial court ruled for the landlord, but the district court reversed the decision
in party. It ruled that the broker had earned the first half of the commission
based upon the lease signing and the second half based upon the payment of
the first month's rent. The court concluded simply, "default under the
Second Lease Addendum does not in any way affect A.F.S.'s entitlement to
the commission that it had already earned." 99
Earnest & Stewart, Inc. v. Codina.1°° The sellers had an exclusive
listing agreement with a broker.101 Under that listing agreement, the broker
could pay a portion of its commission to a cooperating broker.1 2 Another
broker, Earnest & Stewart, was aware that the house was for sale.1°3 One of
its sales people informed the Coneses of that fact and offered to show them
the house.1  The Coneses refused that offer because they were already
89. 725 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Mar. 10, 1999).
90. Id. at 1253.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. A.F.S. Servs., Inc., 725 So. 2d at 1253.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1252.
98. Id. at 1253.
99. A.F.S. Servs., Inc., 725 So. 2d at 1253.
100. 732 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Mar. 24, 1999).
101. Id. at 365.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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familiar with the house and knew the sellers. °5 The Coneses dealt directly
with the sellers in negotiating the deal which culminated with the sale of the
house to the ConesesY16 Honoring their listing agreement, the sellers paid
the real estate commission to their exclusive broker. Earnest & Stewart,
however, claimed that they were also entitled to a real estate commission
because they had procured the buyer.
0 8
Earnest & Stewart's claim was rejected by the trial court which granted
summary judgment to the buyers and sellers and the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed.1 9 The claim was based on the theory that Earnest &
Stewart had become the cooperating brokers and were entitled, as third party
beneficiaries of the listing agreement, to share in the commission. 11° The
district court concluded they had produced a ready, willing and able buyer
and, therefore, had not become cooperating brokers."' Thus they had not
earned a broker's commission 2 The court likened it to the situation where
a broker merely tells a customer about a "For Sale" sign it has seen on the
lawn of a property.1 3  That alone is not enough to earn a
commission! The court did not, however, address the validity of the
plaintiff's third party beneficiary theory. Furthermore, it specifically
avoided dealing with the question of whether the broker, even if the theory
had been valid, was entitled to sue the sellers and buyers, rather than the
listing broker, for its share of the commission.
IV. CONDOMINIUMS
Graves v. Ciega Verde Condominium Ass'n, Inc.115 Nancy Graves, the
personal representative to Fred Graves' estate, appealed the trial court's non-
final order vacating an amended final judgment of foreclosure and canceling
judicial sale against Ciega Verde Condominium Association, Inc. ("Ciega
Verde"? and its unit owners in this foreclosure and construction lien
action.
105. Earnest & Stewart, Inc., 732 So. 2d at 365.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 365-67.
110. Earnest & Stewart, Inc., 732 So. 2d at 365 n.2.
111. Id. at 365-66.
112. Id. at 366.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 703 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
116. Id. at I110.
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Decedent, Fred Graves, as a general contractor, performed repair work
to the condominiums pursuant to a contract.11 7 Ciega Verde later refused to
pay Graves for his services and denied Graves access to the property.1
Graves served a claim of lien and a contractor's affidavit.119 Subsequently,
Graves filed an amended complaint which sought to foreclose the
mechanic's lien against the unit owners and sought recovery of damages for.
breach of contract against Ciega Verde. 12° Graves sued the unit owners as a
defendant class with Ciega Verde as class representative.12 1 Ciega Verde, in
its individual capacity and as representative of the class, answered the
amended complaint.'
The contract portion of the complaint was set for binding arbitration
where Graves was the prevailing party.'23 "Graves served Ciega Verde with
a motion to confirm the arbitration award and to set cause for trial on the
foreclosure action against the unit owners."'124 "[T]he trial court entered
final judgment in March 1996 .... and set [judicial] sale for May 1996."'15
Counsel for unit owners "filed a motion to set aside the amended final
judgment... [claiming] the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order
foreclosure of the unit owners' property."' 26 Ultimately, the trial court
granted the unit owners' motion to dismiss and dismissed them from the
action 2 7 Since Graves failed to serve such unit owners "within 120 days
from filing the original complaint as required by Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure &ule] 1.170(l) [sic]," he was precluded from filing the original
complaint.
The district court recognized that the trial court erred in vacating the
amended final judgment of foreclosure. 29 The trial court had jurisdiction of
the unit owners because they constituted a class with a common interest
based on membership in Ciega Verde.
30
Ciega Verde's Declaration of Condominium stated that each unit owner
was a member of the condominium association while they owned the unit.
131
117. Id.
118. It
119. Id.
120. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1110.
121. Id. at 1111.
122. Id.
123. 1d.
124. Id.
125. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111.
126. let
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111; see FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.221.
131. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1111.
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When Ciega Verde authorized work to be performed on the common
grounds, it was understood that the unit owners consented to that
authorization. 132  As such, Graves' lien attached to each condo unit and
could be foreclosed.1
33
Each unit owner was not required to receive individual notice.134 It was
the condominium's board of directors' fiduciary and statutory obligation to
give unit owners notice of a lawsuit. 135 Graves' service upon Ciega Verde,
the class representative, was sufficient. 36 If the court wanted to require
notice to the individual members, it should have provided Graves adequate
time to do So.137
Perlow v. Goldberg 38  This court affirmed the order dismissing
owner's claims because the facts showed the directors could not be held
liable in their individual capacity. 39 Perlow sought personal judgments for
breach of fiduciary duty against Goldberg and Leb for "failure to properly
administer insurance proceeds." 14
The condominium association directors were immune from individual
liability absent fraud, self-dealing, or criminal activity.' 4 1 The court below
relied on Munder v. Circle One Condominium, Inc., which furthered this
rule. 43 This court agreed with that holding and stated the directors here
were neither unjustly enriched nor did they commit fraud or a crime. 44 At
most, the directors were negligent by failing to properly administrate
insurance proceeds from Hurricane Andrew."4 - This negligence was not
enough to create personal liability for the condominium directors1
46
The court also recognized that the owner's reliance on B & J Holding
Group v. Weiss147 was unwarranted because the directors in that case
deliberately engaged in self-dealing.148 That was not the situation here.
149
132. Id. at 1112.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 1112.
137. Id.
138. 700 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
139. Id. at 149.
140. Id.
141. Id.; see FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0831(1), 617.0834, 718.111(2) (1995).
142. 596 So. 2d 144 (Fa. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
143. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 353 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
148. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150; see B & J Holding Corp., 353 So. 2d at 142.
149. Perlow, 700 So. 2d at 150.
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Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condominium Ass'n, Inc.150 Kingswood E.
Condominium Association ("Kingswood") brought an arbitration proceeding
under section 718.1255 of the Florida Statutes, against unit owner Mary
Ruffm and her son, appellant Paul Ruffm.15 1 The reason for the arbitration
was that Kingswood alleged that Mary Ruffin and the appellant were in
violation of the condominium declarations.152 Kingswood requested the
Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominium and Mobiles Homes of the
Department of Business Regulation to issue an order requiring appellant as
tenant to vacate the premises and restrain him from further entry.153 The
appellant informed "the arbitrator that his mother had moved... and
therefore, the matter was moot."154 However, Kingswood wanted future
protection. So, the arbitrator issued an order that "Mr. Ruffm shall remain
away and off the condominium property. '55
The appellant filed a complaint for a trial de novo in circuit court and
Kingswood moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the case was
moot. 56 The circuit court entered the summary judgment and reserved
jurisdiction to assess attorneys' fees.157
The appellate court, sua sponte, considered the subject matter
jurisdiction of the arbitrator to have heard this action.15 The court looked at
section 718.1255(1) of the Florida Statutes,"5 9 and found that the arbitrator
had no subject matter jurisdiction.16 The arbitrator may only hear disputes
within its statutory authority and disputes that include disagreements
involving eviction or other removal are not within the arbitrator's statutory
authority. 161 Further, the appellant was not the owner of the unit and,
therefore, section 718.1255 did not cover disputes with the appellant.
62
Since the arbitrator lacked subject matter jurisdiction the trial de novo
was not moot. 6  If the appellant had not challenged the matter, the
arbitrator's order would have become final. 164 Therefore, this court reversed
150. 719 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
151. Id. at 952; See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (1995).
152. Ruffin, 719 So. 2d at 952.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Ruffin, 719 So. 2d at 952.
158. Id.
159. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(1) (1995).
160. Ruffin, 719 So. 2d at 953.
161. See id.
162. See id.; See Carlandia Corp. v. Obemauer, 695 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct.
App. 1997).
163. Ruffin, 719 So. 2d at 953.
164. Id.
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the final judgment and directed the trial court to enter an order vacating the
arbitrator's final order.
165
Current legislative changes include, but are not limited to, the
following:
Section 718.111(11)(d) of the Florida Statutes'66 now includes
subparagraph (d) which provides for the association to "maintain adequate
insurance or fidelity bonding of all persons who control or disburse funds of
the association."
167
Section 718.112(d)(8) of the Florida Statutes168 provides that, unless
the bylaws provide otherwise, any vacancy on the board of directors of the
association prior to the expiration of a term may be filled by a majority vote
of the remaining directors even though they may constitute less than a
quorum or by the sole remaining director.' 6  Alternatively, however, the
board may hold an election to fill the vacancy. 70
Section 718.503(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes'7' has been amended to
require that a unit owner who is not a developer shall include a copy of the
financial information required by section 718.111 in the disclosure
information presented to a prospective purchaser. 72 Likewise, a prospectus
or offering circular, per section 718.504'73 of the Florida Statutes, requiresthe same information to be included. 174
V. CONSTRUCTION
Gaston-Thacker General Partners v. School Board.175  The plaintiff
was the successful bidder on a school construction project. 176 The contract
required that a certain percentage of the subcontract work be allocated to
firms owned by hispanics, blacks, and women.17 ' To make it possible for the
plaintiff to satisfy that requirement, the school board agreed to make bi-
weekly progress payments to under financed subcontractors. As the
165. Id.
166. FLA. STAT § 718.111(11)(d) (1999).
167. Id.
168. Id. § 718.112(d)(8).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. FLA. STAT. § 718.503(2)(a) (1999).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 718.504.
174. Id.
175. 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D381 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 1999).
176. Id. at D381.
177. Id.
178. Id. at D382.
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project progressed, "it allegedly became clear to both parties that the
drawings, specifications, and addenda were flawed and could not be used for
the Project." 179 That resulted in extra work for plaintiff and in delays in the
progress payments to the subcontractors. 180 To keep them workinAl plaintiff
was forced to make their progress payments out of its funds. 1 When
payment was not forthcoming from the school board, the plaintiff brought
this suit in federal district court claiming: 1) breach of contract; 2)
rescission and restitution; and 3) quantum meruit.182  The school board
responded with a motion to dismiss based on the clause in the contract that
provided that, "[a]ll matters in dispute under this Contract and/or the
Contract Documents shall be resolved in the Circuit Court for the 11th
Judicial Circuit, In and For Dade County, Florida. 183 There was no doubt
that a forum selection clause can preclude removal of a claim to a federal
court.184 Furthermore, there was no allegation that this forum selection clause
was unreasonable or unjust, or that it had been procured by fraud or
overreaching.18 5  Nor was there an allegation that the clause failed to
unequivocally state the selected forum.8 6 Thus, there was no claim on which
the clause could have been held invalid. 187 Plaintiff's argument was that its
claims did not fit within reach of the clause and so it was free to bring these
claims in federal court.
88
That argument was rejected by Chief Judge Davis.189 Even though the
moving party had a heavy burden, the plaintiff could not survive the motion to
dismiss merely by arguing that these claims did not arise under the contract. 19°
Analysis of the term led to the contrary conclusion. 91 To interpret the contract
as plaintiff wanted would allow parallel claims to be litigated simultaneously
in state and federal court, and that could not have been what the parties
intended by this clause, particularly as the contract was the only basis for the
relationship out of which these claims arose. 192
179. Id.
180. Gaston-Thacker Gen. Partners, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D382.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. Gaston-Thacker Gen. Partners, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D382.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. atD382-83.
189. Id.
190. Gaston-Thacker Gen. Partners, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at D382-83.
191. Id. at 383.
192. Id.
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Sabal Chase Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Walt Disney World Co. 193 The
condominium was built between 1973 and 1978.194 In 1992, Hurricane
Andrew severely damaged the common areas.' 95 Consequently, in 1994, the
Homeowners' Association brought this action against, inter alia, the builder of
the condominium, claiming latent construction defects. 19 6  The trial court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the fifteen
year statute of repose provided by section 95.11(3)c) of the Florida
Statutes.'97 The Third District Court of Appeal 
affirmed., r
On appeal, the homeowners association unsuccessfully raised two
points. 199 The first was that the statute was inapplicable because it was
enacted in 1980, after the acts complained of had occurred.2 ° The statute had
originally been enacted in 1978, before the construction was completed, but
the enactment was held invalid because the legislature had failed to make an
express finding of overwhelming public necessity as required by the
constitution.20' The legislature cured that defect by reenacting the statute with
an express finding, having the effect that "all parts of the original statute which
were reenacted are deemed to have been in continuous effect.
' 2
The second point was that the fifteen years had not expired because the
time did not begin to run until the developer turned over control of the
association to the unit owners. M3 This argument was based on section
718.124 of the Florida Statutes which provides that, "[t]he statute of
limitations for any actions in law or equity which a condominium association
or a cooperative association may have shall not begin to run until the unit
owners have elected a majority of the members of the board of
administration." 2°4 The district court rejected this argument.205 It noted that
courts have clearly delineated the distinction between a statute of limitation
and a statute of repose.206 The fifteen year statute at issue here was clearly a
193. 726 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Mar. 24, 1999).
194. Id. at 797.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (Supp. 1980)).
198. Sabal Chase Homeowners'Ass'n, 726 So. 2d at 799.
199. Id. at 798.
200. Id. at 797-98.
201. Id. at 799 (citing Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979)).
202. Id. at 799.
203. Sabal Chase Homeowners'Ass'n, 726 So. 2d at 798.
204. Id. at 798 n.1 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.124 (1995)).
205. Id. at 799.
206. Id. at 798.
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statute of rqpose, therefore, section 718.124 was not applicable to delay its
application.
Judge Cope's dissent focused on the distinction of the statute of
limitations and the statute of repose considered in the majority's opinion.208
Judge Cope disliked the fact that the term statute of limitations is technically
distinguishable from a "statute of repose," but has been used generically to
include all statutes that impose time limits for bringing suit.m9 The Florida
Legislature seems to use the generic definition by including this statute of
repose in chapter ninety-five under the general term "statute of limitations. 210
In interpreting a statute, the critical question is what the legislature intended. 1
Furthermore, any doubt regarding the limit intended by the legislature, should
be resolved in favor of the longer period because limitations defenses are not
preferred.
212
VI. COOPERATIVES
Current legislative changes include, but are not limited to, the
following:
Section 719.103 of the Florida Statutes has added additional definitions
including those for "buyers," "common areas," and "conspicuous type. '213 A
"buyer" is one "who purchases a cooperative," and the words "purchaser"
and "buyer" may be ised interchangeably within the act.214 "Common areas"
now include, among other things, cooperative property which is not included
within the units.21 "Conspicuous type" means typing capital letters not
smaller than the largest type on the page on which it appears.2 16 Also, there
are additional definitions for "division," "limited common areas," "rental
agreement," and "residential cooperative.
217
Section 719.1035 of the Florida Statutes has been amended to require
that, upon creating a cooperative, the developer or association must record
the information with the division, on a division form, within thirty working
days.21
8
207. Id. at 799.
208. Sabal Chase Homeowners' Ass'n, 726 So. 2d at 799-801 (Cope, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 800.
210. Id. at 801.
211. Id. at 800-01.
212. Id. at 801.
213. FLA. STAT. § 719.103 (1999).
214. Id. § 719.103(4).
215. Id. §§ 719.103(7), (8)(a).
216. Id. § 719.103(11).
217. Id. §§ 719.103(17), (18), (20), (21).
218. FLA. STAT. § 719.1035 (1999).
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Section 719.104 of the Florida Statutes now includes subpart (10),
requiring the board to notify the division before an' action is taken that
would dissolve or merge the cooperative association.
Section 719.502(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes now includes a provision
that states:
[a] developer shall not close on any contract for sale or contract for
a lease period of more than 5 years until the developer prepares and
files with the division documents complying with the requirements
of this chapter and the rules promulgated by the division and until
the division notifies the developer that the filing is proper.
220
Further, any contract for sale or for a lease period of more than five years
shall not be closed on by the developer until all documents, as required by
section 719.503(1)Sb), are prepared and delivered by the developer to the
prospective buyer.
Section 719.503(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes has an added provision
requiring that:
[t]he developer shall not close for 15 days following the
execution of the agreement and delivery of the documents to the
buyer as evidenced by a receipt for documents signed by the buyer
unless the buyer is informed in the 15-day voidabilty period and
agrees to close prior to the expiration of the 15 days.
The developer must keep in its records "a separate signed agreement as proof
of the buyer's agreement to close prior to the expiration of the voidability
period."2
Section seven of Chapter 99-350 of the Laws of Florida adds section
718.105(5) to the 1999 Florida Statutes, reguiring the filing of a certificate
demonstrating all taxes have been fully paid. T2
219. Id. § 719.104(10).
220. Id. § 719.502(1)(a).
221. Id.
222. Id. § 719.503(1)(b).
223. FLA. STAT. § 719.503(1)(b) (1999).
224. Ch. 99-350, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 3589, 3589 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 718.105(5)
(1999)).
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VII. DEEDS, RESTRICTIONS, AND COVENANTS
Mora v. Karr.225 The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
temporary ijunction to the Moras, regarding a violation of deed
restrictions. Karr wished to purchase a home and rebuild so that it would
contain "a three car garage and a twenty five foot setback." 2 7 However,
deed restrictions only allowed a two car garage and required a thirty-five
foot setback.m Karr secured a waiver to those restrictions from the
developer and from adjacent property owners prior to the purchase. 2 9 After
closing, Mr. Mora, an adjacent property owner and attorney, wrote Karr a
letter stating that he would sue over the deed restrictions he waived. 0 Karr
continued with construction, and Mora sued.2 1
Both the trial court, and this court, denied injunctive relief to Mora. z2
The most compelling evidence was the fact that Mora waived the deed
restrictions prior to the construction, and that Karr relied on that waiver in
making the purchase.2
33
VIII. EASEMENTS
Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Florida East Coast Railway CoY'4 Final
judgment was entered which quieted title to certain property in favor of
Florida East Coast Railway Company ("FEC").235  The appellate court
reversed, finding that "Citgo was granted an express easement to construct
and maintain a pipeline on the subject property... and that Citgo's failure to
record this easement does not render it ineffectual against FEC since FEC
was on inquiry notice of its existence.
''236
The events giving rise to this dispute involved the expansion of the Fort
Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport and the resulting utilities
relocation. 7 Citgo's licensing contract with FEC provided them with the
"right and privilege" to operate a pipeline under FEC's main track, and
225. 697 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
226. Id at 888.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. L
230. Mora, 697 So. 2d at 888.
231. Ma
232. Id.
233. IM.
234. 706 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
235. Id. at 384.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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across their right-of-way. 238 FEC's right-of-way and Citgo's pipeline both
had to be repositioned when the airport was expanded.239  Citgo and
Florida's Department of Transportation ("DOT") agreed to reestablish the
pipeline. 2 0 The stipulated agreement stated that property rights along the
original pipeline belonged to Citgo. It also provided that Citgo transfer those
property rights to the DOT in exchange for allowing Citgo to reposition and
operate the pipeline on other DOT property.24'
Citgo informed FEC that the pipeline was to be reestablished across the
proposed relocation of FEC's right-of-way. 242  FEC sent Citgo the
appropriate engineering specifications, as well as an application for a new
licensing agreement.2A FEC remained adamant that, until it reached an
agreement with Broward County to reposition its rigt-of-way, it was unable
to consider granting Citgo a utility crossing permit.
FEC and Broward County eventually "reached an agreement with
Broward County to relocate the railroad track." 24 5 That agreement provided
that FEC would transfer its existing right-of-way, and in exchange retrieve a
replacement right-of-way to Broward County. 246 The parcels of land
comprising the new right-of-way were transferred to FEC, which promptly
247
recorded the quitclaim deed. Citgo did not maintain any easements on
record regarding this property.24 s
The new right-of-way was to be transferred to FEC "free and clear of
all encumbrances."2 49 However, FEC was required to "grant easements,
licenses, and permits to various utility companies.., to allow storm sewers,
fuel lines, and other appurtenances to cross the new right-of-way." 20 No
mention was made of the relocated Citgo pipeline.2 1
FEC sent Citgo an additional application for a licensin agreement.
As before, this licensing agreement was never executed. After FEC's
railroad tracks and Citgo's pipeline were fully completed, it was evident that
238. Id.
239. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 384.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 384.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 384.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 385.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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the railroad track was built between two of the pipeline's protruding vents 4
In response, FEC brought suit to quiet titleY
5
Citgo argued that it had an express easement due to the earlier
agreement with the DOT.' After the proceedings began, Citgo recorded a
Notice of Easement. 2 7 The court concluded that FEC was not on inquiry
notice of any "potential unrecorded easement," that Citgo was never ranted
an easement, and that Citgo's Notice of Easement was null and void. Citgo
appealed the court's final judgment.259
Under de novo review, the appellate court was convinced that the 1983
Agreement granted Ci o an express easement to operate and preserve the
reestablished pipeline. The court stated that "'[ain easement is the right in
one other than the owner of the land to use land for some particular purpose
or purposes.1'126 The applicable rule to determine whether the agreement
did in fact grant Citgo an easement, is that "'no particular form and language
are necessary to create an easement; rather, any words clearly showing the
intention of the parties to create a servitude on a sufficiently identifiable
estate is sufficient."' 262 No provision in the 1983 Agreement affirmatively
established that an easement was not intended.2 63 In fact, the court found the
DOT manifested an intent to grant Citgo an easement based on other
provisions in the agreement.2
4
The court also rejected FEC's argument that the easement was
ineffectual against FEC because of Citgo's failure to record it.265 In Florida,
the recording act subjects FEC to Citgo's ore-existing, unrecorded easement,
unless FEC was "without notice" of it.26P "If the circumstances known to
FEC when it acquired the subject property were 'such as should reasonably
suggest inquiry' into Citgo's property rights, then FEC is deemed to be on
'inquiry notice' of-and bound by-those encumbrances which would have
254. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 385.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 385.
260. Id.
261. Id. (quoting Dean v. MOD Properties, Ltd., 528 So. 2d 432,433 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1988)).
262. Id. (quoting Hynes v. City of Lakeland, 451 So. 2d 505, 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984)).
263. Id.
264. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 385.
265. Id.
266. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 695.01(2) (1995).
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been discovered upon a reasonable inquiry." 2  This court concluded that
"Citgo's actual, open, and obvious possession by construction of a
conspicuous pipeline placed FEC on inquiry notice of Citgo's easement." '268
H & F Land, Inc. v. Panama City-Bay County Airport & Industrial
District.269 The issue before the court was "whether the Marketable Record
Title Act (hereinafter MRTA) Chapter 712, of the Florida Statutes, operates
to extinguish an otherwise valid claim of an easement of necessity, when
such a claim has not been asserted within 30 years, as required by [the
Act]." 270
The appellate court recognized the general rule that a "landowner has a
right to access his land."271 However, it disagreed with H & F, the owner of
a landlocked estate, that its claim deserved different treatment from any
other claim of an interest in land which did not fall within an exception to
272the MRTA, and which had not been asserted in a timely matter.
The MRTA was devised to streamline conveyances of real property,
balance titles, and provide assurance to land ownership. 273 A party can only
blame himself if he fails to provide proper notice.274 The legislature
intended to afford a means to preserve old claims and interests, and to give a
reasonable time period to take steps to accomplish the purpose.275
Since the policies underlying the MRTA conflict with the public policy
that "lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or cultivation," the
court certified a question of great public importance:
DOES THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT, CHAPTER
712, FLORIDA STATUTES, OPERATE TO EXTINGUISH AN
OTHERWISE VALID CLAIM OF A COMMON LAW WAY OF
NECESSITY WHEN SUCH CLAIM WAS NOT ASSERTED
WITHIN 30 YEARS?276
267. Citgo, 706 So. 2d at 386 (citing Chatlos v. McPherson, 95 So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla.
1957)).
268. Id.
269. 706 So. 2d 327 (Ba. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
270. Id. at 327.
271. Id.; see Roy v. Euro-Holland Vastgoed, 404 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
272. H & F Land, Inc., 706 So. 2d at 328.
273. Id. (citing City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So. 2d 439,444 (Fla. 1978)).
274. IM
275. IM
276. Id
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Highland Constuction, Inc. v. Paquette.2 7 This court affirmed final
judgment granting Paquette an implied easement over Highland's
property. Paquette sued Highland requesting an implied easement be
granted over Vickers Street.279  Once Vickers Street was abandoned,
ownership reverted to Highland.280
With regard to determining the existence of an implied easement,
Florida adopted the "beneficial" or "complete enjoyment rule."281 This rule
states that.the grantee acquires the right to all streets in the plat advantageous
to him. 2 If the grantee can show he will suffer injury, differing in degree
and kind from everyone else, he is authorized to acquire an implied
easement.2 3 Paquette satisfied the beneficial enjoyment rule.2 4 Since they
operate two car businesses on their property, and Vickers Street was the only
viable entrance to these establishments, the loss of this access would impair
the business.285 As such, the implied easement was granted. 8 6
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Franchise Finance Corp. of America. 8 This
court reversed a final summary judgment that "declared a condition in a
nonexclusive easement unenforceable and void.' ' 8 Sears owns real property
where it operates a retail store, adjacent to a retail shopping center owned by
Bradenton Mall Associates ("Developer"). 289 Sears and Developer managed
their parcels under a joint Operating Agreement because they had adjacent
parcels and parking lots that were connected.29 Southern Homes Park, Inc.
("Southern"), a corporate affiliate of Developer, owned an "outparcel"
adjacent to the others but only accessible through the Sears parking lot.291 In
1987, Southern sold its outparcel to Suncoast Rax, Inc. ("Suncoast"), on the
condition that Southern acquired an ingress and egress easement to the
"outparcel" over a section of the Sears parking lot. At the same time,
Suncoast, was contracting to sell the "outparcel' and easement, if acquired,
277. 697 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1997).
278. 1& at236.
279. Id.
280. Id
281. Id.
282. Paquette, 697 So. 2d at 236.
283. Id
284. Id. at 237.
285. I&
286. Id.
287. 711 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
288. Id. at 1190.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1190.
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to the appellee, Franchise Finance Corporation of America ("F.F.C.A."). 293
However, F.F.C.A. agreed to lease the property back to Suncoast.
294
Developer and Sears agreed that Sears would grant the easement to
Suncoast, and Developer, in return, would sweep both the Developer parking
area and the Sears entire parking area. The easement provided:
The rights granted herein shall be perpetual, but shall expire in
the event that:
(iii) Developer... shall fail to sweep that portion of Grantor's
parcel devoted to customer parking and which includes the
Easement Parcel ("Parking Parcel") as shown in yellow on Exhibit
C hereto. Grantor, its employees, agents or contractors shall upon
written notice to both Developer and Grantee, have the right, at its
cost and expense, to sweep the Parking Parcel. In the event that
after notice Developer and/or Grantee fails to or refuses to cure,
Grantor shall have the right to terminate the easements granted
herein by filing a Notice of Termination of Easement in the Public
Records of Manatee County, Florida, thirty (30) days, after written
notice to both Grantee and Bradenton.
296
In 1990, Suncoast went out of business and F.F.C.A. terminated the
297lease. In November, 1992, Developer sent F.F.C.A. an invoice for the
298
annual cost of sweeping the Sears parking area. Developer notified
F.F.C.A. that if the invoice was not paid, the Developer would cease
sweeping the Sears parking area.299 F.F.C.A. refused to pay the invoice, and
fearing that Sears may want to terminate the easement, brought its
declaratory action to have the "sweeping" condition proclaimed void and
unenforceable. 300 The trial court declared the forfeiture provision
unenforceable under section 689.18 of the Florida Statutes because it
provides that "reverter or forfeiture provisions of unlimited duration in the
conveyance of real estate or any interest therein in the state constitute an
unreasonable restraint on alienation and are contrary to the public policy of
the state."3 '
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1190.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1191.
300. Id.
301. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1999).
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The appellate court rejected this argument, because a grant of easement
is not a conveyance of a proprietary interest in real property."° An easement
only grants the right to use property for some particular purpose, and does
not transfer title to land or disinherit the owner of the land subject to
easement. 303 Therefore, this court concluded that "a specified condition to
the continuance of an easement agreed upon by the parties... is not an
encumbrance to the marketability of title to real estate" which is meant to be
protected by section 689.18 of the Florida Statutes.304 Easements that cease
upon the occurrence of a clearly defined condition have been recognized in
the past. °5
Furthermore this court found it was an error of the trial court to apply
section 689.18. 3  Even if it did apply, the forfeiture provision would only
become void twenty-one years after the granting of the easement, because
section 689.18 (3) and (4) provide that the provisions do not become void
until twenty-one years after the conveyance has passed. °7
Shiner v. Baita.318  Shiner sought to terminate a real property right
reserved by Baita through a deed given by Baita to Shiner's predecessor in
interest.3°9 A reservation was placed in the deed by Baita, the original
grantor of the property which stated:
Grantors reserve to themselves, their heirs and assigns the right to a
hook-up to septic tank located on the land herein conveyed, said
septic tank being located to the Southeast of the acre being retained
by the Grantors herein with the understanding that responsibility of
maintaining said septic tank shall remain with the Grantors, their
heirs and assigns, and for purposes of maintenance the Grantors,
their heirs and assigns, shall have the right to ingress and egress to
maintain said septic tank. It is understood this reservation of use of
the septic tank is to continue indefinitely but that should Grantee,
his successors or assigns determine later that connection to septic
tank interferes with use of property herein conveyed, Grantee, his
successors or assigns shall have the right to pay expenses necessary
to construct a septic tank on the premises which are herein reserved
302. Sears,711 So. 2d at 1191.
303. Id.; see Easton v. Appler, 548 So. 2d 691,696 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1989); see also
Dean v. MOD Properties, Ltd., 528 So. 2d 432,433 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
304. Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1191.
305. Id.; see Dotson v. Wolfe, 391 So. 2d 757,759 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1980).
306. Sears, 711 So. 2d at 1192.
307. Id. (citing EtR. STAT. §§ 689.18(3), (4) (1987)).
308. 710 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1998).
309. Id. at 711.
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by the Grantors, and then in that event, this right of hook-up to
septic tank shall cease and be of no further force and effect.
310
Shiner elected to construct a septic tank on the property still held by
Baita, because she believed she had the right to do so after acquiring the
311property. Shiner felt that this action would end the reserved right for
Baita's septic tank hook up.312 Baita, who intended to develop a mobile
home park, disputed Shiner's view.313
The lower court found the restrictive covenant to be ambiguous, and
Shiner's septic tank would deprive Baita of using her property. 314 Therefore,
the lower court held that Shiner could not take any action regarding the
septic tank that would deprive Baita from using and enjoying herproperty.1 5
The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision. First, the
court found that a restrictive covenant did not exist.317 Rather, a reservation
existed and that the deed created an easement, not a restrictive covenant.
318
Although an easement is often permanent, it does not have to be, and may in
fact end upon the happening of a condition.
319
When there is a grant of easement, "'[t]he intent of the parties... is
determined by a fair interpretation of the language."'' 320 When the language
is unambiguous, the court must look at the plain meaning.321 This court
found that there was no ambiguity in the language of the deed, and it clearly
shows that if the grantee determines that the septic tank interferes with their
use of the property, they may construct a septic tank on the property and the
hook-up septic tank shall cease. 322  Therefore, because "'[tihe easementholder cannot expand the easement beyond what was contemplated at the
310. Id. at 711-12.
311. Id. at 712.
312. Id.
313. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 713.
317. Id. at 712.
318. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712; see Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d
834, 836 (Fla. 1969).
319. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712; see Dotson v. Wolfe, 391 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1980).
320. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712 (quoting Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
321. Id. at 712; see Richardson v. Deerwood Club, Inc., 589 So. 2d 937, 939 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
322. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 712.
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time it was granted, ' ''3 3 the appellate court held that the appellant is
permitted to enforce the unambiguous provisions and reversed the lower
court's order.324
IX. ELECrIVE SHARE
Chapter 99-343 of the Laws of Florida provides numerous changes to
section 732 of the Florida Statutes, including, but not limited to, expanding
the elective share right to various assets not included in the probate estate.
3 -
X. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Condemnation
1. In General
Buried in 1999 Fla. Laws. ch 385, a huge act relating to the DOT,326 are
some significant changes to the eminent domain statutes.327  The most
important changes are that section 73.015(1) of the Florida Statutes will
require every condemner to: 1) provide the landowner with notice by
certified mail of the planned taking; 2) make a written offer to buy the land;
and 3) negotiate in good faith before filing the condemnation
petition. The condemner is also required to notify the owners of
businesses located on the land.329 The condemner will no longer be allowed
to take an entire property when that is not needed for the condemner's
project, but taking the whole would be cheaper because that approach would
avoid having to pay business damages.330 Section 73.015(4) of the Florida
Statutes will provide for attorneys' fees and costs when the parties reach
323. Id. at 712-13 (quoting Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1984)); Fields v. Nichols, 482 So. 2d 410,414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
324. Shiner, 710 So. 2d at 713.
325. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-343 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 732 (1999)).
326. Under article III, section 5 of the Florida Constitution, a legislative act is limited
to one subject. If this act satisfies the one subject rule, then the rule is entirely meaningless.
327. For further discussion see Bain, supra, note 4, at 68.
328. Ch. 99-385, § 57(1), 1999 Fla. Laws 3820, 3823 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.23
(1999)).
329. Id. § 57(2), 1999 Fla. Laws at 3825 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 206.45 (1999)).
330. FLA. STAT. § 337.27(2) (1999) has been eliminated; Ch. 99-385, § 64, 1999 Fla.
Laws 3820, 3826-27 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 215.615 (1999)).
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agreement without litigating, 331 however, the condemnee will no longer be
able to recover prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees and costs. 332
Boulis v. Florida Department of Transportation.333  At trial, the
condemnee succeeded in winning a verdict that valued the land substantially
higher than the Department of Transportation had claimed.334 As costs, the
condemnee was awarded expert witness fees, but the trial court denied his
claim for prejudgment interest on that amount.335 The Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed but the decision was reversed by a unanimous Supreme
Court of Florida.136
The holding was narrow.33 7 "[P]rejudgment interest is to be awarded on
reasonable costs in eminent domain proceedings, but only from the date
those costs were actually paid and only after the trial court makes a
determination of entitlement to the costs."'338 The decision was based upon
the mandate of the Florida Constitution that the state pay "full
compensation" for property taken,339 and the statute that provides for "all
reasonable costs incurred.' 34  The court clarified that, "Boulis should be
awarded prejudgment interest from the date of payment once the trial court
determines reasonable entitlement. ' 341 This is consistent with the supreme
court's earlier determination that prejudgment interest could be awarded on
attorneys' fees in appropriate cases. 4 2  However, the legislature reacted
quickly and tried to overrule Boulis:343 It will be interesting to see if that
will be successful. 3 4
331. Ch. 99-385, § 57(4), 1999 Fla. Laws 3820, 3825 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 73.091
(1999)).
332. Id. § 60, 1999 Fla. Laws at 3880 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1999)).
333. 733 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1999).
334. Id. at 960-61.
335. Id. at 961.
336. Id. at 961, 963.
337. Boulis, 733 So. 2d at 963.
338. Id.
339. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
340. FLA. STAT. § 73.091(1) (1999).
341. Boulis, 733 So. 2d at 962 (emphasis added).
342. Quality Eng'd Installation, Inc. v. -igley, Inc., 670 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1996). In
contrast, the supreme court held, in Lee v. Wells Fargo Armored Services, 707 So. 2d 700, 702
(Fla. 1998), that prejudgment interest on attorneys' fees was not available in workers
compensation cases due to the language of Section 440.34(1) of the Florida Statutes. Lee, 707
So. 2d at 702.
343. Ch. 99-385, § 60, 1999 Fla. Laws 3820, 3880 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 73.091
(1999)).
344. See the statutory changes discussed supra at notes 3-7.
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Blockbuster Video, Inc. v. Florida Dpartment of Transportation.3 45
The tenant operated a store in a strip mall. When the landlord decided to
sell the mall, it kept an outparcel and agreed to relocate the tenant to a new
building there.347 When the new building was ready, the tenant's inventory
was shifted to it, about fifty feet away. The business was shut down for
only a few hours during the move. The business reopened with the same
address, the same telephone number and the same customers.350
Later, the DOT took a section of the store and parking lot in a road
widening project. The tenant claimed statutory business damages.352 The
trial court granted the DOT's motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the store had not operated in that location for five years, as required by
the statute.53 The tenant appealed on the grounds that it met the statutory
five-year period, when including its period of occupying the original store in
the calculation. 54
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding the summary
judgment as inappropriate.Y5 5 It acknowledged that recovery of business
damages was a matter of "legislative largess," and therefore, should be
strictly construed.35 6 However, it considered the legislative purpose behind
the statute and the plain meaning of "location" more convincing. 357 "Any
reasonable definition of 'location' creates only one location for [the tenant]
under the facts in this case. 358 Moreover, it rejected application of the
"parent tract" as the applicable test, holding that it is a doctrine used in
determining whether severance damages could be recovered, and having no
application to a business damages determination.3 9
Grandpa's Park, Inc. v. Florida Department of Transportation.2
When the DOT took 0.665 acres from Grandpa's Park, it claimed damages
for the diminution in value of its remaining 107 acres due to downzoning
345. 714 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
346. Id. at 1223.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Blockbuster, 714 So. 2d at 1223.
351. Id.
352. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)0b) (1995).
353. Blockbuster, 714 So. 2d at 1223.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1225.
356. d at 1223-24.
357. Id. at 1224.
358. Blockbuster, 714 So. 2d at 1224.
359. Id.
360. 726 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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and impairment of access resulting from the elimination of its two access
routes. 36 The trial court denied recovery, and the district court affirmed.362
Regarding the downzone claim, the court noted that the general rule is
that the value of the condemned property is based on the facts existing at the
time of the taking, but there is an exception when the property value at that
time is depressed by the market's anticipation of that taking. 36 3 However,
Grandpa's Park did not fit into that exception because, at the trial court level,
the DOT had not influenced the city to downzone the land, nor had the city
downzoned it in anticipation of the taking of the 0.665 acres.
364
The claim for diminution in value of the land retained was also
rejected. 365 The rule is that a partial taking does not entitle a person to
compensation for a decrease in the value of land retained. 66 The exception
to this rule is where the land taken "'constitutes an integral and inseparable
part of a single use to which the land taken and other adjoining land is
put.'',367 The court found this exception inapplicable because the loss of
access was not caused by diminishing access from an abutting road.368 The
court concluded Grandpa's "theory that, in effect, it has been deprived of all
reasonable use of the properl, is more appropriate in the context of an
inverse condemnation claim.
' 3
Judge Booth dissented.370 He noted that the effect of the downzoning
and condemnation was to leave Grandpa's with a 107-acre tract of land on
which he is able to construct two residences, with no permitable access.3 7'
Moreover, Judge Booth argued that the majority had misread the law on
decreasing land value, due to the threat of condemnation, by focusing on the
actual filing of the condemnation rather than the announcement of intent to
condemn. Thus, "[flactual issues existing as to these matters were
improperly removed from the jury's consideration."373
361. Id. at 790.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Grandpa's Park, 726 So. 2d at 791.
366. Id.
367. Id. (quoting Lee County v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 417 So. 2d 268, 269 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Grandpa's Park, 726 So. 2d at 791. (Booth, J., dissenting).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 793.
373. Id. at 791.
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Seminole County v. Sanford Court Investors, Ltd.374  The County
engaged in a road widening project that required taking part of the parking
lot owned by Cumberland Farms.37 5 At that time, Cumberland had two
tenants, Deis and Hancock.376 Deis' original written lease had expired and
377he was then under a month to month lease. Hancock was under an
extension of its original lease.378 More than two years after the filing of the
condemnation action, Cumberland Farms notified these tenants that their
leases were being terminated so it could build itself a new larger store.3 79 In
a letter to Deis, Cumberland Farms stated, but for the condemnation, Deis
would have continued to be its "tenant for the indefinite future. 380
In the condemnation proceeding, Deis and Hancock sought business
damages.381 Their expert witness was allowed to testify about their business
damages, calculated on the theory that their leases would be continually
renewed for the indefinite future. 38  He based this on the past history of
renewals by Cumberland Farms. 83 The district court found that the
384admission of this testimony amounted to error.
Business damages are provided by statute, not by constitutional
mandate.385 A statute providing such legislative largess is to be narrowly
construed. Consequently, a tenant is entitled to recover business damages
based only upon its leasehold interest at the time of the taking.386 Thus, Deis
was entitled to business damages suffered over a one month period, and
Hancock was entitled to business damages until the lease was properly
terminated by the landlord, prior to the end of its current term.38
The district court also found the trial court had erred in allowing, as
business damages, the losses suffered when the tenants auctioned off their
inventory and other personal property in order to vacate the premises.38 8 The
tenants never presented "any evidence [showing that] they were required to
374. 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1056 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1999) (the opinion cited was
later withdrawn and superceded on clarification by Seminole County v. Sanford Court Investors,
743 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
375. Id. at D1056.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Sanford, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1056.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Sanford, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1056.
385. Id.; See FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1995).
386. Sanford, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1056.
387. Id. at D1057.
388. Id.
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389Th
move their business property as a result of the County's taking. They
were vacating because the landlord had terminated their leases, and
apparently, the district court did not consider the "but for" letter sufficient to
establish the causal connection between the taking and the landlord's
decision to terminate.
390
Florida Department of Transportation v. Powell.391 The DOT brought
this condemnation action as part of a project funded by the Federal Highway
392Administration. Naegele owned a billboard and leased space for it on the
land that was being taken. 393 This qualified as a nonconforming use because
a new ordinance prohibiting off site signs was enacted. 3 4 Thus, he could not
move his sign to another location.395 Since federal funds were involved, the
Federal Uniform Relocation Act396 applied, and Naegele was entitled to
compensation under it.397  The trial court ruled that the federal statute
required separate trials, one for the billboard taking and the other for the
taking of the freehold.398  The district court disagreed, but refused to
reverse.399 The Federal Uniform Relocation Act did abrogate the unity rule
under which the value of the property taken must be calculated and then
apportioned between the owners of the various interests. 4 However, it only
required that the jury consider the value of the leasehold separately, and that
could be accomplished without separate trials.401 In this record, the trial
court, in an exercise of its discretion, could have severed the billboard
taking, thus holding separate trials did not amount to reversible error.402
On appeal, the DOT challenged the admission of expert valuation
testimony that utilized the gross rent multiplier approach. 403  The DOT
claimed that the method allowed, in effect, the recovery of business damages
that were not provided for by the statute, which only allowed recovery of
"just compensation." 4°4 The district court rejected this argnment.4 5 When a
389. Id.
390. Id. For the same reason, the tenants' claim for moving expenses was rejected. Id
391. 721 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
392. Id. at 796.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. 42 U.S.C. § 4652 (1994).
397. Powell, 721 So. 2d at 796-97.
398. Id. at 797.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Powell, 721 So. 2d at 797-98.
403. Id. at 798.
404. Id.
405. Id.
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structure has been taken, the statute allows the owner to recover the greater
of the fair market value of the structure or the amount the structure
contributes to the value of the land.406 The statute did not provide the
method by which these values were to be calculated. Naegele's expert used
both an income approach and a market approach, based on the gross rent
multiplier, to calculate the fair market value of the structure.4w The two
methods produced approximately the same result.408 Therefore, it was not
error to allow the gross rent multiplier testimony into evidence. 4w
2. Quick Taking
Florida Department of Transportation v. Barbara's Creative
Jewelry.4 10 The DOT began a road widening project.411 It decided to take
appellee's entire parcel, because a study that the DOT performed indicated
that it would ultimately cost less than apartial taking, which would include
the payment of severance damages.4 1  By statute, the legislature has
recognized that reducing the costs of a property acquisition is a public
413purpose that justified taking the additional land. However, the owner
objected, and argued that a partial taking would not be more expensive.414
Logically, determining which would be more expensive involved calculating
out what the condemnation award would be for both a partial taking and a
full taking. The trial judge reasoned that valuation of the property in
eminent domain was a jury question, thus determining which was more
416
expensive was also a jury question. Therefore, the judge denied the
petition for a quick taking. 17 The Fourth District reversed. 
18
The condemning authority has the burden of showing that there was a
reasonable necessity for condemnation.4 19 Whether or not the authority has
406. Id.
407. Powell, 721 So. 2d at 798.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. 728 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, Murphy v. Florida
Dept. of Trans., 744 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1999).
411. Id. at241.
412. Id.
413. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 337.27(2) (1995).
414. Barbara's Creative Jewelry, 728 So. 2d at 241.
415. Id. at 242.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at243.
419. Barbara's Creative Jewelry, 728 So. 2d at 242 (citing Lakeland v. Bunch, 293 So.
2d 66, 69 (Fla. 1974)).
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met that burden is a question for the court.420 Here, the DOT presented the
testimony of the engineers on the road project, who professed the need for
some of the land.42' The DOT then presented the testimony of appraisers and
accountants. 422 They testified that taking only the land needed for the road
widening project would result in a greater expense to the state than would
taking the entire parcel. 42 Consequently, the DOT had met its burden.424
The burden then shifted to the objecting landowner to show bad faith or
an abuse of discretion by the condemning authority.42 5 These were also
questions for the court.42 They did not involve final determinations of what
compensation would be paid to the condemnee.427  Here, the landowner
presented a "viable position"428 that the partial taking would be cheaper, but
that did not satisfy their burden which required a showing that the DOT acted
in bad faith or abused its discretion.429 Consequently, the trial judge should
not have denied the quick taking.430
Judge Polen wrote the dissenting opinion.43' He observed that the
majority opinion was at odds with the plain language of the statute.432
Furthermore, he was concerned that a due process violation would result if the
court allowed the taking, and a jury subsequently determined that a partial
taking would have been cheaper. 3 Thus, there would be no publicgUrpose to
justify taking more than the condemning authority was going to use. In light
of these thoughtful arguments, it is hoped that the supreme court will answer
the certified question:
WHERE CONDEMNATION UNDER SECTION 337.27(2),
FLORIDA STATUTES, IS REQUESTED, AND THE
PROPERTY OWNER DISPUTES THE RELATIVE VALUES OF
A WHOLE TAKE OVER A PARTIAL TAKE, MAY A TRIAL
COURT DENY A QUICK TAKING UNDER SECTION 74.031,
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Barbara's Creative Jewelry, 728 So. 2d at 242.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Barbara's Creative Jewelry, 728 So. 2d at 242.
430. Id. at 243.
431. Id. (Polen, J., dissenting).
432. Id. at 244; see FLA. STAT. § 337.27(2) (1995).
433. Powell, 728 So. 2d at 244.
434. Id.
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FLORIDA STATUTES, AND DEFER THE QUESTION OF THE
EXTENT OF THE TAKE UNTIL A JURY DETERMINES THE
VALUE OF BOTH A WHOLE TAKE AND A PARTIAL TAKE
OF THE PROPERTY?435
B. Inverse Condemnation
Hernando County v. Anderson.436 Billboards were located on land that
the county acquired. 437 The county destroyed them without giving their
owners any notice or opportunity to remove them.438 The owners brought
this suit against the county for compensation. 439 "In Florida, billboards are
considered personal property rather than realty."" 0 Consequently, acquisi-
tion of the land did not include title to the billboards, and the county was
held liable for taking this private property.
441
Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investors.44 - The county condemned
a lot in a residential mobile home community and paid compensation to the
lot owner.443 The plaintiff in this case runs the community's country club.
44 4
Under the recorded Declaration of Conditions, Covenants, Restrictions and
Reservations, each purchaser of a lot in the mobile home community was
required to pay a monthly recreational fee to the country club, in exchange
for the right to use the club's recreational facilities.445 The effect of the
condemnation was to give the county title to that lot, free of the burden of
paying that monthly fee.446 The plaintiff characterized this as a taking of its
private property for public use, and therefore, demanded compensation in
this inverse condemnation action.447 The circuit court, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal,448 and the Supreme Court of Florida all agreed.449
435. Id. at 243.
436. 737 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 19
437. Id. at 569.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Anderson, 737 So. 2d at 569.
442. 734 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1999).
443. Id. at 380.
444. Id.
445. Id. at380-81.
446. Id.
447. Cove Club Investors, 734 So. 2d at 380.
448. Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investo
App. 1997).
449. Cove Club Investors, 734 So. 2d at 381.
99), review denied, (July 21, 1999).
irs, Ltd., 692 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
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The court noted that the loss of the benefit of every covenant will not
result in a compensable taking.45°  Thus, if the lot was taken in a
development that was the subject of mutual restrictive covenants, the owners
of the other lots would not have a claim for compensation due solely to the• . 451
loss of that one lot from the scheme of restrictions. Nor would the owner
of a franchise, such as the right to supply gas to the homes in the
development, have a valid claim for compensation when one of the home
lots was taken in an eminent domain action.452 The court went to great
lengths to point out that this case was different.453 Here, each lot owner had
a right of access to the club's property, and the club was still required to
provide those facilities to the remaining lot owners, in reliance on its income
from those fees.454 Moreover, the club had a corresponding right to a lien on
any lot whose owner failed to pay the fees.455 Consequently, the club had
more than mere contract rights. The club had lost property and
compensation must be paid for it. Senior Justice Overton found this
distinction unconvincing.457 To him, this was just one more provider of
services who had lost a customer, and not a situation requiring the payment
458
of compensation. 4 5
City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc.4 9 The Nuisance Abatement Board was
faced with the difficult problem of abating prostitution and drug use at a
motel.460 A series of limited solutions, including partial closures, failed to
cure the problem, so the Board issued a six month closure order that was
enforced by an injunction issued by the circuit court.461 The motel's owner
sought compensation, alleging that it had been deprived of all economic use
of its property for the six month period.462 "We are faced with a deceptively
simple-appearing question: whether the owners are required to be
compensated by the City for a valid exercise of the City's power to abate
nuisances because that exercise deprived the owners, at least temporarily, of
450. Id. at 383.
451. Id.
452. See id.
453. Justice Anstead wrote the majority opinion. Id.
454. Cove Club Investors, 734 So. 2d at 381.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 390 (Overton, J., dissenting).
458. Id.
459. 717 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review granted, 729 So. 2d 392 (Fla.
1999).
460. Id. at 602.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 603.
[Vol. 24:267
302
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Brown/Grohman
all economic use of their property." 463 The court concluded that Lucas
provided the controlling law, but still found that compensation was not
required.4 54 "[T]he record reflects that the motel was, in reality, not a motel,
but rather a brothel and drug house which the owners, for whatever reason,
failed to stop operating on their property."46- These were public nuisances
that were not protected by the common law.46 The owner had no riht to
continue them and their continuation could be prohibited by the city. W  No
compensation would be required if shutting down the motel was the only
468
method to stop these uses. In fact, these activities had become
"inextricably intertwined with the motel."469
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District.470  The
landowner wanted to develop a portion of his property.4 1 To do so, he
needed a permit to dredge 3.4 acres of wetlands, along with a wetland
resource management permit.47 2 The Water Management District indicated
it would issue the permits if he would deed part of his land to the district,
and also replace culverts over four miles away as offsite mitigation.473 He
refused to perform the offsite mitigation, so the district denied his permit
application. As a result, Koontz filed this suit claiming inverse
condemnation.474
The Water Management District raised the defense of ripeness.475 It
claimed that he could have, and should have, attempted to make additional
filings, offering different concessions, until an agreement could be reached
so he could obtain his permits.476 The trial court found this argument.... 477convincing, but the district court reversed. Quite simply,
[t]here is no requirement that an owner turned down in his effort to
develop his property must continue to submit offers until the
463. Id.
464. Keshbro, 717 So. 2d at 604 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992)).
465. Id.
466. Id. at 605.
467. See id.
468. Id. at 604-05.
469. Keshbro, 717 So. 2d at 602.
470. 720 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 729 So. 2d 394 (Fla.
1999).
471. Id. at 561.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Koontz, 720 So. 2d at 561.
476. Id. at 562.
477. Id.
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governing body finally approves one before he can go to court. If
the governing body finally turns down an application and the owner
does not desire to make any further concessions in order to
possibly obtain an approval, the issue is ripe.478
In a footnote, the court distinguished this case from Williamson Co.
Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank,479 where the landowner could have
480
applied for a variance but had not done so.
South Florida Water Management Distric. v. Basore of Florida, Inc.
Basore was growing lettuce on its farm when a big storm hit.482 It claimed
that its lettuce crop was damaged by flooding, resulting from the high water
levels in the District's canals thwarting its efforts to pump water off its
fields. 8 3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected its claim that a taking
had occurred.48 The court recognized that a governmental taking of
personal property would require compensation, but concluded that these
damaged crops were part of the realty. 485 At best, the flooding might have
amounted to a temporary taking of the land, but that argument had never
been raised by Basore. 486 Consequently, there was no basis for relief under
the taking clause.48 7 Basore would have to base any claim for relief on a tort
theory, e.g., declaring that the district had been neligent in not reducing the
water levels enough in the canal before the storm.
Town of Jupiter v. Alexander.489 The claimant contracted to buy vacant
land in June, 1988.490 The land consisted of a parcel on the shore and an
island about 500 yards from the mainland.491 Due to problems with the
zoning of the island, she was not able to finalize her plan to build on the
mainland and the island until late 1991.492 She sued for a temporary taking
478. Id.
479. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
480. Koontz, 720 So. 2d at 562 n.2 (citing Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v.
Hanilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 187-88 (1985)).
481. 723 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 740 So. 2d 527 (Fla.
1999).
482. Id. at 288.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 289.
486. Basore, 723 So. 2d at 288.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 290.
489. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2139 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 729 So. 2d 389
(Fla. 1999).
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at D2140.
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of her land during that period.493 The district court concluded that she had
not been deprived of all use of her land when considering it as one parcel,
and that was appropriate, even though they were not physically contiguous,
because: 1) they were to be put to one integrated use; 2) one owner owned
both parcels, i.e., there was unity of ownership; and 3) they were to be
treated by their owner as one integrated tract.494 In fact, the highest and best
use of the island could only be achieved if the island was developed jointly
with the mainland tract.495 The owner was not prevented from using the
mainland tract while the approvals were obtained for the island portion,
. 496therefore, so there was no taking. This seems oddly like a Catch-22,
because it would have been unreasonable for the owner to proceed with her
plans on the mainland without knowing if she would ever get the island
portion approved.497 She could have found herself stuck with structures
intended for supporting island use, which may have never occurred, and this
would have put her plans for the entire tract on hold.
498
XI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The City of Jacksonville v. American Environmental Services, Inc.499
The court addressed the lower court judge's declaratory statement
concerning the applicability and validity of the local certificate of need
("CON") application ordinances.500 This court affirmed the lower court's
decision and held American Environmental Services could not be compelled
to procure a local CON from the City of Jacksonville.
50 1
Jacksonville's CON ordinances, as applied to American Environmental
Services proposed hazardous waste transfer station, conflicted with chapter
403 of the Florida Statutes.502 The Jacksonville ordinance requires a
violation of local need, and ordains a condition requiring that the waste only
be of the type produced in Duval County.
503
In comparison, chapter 403 of the Florida Statutes documents a
statewide need for hazardous waste facilities, and ponders regional facilities
493. Id.
494. Alexander, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2140-41.
495. Id. at D2141.
496. Id.
497. See id.
498. See id.
499. 699 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997), review denied, 717 So. 2d 529 (Fla.
1998).
500. Id. at 256.
501. Id
502. Id.; See FLA. STAT. § 403.7225(8) (1995).
503. American EnvtL Servs., Inc., 699 So. 2d at 256.
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for the transfer, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste.5 4 The City of
Jacksonville can not prevent the facility by determining lack of local need,
even though statutes refer to local assessments of hazardous waste
management. 0 5 Local assessments have the puo ose of collecting
information for an evaluation of need within the state.
5
Local governments cannot enact an ordinance relating to the subject of
hazardous waste regulation more stringent than section 403.507 Pursuant to
chapter 403, local governments can control the zoning of such hazardous
waste, and ordain requisite conditions to protect the health, safety, and
508welfare of citizens. However, it may not implement a further obligation to
satisfy a test for local need .5
Secret Oaks Owner's Ass'n v. Department of Environmental
Protection.51°  The final order of the Department of Environmental
Protection ("DEP") denied the association the right to request a permit to
build a dock on sovereign land.511 This court concluded that the association
had a "sufficient title interest" in the uplands for the purpose of obtaining
authorization to build a dock, and thus, the final order was reversed.512
This is the third appeal involving the two parties in dispute here, the
association and the Parlatos. 1 3 This brief pertains solely to the last
appeal.514 The association, through Environmental Services, Inc., filed an
application with the DEP for the pernits needed to build the dock.515 This
was the issue of the prior appeal. 16 The application solicited a dredge fill
permit and authorization from the state, as owner of the submerged lands, to
assemble such dock.5 17 Almost a year later, the DEP denied the application
and stated that the holder of an easement does not have sufficient title
504. Id. at 256; see FLA. STAT. § 403.7225(7), (8) (1995); FLA. STAT. § 403.723 (1995).
505. American Envtl. Servs., Inc., 699 So. 2d at 256.
506. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 403.7225 (1995).
507. American Envtl. Servs., Inc., 699 So. 2d at 256; see FLA. STAT. § 403.7225(10)
(1995).
508. American EnvtI. Servs., Inc., 699 So. 2d at 257; see Escambia County v.Trans.
Pac., 584 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1991).
509. American Envtl. Servs., Inc., 699 So. 2d at 257.
510. 704 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review dismissed, 719 So. 2d 288
(Fla. 1998).
511. Id. at 703.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. See id.
515. Secret Oaks Owner's Ass'n, 704 So. 2d at 704.
516. Id.
517. Id.
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interest to make an application for activities pertaining to submerged
lands.18
In return, Secret Oaks requested a formal hearing. The hearing
officer determined that there were no material issues of fact, and thus,
ordered the case back to the agency for an informal hearing.5 The director
at the informal hearing stated the issue as whether the association, as the
holder of an easement, is among the class of persons permitted to file a
request to perform activities on state-owned sovereign submerged lands. 21
The director issued a lengthy order regarding such issue.5
The DEP framed the issue as follows:
[W]hether the Association, as the holder of recorded contractual
rights to construct, maintain and use all docks on lot 10, and,
concomitantly, to limit the rights of any owner or lessee of lot 10,
is precluded from applying for a permit to construct a dock because
the rule requirement of "sufficient title interest in uplands for the
intended purpose" means the appellant must have a possessory
interest in the upland property.5z
In this case, the Owners' Agreement and the recorded easement on lot
ten provided that lot owners in the Secret Oaks Subdivision were granted
pedestrian access to the St. John's River and to any dock that is situated or
may later be situated thereon.524 The Association was obligated to improve,
repair, or maintain the easement.
525
The DEP relies on the definition of "title interest" as set forth in
Black's Law Dictionary: Title is defined as, "the means whereby the owner
of lands has the just possession of his property. The union of all the
elements which constitute ownership. Full independent and fee ownership[;]
The right to or ownership in land ... ,,526 Just because title can be the
means to receive right of possession, that does not dictate that all possessory
interests are title interests.527 This case clearly shows that the associationhas recorded contractual rights in lot ten adequate to grant the right to
518. Id.
519. Id. at 705.
520. Secret Oaks Owner's Ass'n, 704 So. 2d at 705.
521. Id
522. Id.
523. Id at 706.
524. I
525. Secret Oaks Owner'sAss'n, 704 So. 2d at 706.
526. Id. at 707; see BLACK's LAW DIcIONARY 1485 (6th ed. 1990).
527. Secret Oaks Owner's Ass'n, 704 So. 2d at 707.
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528construct the dock. If the language "sufficient title interest in the uplands"
meant only "right of possession," the Agency would have specified.
In addition, the DEP offers no reason why a possessory interest is the
only possible "title interest," or why "possessory" interests would be the
minimum "sufficient title interest" for dockbuilding permit application.530
This court viewed the Agency's interpretation as illogical and
unreasonable. 531  To interpret "title interest" as meaning "right of
possession" creates irrational distinctions.532
XII. HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATIONS
Section 617.303 of the Florida Statutes has a new subsection (8).
This subsection provides that "[a]ll association funds held by a developer
shall be maintained separately in the association's name." 534 There shall be
no commingling of reserve and operating funds prior to turnover.535
However, the association may jointly invest reserve funds, even though the
invested funds must be accounted for separately.536
Section 617.307 of the Florida Statutes has a new subsection (3).
This subsection is designed to provide for the transition of a homeowners'
association control in a community. 538 Under this subsection, such shall
occur when the members are entitled to elect at least a majority of the board
of directors of the homeowners' association. 539 The developer shall, at its
expense, have no more than ninety days to deliver the prescribed documents
to the board.54°
Section 617.0375 of Florida Statutes was enacted to create a list of
prohibitive clauses to be found in homeowners' association documents.5 41
Subsection (1) and its sub parts prohibit provisions to the effect that the
developer has the unilateral ability, and right, to make changes in the
homeowners' association documents, after the transition of the association's
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id
531. Id.
532. Secret Oaks Owner's Ass'n, 704 So. 2d at 707.
533. FLA. STAT. § 617.303(8) (1999).
534. Id. § 617.303(8)(a).
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id. § 617.307(3).
538. FLA. STAT. § 617.307(3) (1999).
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id. § 617.3075(1).
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control in a community to the non-developer members. s42 Also, the
association is restricted from filing a lawsuit against the developer, and the
developer is entitled to cast votes in an amount that exceeds one vote per
residential lot, after the transition to the association 5 43
Subparagraph (2) declares the prohibited position, stated above,
unenforceable as a matter of public policy, where those clauses were created
on or after the effective date of that section, October 1, 1998.
544
XII. INSURANCE
Fassi v. American Fire & Casualty Co.545 The appellate court affirmed
final judgment denying Fassi's claim for fire damages. 46 Fassi's home was
destroyed by fire and he filed a claim for damages under their homeowners'
policy.547 American Fire and Casualty ("American") was suspicious as to
the cause of the fire, and wanted Fassi to submit to examination under oath
and provide a sworn claim of loss.548 The examination was never conducted
since Fassi failed to contact the attorneys involved.549 In addition, Fassi still
failed to respond after American followed up with a letter. The law firm
scheduled the examination on behalf of American.551 In return, Fassi refused
to submit to the sworn examination because of the threat of criminal
proceedings.552
A claimant cannot recover fire losses under an insurance policy and
refuse to comply with policy requirements to submit to sworn examination
because criminal charges related to the cause of fire may be pending against
him.5
53
The examination was again rescheduled, and once again, Fassi failed to
appear or respond.554  Three months later, Fassi wished to have the
542. Id.
543. FLA. STAT. § 617.3075(1) (1999).
544. Id. § 617.3075(2).
545. 700 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
546. Id. at 52.
547. ik-
548. Id.
549. I
550. Fassi, 700 So. 2d at 52.
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. I
554. Id.
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examination conducted but American responded that it was too late.555
Summary judgment was granted after Fassi filed suit on the policy.556
This court agreed with American's contentions.557 Fassi was given one
last chance to explain the refusal to cooperate, and failure to respond would
lead to denial of the claim. 55 Since Fassi did not explain, no further notice
was required on American's behalf 5 59 The final letter to Fassi was only an
opportunity to explain, not a chance to participate. The court concluded
that five opportunities to participate were enough.
561
XIV. LANDLORD AND TENANT
ARC Foods, Inc. v. MGI Properties.562 The commercial lease provided
that: "[d]uring the lease term and any options; the landlord agrees not to rent
to any other tenant that sells take-out or delivery pizza. 56  The landlord
rented the neighboring space to an Italian restaurant, so the tenant declared
the lease had been breached, moved out, and refused to pay any more rent.
5 64
The landlord brought this action for damages. 565 The affidavit of the owner
of the neighboring restaurant acknowledged that the store did sell take-out
pizza, but claimed that its take-out pizza sales amounted to less than one half
566of one percent of the business of any of its restaurants. Based on that
affidavit, the trial court granted summary judgment for the landlord. 67 The
district court reversed the trial court's decision.
568
The district court first addressed the summary judgment issue and held
that summary judgment should only be granted when there are no genuine
issues of material fact. 569 The lease with the neighboring restaurant did,
however, technically violate the terms of this lease.57° The landlord's claim
that the violation was minimal, and had little effect on the tenant, created an
555. Fassi, 700 So. 2d at 53.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Fassi, 700 So. 2d at 53.
561. Id.
562. 724 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1999).
563. Id. at 664.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. ARC Foods, 724 So. 2d at 664.
568. Id. at 665.
569. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
570. ARC Foods, 724 So. 2d at 664.
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issue of fact that could be resolved only by a judge weighing the evidence.57 1
Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate. Furthermore, the claim that
the tenant had waived its rights under this clause by failing to object earlier,
or to the presence of other competing restaurants also raised issues of fact
that could not be resolved by summary judgment.
s5 3
The court also declared that the trial court had erred in its calculation of
damages.574 The landlord found another tenant for the vacated space, and
the court awarded the landlord the real estate broker's commission.57 5
However, the new tenant's lease was at a higher rent, and for a period
longer, than was left on the defendant's lease. 576-The defendant could not be
held liable for a commission that was calculated at the higher rent and longer
term. 577 The defendant was liable only for paying the commission involved
in finding its replacement, i.e., a commission based on the remaining term
and at the rent provided for in the lease.
578
DHSH Corp. v. Affordable Enterprises Exchange.579 When this
commercial lease was negotiated, the tenant wanted an option to renew for
another seven-year term because of the substantial capital investment
involved in setting up an automobile paint and body shop.80 The landlord,
concerned that the shop might be an eyesore, included in the lease a clause
requiring the outside to be cleaned twice daily and cars to be stored inside at
night.58 ' It also contained a renewal option which was the source of the
problem.
582
The lease granted the tenant a five-year option to renew, but it went on
to provide that, "[1]andlord-at [l]andlord's sole option to renew-shall
notify [t]enant if they desire to honor the option .... 5" Who had the right
to exercise, or not exercise, the renewal option? The successor landlord,
interpreting the lease as giving that right to the landlord, decided it did not
want to renew the lease, and sent the tenant a notice that the lease would not
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 664-65.
575. ARC Foods, 724 So. 2d at 664.
576. Id. at 664-65.
577. Id. at 665.
578. Id.
579. 734 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
580. Id. at 568.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id.
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584be renewed. Wanting to renew the lease, the tenant brought this action for
declaratory judgment.'
The trial court concluded that the renewal option contained an
irreconcilable conflict.586 The landlord and tenant could not both have a
renewal option. Attempting to reconcile all the terms, the landlord asserted
that the intent was to give the landlord the right to offer the tenant the
renewal option if it wanted to, but that would have rendered the option
illusory. The court solved the problem by invoking the "principles of
contract construction," under which an ambiguous term must be interpreted
against the one who drafted it.588 In this case, the term was drafted by the
landlord's real estate broker, so the term was interpreted in favor of the
tenant.589 The term was drafted by the agent of the prior landlord, not the
successor landlord involved in this litigation, but it did not change the
application of the rule or the outcome.
590
Foster v. Matthews.5 91 The lease included two paragraphs relating to
the landlord's liability if the tenant suffered injury. 59 The first portion of
the lease provided that the landlord would not be liable for damage or injury
caused by water. 93 The second portion provided that the tenant placed its
personal property on the premises, at its own risk. 94 Water leaked into the
leased premises, causing one of the co-tenants to slip and fall, and she sued
the landlord for negligence.' 9' Relying on the terms in the lease, the trial
596judge granted summary judgment for the landlord. The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision.
597
Exculpatory clauses are not favored in the law to absolve the landlord
from liability due to its negligence. 98 The clause must be clear enough to
release a party from liability for negligence.599 The terms in this lease did
not provide such a clear statement of intent, so the court should not have
584. DHSH, 734 So. 2d at 568.
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. Id.
588. Id. at 569.
589. DHSH, 734 So. 2d at 568.
590. Id. at 568-69.
591. 714 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
592. Id. at 1216.
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Foster, 714 So. 2d at 1216.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id.
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granted summary judgment. 6 However, Judge Cope, in a brief
concurrence, observed that in a prior case, a lease similar to this had been
read to reveal a clear intent to absolve the landlord of liability for its own
negligence when exculpatory clauses similar to these were read in
conjunction with an indemnity clause.601
Greco v. Corn.6°2 Here, the parties had entered into a four-year
commercial lease that included a purchase option.0 3 However, a dispute
quickly arose as to whether the purchase price included rent credit.0 4 The
landlords notified the tenants that they would not accept any rent payments
until the option issue was resolved.60- When an agreement could not be
reached, the landlords brought an unsuccessful action for declaratory
judgment to determine whether there had been a "meeting of the minds" to
create a binding contract.606 Following the conclusion of that action, the
landlords sent the tenants letters demanding the unpaid rent.6w When the
tenants failed to make payment, the landlords sought and obtained an
eviction judgment removing the tenants from the property.608
This case began when the tenants brought an action for specific
performance of the option.60 The landlords then counterclaimed for the
unpaid rent and the unpaid option fee.610 The tenants' defense was that the
landlords waived their claims by refusing to accept the payments.61 The
trial court denied relief to both. 61 The Second District Court of Appeal held
613that the landlords had not waived their claims. Unfortuiately, the court
does not explain why this was not a waiver. The landlords' refusal to accept
"rent payments until a determination was made regarding the option to
purchase clause .... ,,614
600. Id.
601. Foster, 714 So. 2d at 1217 (citing Meyer v. Carribbean Interiors, Inc., 435 So. 2d
936 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1983)).
602. 724 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. CL App. 1998), review denied, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla.
1999).
603. Id. at 613.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Greco, 724 So. 2d at 613.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 612.
610. Id. at 613.
611. Id.
612. Greco, 724 So. 2d at 613.
613. Id.
614. Id.
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615LaFountain v. Estate of Kelly. This commercial lease had a renewal
option that provided "[i]n the event Lessee exercises its option to renew, the
lease payment for the renewal period will be negotiated between the
parties." 16 The tenant gave notice of her intent to exercise the option, but
the parties could not agree on the amount of the rent payments.
617
Subsequently, the tenant died and her estate brought this suit against the
landlord for wrongful breach of the renewal option and tortious breach of
contract. 618 The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and the
district court affirmed.619
Here, the parties could not agree to the rent and the option did not
provide a rent amount or a method to calculate a rent amount.620 Once the
parties had failed to reach an agreement, the court had no method for
calculating what the rent should have been.g2l The court could not provide a
term that the parties failed to agree on, there had been no meeting of the622
minds on that point. Therefore, the renewal option was too vague to be
enforced. 623 The district court avoided language in an earlier case that such
options were valid by pointing out that case was an eminent domain action.
In the past, the parties had not even begun to negotiate the extension term
when the condemnation proceeding began, so it was still possible that the
extension option might be successfully implemented but for the
condemnation.
624
Making Ends Meet, Inc. v. Cusick.625 The landlord sued for unpaid rent,
and the tenant counterclaimed for tortious interference with a business
relationship. 626 The tortious interference claim was based on the landlord's
exercise of his power under the lease to either approve, or not approve, a
proposed sale of the lease by the tenant.6 27 The landlord's defense was that
he could not be held liable for interference with a business relationship of
which he was a party. 628 The trial and district courts disagreed with that
615. 732 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
616. Id. at 504.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. LaFountain, 732 So. 2d at 505.
621. Id.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Id. (citing State Rd. Dep't v. Tampa Bay Theaters, Inc., 208 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1968)).
625. 719 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 732 So. 2d 326 (Fla.
1999).
626. Id. at 926-27.
627. Id. at 927.
628. Id.
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interpretation of the law.629 Apparently, the landlord created one hurdle after
another to prevent the tenant from ever successfully assigning its
leasehold.630 The landlord had no right to play that game. His approval
power could only be exercised for a proper purpose. His wrongful conduct
under this set of circumstances cost him $250,000.63
Margolis v. Andromides.632 The tenant had a twenty-five year lease
with an option to renew for an additional twenty-five years.633 The tenant
sent two letters to the landlords giving notice that he was exercising his•634
renewal option. In response, the tenant received a letter from a relative of
635the landlords, authorizing the lease extension. In 1992, eleven years later,
but still during the original term of the lease, the tenant received a
surprise.636 The landlords claimed that the extension option had never been
exercised and that their relative did not have the authority to authorize an
63
extension.637 The dispute went to arbitration, where it was concluded that
638the landlords were correct. In 1997, the tenant brought this suit against
the relative for breach of implied warranty of authority. 639 The circuit court
granted the landlords' motion for summary judgment based on the statute of
limitations.64o
Breach of implied warranty of authority is subject to a four year statute
of limitations.64' The critical question was when the cause of action accrued
so that the time would begin to run.642 The tenant claimed it began to run at
the arbitration award, but the circuit court had disagreed, and the district
court affirmed.6 43 The opinion stated, "[a] cause of action 'accrues' when
the last element necessary to constitute the cause of action occurs."6 " The
arbitration award was not a necessary element.645 This cause of action is
based upon misrepresentation, and the final element of misrepresentation is
629. Id. at 927-28.
630. Making Ends Meet, Inc., 719 So. 2d at 928.
631. Id. at 927.
632. 732 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
633. Id. at 508.
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Id.
637. Margolis, 732 So. 2d at 508.
638. Id. at508-09.
639. Id. at 509.
640. Id.
641. Id.
642. Margolis, 732 So. 2d at 509.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id.
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that harm is caused by it.646 That happened when the landlords repudiated
their relative's authority to extend the lease.647 This happened more than
four years before the complaint in this case was filed. 6" Nothing had tolled
the running of the statute, so the action was barred.
649
Menendez v. Palms W. Condominium Ass'n. 65  The condominium
association acted as the rental manager for the unit in question.651 The
tenant heard a knock at the door, opened it, and at least two people came
652 653inside. One of the individuals shot the tenant. This suit charged that
the unit owners and the condominium association were liable because they
had breached their duty of care by failing to provide adequate security on the
premises, in particular, by failing to provide a peephole or door scope by
which a person inside the unit could see who was outside the front door.
Although the tenant's expert testified that this was a high crime area, the
circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. 55
The general rule is that a landlord has no duty to protect a tenant from
criminal acts of third persons.656 In order for such a duty to arise, "the tenant
must allege and prove that the landlord had actual or constructive knowledge
of prior similar acts committed on invitees on the premises., 65 7 However,
the existence of crime in the area "was not sufficient to put the defendants
on constructive notice of a particular risk.' 658 Moreover, there was nothing
in the record to show that the crime in the area was the type of crime that
659could have been prevented by installing a peephole or door scope.
The tenant also failed to establish that the lack of a peephole or door
scope was a defect or inherently dangerous condition. There was no
evidence that the unit would have been made safer by the installation of such
devices. 661 In addition, even if this was a defect, it was an obvious defect,
and not a latent one. 662  Finally, neither the lease nor the Residential
646. Id.
647. Margolis, 732 So. 2d at 510.
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. 736 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
651. Id. at 59.
652. Id. at 59-60.
653. Id. at 60.
654. Id.
655. Menendez, 736 So. 2d at 60.
656. Id.
657. Id. at 61.
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. Menendez, 736 So. 2d at 61.
661. Id.
662. Id. at 61-62.
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Landlord and Tenant Act imposed a duty on the landlord to provide a
663peephole or door scope. Thus, the decision of the circuit court was
affirmed.
664
665Estate of Basile v. Famest, Inc. .Basile guaranteed a commercial lease
for a company in which he was a stockholder. 6 The guaranty was limited
to defaults during the first two years of the original lease, or the first three
years of an approved sublease.667 The tenant transferred his rights and
interests to LM, a local corporation, under a document that stated that the
landlord was not releasing the original tenant from liability under the
lease. A default occured more than two years after the original lease was
entered, but the landlord sued on the guaranty claiming that the guarantor
was still liable.6 69 The landlord's theory was that the default had occured
during the first three years of a sublease.670 The death of the guarantor was
not an issue addressed in this decision.
The trial court concluded that the transaction with LM was a sublease,
and the landlord expressly reserved the right to hold the original tenant
liable.671 Therefore, the guaranty was still in effect at the time of the
672 673breach. 672 However, the district court disagreed. Under the traditional
test, a sublease would occur only if the tenant kept a reversionary interest.
674
The tenant here made no attempt to keep any such interest, therefore the
landlord's retaining rights had no effect upon the characterization of the
transaction.6 75 Since the guarantee was not extended by an assignment, the
guarantor was not liable.
675
Straub Capital Corp. v. Chopin.677 In November 1994, a law firm
entered into a fifty page lease that contained an integration clause, providing
that all negotiations and agreements were in the writing.678 The lease did
contain a time is of the essence clause, but did not contain an express
663. Id. at 62.
664. Id.
665. 718 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
666. Id. at 892.
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Basile, 718 So. 2d at 892.
671. Id.
672. Id.
673. Id. at 893.
674. Id. at 892.
675. Basile, 718 So. 2d at 893.
676. Id.
677. 724 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
678. Id. at 578.
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occupancy date. 679 The space was not ready for occupancy until April,
1995.680 After taking possession, the firm sued for damages, alleging that it
had been assured that the space would be ready by the first of January.
681
Based upon the evidence, the trial court rejected the fraud in the inducement
claim, but granted substantial damages for lost profits based on negligent
68263
misrepresentation. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed.8 3
"[A]bsent some conduct resulting in personal injury or property
damage, there can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual breach
,,684
which would justify a tort claim solely for economic losses . Fraud in the
inducement would have been an independent tort on which damages could
685have been rendered, but the court rejected that claim. Consequently, the
claim was essentially that the landlord had breached the lease by failing to
deliver the premises on time.686 At best, there was a contractual breach.687
Since the claim was solely for economic loss, tort damages should not have
been awarded.
688
WPB, Ltd. v. Supran.689 A commercial lease provided that deposit
money would bear interest, but failed to specify a rate.690 The district court
concluded that the rate would be supplied by section 687.01 of the Florida
Statutes.691 That statute provided, "'[i]n all cases where interest shall accrue
without a special contract for the rate thereof, the rate shall be 12 percent per
annum, but the parties may contract for a greater or lesser rate by a contract
in writing.', 692 A special contract is a contract that would have to be express
because it could not be implied in law or in fact.693 The lease was silent as
679. Id.
680. Id.
681. Id.
682. Straub Capital, 724 So. 2d at 578-79.
683. Id. at 579.
684. Id. (citing HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239
(Fla. 1996)).
685. Id.
686. Id.
687. Straub Capital, 724 So. 2d at 579.
688. Id.
689. 720 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
690. Id. at 1092.
691. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 687.01 (1989)). The current version of the statute
incorporates, by reference, the rate set according to section 55.03 of the Florida Statutes. See
FLA. STAT. § 55.03 (1999).
692. Supran, 720 So. 2d at 1092 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 687.01 (1989)).
693. Id. at 1092-93.
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to the interest rate, so there was no special contract to set the rate.694 Thus,
the statute filled that gap.
695
XV. LIENS
Morse Diesel International, Inc. v. 2000 Island Boulevard, Inc.696 The
appellate court reversed a peremptory writ of mandamus authorizing release
of a cash bond in favor of 2000 Island Boulevard, Inc. ("Williams Island"),
owner and developer of a 280 unit condominium project.697 The court
remanded, with directions that Williams Island redeposit disbursed proceeds
from the cash bond pending further orders.69 8
Morse Diesel sued Williams Island for money due under a construction
contract.699 The parties entered into an agreement which gave Morse Diesel
a lien on twenty condo units to secure the claim.700 Morse agreed to release
its lien rights as to the other units.7 1 Williams Island posted a bond on a
prorated basis as to five of the units. 702 Morse asserted additional claims
when another dispute arose between the parties.70 3 Williams Island later
filed an emergency motion for the clerk to transfer the existing liens to its
cash bond and to reduce Morse's amended claim of lien when the
subcontractors were paid.
704
The trial court allowed the lien transfer to a cash bond, but denied
Williams Island's request for reduction of the bond.705  Since Williams
Island failed to receive the bond reduction, it filed for a writ of mandamus
directing the clerk to disburse the cash bond as per section 713.24(4) of the
Florida Statutes.706 The lower court directed the clerk to release the cash
bond.7°
The appellate court concluded that the lower court abused its discretion
in granting the writ of mandamus where:
694. Id. at 1093.
695. Id.
696. 698 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
697. Id. at 310.
698. Id at313.
699. Id. at 310.
700. Id. at 311.
701. Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 311.
702. Id.
703. Id.
704. Id
705. Id.
706. Morse Diesel, 698 So. 2dat311.
707. Id. at 312.
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(1) the record did not disclose Williams Island's clear legal right to
the same in that a genuine dispute existed as to whether Morse
Diesel's claim of lien had expired by operation of law; (2)
Williams Island had another adequate legal remedy to procure the
release of these funds; and (3) Morse Diesel was an interested party
to the mandamus proceeding who had not been brought before the
court.
70 8
To receive a writ of mandamus, "petitioner must demonstrate a clear
legal right to the performance of a ministerial duty by the respondent and
that no other adequate remedy exists." 7 9 The court found that Williams
Island did not establish a clear legal right to a mandamus where the clerk's
answer and defenses created a genuine issue of fact about whether Morse's
claim of lien had expired and/or been satisfied.710 Williams Island did not
allege in its complaint that it had no adequate remedy at law.71 Just because
Williams Island was unsuccessful in getting2the bond reduced, this did not
signify that such remedies were inadequate.
The court also held that the writ should not have been entered when
Morse was an interested party, but was given no notice or opportunity to be
heard on the issues.713 In addition, it was an abuse of discretion to grant the
writ releasing the cash bond when the funds were in dispute between the
parties in another pending action.7 14 The lower court should have required
Williams Island to redeposit disbursed proceeds of the cash bond.
Robinson v. Sterling Door & Window Co. 715 The issue before the court
was whether the trial court erred when applying section 55.10(1) of the
Florida Statutes to Sterling Door's judgment lien on Robinson's real
estate.716 The trial court determined that Sterling Door had a valid lien on
Robinson's property.717 Robinson claimed the lien was defective because
Sterling's address was lacking, as required per section 55.10(1). 711 The trial
court held that the statute was satisfied since the names of the attorneys
involved were included in the judgment lien.719 The court noted that section
708. Id.
709. Iae; see Pino v. District Court of Appeal, 604 So. 2d 1232, 1233 (Fla. 1992).
710. Moore Diesel, 698 So. 2d at 312.
711. Id.
712. d
713. Ua
714. Id.
715. 698 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
716. U at 571.
717. Id.
718. Id; see FLA. STAT. § 55.10(l) (1997).
719. Robinson, 698 So. 2d at 571.
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55.10(1) of the Florida Statutes specifically recognizes that "'[a] judgment,
order, or decree does not become a lien on real estate unless the address of
the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment.. .is contained in the
judgment.''' 20 Since courts must give effect to statutory language, the
appellee's address must be on the judgment lien.72 1 Without the address,
there was no lien on Robinson's real estate.722
Wolf v. Spariosu.723  The appellate court reversed final summary
judgment of foreclosure, which declared Wolf Group's lien to be superior to
the interests of all appellees, except Maysonet Landscape Company's claim
of lien.724 The court agreed with the Wolf Group that their mortgage gained
priority over Maysonet through the doctrine of equitable subrogation or
conventional subrogation.
725
Maysonet and the Spariosus entered into a contract for landscaping
materials and services for the property.726 Maysonet filed and duly recorded
a claim of lien.727  At that time, two existing mortgages were already
recorded on the property. 728 A few months later, the Spariosus executed a
note and mortgage to City First Mortgage Corporation ("City").729 Two
prerequisites existed in order for the loan to go to the Spariosus as
borrowers. 73 First, the proceeds from City's loan were to be used to satisfy
the two previously recorded mortgages.73 Second, City's first mortgage
would be substituted in the place of the two prior mortgages.732 City's
mortgage was later assigned to the Wolf Group.733
Maysonet sued the borrowers and recorded its notice of lis pendens.3
When the borrowers defaulted on the City's loan, Wolf Group sought to
foreclose the mortgage, and Maysonet was later named as a defendant in the
amended complaint. The lower court entered a final judgment of
720. Id (quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.10(1) (1997)) (emphasis in original).
721. Id.
722. Id.
723. 706 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), cause dismissed, Maysonet Landscape
Co. v. Wolf (Fla. 1998).
724. Id. at 882.
725. Id
726. Id.
727. Id.
728. Wolf, 706 So. 2d at 882.
729. Id.
730. Id.
731. Id
732. Id
733. Wolf, 706 So. 2d at 882.
734. Id.
735. Id.
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mortgage foreclosure finding the Wolf Group's interest superior to the
interests of all defendants except Maysonet.736
[S]ubrogation is the "substitution of one person to the position of
another with reference to a legal claim or right. The doctrine of
subrogation is generally invoked when one person has satisfied the
obligations of another and equity compels that the person
discharging the debt stand in the shoes of the person whose claim
has been discharged, thereby succeeding to the rights and priorities
of the original creditor.,
737
The appellate court found that, under the doctrine of conventional
subrogation, the Wolf Group's lien should have been superior to Maysonet's
lien. Evidence showed that the borrowers had an agreement with City for
the City mortgage to be substituted in place of the two prior mortgages.
Conventional subrogation... arises by virtue of an
agreement, express or implied, that a third person or one having
no previous interest in the matter involved shall, upon discharging
an obligation or paying a debt, be substituted in the place of the
creditor with respect to such rights, remedies, or securities as [the
creditor] may have against the debtor.740
The court concluded "that the Wolf Group's lien was entitled to priority over
Maysonet's lien under the doctrine of conventional subrogation. ' 741
Zalay v. Ace Cabinets of Clearwater, Inc.7 42 The court affirmed final
judgment in a construction lien action filed by subcontractors and
743materialmen. Evidence supported the trial court's decision that all but one
of the claims were valid and timely, and created liens against the property. 744
In 1992, the Zalays contracted with Charles Walker Corporation to
build a home for $360,000. 745 Zalay had to make only one final payment in
736. Id. at 883.
737. Id. at 883 (quoting Eastern Nat'l Bank v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 508 So.
2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
738. Wolf, 706 So. 2d at 884.
739. Id.
740. Id. at 883 (citing Foreman v. First Nat'l Bank, 79 So. 742,744 (1918)).
741. Id. at 884.
742. 700 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
743. Id. at 16.
744. Id.
745. Id.
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the amount of $45,267.07.746 Although most of the work was completed on
the home, several subcontractors and materialmen remained unpaid.747 Three
lienors recorded claims totaling about $31,000, and Artistic Surfaces
presented an untimely claim for $2600. 48
The issue before the court was whether the language of section 713.06
of the Florida Statutes allows the attorneys' fees and costs ultimately
awarded under section 713.29 to become a lien against the property.749 The
court concluded "that the limitation in section 713.06(3)(h) is intended to
define the extent of the lien for the lienor's materials or services prior to
litigation, and is not intended to preclude a lien for costs and attorneys' fees
in a lien foreclosure action.
'1 50
The court found it important to examine section 713.06(1) of the
Florida Statutes.75 1 This statute provides:
A materialman or laborer, either of whom is not in privity with
the owner, or a subcontractor or sub-subcontractor who complies
with the provisions of this part and is subject to the limitations
thereof, has a lien on the realyroperty improved for any money that
is owed to him for labor ....
Nothing in this statute expressly provides a lien for attorneys' fees and
costs.7  Construction lien statutes should not be liberally construed in favor
of any person.7-4 "[A]ttomeys' fees awarded under section 713.29 are not an
element of damages, but are 'taxed as part of... costs."' 755 The court saw
no reason why the costs involved in a construction lien action should not be
included within the lien.
756
Legislative changes include, but are not limited to, the following: With
respect to public lands and property, section 255.05(2)(a) of the Florida
Statutes now provides that where a claimant is no longer furnishing labor on
a project, a contractor, its agent or attorney may elect to shorten the
prescribed time within which an action to enforce a claim against the
746. Id.
747. Zalay, 700 So. 2d at 16.
748. Id. at 17.
749. L
750. Id.
751. Id.
752. Zalay, 700 So. 2d at 17 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.06(1) (1993)).
753. Id.
754. Id
755. Id. at 18 (omission in original).
756. Id.
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payment bond may be made.757 This may be done by filing a Notice of
Contest of Claim Against Payment Bond. The form and procedure for
such are set out in the above referenced statute.759
Section 713.01(12) of the Florida Statutes has been amended to include
in the definition of "improve," a provision for solid waste collection or
disposal on the site of the improvement.76 Likewise, the definitions for
"improvement," "subcontractor," and "sub-subcontractor" have been
amended to reflect the same.
761
Section 713.23(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes has been amended to
762provide a shorter time for a contractor to claim against a payment bond.
This statute provides a form for filing a "Notice of Contest of Claim Against
Payment Bond." Comparatively, section 713.235(1) of the Florida Statutes
provides a form for a "Waiver of Right To Claim Against the Payment
Bond. ,,763
XVI. MORTGAGES
Alafaya Square Ass'n v. Great Western Bank.7 4 The court granted
appellee's motion for rehearing of the opinion dated February 7, 1997.765
766The opinion was entered in place of the previous one. The court reversed
the trial court's order appointing a receiver because there was no showing
767that Alafaya wasted or impaired the real property. Alafaya owned a768
shopping center encumbered by a mortgage in favor of WHC. If there was
a default on the mortgage, Alafaya agreed to have a receiver appointed.769
After the loan matured, Alafaya did in fact default on payment.770 In
responseWIHC sued to foreclose and requested the appointment of a
receiver.
757. FLA. STAT. § 255.05(2)(a) (1999).
758. Id.
759. Id.
760. Id. § 713.01(12).
761. Id. § 713.01(14), (26), (27).
762. FLA. STAT. § 713.23(1)(e) (1999).
763. Id. § 713.235(1).
764. 700 So. 2d 38 (Fia. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
765. Id. at 39.
766. Id.
767. Id.
768. Id.
769. Alafaya, 700 So. 2d at 39.
770. Id.
771. Id.
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The trial court granted WHC's motion to sequester the rents received
from the shopping center's tenants.772  All rent collected was placed in
escrow and Alafaya could not expend funds from the account without the
court's approval.7 3 Alafaya requested use of the escrow funds from WHC
to do repairs on the property. After Alafaya received no response, it
requested permission from the trial court to expend the funds77 4 Alafaya
later requested WHC's consent to withdraw escrow funds for payment of
real estate taxes.775 WHC again failed to answer.!76 In response to Alafaya's
request for funds to repair, "WHC filed a motion for appointment of receiver
alleging an 'apparent waste to the property.
'
"'
777
The trial court granted WHC's motion for the appointment of a
receiver, and Alafaya appealed arguing that evidence failed to show Alafaya
wasted or impaired the property. 7 "The appointment of a receiver in a
foreclosure action is not a matter of right.., it is an extraordinary
remedy., 779 The receiver's role "is to preserve the value of the secured
property."780 The trial court can appoint a receiver, but only if evidence
suggests that the secured property is being wasted or subject to serious risk
of loss.
781
The appellate court agreed that the evidence did not constitute waste or
impairment.78 The only waste could be the disrepair to the parking lot and
the exterior paint.78 3 Alafaya took timely action to get WHC to release the
funds.7 4 As such, there could be no waste since the failure to repair was due
to WHC's refusal to release the funds.785  The appellate court reversed
because the facts did not justify the remedy of receivership.78 6
Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank.787 Beach, the borrowers, asked theUnited States Supreme Court to consider whether the three year rescission
772. Id.
773. Id.
774. Alafaya, 700 So. 2d at 39.
775. Id.
776. Id.
777. Id.
778. M at 40.
779. Alfaya, 700 So. 2d at 40; see Barnett Bank of Alachua County v. Steinberg, 632 So.
2d 233, 234 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
780. Alfaya, 700 So. 2d at 40.
781. Id.; see Atco Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. Beneficial Say. Bank, 523 So. 2d 747, 750
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
782. Alfaya, 700 So. 2d at 40.
783. Id.
784. Id.
785. Id
786. Id. at 41.
787. 523 U.S. 410 (1998).
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period, under the Truth-in-Lending Act, precluded a right of action after a
specified time.788 If so, the borrowers would not be able to raise their right
to rescind under the act as a recoupment defense in a foreclosure action
brought by the lender more than three years after the loan transaction date.789
The Court found the language in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) to be clear, and held
that the right of rescission "shall expire" after the three year period.79
Therefore, it was not a statute of limitations and could not be raised as a
791
recoupment defense after the expiration.79
Blatchley v. Boatman's National Mortgage, Inc.792 The court affirmed
an order denying Blatchley's motion to vacate the foreclosure sale of his
home.7 93 The summary final judgment in foreclosure stated the sale date was
January 9, 1997.794 Boatman's moved for an order changing the sale date to
January 7, because January 9 was a "scrivener's error" and the published,,795
"Notice of Foreclosure Sale contained the correct date of January 7 . The
court granted the date change.796
However, Blatchley failed to receive notice of the new sale date until a
day after the actual sale took place.79 In addition, Blatchley only received
Boatman's motion to change the date on January 10.798 Blatchley motioned
to vacate the sale, since he never received proper notice of the correct sale
date.7 99  As such, he could not exercise his right of redemption or
reinstatement, nor could he participate in the sale or protect his property
interest. 800 The trial court denied the motion to vacate the sale, but gave
Blatchley fifteen days from the order date to pay the judgment amount.8s 1
Instead of taking advantage of the increased redemption period that was
802
offered, Blatchley filed a notice of appeal.
"Section 45.031 required that the final judgment of foreclosure specify
a day for the sale and that the notice of sale be published for two weeks, the
second of which publication 'shall be at least 5 days before the
788. Id. at 410.
789. Id.
790. Id.
791. See id. at 418.
792. 706 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
793. Id. at 317.
794. Id.
795. IU.
796. Id.
797. Blatchley, 706 So. 2d at 317.
798. Id.
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Id. at317-18.
802. Blatchley, 706 So. 2d at 318.
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sale."'803 The requirements of this statute were not satisfied.804 However,
even though Blatchley did not receive proper notice, the court remedied the
error by extending the redemption period.8s 1 "Foreclosure suits are governed
by equitable principles. '8s 6 The trial court "did equity" by extending the
redemption period, and nothing would be accomplished by reversing for a
new judgment and sale date.807
808Clearman v. Dalton. The Clearmans recovered a judgment for
$150,000 against the Daltons.8s 9 The Daltons filed for bankruptcy and
revealed two secured mortgages against their homestead.810 The first was in
favor of their son in the amount of $15,000, and the second was in favor of
Monticello Bank for $50,000.811 The mortgage in favor of their son was
never recorded, while the bank's mortgage was recorded but not delivered. 2
The trustee obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court avoiding the
mortgages, preserving the avoided obligations "for the benefit of the
estate." The trustee assigned the mortgages to the Clearmans who
recorded the assignment and judments, avoiding the mortgages and
preserving the avoided obligations.
The trial court denied the foreclosure petition filed by Clearman. 15 The
appellate court agreed with the trial court that title 544 of the United States
Code did not place the trustee in the place of the former mortgagees with the
power to foreclose.8 6 The appellate court believed the bankruptcy estate
had an assignable interest in the mortgage subject to Daltons' claim of
homestead.8s 7 The assignees "can assert their interest and require the
Daltons to establish the fact of homestead."818 Filing of judgments entered
by the Bankruptcy Court does not constitute slander of title.81 9 Since the
Daltons deliberately filed their bankruptcy petition and submitted their
property, subject to provable exemptions, they cannot complain if the
803. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 45.031 (1997)).
804. Id.
805. Id.
806. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1995).
807. Blatchley, 706 So. 2d at 318.
808. 708 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
809. Id. at 325.
810. Id.
811. Id
812. Id.
813. Cleannan, 708 So. 2d at 325.
814. Id.
815. Id.
816. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 544.
817. Ckaman, 708 So. 2d at 325.
818. Id.
819. Id.
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assignee of the estate's interest requires them to prove entitlement to
820homestead exemption.8 82Crane v. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County.821 The court affirmed
the amended final judgment as to the terms of rescission of the mortgage
agreement, except as to the effective date the rate of interest charged to the
borrower should run.8 2 The court reversed the denial of the borrower's
motion for partial summary judgment on liability, and vacated the provision
for foreclosure of the subject mortgage, if the borrower failed to satisfy the
conditions for rescission within forty-five days.
823
The bank sought to foreclose when a construction loan matured and the
borrower's wife refused to sign a modification of their mortgage
agreement. 24 The borrower had not defaulted under the construction loan
phase of the agreement since the borrower's payments had been refused,
preventing such borrower from performing under the agreement.8s "[T]he
borrower's bank did not have a written agreement requiring the wife's
signature on the mortgage."8 26 Liability against the borrower did not include
the wife's refusal to sign a modification to the mortgage.8
27
On appeal, the borrower claimed that the trial judge erred in denying his
motion for summary judgment because the borrower had offered to make
payments but was refused. 82 "The trial court should have granted the
borrower's motion for partial summary judgment .... [T]he bank's
complaint.., did not include allegations that the borrower defaulted by
failing to have his wife sign the mortgage modification... ,,829 The sole
basis for default was due to the borrower's failure to pay the mortgage.830 As
such, no material issue of fact existed regarding the question of liability for
foreclosure.831
The second issue on appeal was whether the trial court's order
authorizing rescission "ab initio" of the parties' mortgage agreement
properly restored each party to the status quo. "[T]he trial court erred in
assessing two different rates of interest as a condition for rescission of the
820. l
821. 698 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
822. Id. at 905.
823. Id at 905-06.
824. Id. at 903.
825. Id.
826. Crane, 698 So. 2d at 903.
827. I at 903.
828. Id. at 904.
829. Ia
830. Id.
831. Crane, 698 So. 2d at 904.
832. Id.
[Vol. 24:267
328
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
BrownlGrohman
parties' agreement 'ab initio.'" 33 Since there was only one integrated
mortgage agreement and its nullification is ab initio, the borrower should not
be penalized with a higher interest rate. 34 This is especially true if it was
the bank's own refusal to accept payments that led to rescission, simply
because the mortgage agreement provided for two phases of the loan. 35
This court found no error in the imposition of a "costs of funds" rate of
interest and payment required by the borrower as a cost of rescission. 36 No
record established the basis for foreclosure within forty-five days if the
borrower failed to make rescission as required in the amended final
judgment.837 Since "the trial judge erred in denying the borrower's motion
for partial summary judgment on the bank's action for foreclosure, there is
no basis for foreclosure under the mortgage agreement of the parties even if
the borrower is unable to restore the bank to status quo in 45 days. 838
"'[Floreclosure on an accelerated basis may be denied where.., payment
was not made due to... excusable neglect, coupled with some conduct of
the mortgagee which in a measure contributed to the failure to pay when
due.' ' ,839  Acceleration of the balance and foreclosure of the mortgage
agreement were declared premature on this record.m°
Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp.841 The issue on appeal was
"whether a mortgage lender's payment of a 'yield spread premium' to a
mortgage broker violates the antikickback provision of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"). 842
The Culpeppers obtained a federally insured home mortgage loan from
the Inland Mortgage Corporation ("Inland").843 However, rather than dealing
directly with Inland, the Culpeppers dealt only with the mortgage broker,
Premiere Mortgage Company ("Premiere"). "On December 7, 1995,
Premiere received a rate sheet from Inland and informed the Culpeppers that
a 30-year loan was available at a 7.5% interest rate."845 The Culpeppers
approved the given rate.846 However, the Culpeppers did not know that rate
833. Id.
834. Id.
835. Id
836. Crane, 698 So. 2d at 904-05.
837. I& at 905.
838. IM.
839. I& (quoting Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252, 256-57 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App.
1970); Lunn Woods v. Lowery, 577 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
840. Crane, 698 So. 2d at 905.
841. 132F.3d 692 (11th Cir. 1998).
842. Id. at 694; see 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).
843. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 694.
844. Id.
845. Id.
846. Id.
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was higher than the par rate on Inland's 30-year loan, and it carried a yield
spread premium of 1.675% of the loan amount.847 Also, they did not know
that, as a result of the spread, Inland would be paying Premiere the premium
for the higher rate, even though the Culpeppers paid Premiere a loan
origination fee for assisting them in obtaining and closing their loan. 8 Once
the Culpeppers discovered this, they challenged the legitimacy of Inland's
yield spread premium payment under RESPA. 49
Noting that no federal circuit court had addressed this issue, and the
federal district courts that had addressed it were divided, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals presented its own analysis.850  In so doing, it
determined that the yield spread premium under these facts was a nonexempt
referral fee violating RESPA section 2607(a)."1
The court's analysis began with the statutory prohibitions and
exemptions. 82 Section 2607(a) prohibits kickbacks and referral fees
pursuant to an agreement regarding federally related mortgages.853 Section
2607(c) exempts from that prohibition payment for goods or services
actually performed.854
The first question was whether the payment to Premiere was a referral
fee. 855 The court noted that the payment would constitute such "if (1) a
payment of a thing of value is (2) made pursuant to an agreement to refer
settlement business and (3) a referral actually occurs." Here, Inland gave
Premiere value by paying the spread premium.857 The payment was made
pursuant to an agreement to refer settlement business, because the premium
was to be paid for Premiere's "registered" loans with Inland which funded
the loans. 8 There was an actual referral when Premiere registered the loan
with Inland.859
The next question was whether section 2607(c) exempted the
transaction as a payment for goods or services. 860 As to whether there was a
payment for goods, the appellate court noted this was not satisfied, since
847. Id.
848. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 694.
849. Id.
850. Id. at 695.
851. Id. at 695-96.
852. See id. at 695.
853. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 695; see 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a).
854. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 695; see § 2607(c).
855. See Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 695.
856. Id. at 696.
857. Id.
858. Id.
859. Id.
860. See Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 696.
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Inland funded the loan from the beginning.861 It was not one owned by
Premiere and subsequently sold to Inland, which might be done with loans
sold in the permitted secondary mortgage market sales.862 The court noted
that even if Premiere was selling to Inland its right to direct the loan's
disposition to a number of wholesale lenders, it would not be an exempt sale
of goods.863  Paying a referral fee for "directing" the business, violates
RESPA, and the court concluded that the premium did not fit the sale of
goods exemption.
864
As to whether the premium was paid for Premiere's services, the
appellate court first looked at the services Premiere provided the Culpeppers,
which included both obtaining and closing the loan.865 It found the facts
clearly showed the Culpeppers already paid Premiere for these services.866 It
also identified logically that the premium paid to Premiere for generating a
higher loan rate was not a service to the Culpeppers.867
Next, the court looked to whether the premium was for a service to
Inland. However, there was no additional service to Inland. The
premium was based solely on the higher interest rate.870 Premiere provided
no additional service to Inland above what it would have provided them with
a loan consisting of a lower interest rate.871 Therefore, the payment did not
fit the sale of services exemption.872
Having found the transaction violated RESPA'sprohibitions, the court
reversed and remanded the case to the district court. The court noted the
market value test utilized by the trial court was inappropriate, since that test
applies only to facially permissible transactions. 74 The appellate court
directed the trial court to consider the Culpeppers' motion for class
certification ab initio.
875
Dove v. McCormick.876  The court affirmed the trial court's order
granting final summary judgment in favor of McCormick. 87 Dove executed
861. Id.
862. Id.
863. Id.
864. Id.
865. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 696.
866. Id.
867. Id. at 696-97.
868. Id. at 697.
869. Id.
870. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 697.
871. Id.
872. Id.
873. Id.
874. Id.
875. Culpepper, 132 F.3d at 697.
876. 698 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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a mortgage in favor of The First, F.A., that encumbered Orange County real
property. The transaction was subject to The Truth in Lending Act,
("TILA") requirements.879 Afterwards, The First was declared "troubled,"
880
and the RTC was appointed as a receiver to liquidate The First's assets.
Dove's mortgage was assigned by RTC to Blazer Financial Services, which
later assigned the mortgage to McCormick.881 Since Dove failed to make
monthly payments, McCormick sued to foreclose.882
The trial court entered final summary judgment in McCormick's favor,
concluding that Dove posed defenses pertaining to rescission and
recoupment which were barred by the statute of limitations. 883 "Dove sought
to assert her statutory right to rescission based upon alleged violations of
TILA and Regulation Z." 84 Dove also argued for recoupment under section
8851640(e). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling in denying
Dove's claim of rescission because "'under Florida law, an action for
statutory right of rescission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635 may not be revived
as a defense in recoupment beyond the three-year expiration period
contained in section 1635(f). ' ' 816
Florida has historically recognized that "when the right and the remedy
are created by the same statute, the limitations of the remedy are treated as
limitations of the right. ' 8 7 The court reasoned that Dove may not seek the
remedy of rescission under the guise of an affirmative defense of
recoupment outside the statutory three-year time frame. 88
Floyd v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n.889 Floyd appealed a post-
judgment final order denying the "Motion to Vacate Final Judgment and Set
Aside Foreclosure Sale."8  The Federal National Mortgage Company
Association ("Federal National"), filed the complaint to foreclose a first
mortgage against Pamela Johnson.s91 The mortgage encumbering the home
877. Id. at 586.
878. Id
879. Id.
880. Id.
881. Dove, 698 So. 2d at 586.
882. Id.
883. Id.
884. Id. at 587.
885. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1994).
886. Dove, 698 So. 2d at 588 (quoting Beach v. Great Western Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 153
(Fla. 1997), aff'd, 523 U.S. 410 (1998)).
887. Id. (quoting Bowery v. Babbit, 128 So. 801, 806 (1930)).
888. Id. at 588.
889. 704 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
890. Id. at 1111.
891. Id.
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was executed by Pamela and her then husband, Vernon Floyd in the original
principal amount of $11,000. 8 92 After their divorce and Pamela's subsequent
death, Vernon resided in the home with their children.893 In the same year,
the mortgage went into default with a remaining balance of $3,045.96.s9,r
Personal service of the complaint could not be completed because the
sheriff's process server was unable to locate the property. 95 The death of
Pamela was never confirmed.896  Federal National filed an amended
complaint naming Pamela Johnson or her heirs as the defendant.897 Federal
National then filed an Affidavit of Constructive Service alleging that the
heirs could not be found even after a diligent search was conducted.98
After a second letter was sent to Vernon, specifying the amount
necessary to reinstate the mortgage, the trial court entered final summary
judgment in favor of Federal National. s99 Vernon was notified to vacate the
premises after the foreclosure sale.9° In response, Vernon filed a motion to
set aside the foreclosure sale, which was consequently denied by the trial
court.90
The appellate court agreed with Vernon that Federal National failed to
conduct a diligent search. Prior to constructive notice, a plaintiff must
first file an affidavit showing that a diligent search was conducted to
discover the names and addresses of the defendants. 9 3 In this case, Federal
National's affidavit states that a search was conducted of the Social Security
Administration database, probate records, and Vital Statistics, all without
success. 9 4 The Social Security records confirmed that Pamela Johnson was,
in fact, deceased. 905 Federal National failed to locate the property, inquire of
those ingpossession of the property, or talk with neighbors, relatives or
friends.
Federal National's failure to pursue Vernon after his previous inquiries
about reinstating the mortgage showed that Federal National did not
892. Id.
893. Id.
894. Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1111.
895. Il
896. Id.
897. Id.
898. Id
899. Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1111.
900. Id.
901. Id.
902. Id. at 1112.
903. Id.; see FA. STAT. §§ 49.031(1), .041(1), .071 (1995).
904. Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1112.
905. Id.
906. Id.
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"'reasonably employ[] the knowledge at [its] command.' 90 7  Federal
National failed to conduct a diligent search and inquiry required by the
constructive notice statute, by completely ignoring the parties in possession
of the premises.
908
"Strict compliance with constructive service statutes is required." 9 9
The record showed a diligent effort was not made to acquire the information
needed to accomplish personal service on those in possession of the
property. 910 The appellate court believed Federal National would have
learned the additional facts necessary to accomplish personal service if
someone located the property and went there to see who actually had
possession. 91912
Kirkland v. Miller. Kirkland appealed final judgment of ejectment
awarded in favor of Sportsmen's Resort Clubs Inc., ("Sportsmen's"), the
original owner of the subject real property.913 The trial court stated that
914Kirkland only had a beneficial interest in an Illinois land trust.9  Thus,
ejectment was a proper remedy.915 The trial court determined there was only
a personal property interest and foreclosure was unnecessary. 916  The
appellate court reversed.917
Miller was a trustee with legal and equitable title to the property
identified in the trust.918 Mary Shearer the principal, and Sportsmen's only
shareholder, had a beneficial interest.916 Miller explained the documents for
closing to Kirkland, which included a contract showing Sportsmen's sale of
the beneficial interest to Kirkland for $40,000.920 Kirkland executed a
security agreement which assigned the beneficial interest back to Miller as
security for the $40,000 debt recognized as a "Purchase Money Mortgage,"
and included a charge for "State Documentary Stamps on Deed.",921 Kirkland
907. Id. (quoting Batchin v. Barnett Bank of S.W. Fla., 647 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1994)).
908. Id.
909. Floyd, 704 So. 2d at 1112 (citing Tindal v. Vamer, 667 So. 2d 890, 890-91 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
910. Id.
911. Id. at 1113.
912. 702 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), review denied, 717 So. 2d 535 (Fla.
1998).
913. Id.
914. Id.
915. See id.
916. Id.
917. Kirkland, 702 So. 2d at 620.
918. Id.
919. Id.
920. Id.
921. Id. at 620-21.
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was to make monthly payments for twenty years, and if default occurred,
there would be an automatic assignment of the entire beneficial interest to
Sportsmen's.922 After default, Miller was to sell the trust property, and after
costs and fees were paid out, the balance from the proceeds were to be
delivered to Kirkland.923 Kirkland believed a mortgage was created.924
Pursuant to section 697.01 of the Florida Statutes, an instrument is said
to be a mortgage if, when taken either alone or in conjunction with the
surrounding facts, it seems to have been given for the purpose of securing
payment of the money.925 "'Whenever property belonging to one person is
held by another as securit for an indebtedness of the other, the transaction
is in effect a mortgage.
'9
The transaction in this case was not a valid Illinois land trust, but a
mortgage securing an indebtedness. 927  If there was default, Kirkland's
interest in the property reverted to Sportsmen's. 92s Accordingly, the trans-
action was deemed a mortgage, subject to the rules of foreclosure.29
Najera v. NationsBank Trust Co.930 Najera appeals from a final
summary judgment of foreclosure by NationsBank.931 The appellate court
reversed the trial court's decision because it believed issues of material fact
remained on the record which could not be disposed of by summary
judgment.912
Najera's deposition showed that he requested a copy of the property
appraisal but never obtained it.933  General Development Corporation
("GDC") said it would take care of the appraisal because no bank would
authorize a loan for more money than the property value.934 Najera paid a
fee for the appraisal, with the understanding that it was being done in order
to verify that the property would provide the lending institution with
sufficient collateral for the loan.
935
922. Kirkland, 702 So. 2d at 621.
923. Id.
924. IRt
925. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1985).
926. Kirkland, 702 So. 2d at 621 (quoting Williams v. Roundtree, 478 So. 2d 1171,
1173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
927. Id.
928. Id.
929. Id. at 621-22.
930. 707 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Apr. 15, 1998).
931. Id. at 1154.
932. Id.
933. Id.
934. Id.
935. Najera, 707 So. 2d at 1154.
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The appellate court believed "the allegations and record create[d] issues
of fact concerning whether the Najeras relied upon the existence of a
professional appraisal to support the loan values, and whether they would
have entered into this transaction had those representations not been
made.
9 36
The record established much more than the assertion of inflated
values. 93 7 GDC and General Development Financial Corporation, ("GDV")
collectively misrepresented
the value of the lot the Najeras already owned, the value of the
condo for which they were induced to swap the lot, the fact that
they were to have conventional financing... that the rental market
in the area was sufficiently strong to cover their mortgage
payments, that the resale market for GDC properties was strong at
the false sales prices, and that there existed and would be provided
a professional appraisal to back up the value of the property
provided to them.
938
The appellate court recognized that if the alleged course of fraudulent
conduct by GDC and GDV was established at trial, and if it was shown that
it was reasonably relied upon by Najeras, they would have a defense to the
foreclosure action.
939
Southeast & Associates v. Fox Run Homeowners' Ass'n.9  The issue
before the court was whether the owners may set aside a foreclosure sale
where constructive service was "based on affidavits of diligent search and
inquiry which were facially sufficient and complied with the statutory
requirements."
941
On July 1, 1995, an association assessment for semi-annual
maintenance was due.92 Albert and Rose Love received a notice of
delinquency from the association.943 The notice stated that the association
could file a lien against the home and foreclose at a later date.94 When the
Loves failed to pay the assessment, a lien was filed against the property. 945
The Loves paid a partial payment, which the association returned with a
936. Id. at 1155.
937. Id.
938. Id; see Watson v. Hahn, 664 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
939. Najera, 707 So. 2d at 1155.
940. 704 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
941. Id. at 695.
942. Id.
943. Id.
944. Id.
945. Southeast & Assocs., 704 So. 2d at 695.
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notice stating that if full payment was not made, a foreclosure suit would beinitiated.' 4
When the association planned to foreclose, it hired a process server to
serve the Loves. 947 The server failed to recognize that the Loves were at
their New York address and made numerous attempts to serve them at their
Fox Run address, as well as another Florida address said to be attributed to
them.948 Since personal service was not able to be performed, the
association served by publication after filing an affidavit of diligent search
and an affidavit of constructive service.94"- Final summary judgment of
foreclosure was filed against the Loves. 95  Southeast and Associates the
successful bidder at the foreclosure sale, received a certificate of title. In
response, the Loves moved to set aside the sale due to an insufficient service
of process.952 The trial court entered an order finding lack of diligent search
and inquiry by Fox Run, thereby setting aside the foreclosure sale. 53
Section 49.041 of the Florida Statutes "provides that a person may be
served by publication upon verified statement showing on its face that
'diligent search and inquiry have been made to discover the name and
residence' of the person being served."954 If the court finds the verified
statement to be defective, or considers the diligent search to be deficient, the
court must then decide "'whether the trial court's judgment of foreclosure
would be void or voidable."'955 If voidable, a foreclosure sale resulting from
constructive service cannot be set aside as against a bona fide purchaser.
956
The plaintiff here followed the favored approach.95 7 It filed a detailed
affidavit which listed the various attempts to deliver personal service, "the
contact with the neighbors, the two skip traces, and the trip to a retail
establishment where the process server learned the lessee had moved out in
the middle of the night.
In addition, "'where one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss as
the result of the default of another, the loss shall fall on the party who is best
946. Id.
947. Id.
948. Id.
949. Id
950. Southeast & Assocs., 704 So. 2d at 695.
951. Id. at 695-96.
952. Id. at 696.
953. Id.
954. Id.
955. Southeast & Assocs., 704 So. 2d at 696 (quoting Batchin v. Barnett Bank of S.W.
Fla., 647 So. 2d 211,213 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
956. Id.
957. Id.
958. Id.
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able to avert the loss and is the least innocent. ' '9 59 The Loves did not make
the requisite maintenance payment and could have informed the Association
of their move to New York. In addition, someone on the Loves' behalf
kept signing the certified letters and made partialpayments.
961
United Companies Lending v. Abercrombie. 62 The issue presented was
whether the "circuit court abused its discretion when it declined to set aside
a mortgage foreclosure sale of real property." 963 The appellate court held
that the circuit court was mistaken in its view of what its scope of discretion
is in such a matter.
964
The United Companies Lending Corporation ("United") sued to
foreclose its mortgage on the residence owned by the appellee. 965 The circuit
court entered a final judgment and subsequently scheduled a foreclosure sale
to be held at the Sarasota County Courthouse.9 56 United's counsel agreed to
attend the sale, but due to an illness in the original attorney's family, United
sent another attorney to appear in his place. 67 The replacement attorney
arrived early for the foreclosure sale, however, he was at the wrong
courthouse. He was informed that it was to be held in Sarasota only five
minutes before the sale was to take place.969 The clerk in Sarasota "declined
his request to delay the bidding." By the time a substitute Sarasota
attorney arrived, the property had already been sold to Darrell Crane for
$1000.
971
United filed an objection to the sale and a motion to have the sale set
aside on the grounds of "gross inadequacy of price and the mistaken failure
of its agent to attend. 972 Evidence at the hearing proved that the property
was worth over $125,000 and that United was going to bid as high as
$181,898. 973 The successful bidder, Crane, testified that he would have only
bid up to $115,00. 974
959. Id. at 697 (quoting Jones v. Lally, 511 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1987)).
960. Southeast & Assocs., 704 So. 2d at 697.
961. Id.
962. 713 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
963. Id. at 1018.
964. Id.
965. Id.
966. Id.
967. United Cos. Lending, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
968. Id.
969. Id.
970. Id.
971. Id.
972. United Cos. Lending, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
973. Id.
974. Id.
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The circuit court found that the price paid for the property at the sale
was "grossly disproportionate. 975  However, it denied United's motion,
because the court found that the inadequate price resulted from the
"unilateral mistake" of United's counsel, "and not from any mistake,
misconduct, or irregularity" on the part of anyone else involved in the
sale.9 7 6 The circuit court cited Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Martin977 and
Sulkowski v. Sulkowski 978 for authority. 9  The appellate court upon
reviewing the transcript from the circuit court found that the circuit court
mistakenly believed that the Second District, unlike the Third and Fourth
Districts, holds that a mistake cannot be a unilateral mistake by the
complaining party.98° However, the law of this appellate district does not
differ from the other districts, and follows the holding in Art v. Buchanan.98 1
In Arlt, the court stated the general rule that:
standing alone mere inadequacy of price is not a ground for setting
aside a judicial sale. But where the inadequacy is gross and is
shown to result from any mistake, accident, surprise, fraud,
misconduct or irregularity upon the part of either the purchaser or
other person connected with the sale, with resulting injustice to the
complaining party, equity will act to prevent the wrong result.
982
This court does not construe "person connected with the sale" to mean
that it has to be a person who was physically present at the sale.983 Therefore,
the circuit court mistakenly read this court's past opinions to the contrary.984
"Whether the complaining party has made the showing necessary to set
aside a [foreclosure] sale is a discretionary decision by the trial court, which
may be reversed only when the court has grossly abused its discretion. 985
This court found that, in the present case, the circuit court's discretion was
restricted by a mistaken understanding of the law in this district, and
975. Id.
976. Id.
977. 605 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), case dismissed, 613 So. 2d 13 (Fla.
1993).
978. 561 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
979. United Cos. Lending, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
980. Id.
981. 190 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1966).
982. Ia at 577.
983. United Cos. Lending, 713 So. 2d at 1019.
984. Id.
985. Id. at 1018 (citing RSR Invs., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Pinellas County, 647 So. 2d
874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
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reversed and remanded for a reconsideration. 986  This court states no
"opinion as to the balance of equities in this case." 987 Rather, the court
stated that "[i]n one set of circumstances, the fact that the inadequate sale
price was caused by the complaining party's own mistake might tip the
balance of equities in favor of the successful bidder; in another case, it might
not. 988
XVII. OPTIONS AND RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSA
9 89
Gonzalez v. Archer.990 When the tenant tried to exercise the purchase
option contained in the commercial lease, the seller claimed that the option
had been nullified by the tenant's default in making late rent payments.
991
The tenant then brought this action for specific performance. The trial
court denied relief, but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed because
the record revealed that the landlord had accepted the untimely rent
payments without protest, and had, therefore, impliedly waived the right to
declare the lease in default based on those breaches. 993 The court also
invoked estoppel to prevent the landlord from declaring the lease in default
under these circumstances.
994
The court rejected the defense that the tenant had failed to pay the
deposits required upon exercising the option.995 The lease did not specify
when the deposits had to be paid, and in the absence of an express term, the
tenant had a reasonable time to comply, but the landlord had repudiated the
option before a reasonable time had passed.996 The tenant was not required
to make a tender that the landlord already indicated would be refused.
Indian River Colony Club, Inc. v. Bagg.998 The Indian River ColonyClub ("Club") was a nonprofit organization created to provide benefits to
986. Id.
987. Id.
988. United Cos. Lending, 713 So. 2d at 1018.
989. Rights of first refusal and, for that matter, rights of first sale, are merely options that
are subject to conditions precedent. See Ronald Benton Brown, An Examination of Real Estate
Purchase Options, 12 NOVAL. REV. 147, 172 (1987).
990. 718 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Oct. 14, 1998).
991. Id. at 890.
992. Id. at 889.
993. Id.
994. Id. at 890.
995. Gonzalez, 718 So. 2d at 890.
996. Id.
997. Id.
998. 727 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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former military officers. 999  One of the benefits of membership was the
ability to buy a residence in the Club's planned unit development. 100°
However, under the deed restrictions, nonmembers were unable to purchase
a unit.100 1 Furthermore, if an owner decided to sell, the residence had to be
sold at a price agreed to when the unit was first acquired, and to another
Club member on the waiting list. 002 If a Club member wanted to buy the
unit, the Club was required to sell it at the agreed price. 1003 The Baggs
claimed that these restrictions violated the rule against restraints on
alienation. 1'°4 The trial court agreed, based upon the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in Inglehart v. Phillips 1005 which invalidated a fixed price
repurchase option of unlimited duration.1
°°
The Fifth District Court of Appeal disagreed, distinguishing Inglehart
on the critical facts. 007 The rule against restraints on alienation does not
prohibit all restrictions that prevent sale of land on the open market. 00 8 The
rule prohibits only unreasonable restraints.1° 9 The restriction in Inglehart
had no stated purpose and the court found it would have a significant
negative impact on the likelihood that the property would be improved, and
on its general marketability.'010 In contrast, the restrictions in this case were
shown not to have the same degree of negative impact.1011 To the contrary,
the restrictions were part of a rational plan to ensure continued success of
the organization, and the planned unit development. Declaring the
restrictions invalid would undermine the legitimate objectives of the
members of the association.101  The dissent considered the case "squarely
controlled by Inglehart."'0 13 The critical factor, in the dissent's opinion, was
that there was no provision for an increase in the value of the property
between purchase and resale.10 1 4 The dissent would, however, have allowed
999. Id. at 1144.
1000.Id.
1001.Id.
1002. Id.
1003.Bagg, 727 So. 2d at 1144.
1004. Id.
1005.383 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1980).
1006.Bagg, 727 So. 2d at 1145.
1007. Id.
1008. Id. at 1145-46.
1009. Id.
1010. Id. at 1146.
1011.Bagg, 727 So. 2d at 1146.
1012.Id.
1013. Id. at 1146 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
1014. Id. at 1146.
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the Club to seek relief based upon equitable principles for the loss of the
benefit of its bargain.
0 15
Taylor v. Ceser . 16 Defendant was the trustee and executor of the
property in dispute. U1 7 As such, he had the power to sell or grant an option
on the land.1° g Cesery decided to sell the residence, but first offered it to
one of the beneficiaries. 10 19 When the beneficiary did not accept the offer,
the defendant gave her "a right of first refusal."''1 0 He later received an
offer from a third party and notified the beneficiary. °02 The beneficiary
proposed that she receive the house in lieu of her cash distribution under the
will. 10 22 When the defendant rejected that roposal, the beneficiary brought
this suit and filed a notice of lis pendens. 0
The trial court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. The
First District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the preliminary
injunction, reasoning that the plaintiff had no likelihood of ultimate success
on the merits.102 The claim was based upon having exercised the right of
first refusal, but a matching cash offer was never made by the third party. 10 26
Taking the house in lieu of a distribution from the estate was not the
equivalent of a cash offer.'
0 27
XVIII. RIPARIAN RIGHTS
Lee v. Williams.'028 This court resolved the issue of whether the
appellant had a right to construct a boat lift, by looking at which neighbor
owns the nonnavigable tidelands of Florida.'029- In Lee, the two neighbors'
1015. Id. at 1147.
1016.717 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1017. Id. at 1113.
1018.Id.
1019. Id.
1020. Id.
1021. Taylor, 717 So. 2d at 1113.
1022. Id. at 1114.
1023. Id.
1024. Id. Plaintiff also filed a notice of lis pendens which the trial court ordered
discharged. The district court reversed because there were issues remaining in the litigation that
might affect the title. Consequently, the third party would take title subject to the ultimate
outcome of this litigation. Id. at 1114-15.
1025. Taylor, 717 So. 2d at 1114.
1026. Id.
1027. Id.
1028.711 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 722 So. 2d 193 (Fla.
1998).
1029. Id. at 57.
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lots were contiguous.' °3° The western boundary of the Williams' lot, Lot 13,
was defined as the centerline of Butler's Branch, a small waterway shown on
the plat of Butler's Replat, and the Lees' northern boundary of their lot, Lot
12, was Julington Creek, a navigable body of water. 1031 The waters of
Butler's Branch and Julington Creek joined at the northwest end of the Lees'
poe*1032property.
I s
In 1960, the owner of Lot 13 excavated a navigable canal to run through
and across Lot 13, and through and across the conflux of Butler's Branch
and Julington Creek and into Julington Creek.1033 In 1961, when the
Williams purchased Lot 13, the canal had been excavated. 1034 If in 1961, the
boat lift had been erected where it is today, it would have been over dry
1035land. Over the years, the canal bank eroded toward the common
boundary line, and in the 1980's the owner of Lot 12 constructed a bulkhead
along the, then existing, bank of the canal.10 36 Surveys show that a great
portion of this bulkhead was built on Lot 13.1037
In 1993, the Lees purchased Lot 12, and without the Williams'
knowledge, constructed a boat lift in the canal adjoining the previously
constructed bulkhead sometime in 1994. The boat lift was situated
entirely within Lot 13, and the Williams, upon discovering this, protested the
construction of the boat lift.1039
The issue facing this court was whether the canal, which traverses
nonnavigable tidelands within the Williams' lot, was privately owned by the
Williams, or was sovereignty land available for public use. 1°4° The trial
court found that Clement v. Watson1 0 1 was dispositive.'0 2 In Clement, the
court found that Watson was able to exclude Clement from fishing privileges
in a cove surrounded by property owned by Watson's wife.1043 The Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the basis of the decision in Clement, when it
defined navigable waters and "emphasized that waters are not navigable
1030. Id.
1031. Id. at 57-58.
1032. Id. at 58.
1033. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58.
1034. Id.
1035. Id.
1036.Id.
1037. Id.
1038. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58.
1039. Id.
1040. Id.
1041.58 So. 25 (Fa. 1912).
1042.Lee, 711 So. 2d at 58.
1043. Id.
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merely because they are affected by the tides."' ' 4 The court distinguished
between sovereignty and privately owned lands as follows:
"The shore of navigable waters which the sovereign holds for
public uses is the land that borders on navigable waters and lies
between ordinary high and ordinary low water mark This does not
include lands that do not immediately border on the navigable
waters, and that are covered by water not capable of navigation
for useful public purposes, such as mud flats, shallow inlets, and
lowlands covered more or less by water permanently or at
intervals, where the waters thereon are not in their ordinary state
useful for public navigation. Lands not covered by navigable
waters and not included in the shore space between ordinary high
and low water marks immediately bordering on navigable waters
are the subjects of private ownership, at least when the public
rights of navigation, etc., are not thereby unlawfully impaired."'
1 45
The court concluded in Clement that a majority of states, including Florida,
base the determination on whether water is navigable and not upon whether
water is tidal. 1046 The appellants, however, argued that reliance on Clement
was an error and that the 1988 decision by the United States Supreme Court
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi' 47 governed.' 04 The appellants
concluded that all of Florida's tidelands are sovereignty lands of the state.
1049
In Phillips Petroleum, the United States Supreme Court held that the states,
"upon entry into the Union, received ownership of all lands under waters
subject to the daily tidal ebb and flow."'0 50 However, the Court also held
"that the states have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in
public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit."'10 5
This court looked to see how Florida law defined the limits of the lands
held in public trust, and what private rights in tidelands that Florida
recognizes. 052 No Supreme Court of Florida case has overruled Clements,
nor has any case held a nonnavigable tideland to be sovereignty land.
1053
1044. Id.
1045.Id. at 59 (quoting Clement v. Watson, 58 So. 25, 26 (Fla. 1912)) (emphasis in
original).
1046. Id.
1047.484 U.S. 469 (1988).
1048. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 59.
1049. Id. at 60.
1050. Id.
1051. Id.
1052. Id.
1053. Lee, 711 So. 2d at 62.
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Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision that the land
is not to be sovereignty land.
10 54
XIX. SALES
Anchor Bank, S.S.B. v. Conrardy.1 55 Condominium buyers brought an
action for damages for fraud and rescission based on claims that the seller
had made fraudulent representations and failed to disclose known
construction defects.'056 The two claims were tried together. The court
granted a directed verdict for the defendant on the fraud claim due to
"deficiencies in proof as to the tort damages," but then granted rescission
based on fraud in the inducement.
1057
Two points on appeal were noteworthy. First, the seller claimed that
the buyers had an adequate remedy at law, so they should be denied any
equitable relief.1058 The crux of this argument seems to be based on the fact
that the buyers could not simultaneously bring the tort suit without
undermining their claim for rescission.1059 The district court rejected that
argument because the Supreme Court of Florida allowed such joinder in
Johnson v. Davis.'6 The seller also seemed to be arguing that losing the
tort suit should bar the claim for rescission, but that argument was rejected
because the elements for establishing damages for fraud were not the same
as those for rescission for fraudulent concealment.10
61
The seller also claimed that rescission should not be granted because
the buyers could not restore the property to its condition at the time of the
sale, as is ordinarily required.1 62 The exception to the general rule is where
restoration is prevented by the very fraud from which the victim seeks
relief. The exception applied in this case because the deterioration was
caused b the structural problems that the seller had failed to disclose to the
buyers.
1054. Id. at 64.
1055.23 Fla. L. Weekly D1764 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1056. Id.
1057. Id.
1058. Id.
1059. Id.
1060.AnchorBank, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D1764 (citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625
(Fla. 1985)).
1061.Id.
1062. Id.
1063.Id.
1064. Id.
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Beach Higher Power Corp. v. Granados.10 65  The Buyer signed a
contract to purchase a condominium unit "as is.' 1066 The contract called for
closing within sixty days but the buyer paid the entire purchase price at the
time of signing the contract. 0 67 Over fifteen months later, the buyer still did
not have title despite repeated demands, and he thereafter filed this suit for
specific performance and breach of contract.1°68 He alleged that the seller
had been using the unit during that period and had damaged it.
1069
Before the seller had filed its answer the trial court granted the buyer's
motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. In
support of the motion, the buyer had filed an affidavit which incorporated by
reference a letter from the seller's attorney claiming the buyer had gotten the
unit at a bargain price because he had orally agreed to allow the seller to use
the unit as a sales office and model until all the other units had been sold.107 1
The buyer, in his affidavit, denied any such agreement.1
07 2
The district court concluded that the partial summary judgment should
not have been granted. 07 3 Summary judgment should only be granted before
an answer has been filed where it appears that no genuine issue or defense
could possibly be raised by the answer. 107 4 Here, at least one possible
defense existed. The written contract could have been modified by a
subsequent oral agreement, or the conduct of the parties, even if that was
prohibited by an express term in the contract. 07 5" The buyer's affidavit
reveals that there was a dispute about the existence of an agreement under
which seller could use the unit.1076 If there was such a valid modification,
then seller might not have breached the contract. Consequently, the motion
should not have been granted at this stage of the proceedings.1
07
Bush v. Ayer. °78 The land and the buyer were located in Florida, butthe sellers were located in Ohio. 107 9 An agreement in principle was reached
1065.717 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Sept. 23, 1998).
1066. Id. at 564.
1067. Id.
1068. Id.
1069. Id.
1070. Granados, 717 So. 2d at 564.
1071. Id.
1072. Id.
1073. Id.
1074. Id. at 565.
1075. Granados, 717 So. 2d at 565.
1076. Id.
1077. Id.
1078.728 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, Ayer v. Bush, 744 So.
2d 452 (Fla. 1999).
1079. Id. at 800.
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during a telephone conversation.10 80 The buyer instructed his attorney to
draft the contract and mail it to the sellers.081 After reviewing the contract,
the sellers wanted one change.1082 They wanted the buyer to pay the closing
costs.10s3 They hand wrote their modifications onto the draft, signed it, and
then faxed it to their attorney.10 4 Their attorney mailed the fax to the buyer
with a cover letter that stated:
Please forward these counter-offers to your client, Mr. Bush, and
explain the changes. If he is willing to consider the terms proposed
by my clients, then please contact me and I will deliver the original
signed contracts to your office for [your] review and execution.
Once there is a complete bilateral contract ... then we can discuss
making preparations for the closing.1085
That procedure was not followed. 10 6 The original contract that the
buyer had sent to the sellers was never delivered back to the buyer's attorney
for review and execution, as the cover letter required for the completing of a
bilateral contract. 087 The buyer simply went to his attorney's office and
agreed to the changes. 088 He then signed the fax copy of the contract that
his attorney had received.1089 The buyer's attorney communicated those
facts to the sellers and their attorney, and further stated that he was taking
the contract to a title company so that the closing documents could be
prepared.1°9° The title company sent the closing documents, including
closing statements and proposed deeds, to the sellers.1091 . The sellers
objected to the tax prorations, but that was worked out.1°92 Anticipating
closing, the buyer delivered checks to the title company. 093 A further
dispute broke out regarding minor discrepancies in the names of the
1094sellers. Apparently frustrated over the delays, the sellers attempted to
1080. Id.
1081. Id.
1082. Id.
1083. Bush, 728 So. 2d at 800.
1084. Id.
1085. Id.
1086. Id. at 801.
1087. Id.
1088.Bush, 728 So. 2d at 800-01.
1089. Id. at 801.
1090. Id.
1091.Id.
1092. Id.
1093. Bush, 728 So. 2d at 801.
1094. Id. at 802.
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rescind the contract, offering to return the buyer's deposit. 0 95 The buyer
responded with the threat of a lawsuit."' 96 Attempting to resolve the matter,
the sellers' attorney stated, "Mr. and Mrs. Ayer are willing to meet their
contractual requirements to sell Lot 13; however, there is a problem."'
97
When the negotiations again broke down, the sellers claimed, for the first
time, that there was no contract because the buyer had never properly
accepted the counteroffer.1
98
The trial court agreed with the sellers and found that there was no
contracL.) 99 The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed and reversed.1"0
While the counteroffer required acceptance in a particular manner, strict
compliance with those terms could be waived expressly or impliedly."O'
Reviewing the facts, the district court found:
Prior to the date set for closing, the parties had proceeded in all
respects as if a valid contract existed for the sale of Lot 13.
[Sellers] did not simply fail to assert to the contrary-they actively
conducted themselves in a manner that left no room for a
reasonable inference to the contrary. It would be difficult to
imagine a much stronger showing of waiver by conduct than that
made in this record. We conclude that the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from the undisputed evidence ... is that they
waived strict compliance with the designated manner of acceptance
of their counter-offer.1102
The trial court had concluded otherwise. Because the facts were not in
dispute, its findings were in the nature of a legal conclusion."03 Thus, the
district court was not required to defer to the trial court's findings.
Midtown Realty, Inc. v. Hussain.'14 The buyer sent a signed "Letter of
Intent" to the sellers containing a proposal for the purchase of a gas
station.1105 It included terms such as the proposed purchase price, financing
plans, and an inspection period. It further provided, "[i]f these TERMS and
CONDITIONS are acceptable to the Seller, Purchaser shall present to the
1095. Id.
1096. Id.
1097. Id.
1098. Bush, 728 So. 2d at 802.
1099. Id.
1100. Id.
1101. Id. at 801.
1102. Id. at 802.
1103. Bush, 728 So. 2d at 802.
1104.712 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1105. Id. at 1250.
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Seller a more detailed and formal Purchase Agreement."" 6 Before signing
the letter of intent, the sellers' representative changed and added
terms.11 07 In response, the buyer sent a signed Purchase and Sale Agreement
to the sellers. 1r 8  The sellers responded by making several changes,
executing it and sending it back to the buyer. The buyer notified the
sellers that he could not agree to two of the changes the Sellers had made,
and that unless an agreement could be reached on these points, the
transaction could not be consummated."1 10 An agreement could not be
reached and the sellers withdrew the property from the market.,
The buyer then brought this suit for breach of contract.1112 The sellers'
defense was that there was no contract1 3 The trial court dismissed the case
and the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.' 4 In order to have a
contract, there must have been a meeting of the minds on the essential
elements of the agreement. Several factors led the court to conclude that no
contract existed. First, a letter of intent is customarily used to memorialize a
preliminary understanding, rather than a contract.111  Second, this letter of
intent included language making it clear that it was merely a proposal
intended to further negotiations, rather than an offer.1 6 The sale of a gas
station, necessarily involving many complicated details, such as
environmental matters, licensing, permits and financing, would ordinarily be
reduced to a detailed contract, rather than a brief document like the letter of
intent.1117 Furthermore, the buyer himself had stated that the transaction
could not be consummated unless agreement could be reached on points not
resolved by the letter of intent.1118
Pressman v. Wolf.1119 The buyer signed a contract that provided the
central air conditioning, refrigerator, washer/dryer, hot water heater, stove
1106. Id.
1107. Id.
1108. Id. at 1251.
1109.Hussain, 712 So. 2d at 1251.
1110.Id.
1111.Id.
1112.Id.
1113.Id.
1114. Hussain, 712 So. 2d at 1251. The claim of the broker operating under an open listing
contract was also dismissed and that was also affirmed by the district court. Id.
1115. Id. at 1252.
1116. Id.
1117.Id.
1118.Hussain, 712 So. 2d at 1252.
1119.732 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, Wolf v. Pressman, 744
So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1999).
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top and existing fixtures were "ALL IN 'AS IS' CONDITION."11 20 The
standard term warranting the septic tank, pool, major appliances, plumbing,
and machinery to be in working condition was crossed out.I1 21 The contract
also provided that the buyer waived any defects not reported at least ten days
before the closing. 1122 Furthermore, the contract provided the standard
integration term that, "[n]o prior or present agreements or representations
shall be binding upon [B]uyer or [S]eller unless included in this
contract." 1123 The buyer was clearly aware of these terms, but made a
"business decision" to accept against the advice of her attorney. 1
Before closing, the buyer's inspectors warned her that the true extent of
the problems could not be determined without further testing."2  They
warned her that there were reasons to be concerned about the home's
structural integrity, whether the air conditioning system worked, and the
presence of termites. Furthermore, there were reasons to suspect that the
pool leaked, or worse. 1127 The buyer, however, decided to close anyway. H2
She later claimed that she went through with the closing because the sellers
represented that a city owned building obstructing the view would be torn
down and that a person they knew, Mr. Cruz, would be able to renovate the
home for only $100,000.1129
The buyer quickly became dissatisfied with Mr. Cruz's work, and fired
him. ' 30 After spending $225,000 on repairs, with the end not in sight, she
became dissatisfied with her purchase and brought this suit claiming breach1131
of contract and fraud. The trial court awarded her compensatory and
punitive damages, but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed.'
132
The Third District considered the contract as a whole, rather than rely-
ing on isolated terms.1 33 It found that the agreement was to sell the home
"as is," with no warranties because both parties knew it was in bad repair.1134
1120. Id. at 358 (The capitalization for emphasis reflects the way the term was typed into
the contract).
1121.Id.
1122. Id.
1123.Id.
1124. Pressman, 732 So. 2d at 358.
1125.Id.
1126. Id. at 358-59.
1127. Id. at 359.
1128.Id.
1129. Pressman, 732 So. 2d at 359.
1130.Id.
1131.Id.
1132. Id. at 357.
1133. Id. at 360.
1134. Pressman, 732 So. 2d at 360.
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Thus, there could be no recovery for breach of contract.1 1 35 Nor could there
be recovery for fraudulent misrepresentation based on Johnson v. Davis
because that only gave relief from the seller's failure to disclose defects that
"are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer."'1 36 Not only
were hints of these defects observable, but the buyer was warned by the
terms of the contract and by her own inspectors.
n37
The buyer could also not recover based upon claims that she was misled
by the sellers' statement that the property could be renovated for $100,000,
or that the publicly owned building would be torn down. 11 The buyer could
not rely upon an obviously unreliable statement, she still had the duty to take
reasonable steps to ascertain the material facts relating to the property 13 9 In
light of the seller's disclaimers and the warnings of her inspectors, she could
not have reasonably relied upon such an unsupported estimate1
n40
Furthermore, she should have known that the plans of a government might
change so she could not rely upon its unconfirmed plans to tear the building
down.1
141
Finally, any claims that the buyer had been fraudulently induced to
enter this contract were barred by the economic loss doctrine. 114 2 Any
representation about the condition of the land was inseparably embodied in
the parties' subsequent agreement. 14 Consequently, she could not recover
damages for purely economic injury.'144
Spitale v. Smith."4  The buyer brought an action for, inter alia,
fraudulent nondisclosure of construction defects.'1 46 The seller was the first
owner of the home, but had never occupied it.147 As the landlord, he had
received a letter from the tenant to the seller specifing some minor
problems, including water leaks above the garage door. 11 The tenant later
testified that the leak over the garage door was the only one.1149 The seller
hired a roofer to repair that leak."
50
1135.Id.
1136. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985)).
1137. See id.
1138.Id. at 361.
1139. Pressman, 732 So. 2d at 361.
1140.Id.
1141.Id.
1142.Id.
1143.Id.
1144.Pressman, 732 So. 2d at 362.
1145.721 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Nov. 12, 1998).
1146. Id. at 342.
1147.Id.
1148. Id. at 343.
1149.Id.
1150. Spitale, 721 So. 2d at 344.
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During the four years after the closing, the buyer experienced repeated
problems with the roof and had it repaired a number of times.'1 ' Following
a bench trial, judgment was entered for the buyer, but the district court
reversed.' 52 "Johnson [v. Davis] does not convert a seller of a house into a
guarantor of the condition of the house."1 3 What it did hold was that
"where the seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the value of
the property which are not readily observable and are not known to the
buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer."' 54 In this
case, there simply was insufficient evidence that the seller knew of facts that
would materially affect the value of the property.1
5 5
Tiburon Ltd. v. Minola, Inc.1 56 The buyer contracted to buy fifty acres
of an approved development of almost eight hundred acres.11 57 The contract
of sale included a clause that required the recording of a covenant at closing
that would obligate the buyer to pay its pro rata share of the construction,
operation, maintenance, and repair of the water management system for the
entire development.'1 58 The parties' engineers were to jointly determine
what that pro rata share would be, but if no agreement could be reached,
"such issue shall be submitted to binding arbitration.""159 The clause also
provided that the buyer's share would not exceed $265,000.1160
Subsequently, the buyer signed an option to purchase up to an
additional twenty-four acres adjacent to the original fifty. 11 The buyer
assigned its rights to a related entity, which we will identify as Buyer-2, who
went through with the purchase 1 62 Buyer-2 exercised the option and the
parties proceeded to closing.' 63 Because they could not agree on Buyer-2's
pro rata share of the costs of the water management system for its combined
purchases, they entered into an escrow agreement.1164 It provided that
Buyer-2 would deposit $395,000 in escrow as its maximum obligation, and
the exact amount would be determined by an arbitrator.1 65 The $395,000
1151.1d.
1152. Id. at 345.
1153. Id. (citing Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985)).
1154. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1986)).
1155. Spitale, 721 So. 2d at 345.
1156.730 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Apr. 22, 1999).
1157.3d.
1158.1d.
1159.Id.
1160.Id.
1161. Tiburon Ltd., 730 So. 2d at 754.
1162. Id. at 755.
1163.Id.
1164. Id.
1165.Id.
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represented an increase of its original $265,000 maximum proportional to
the greater amount of land it was now purchasing. 66
Buyer and Buyer-2 during arbitration tried to collect from the seller its
pro rata share of the cost of the water management system.1 67 The seller
objected on the grounds that imposing liability on the seller was beyond the
scope of the arbitration to which they had agreed.1168 The trial court agreed,
as did the district court. 1169 The arbitration clause, as interpreted by looking
at all the documents, clearly was limited to the question of what share of
these costs buyer would have to pay.1170 While that necessarily involved
calculating the total cost of the system, it did not extend to the question of
the seller's responsibility for costs incurred by the buyer in regard to the
system.1171 The court acknowledged that the buyer and Buyer-2 might have
a cause of action against the seller for contribution to the cost of the water
management system, but pointed out that issue was not before the court.
1172
XX. SLANDER OF TITLE
Clearman v. Dalton.1173  This opinion resulted from a motion for
rehearing or clarification.1 74 The Clearmans sought rehearing of the court's
unpublished order that granted the Clearmans attorneys' fees. 175 This court
withdrew the previous opinion and the order awarding the Clearmans
appellate fees and substituted the following information.
11 7 -
The Clearmans recovered a judgment for $150,000 against the
Daltons. 177 The Daltons filed for bankruptcy and stated there were two
secured mortgages against their homestead. The first mortgage in favor
of the Daltons' son was never recorded and the second mortgage to
Monticello Bank was recorded but never delivered.' 79 The Daltons neveramended their bankruptcy petition to correct the "error."'1 180
1166. Tiburon Ltd., 730 So. 2d at 755.
1167.Id.
1168.Id.
1169. Id. at 754.
1170. Id. at 755.
1171. Tiburon Ltd., 730 So. 2d at 755-56.
1172. Id. at 756.
1173.708 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1174. Id. at 324.
1175.Id.
1176. Id. at 325.
1177. Id.
1178. Clearman, 708 So. 2d at 325.
1179.Id.
1180. Id.
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The trustee in bankruptcy elected to avoid the liens and obtained an
order from the bankruptcy court avoiding the mortgages, preserving the
avoided obligations "for the benefit of the estate. '11 8 The mortgages were
assigned to the Clearmans.1 82 After they recorded the assignment and the
judgments avoiding the mortgages, the Clearmans attempted to foreclose on
the interest acquired from the trustee.' 83 Dalton counterclaimed to quiet
title and for slander of title." 84 The trial court denied foreclosure and found
against the Clearmans on the Daltons' counterclaim for slander of title.
1 85
The court awarded the Daltons attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment
interest.'
186
The appellate court agreed with the trial court holding that "even
though the obligations evidenced by avoiding the mortgages were preserved
for the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 544 does not place the Trustee ... in the place of
the former mortgagees with the power to foreclose and avoid the Daltons'
homestead claim." It went on to hold "the bankruptcy estate did have an
assignable interest in the mortgages subject to the Daltons' claim of
homestead."' 1 88 The court ruled that the assignees paid a fair price for the
assignment, can assert their interest, and thus, can be required to establish
the fact of homestead.!
18 9
The appellate court determined that filing of judgments does not
constitute slander of title even if the assignment of the estate's interest was
in the nature of a quitclaim deed.119 The Daltons willingly filed their
bankruptcy petition and submitted their property to bankruptcy.'
91
Therefore, they cannot subsequently complain if the assignee of the estate's
interest requires that they prove their entitlement to the homestead
exemption.1
92
1181. Id.
1182.1d.
1183. Cleannan, 708 So. 2d at 325.
1184.Id.
1185.1d.
1186.Id.
1187.Id.
1188. Clearman, 708 So. 2d at 325.
1189.3d.
1190.Id.
1191.Id.
1192.Id.
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XXI. TAXATION
Fuchs v. Robbins.1 93 The issue here is whether the trial court properly
held section 192.042(1), of the Florida Statutes to be unconstitutional." 4
Section 192.042(1) of the Florida Statutes requires that a zero valuation be
placed on buildings under construction and not substantially completed on
the taxing date, which is January first of each year.11gs
The appellate court held that the trial court was correct and the statute
was unconstitutional. 1196  The court determined the statute violated the
mandate of article VII, § 4, of the Florida Constitution (1968) that all real
property (with some inapplicable exceptions) be assessed and taxed at just
valuation.1 97 According to the court, just valuation is synonymous with fair
market value, and has been determined by the Supreme Court of Florida as
"[tihe amount a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy, would pay to one
willing but not obliged to sell."''198
This court held in McNayr v. Claughton' 99 that there are three well
recognized ways to appraise: 1) the cost approach; 2) the comparable sales
approach; and 3) the income or economic approach.12°° Here, the Master's
Report states that the property appraiser's expert used the comparable sales
approach and arrived at the $3,790,227 tax assessment valuation on the
improvements.'2 1 Therefore, on January 1, 1992 the incomplete hotel
structure had an uncontested just valuation of $3,790.227.1202 The court has
previously held in Interlachen Lake Estates v. Snyder, ITT Community
Development Corp. v. Seay, and Valencia Center, Inc. v. Bystrom that,
except where the constitution specifically authorizes it that legislation which
singles out classifications or properties for treatment that shows a tax
assessment valuation at something other than fair market value violates
article VII, section 4, of the Florida Constitution (1968)."'
1193.24 Fla. L. Weekly D1529 (3d Dist. Ct. App. June 30, 1999).
1194. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 192.042(1)(1991)).
1195. Id. (referring to the 1991 version of the Florida Statutes).
1196.Id.
1197.Id.
1198.Fuchs, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1530.
1199. 198 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
1200. Fuchs, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at D1530 (citing McNayr v. Claughton, 198 So. 2d 366
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
1201. Id.
1202. Id.
1203. Id.; see Snyder, 304 So. 2d at 433; Seay, 347 So. 2d at 1024; Bystrom, 543 So. 2d
at 214.
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Kuro v. Department of Revenue. 1 4 Kuro, Inc. ("Kuro") appealed a
final order which assessed an additional documentary stamp tax
collectively, on conveyances of eight unencumbered condominium units. 203
Stock issued by Kuro in exchange for the condominiums was concluded in
the final order to constitute consideration and that, pursuant to the applicable
statutes and rules, this consideration was equal to the fair market value of the
condominiums. 12 The documentary stamp tax was based on the fair market
value. 207 This court reversed and found that levying the additional tax was
1208
error.
The condominiums were owned by a father and son team in
1991.1209 In 1994 the father and son incorporated Kuro.1210 They transferred
the units' titles to the corporation to avoid the potential personal liability for
1211managing the eight rental units. The father and son transferred each
condominium unit to Kuro by warranty deed.1 2 Each deed recited nominal
consideration of ten dollars and Kuro paid the minimum documentary stamp
tax on each transaction.1213
After conducting an audit, the Department of Revenue ("DOR")
1214determined that additional documentary stamp taxes were due. The
administrative law judge recommended the assessment of additional
documentary stamp taxes and the DOR entered a final order adopting these
recommendations.
The appellate court first looked at section 201.02(1) of the Florida
Statutes, which states that "a purchaser of real estate is required to pay a
documentary stamp tax of $.70 on each $100 of consideration" for the
property.1 6 It further states that when consideration given in exchange for
real property or any interest therein is other than money, it is presumed that
the consideration is an amount that is equal to the fair market value of the
real property.
12 17
1204.713 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1205. Id.
1206. Id. at 1021-22.
1207. Id. at 1022.
1208. Id.
1209. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
1210. Id.
1211. Id.
1212. Id.
1213.Id.
1214. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
1215.Id.
1216. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 201.02(1) (1999).
1217. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
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The court found that Kuro was not a purchaser within the meaning of
section 210.02(1)."" Therefore, no additional taxes were due.12 19 Section
210.02(1) applies to transfers of real estate for consideration to a purchaser
and "purchaser" has been defined by the Supreme Court of Florida as "'one
who obtains or acquires property by paying an equivalent in money or other
exchange in value."'" 2 ° The DOR's rule deals with stock as consideration
and the statute merely creates a rebuttable presumption. 221 In this situation
Kuro successfully rebutted the presumption.
1222
The appellate court found the conveyances were for the benefit of the
father and son, who were availing themselves of the advantages of
incorporation, and that the father and son still were the beneficial owners
although not the legal owners.1m23 At the time the deeds were recorded the
father and son owned all of the real estate and Kuro's stock.1 4 The father
and son did not receive anything that they did not already have.125
Therefore, all that occurred were book transactions and not sales to a
purchaser./2 The court reversed the DOR's final order./91
S & W Air Vac Systems, Inc. v. Department of Revenue. l The
appellate court affirmed the final administrative decision which held S & W
liable to the DOR for use taxes as the licensee of real property pursuant to
section 212.031 of the Florida Statutes.1 229
S & W owned coin-operated air vac machines used to vacuum cars and
add air to tires.1230 Store owners having these machines received monthly
compensation in the form of a percentage of the unit's gross receipts.
S & W had the responsibility to collect money from the machines, make
repairs, and pay licensing fees and taxes on them.1232
S & W described this agreement as a "revenue sharing
arrangement.' '2 3 3 The hearing officer found that payment was based on the
1218.Id.
1219.Id.
1220.Id. (quoting Florida Dep't of Revenue v. De Maria, 338 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla.
1976)).
1221. Id.
1222.Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1022.
1223. Id.
1224. Id. at 1023.
1225. Id.
1226. Id. at 1022 (citing Palmer-Florida Corp. v. Green, 88 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1956)).
1227. Kuro, 713 So. 2d at 1023.
1228.697 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1229. Id. at 1314; see FLA. STAT. § 212.031 (1999).
1230. S & WAir Vac Sys., 697 So. 2d at 1314.
1231. Id.
1232. Id. at 1314-15.
1233. Id.
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right to place the machine in these stores and store owners should not be
gaining compensation when the machine was removed.l2 34  The hearing
officer concluded that S & W had been granted licenses for the use of real
property.1235 Section 212.031 of the Florida Statutes dictated that use taxes
were owed to the Department.
12 36
First, the facts showed that the air vac machines were not the subject of
a bailment. 1237 A "bailment" is a contractual relationship among parties in
which the subject matter of the relationship is delivered temporarily to and
accepted by one other than the owner.
1238
Next, the arrangement with the store owners could not constitute joint
ventures.1239 To have a joint venture, five elements must be established in
addition to those required to form a basic contract.124° These elements
include: 1) a community of interest in the performance of the common
purpose; 2) joint control or right of control; 3) joint proprietary interest in
the subject matter; 4) a right to share in the profits; and 5) a duty to share in
any losses which may be sustained.1241 Although the first element was met,
the court recognized that the others were not.
124r
S & W also questioned whether convenience stores and gas stations met
section 212.031's use requirement.12 43 The statute states "it is declared to be
the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege who
engages in the business of rentin leasing, letting, or granting a license for
the use of any real property .... "
The hearing officer and the Department of Revenue concluded the
transactions between S & W and store owners were taxable under section
212.031 of the Florida Statutes.1245 That statute defines "business" as "any
activity engaged in by any person, or caused to be engaed by him, with the
object of private or public gain, benefit, or advantage."
In this situation, "the licensors operated a commercial premises
designed to attract customers for revenue generating purposes." The
1234. IM
1235. S & WAir Vac Sys., 697 So. 2d at 1315.
1236. Id.
1237. See id.
1238. See 5 FLA. JuR. 2D Bailments § 1 (1978).
1239. S & WAir Vac Sys., 697 So. 2d at 1315-16.
1240. Id.
1241. Id. (citing to Conklin Shows, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 684 So. 2d 328, 332
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)); See also Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So. 2d 510,515 (Fla. 1957).
1242. S & WAir Vac Sys., 697 So. 2d at 1315.
1243. Id. at 1316.
1244. Id. at 1316 (citing FLA. STAT. § 212.031(1)(a) (1993)).
1245. Id.
1246. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 212.02(2) (1989)).
1247. S & WAir Vac Sys., 697 So. 2d at 1317.
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ventures included income derived from a range of premises activity.128
Therefore, it was not a clearly erroneous interpretation to determine that
store owners were in the business of granting a license under section 212.02
and 212.031 of the Florida Statutes.12  gd
Smith v. Welton.12 50 The issue this court heard on appeal was whether
section 193.155(8)(a) of the Florida Statutes, is facially unconstitutional in
light of article VII, section (4)(c) of the Florida Constitution. 125 In Smith,
the court stated that article VII, section (4)(c) provides:
Taxation; assessments.-By general law regulations shall be
prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad
valorem taxation, provided:
(c) All persons entitled to a homestead exemption under Section 6
of this Article shall have their homestead assessed at just value as
of January 1 [,19941. This assessment shall change only as
provided herein.
1. Assessments subject to this provision shall be changed
annually on January 1st of each year; but those changes in
assessments shall not exceed the lower of the following:
(A) three percent (3%) of the assessment for the prior year.
(B)the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for all urban
consumers, U.S. City Average, all items 1967=100, or successor
reports for the preceding calendar year as initially reported by the
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2. No assessment shall exceed just value.
3. After any change of ownership, as provided by general law,
homestead property shall be assessed at just value as of January 1
of the following year. Thereafter, the homestead shall be assessed
as provided herein.
4. New homestead property shall be assessed at just value as of
January 1st of the year following the establishment of the
homestead. That assessment shall only change as provided herein.
5. Changes, additions, reductions or improvements to homestead
property shall be assessed as provided for by general law;
provided, however, after the adjustment for any change, addition,
reduction or improvement, the property shall be assessed as
provided herein.
1248. Id.
1249. Id.
1250.710 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
1251.Id. at 136.
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6. In the event of a termination of homestead status, the property
shall be assessed as provided by general law.
2 52
However, section 193.155(8)(a) of the Florida Statutes provides:
(8) Erroneous assessments of homestead property assessed under
this section may be corrected in the following manner:
(a) If errors are made in arriving at any annual assessment under
this section due to material mistake of fact concerning an essential
characteristic of the property, the assessment must be recalculated
for every such year.
The trial court found that section 193.155(8)(a) is unconstitutional
because the constitution states clearly that the assessment of just value shall
only change as provided by the statute and section 193.155(8)(a?lermits
changes to the assessment that are not found in the constitution. This
court found that section 193.155(8)(a) of the Florida Statutes is facially
unconstitutional because the purported exception to the three percent rule
contained in section 193.155(8)(a) is not one provided for in the
constitution.
12 55
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that provisions of the
Constitution cannot alter, contract or enlarge legislation. 6  The court
determined in this case that the statute in question would defeat the purpose
of article VII, section (4)(c) by allowing constant reassessments of
homesteads when the purpose of section (4)(c) of article VII is to encourage
the preservation of homestead property in the face of increasing real estate
development and rising property values and assessments.
Z5 7
Furthermore, this court found no merit to appellant's argument that
without section 193.155(8)(a) there would be inequitable taxation since the
constitution expressly mandates the special or inequitable taxation.125s Only
the homestead property receives the three percent cap and, therefore
nonhomestead property, commercial, agricultural, and noncommercial
recreational land are excluded from the three percent cap.125 9 Further, the
constitution provides that assessments shall not exceed just value, but does
1252. Id. at 136-37 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(c)).
1253. FLA. STAT. § 193.155(8)(a) (1999).
1254. Smith, 710 So. 2d at 136.
1255. Id. at 137.
1256. Id. at 138; see Ostemdorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539, 544 (Fla. 1982).
1257. See Smith, 710 So. 2d at 138.
1258. Id. at 137.
1259. Id.
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not say that assessments shall not be below just value.l2 ° Therefore, this
court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment. 261
Legislative changes include, but are not limited to, the following:
The Florida Legislature enacted chapter 98-185 to be retroactive to
January 1, 1998 and to be effective until it expired on July 1, 1999.26 This
chapter provides for a partial abatement of ad valorem taxation where
property has been destroyed or damaged by tornadoes. 1263 The application
for such abatement must be filed by the owner with the property appraiser
before March 1 following the tax year in which the destruction or damage
occurred. 1 4 Chapter 6 discusses the detail and criteria to be included in the
application and what events will occur if the properl appraiser determines
the applicant to be entitled to such partial abatement.
Section 196.1977 of the Florida Statutes provides:
[e]ach apartment in a continuing care facility certified under
chapter 651, which facility is not qualified for exemption under
[section] 196.1975 or other similar exemption, is exempt to the
extent of $25,000 of assessed valuation of such property for each
apartment which is occupied on January 1 of the year in which
exemption from ad valorem property taxation is requested by a
person holding a continuing care contract as defined under chapter
651 who resides therein and in good faith makes the same his or
her permanent home.12
66
These provisions shall take effect January 1, 1999 and shall apply to the
1999 tax rolls and each subsequent year's tax rolls.
1267
XXII. TIMESHARES
Effective April 30, 1998 amendments to chapter 721 of the Florida1268
Statutes became effective. Those changes include, but are not limited to,
the following:
To section 721.05 the legislature added a definition of "regulated short-
term product."1 269 That term is defined as
1260. Id.; see Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1992).
1261. Smith, 710 So. 2d at 138.
1262.1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-185.
1263. Ch. 98-185, § 1(1), 1999 Fla. Laws 1616, 1616.
1264. Id. § l(1)(a), 1999 Fla. Laws at 1616.
1265. I
1266.FLA. STAT. § 196.1977 (1999).
1267.Id. § 196.1979 n.1.
1268. FLA. STAT. § 721 (1999).
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a contractual right, offered by the seller, to use accommodations of
a timeshare plan, provided that:
(a) The agreement ... is executed in this state on the same day that
the prospective purchaser receives an offer to acquire an interest in
a timeshare plan and does not execute a purchase contract, after
attending a sales presentation; and
(b) The acquisition of the right to use includes an agreement that all
or a portion of the consideration paid by the prospective purchaser
for the right to use will be applied to or credited against the price of
a future purchase of a timeshare interest, or that the cost of a future
purchase of a timeshare interest will be fixed or locked in at a
specified price.1270
An item of consideration that the legislature deleted is section
721.075(4) of the Florida Statutes.127' That paragraph required the
developer to file an irrevocable letter of credit, surety bond, or other
assurance acceptable to the director of the division where the aggregate
represented value of all incidental benefits offered by a developer to a
purchaser exceeded five percent of the purchase price paid by that1272
purchaser. However, that requirement has been deleted and is no longer a
part of the statutory scheme.
2 73
The legislature added subsection (c) to section 721.09(1) of the Florida
Statutes. 27  This new provision provides that "the seller must immediately
cancel all outstanding reservation agreements, refund all escrowed funds to
prospective purchasers, and discontinue accepting reservation deposits or
advertising the availability of reservation agreements," where the time share
plan subject to the reservation agreement has not been filed with the division
as required by Florida law within ninety days after the date the division
approves the reservation agreement filing.
275
To that same statute the legislature added subsection (1)(d)."' This
section permits the seller who has filed a reservation agreement and escrow
agreement program as required by statute to advertise the reservation
agreement providing the material meets the criteria prescribed by the
subsections to subparagraph (d). 277
1269. Id. § 721.05(27).
1270. Id.
1271. Id. § 721.075(4).
1272. Id.
1273. FLA. STAT. § 721.075(4) (1999).
1274. Id. § 721.09(l)(c).
1275. Id.
1276. Id. § 721.09(l)(d).
1277. Id.
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Section 721.11 of the Florida Statutes added subsection (6) and its
subparts. 127 These provisions state that failing to provide cancellation rights
or disclosures required in connection with the sale of a regulated short-term
product automatically constitutes a misrepresentation in accordance with
subsection (4)(a) of this statute.1279 Section 721.11(6)(a) requires the filing
within ten days prior to use of a standard form of any agreement relating to
the sale of a regulated short-term product.1S ° Subsection (b) of that statute
establishes the right of a purchaser of a regulated short-term product to
cancel the agreement until midnight of the tenth calendar day following the
execution date of the agreement.' 28' It also provides that the right of
cancellation may not be waived by the prospective purchaser or anyone on
his or her behalf.18 2 Subsection (c) and its subparts with respect to this
same statute provide for statements that must be included in an agreement
for purchase of a regulated short-term product.12 3 Further, subsection (d) of
the same statute provides for a series of statements in conspicuous type that
must be included in an agreement for the purchase of a regulated short-term
product.'
2 4
Section (e) of the foregoing statute also provides for an exemption from
the requirements of subsection (b), (c), and (d).1' s5  Where the seller
provides the purchaser with the right to cancel the purchase of a regulated
short-term product for any time up to seven days before the purchasers
reserved use of the accommodations, but never less than ten days, and if the
seller refunds the total amount of all payments made by the purchaser
reduced by the proportion of any benefits the purchaser has actually received
prior to the effective date of the cancellation, the specific value of which has
been agreed to by the purchaser and seller, the short-term product offer shall
be exempt from the requirements of the aforementioned paragraphs.1
286
To section 721.15 the legislature added subparagraph (1)(b).11 7 This
section provides for allocating total common expenses for a condominium or
cooperative timeshare plan and allowing such to vary on a reasonable basis
if "the percentage is any interest in the common elements attributable to each
1278. FA. STAT. § 721.11(6) (1999).
1279. Id.
1280.Id. § 721.11(6)(a).
1281.Id. § 721.11(6)(b).
1282. Id.
1283. FA. STAT. § 721.11(6)(c) (1999).
1284. Id. § 721.11(6)(d).
1285. Id. § 721.11(6)(e).
1286.Id.
1287. FLA. STAT. § 721.15(1)(b) (1999).
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time share condominium parcel or timeshare cooperative parcel equals the
share of the total common expenses allocable to that parcel."2
8
To chapter 721 the legislature added the Timeshare Lien Foreclosure
Act. This act consists of sections 721.80 through 721.86 and should be read
in detail to become familiar with the rights and procedures involved.
The legislature also added sections 721.96 through 721.98 to the
Florida Statutes. These statutes provide for establishing a commissioner of
deeds to take acknowledgments, proofs of execution, and oaths outside the
United States in connection with the execution of any instruments relating to
or being used in connection with a timeshare estate.129 These sections
should be read in detail.
XXIII. TME INSURANCE
Security Union Title Inurance. Co. v. Citibank, N.A.' 2g The First
District Court of Appeal was asked to review a jury verdict finding the title
insurance underwriter vicariously liable for fraud committed by its agent, an
attorney, when he made fraudulent representations to the lender to obtain
loans, some of which benefitted him personally and others of which
benefitted his clients.12g Noting that the agent was expressly authorized
only to sign and issue title insurance commitments and policies and that the
losses did not occur from his acting in such a capacity, the appellate court
found no vicarious liability under that authority.
1292
Next, it considered whether there might be vicarious liability arising
from the agent's acting within his apparent authority. 1293 In doing so, the
appellate court noted that at least one element needed for this liability is that
there must have been some representation by the principal.1 94 Here the facts
showed only that the principal who represented the agent had the authority to
issue title commitments and policies. 2 95 The fraudulent acts involved the
agent's representations made to obtain loans.1296  There were no
representations by the underwriter that the agent had any authority to make
1288. Id.
1289. Id. § 721.96.
1290.715 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, (Aug. 25, 1998),
review dismissed, Citibank, N.A. v. Security Union Title Ins., 728 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1998).
1291. Id.
1292. Id.
1293. Id.
1294. Id. at 975. Presumably this representation must be one that would lead the claimant
to have relied reasonably on the appearance that the agent had the authority to commit the act that
caused the harm.
1295. Citibank, 715 So. 2d at 975.
1296. Id.
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statements as a closing agent to obtain loans.1297 Also, it was clear that the
loans were for both his personal benefit and his clients' benefit. 298
Therefore, the appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions to
enter a judgment in favor of the underwriter.1 299
Legislative changes include, but are not limited to the following:
chapter 99-286 of the Laws of Florida provides such changes to sections 624
and 627 of the Florida Statutes as differentiated ratings and premium splits
for real estate transactions exceeding $1,000,000; legislative clarifications
for such terms as "premium" and "primary title services;" and a restructuring
of reserve requirements.
1 30
XXIV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey presents selected materials of significance to real
estate professionals. 01 There seems to be no consistent pattern to the case
law or legislative developments, but, as always, there is plenty for the reader
to ponder. Real estate law continues to evolve in interesting ways.
1297. Id.
1298. Id. at 975.
1299. Id. at 976.
1300.1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-286.
1301. Readers are also urged to read the article on zoning and land use controls.
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Invoking What Rule?
Michael Flynn*
The sequestration of witnesses has been a part of Florida trial practice
since at least 1906.' The purpose of the sequestration rule is to "avoid the
coloring of a witness's testimony by that which he has heard from other
,,2witnesses. By "invoking the rule," the court in a criminal or civil case can
insure that the testimony of each witness stands on its own and is not
influenced, tainted or purposefully altered because of other witness
testimony.3 The procedure at common law for "invoking the rule" at trial
was simple. A lawyer for either side of a case simply asked the judge to
"invoke the rule."4 Then the court, in its discretion, immediately ruled to
grant or deny the request for sequestration of prospective witnesses.5
Ordinarily, the court granted the request for sequestration absent a showing
of extraordinary circumstances. 6 This process for "invoking the rule" was
fast, fair, and inexpensive. The Florida courts still use this process for the
sequestration of potential witnesses during a trial.7 But the application of the
rule of sequestration to deposition proceedings remains unsettled.
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. B.A.,
magna cum laude, Gonzaga University, 1973 and J.D., cum laude, Gonzaga University, 1977.
The author thanks Allison Carmine, LD. Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law
Center, 1998, for her assistance in preparing this article.
1. WmuAM R. ELEAZEp & GLEN WEiSSENBERGER, FLORIDA EviDENcE: 1999
CouRTROOM MANUAL 425 (1999). See generally Seaboard Air Line RY v. Smith, 43 So. 235
(Fla. 1907) (holding that sequestration was a matter of judicial discretion by trial court,
undisturbed unless there was evidence of abuse of that discretion).
2. Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla. 1961).
3. Dardashti v. Singer, 407 So. 2d 1098, 1099 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct App. 1982). The trial
court has an additional consideration in sequestration of a witness during a criminal trial: the
balancing of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confronting and cross-examination of
witnesses. See Wright v. State, 473 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1985); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332
(Fla. 1982); Dumas v. State, 350 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1977).
4. ELEAzER & WEiSSENBERGER, supra note 1, at 425. Although no written rule was yet
adopted, "invoking the rule' or "the rule" was commonly known among Florida attorneys and
judges as the rule of sequestration. Id.
5. Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1984).
6. Id.
7. Dardashti, 407 So. 2d at 1100. The court in Dardashti quoted Spencer v. State, an
often cited case for the common law mie of sequestration: 'Ordinarily, when requested by either
side, the trial judge will exclude all prospective witnesses from the courtroom' during the trial.
Id. at 1099 (quoting Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla. 1961)). The court used the
language "ordinarily exclude" to mean that not excluding prospective witnesses will only occur
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The application of the rule of sequestration to depositions first surfaced
in Florida in the Fourth District Court of Appeal case of Dardashti v.
Singer.8 In that case, the plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of contract
against a defendant.9 The defendant, in his answer, denied the existence of a
contract with the plaintiff.10 Through interrogatories, the defendant learned
that the plaintiff's wife planned to testify in support of her husband's
claim." The district court noted that the plaintiff's wife's testimony was the
only corroborating testimony offered by the plaintiff and was therefore,
essential to substantiate the husband's claim.12 The Dardashti court found,
unlike the trial court, that permitting the plaintiff's wife to sit in on the
deposition of her husband would clearly prejudice and compromise the
plaintiff's wife's testimony.' 3  Based on this finding, the district court
reversed the trial court ruling and granted the defendant's request to "invoke
the rule" and exclude the plaintiffs wife from attending her husband's
deposition. 4 In so ruling, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the
same considerations apply to invoking the rule of sequestration at a trial and
a deposition. 15
It is important to note that the district court did not rely on any Florida
Rule of Evidence in making this decision. 16 Rather, the Dardashti court
relied on the basic premise used to support the application of the rule of
sequestration in any context, namely, the need for untainted testimony. 7 The
court, in its critical analysis of Spencer v. State8 which denied witness
sequestration in a criminal case, reasoned that the failure to apply the
sequestration rule to depositions would not only permit influenced, tainted,
and altered deposition testimony, but also threaten the integrity of a trial on
upon a showing of "extra ordinary circumstances." Id. at 1100. In other words, the general rule
after Dardashti is that either party should grant exclusion of a witness in a deposition upon the
request of the other party.
8. 407 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
9. Id. at 1099-1100.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1100.
12. Id.
13. Dardashti, 407 So. 2d at 1100. ELEAZER & WEISSENBERGER, supra note 1, at 425.
Although no written rule was yet adopted, "invoking the rule" or "the rule" was commonly
known among Florida attorneys and judges as the rule of sequestration. The court noted: "[t]o
have it otherwise would emasculate the rule of exclusion and sequestration of witnesses and
subject the trial courts to attack alleging collusion among witnesses." Dardashti, 407 So. 2d at
1100 (quoting Thomas v. State, 372 So. 2d 997, 999 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
14. Dardashti, 407 So. 2d at 1099-1100.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961).
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the merits.19 Simply stated, the Dardashti court decided that upon the
request of either party at the deposition, the rule of sequestration of potential
witnesses should apply.20
Eight years later, the First District Court of Appeal chose not to apply
the rule of sequestration to depositions in a medical malpractice case.2 In
Smith v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 2 the plaintiff sought to sequester an
eyewitness doctor from attending the deposition of the defendant doctor.
23
The Smith court, while never questioning the reason for the plaintiff's
request to "invoke the rule," stated that the common law rule of seques-
tration only applies to trial proceedings and not depositions.24 The court
further ruled that Rule 1.280(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
which sets out the procedure for obtaining protective orders during the
discovery stage of a lawsuit, dictates the procedure and legal standard for a
lawyer to "invoke the rule" at a deposition.25 Based on this finding, the
district court then ruled that the court in Dardashti had no legal authority for
its decision.26 If the Smith court is right, the procedure for "invoking the
rule" in a deposition just became more time consuming, less immediate, and
more costly.
The Smith court recognized that its decision was in direct conflict with
the decision in Dardashti and certified this conflict to the Supreme Court of
Florida in 1990.27
Meanwhile, the Florida Legislature meandered into the witness
sequestration in depositions debate, while waiting for the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision on the subject. For its part, the Florida Legislature
enacted section 90.616(1) of the Florida Statutes for inclusion as part of the
Florida Rules of Evidence.28 Section 90.616(1) of the Florida Statutes states
in pertinent part that "at the request of a party the court shall order, or upon
its own motion the court may order, witnesses excluded from a proceeding
so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses .... 29 The good
19. Dardashi, 407 So. 2d at 1100 (citing Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729, 731 (Fla.
1961)).
20. Id.
21. Smith v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 564 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. lst Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
22. 564 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. lst Dist. CL App. 1990).
23. Id. at 1115.
24. Id. at 1117. The court noted not only that Dardashti had no legal authority for its
decision but also that the reasoning is not applicable to depositions but only to trials. l
25. Id.
26. Smith, 564 So. 2d at 1117.
27. Id. at 1118. The court granted the Motion for Certification of Direct Conflict. Id.
28. FLA. STAT. § 90.616 (1999).
29. Id. The rest of the rule reads:
(2) A witness may not be excluded if the witness is:
(a) A party who is a natural person.
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news about this statute is that the legislature explicitly makes the
sequestration of potential witnesses mandatory upon the request of a party
and implicitly supports the traditional reasons for "invoking the rule."'"
While the statute resolves some questions, it prolongs the debate about
whether the sequestration rule applies to depositions. The use by the
legislature of the word "proceeding" is too imprecise. The use of the word
"proceeding" suggests that the legislature did intend to apply this rule of
evidence to proceedings other than trials.31 Yet the legislature does not
define the word proceeding either in the statute or in the legislative history
of the statute.32 Does "proceeding" mean only evidentiary hearings?33 Is
voir dire a "proceeding" within the meaning of the statute?m What about
summary judgment or preliminary injunction hearings?35 Is a deposition a
proceeding? How is a practitioner to know what to do?
First, if one would apply the statutory construction rule that a court
should apply the procedural or evidentiary rule most on point, it would seem
(b) In a civil case, an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural
person. The party's attorney shall designate the officer or employee who
shall be the party's representative.
(c) A person whose presence is shown by the party's attorney to be
essential to the presentation of the party's cause.
(d) In a criminal case, the victim of the crime, the victim's next of kin, the
parent or guardian of a minor child victim, or a lawful representative of
such person, unless, upon motion, the court determines such a person's
presence to be prejudicial.
Id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. The Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement of section 90.616 of the
Florida Statutes employs the word "proceeding" in a description of the statute but never defines
it. Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement for Senate Bill 1350 (1990). In
describing sequestration of a law enforcement officer in a criminal proceeding, the Statement
quotes Randolph v. State for trial sequestration. Id. (quoting Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 1098
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). The Statement also cites Dardashti for the proposition that
sequestration is a matter of right. Id. (citing Dardashti v. Singer, 407 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)). Also note that the Statement does not disclaim the Dardashti application of
sequestration rule to depositions. Could this be implicit legislative approval of the result in
Dardashti?
33. By using "proceeding," the legislature is tacitly approving a line of cases in criminal
law. Sequestration is utilized in voir dire; see Randolph v. State, 562 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1990);
Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1984); and suppression hearings; see Bryant v. State, 656 So.
2d 426 (Fla. 1995); Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1984). Question: if the legislature is
putting a stamp of approval on these cases, did the legislature in the process also approve of
Dardashti? If not, at least the door is certainly open for its application to depositions.
34. See FLA. STAT. § 90.616 (1999).
35. See id.
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that Rule 1.280(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to
"invoking the rule" at a deposition.36  This means that a party will be
required to set for hearing a motion for a protective order to sequester
potential witnesses from a deposition.37 However, since the term "proceed-
ing" is not defined by the legislature, a court might decide that the term is
ambiguous and open to interpretation. 38  If the term "proceeding" is
ambiguous, then a court may turn to sources other than the statute's language
for guidance. In that case, the Florida courts would look to the directly
conflicting decisions of the Dardashti and Smith cases for guidance.4 Then,
any court would be further confused because the Supreme Court of Florida
has never ruled on the certification of these two directly conflicting appellate
decisions.41
Acknowledging the good intentions of the legislature in attempting to
clarify the rule of sequestration and the Supreme Court of Florida's benign
neglect in ruling on the certification for appeal based on the legislature's
enactment, lawyers must feel a little unsettled about the sequestration rule.
Simply stated, a Florida lawyer should take the time and spend the money to
use Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(c) concerning protective orders to
"invoke the rule" in deposition proceedings. It seems such a shame to add
the sequestration of prospective witnesses from a deposition to the list of
time consuming, inefficient and costly tasks for judges, lawyers and litigants.
Perhaps this is one instance where that curious Florida practice of "invoking
the rule" was better off left alone, without judicial or legislative interven-
tion.42
36. FLA. R. COv. P 1.280(c). As a rule of statutory construction, the statute that is on
point controls over another statute that merely refers to or speaks more generally to the issue.
McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted). The statute on point is
considered an exception to the general principles of the broader statute. Id. (citations omitted).
37. Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, similar to Rule 1.280 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a protective order to exclude witnesses from a
deposition. Rule 26(c)(5) provides, in pertinent part: "the ourt... may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense, including... that discovery be conducted with no one present except
persons designed by the court." Id.
38. Cf. State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973) (citations omitted).
39. Id. Where a statute utilizes clear language, a court may not interpret any terms and
must enforce the statute as it is written. Id However, an ambiguity could be the springboard
from which courts may interpret section 90.616 of the Florida Statutes to apply to depositions.
40. Dardashti, 407 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. Southern
Baptist Hosp., 564 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
41. SeeSmith,564So.2datll15.
42. See Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1984); Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729
(Fla. 1961); Seaboard Air Line RY v. Smith, 43 So. 235 (Fla. 1907); Dardashti v. Singer, 407 So.
211098 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, "occurrence-based" comprehensive general liability
("CGL") insurance policies promise to indemnify the policyholder for "all
sums" resulting from an occurrence during the policy period. In the context
of pollution cases, however, such policies typically contain a "pollution
* Mr. Goldenberg is an attorney with the law firm of Halsey & Bums, P.A., Miami,
Florida. J.D., The George Washington University; M.S., University of California at Los
Angeles; B.S., Tufts University. The firm practices exclusively in the field of environmental
and land use law.
1. See generally John G. Nevius & Steven J. Dolmanisth, The Pollution-Exclusion
Conspiracy: A Newly Recognized Basisfor Recovery, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1103 (1996).
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exclusion" clause that either limits or precludes coverage.2 Because the
standard CGL policy, and the language of the "pollution exclusion" clause,
have changed over the years, whether coverage is precluded or merely
limited generally depends on the date the policy was issued.3
Many pollution cases are initiated with the discovery of damages (i.e.,
contamination), rather than the awareness of a specific pollution release.
Often, it is difficult to trace the contamination back to a specific incident.
Since the damage from a pollution event may occur over an extended period
of time, covered property damage may continue over the course of numerous
policy periods during which different insurers were on the risk. Because the
terms of the standard "pollution exclusion" have changed over the years, the
date of the relevant release or "occurrence" can be the difference between
full indemnification and no indemnification. 5
With the Supreme Court of Florida's rulings in Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc.
v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp.,6 and Deni Associates of Florida,
Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,7 Florida's insureds
seemingly have little chance of recovering insurance proceeds for
environmental pollution claims. In Dimmitt Chevrolet, the court held that
the phrase "sudden and accidental," found in most pollution exclusion
clauses in insurance policies issued between 1970 and 1985, was
unambiguous. 8 More specifically, the court stated that "[t]he ordinary and
common usage of the term 'sudden' includes a temporal aspect with a sense
of immediacy or abruptness." 9 Five years later, in Deni Associates., the
court held that the "absolute pollution exclusion,"' found in most CGL
policies since 1985, was similarly unambiguous, and bars any recovery for
damages arising from the release of pollutants or contaminants."
Although the pollution exclusion clauses have been given a restrictive
reading under Florida law, no Florida court has defined the scope of
coverage in pollution cases in which some, but not all, of the contamination
2. See id. at 1105-10.
3. Id.
4. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 978 F. Supp. 589 (D.N.J.
1997), rev'd, 177 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1999); Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Highlands Ins. Co. v. Aerovox, 676
N.E.2d 801 (Mass. 1997); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of NY, 523
N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
5. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1995).
6. 636 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1993).
7. 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998).
8. Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 704.
9. Id. The "word sudden means abrupt and unexpected." ld
10. DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1137.
11. Id. at 1141.
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was caused by a covered occurrence. This is a critical issue because when
contamination is discovered, it is often possible to identify several
"occurrences" that may have caused or contributed to the contamination.
Rarely, however, is it easy to distinguish the contamination caused by these
various "occurrences." Some of these releases may be covered under the
insurance policy in effect at the time of the release, and others might not.
This situation may arise in a number of different contexts:
* A covered "sudden and accidental" release that has caused pollution
that is indistinguishable from that caused by other nonsudden or
nonaccidental releases;
0 A covered, pre-1985 "sudden and accidental" release that has caused
pollution that is indivisible from that caused by noncovered, post-1985
releases;
0 A pre-1985 release that begins suddenly and accidentally but
continues for an extended period of time, beyond the policy period;
* Multiple, pre-1985 "sudden and accidental" releases that each
occurred during different policy periods with different insurers;
* A covered pre-1985 "sudden and accidental" release that caused
pollution that is indivisible from noncovered post-1985 releases subject to
an "absolute pollution exclusion;"
0 A covered, pre-1970 release not subject to any pollution exclusion
clause that caused pollution that is indivisible or indistinguishable from
that caused by noncovered post-1970 releases;
* Multiple covered releases, but only one from which recovery is
possible (i.e., other insurers have filed for bankruptcy or the policies
cannot be located); and
* A covered release attributable to the insured coupled with other
releases caused by previous or subsequent operators at the site.
This article will discuss the scope of insurance coverage for pollution
claims when more than one release has caused or contributed to the
contamination but not all such releases are covered by the policies then in
effect. While the factual scenarios listed above are different, the same
1999]
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general legal principles apply. As discussed below, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court of Florida's rulings in Dimmitt Chevrolet and Deni
Associates, there is still hope for insurers to receive full indemnification for
pollution cleanup costs.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE "POLLUTION EXCLUSION" CLAUSE
Beginning in 1966, the standard CGL policy provided coverage for an
"occurrence," which was defined as "'an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.'"2
This definition expanded the scope of coverage from that of earlier,
"accident-based" policies, by including "continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions" as a coverage-triggering event.1 3 At a time when pollution issues
were receiving increased attention, this change from "accident-based" to
"occurrence-based" policies made it clear that insurers intended the standard
CGL policy to apply to pollution claims.14 A few years later, in the early
1970s, insurance companies began including a "pollution exclusion" in their
policies because the earlier policies, drafted before public attention focused
on large scale pollution events, seemed tailor made to cover most pollution
situations. As one commentator noted:
With the increase in litigation concerning environmentally related
losses, the liability exposure of insurers, and the uncertainty that
courts injected into the policy coverage inquiry, the insurers, in
1970, again changed their policies. The insurers' primary concern
was that the occurrence-based policies, drafted before large scale
industrial pollution attracted wide public attention, seemed tailor-
made to extend coverage to most pollution situations.
Consequently, they tacked onto the occurrence-based policies an
12. See Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 703 (quoting Broadwell Realty Serv. Inc. v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of NY, 528 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)) (emphasis added).
13. See id.
14. Eugene R. Anderson & Maxa Luppi, 1970 Pollution Exclusion Filings: Do Two
Wrongs Make A Right?, 3 ENVTL. CLAIMs J. 195, 196 (1991) (quoting E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The
Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1251 (1986)):
With the lesson of accident-based coverage fresh in their minds, the insurers
used new language to remove only the suddenness barrier and to cover
pollution liability that arose from gradual losses. The standard policy made
it clear that the loss had to be unexpected and unintended from the insured's
standpoint for coverage to apply.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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exclusionary clause that applied specifically to pollution related
claims. 1
This new "pollution exclusion," which appeared in virtually all CGL
policies from roughly 1971 through 1986," typically stated that:
[i]nsurance would not apply ... to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids
or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or
body of water, but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
17
This limited pollution exclusion remained in effect until 1985, when a
new endorsement was added to the CGL form to amend coverage' s as
follows: It is agreed that the exclusion relating to the "discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants
or pollutants,"' 9 is replaced by the following:
(1) '"odily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the
actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of pollutants;
(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
(b) At or from any site or location used by or for [the
named insured] or others for the handling, storage, disposal,
processing or treatment of waste;
(c) Which are at any time transported, handled, stored,
treated, disposed of, or processed as waste by or for the named
insured or any person or organization for whom the named insured
may be legally responsible; or
(d) At or from any site or location in which the named
insured or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or
15. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass,
74 Gao. L.J 1237, 1251 (1986) (citations omitted).
16. See Virginia Properties, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 74 F.3d 1131,1132 (lth Cir. 1996).
17. Id. at 1134 (emphasis in original).
18. William P, Shelly & Richard C. Mason, Application of the Absolute Pollution
Exclusion to Toxic Tort Claims: Will Courts Choose Policy Construction or Deconstruction?,
33 TORT & INs. L.J. 749, 752 (1998).
19. Id. at 752.
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indirectly on behalf of the named insured are performing
operations;
(i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the site or
location in connection with such operations; or
(ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor, clean
up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize the pollutants.
"Pollutants" means any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled,
reconditioned or reclaimed.
20
In Deni Associates, the Supreme Court of Florida held that this
"absolute pollution exclusion," as well as the undefined terms "irritant" and
"contaminant," were clear and unambiguous. 21  In so holding, the court
rejected the argument that the clause excludes only environmental or
industrial pollution.22
As discussed above, the availability of insurance coverage for pollution
events has gone through four distinct phases over the past thirty-five years.
Prior to 1966, pollution events were generally covered under the standard
CGL policy as long as the release could be categorized as an accident. 
3
From roughly 1966 through 1973, most CGL policies covered most pollution
claims.24  Between 1973 and 1985, pollution events were covered
occurrences only if they were sudden and accidental,2 and since 1985, the
standard CGL policy broadly precludes coverage for releases of pollutants or
contaminants. Accordingly, the discovery of contamination may implicate
several insurance policies with very different provisions regarding coverage
for pollution claims.27
20. Id. at 752-53.
21. DeniAssocs., 711 So. 2d at 1138-39.
22. See id. Even before Deni Associates it was clear that the "absolute pollution
exclusion" barred coverage for claims arising out of environmental or industrial pollution. See id.
at 1137.
23. See Holis M. Greenlaw, The CGL Policy and the Pollution Exclusion Clause:
Using the Drafting History to Raise the Interpretation Out of the Quagmire, 23 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 233 (1990).
24. See id.
25. See Virgina Properties, Inc., 74 F.3d at 1134.
26. Shelly & Mason, supra note 18, at 752.
27. See New Castle County v. Continental Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1989),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir.
1992).
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Ill. SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL RELEASES AFTER DIMMITr CHEVROLET
In Dimmitt Chevrolet, the insured car dealership-sold used crankcase oil
to an oil recycling company known as Peak Oil. As part of its daily
operations, Peak Oil illegally dumped thousands of gallons of used oil into
unlined pits.29 As expected, Peak Oil routinely spilled large quantities of
used oil onto the ground outside of the pits, and when it rained, runoff from
the pits and spills became contaminated.30 The EPA subsequently named
Dimmitt Chevrolet a potentially responsible party ("PRP") liable under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") for the costs of cleaning up the Peak Oil site.31
In holding that insurance coverage did not exist, the Supreme Court of
Florida construed the meaning of "sudden and accidental" within the
pollution exclusion clause at issue in that case. 3 7 As explained in Dimmitt
Chevrolet, a split in authority existed among the various states as to whether
"sudden and accidental" was ambiguous, with many state supreme courts
construing that phrase to mean "unexpected and unintended" pollution and
others holding that it was limited to "abrupt and unintended" pollution.
33
Siding with the latter interpretation, the court explained that the phrase was
not ambiguous and that "[a]s expressed in the pollution exclusion clause, the
word sudden means abrupt and unexpected."34 Applying the policy language
to the facts in this case, the court held that Dimmitt Chevrolet's claim was
barred because "[t]he pollution took place over a period of many years and
most of it occurred gradually."
35
The nongradual spills of used oil were also excluded from coverage, the
court explained, because they occurred on a regular basis, thereby taking
28. Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 701.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. See generally Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1995).
32. Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 703-05. The exclusion in Dimmitt Chevrolet
excluded coverage for.
BODILY INJURY or PROPERTY DAMAGE arising out of the discharge,
dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids, or gases, waste materials... into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any water course or body of water, but this exclusion does not
apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
accidental ....
Id. at 702.
33. Id. at 703.
34. kL at 704.
35. Id at 705.
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them outside the scope of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
pollution exclusion:
[T]hese spills and leaks appear to be common place events which
occurred in the course of daily business, and therefore cannot, as a
matter of law, be classified as "sudden and accidental." That is,
these "occasional accidental spills" are recurring events that took
place in the usual course of recycling the oil.
36
In Southern Solvents, Inc. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,3 7 the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether, under Florida law, the phrase "sudden
and accidental" in the 1972-85 CGL pollution exclusion applies to the initial
discharge of pollutants or to the subsequent environmental damage. 3 There,
the insured operated a tetrachloroethylene (perchloroethylene) distribution
facility at which four perchloroethylene releases had occurred.39 While the
district court found that the initial discharges of these four releases were
"sudden and accidental," it also found that the resulting leaching was
continuous after the initial discharge. 40 The district court then held that "[t]o
rule that such continuous pollution is 'sudden and accidental' thwarts the
policy goals behind the exclusion" and granted summary judgment in favor
of the insurers.41 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that:
Our reading of Florida law, specifically Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corp., 636 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1993),
leads us to conclude that the District Court erred in this respect.
Under Florida law, the discharge must be sudden and accidental,
not the resulting environmental damage.... Based on the holding
in Dimmitt and the unambiguous terms in the policy issued by
Canal it is clear that it is the actual discharge, not the resulting
damages or contamination, which must be sudden and accidental in
order to fall within the exception to the pollution exclusion
clause.42
While Florida courts have not directly addressed the issue, in recent
years Massachusetts courts have considered whether "damage due to the
release of pollutants on particular occasions would be covered under the
36. Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 705 (emphasis added).
37. 91F.3d 102(11th Cir. 1996).
38. Id. at 105.
39. Id. at 103-04.
40. H at 104.
41. Id.
42. Southern Solvents, Inc., 91 F.3d at 105.
[Vol. 24:373380
378
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Goldenberg
sudden and accidental exception to the pollution exclusion clause if the
insured had also engaged in pollution-generating activities not subject to the
exception over a longer period." 43 While these Massachusetts cases
obviously are not binding on Florida courts, they are instructive because
Massachusetts law is consistent with Florida law in its interpretation of the
"sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion.44
In Nashua Corp. v. First State Insurance Co., 5 the court ruled that,
notwithstanding a company's history of routinely delivering hazardous waste
to a landfill, evidence of a subsequent unexpected and abrupt release of a
significant amount of pollutants into the-environment may be sufficient to
confer insurance coverage despite the pollution exclusion clause.46 The test
focuses on whether the triggering event is common or uncommon. 47
Accordingly, the court found that evidence of a burst tank seal, a fire, and a
subsequent explosion created genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the releases were "sudden and accidental."
4
Subsequently, in Highlands Insurance Co. v. Aerovox, Inc.,49 the court
made it clear that the exception to the pollution exclusion clause may apply
to a "pollution-prone industry." 50  The court explained that the test is
whether the triggering event is "so beyond the pale of reasonable
expectability as to be considered 'accidental."' 51 In applying this standard to
the facts of that case, the court looked to whether a "sudden and accidental"
release led to any damages that were more than de minimis.52 This standard
was later applied in Millipore Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 53 in which
the court held that to survive a motion for summary judgment, the insured
"must present specific evidence creating a genuine issue as to whether the
incidents at the sites were sudden and accidental and caused more than a de
minimis release of pollutants into the environment." 54
While these Massachusetts cases are not binding on Florida courts, they
provide some insight into how a Florida court might view "sudden and
43. Millipore Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 115 F.3d 21, 32 (lst Cir. 1997).
44. See Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass.
1990).
45. 648 N.E.2d 1272 (Mass. 1995).
46. See id. at 1276.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. 676 N.E.2d 801 (Mass. 1997).
50. Id. at 806 n.10 (citing Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d
1423, 1427 (5th Cir. 1991).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 806.
53. 115 F.3d 21 (lst Cir. 1997).
54. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
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accidental" releases by a "pollution-prone industry." 55  However, not all
courts have acknowledged the potential for "sudden and accidental" releases
to co-exist with intentional or nonsudden releases. These courts have
typically avoided the issue by refusing to "microanalyze" the alleged
releases, instead looking at the insured's operations as a whole. 56 This view
is contrary to Florida law because it amounts to a determination that insureds
in pollution prone5 7 industries can never have covered "sudden and
accidental" releases. Some of these courts have gone so far as to suggest
that a "foreseeable" release for which the insured has taken precautions to
prevent or minimize cannot be "sudden and accidental."5 8 Such a position is
akin to a determination that a car accident cannot be sudden and accidental
because of the presence of brakes, seatbelts, and air bags in the cars.
Moreover, this view disregards the policy language and would effectively
eliminate the exception to the pollution exclusion for companies whose
operations might result in pollution. Thus, it seems likely that Florida courts
would recognize the possibility of covered "sudden and accidental" releases
coexisting with noncovered expected or intended releases. This raises the
question of how much coverage is an insured entitled to when the
contamination was caused by both covered and uncovered releases.
55. Highlands Ins. Co., 676 N.E.2d at 806 n.10.
56. See, e.g., Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing
to "break down [the insured's] long-term waste practices into temporal components in order to
find coverage where the evidence unequivocally demonstrates that the pollution was gradual");
Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 768-69 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating "when
viewed in isolation... all releases would be sudden .... Rather than pursuing such meta-
physical concepts, we choose to recognize the reality of Sea Ray's actions in this case.");
Lumbermens, 938 F.2d at 1430 (noting "it is... the nature of an insured's enterprise and its
historical operations that determine the applicability of the [pollution exclusion]."); Hyde Athletic
Indus. v. Continental Cas. Co., 969 F. Supp. 289, 301 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (noting the futility of
perforning a microanalysis of a continuous pattern of pollution); Snyder General Corp. v. Great
Amer. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (stating "[tihe fact that the insured may
have also experienced isolated spills or minor accidents over the same period of time is
irrelevant."); American States Ins. Co. v. Sacramento Plating, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 964, 970-71
(E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding three distinct events that contributed to contamination caused by
pollution occurring in the regular course of plating operation not covered).
57. See, e.g., Smith, 22 F.3d at 1438; Ray Indus., Inc., 974 F.2d at 768-69;
Lumbermens, 938 F.2d at 1430; Hyde Athletic Indus., 969 F. Supp. at 301; Snyder General
Corp., 928 F. Supp. at 680; American States Ins. Co., 861 F. Supp. at 970-71.
58. See, e.g., Smith, 22 F.3d at 1439; American States, Inc., 861 F. Supp. at 970-71.
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IV. THE EXTENT OF COVERAGE UNDER FLORIDA LAW ONCE A POLICY HAS
BEEN TRIGGERED
Under Florida law, if contract language is plain and unambiguous, it is
to be given the meaning that it clearly expresses.5 9 On the other hand, when
the language is ambiguous, an insurance contract prepared by an insurance
company shall be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.
In determining whether policy language is ambiguous, the court must view
the terms in the context of the specific policy at issue.
In the standard CGL policy, the insurer agrees to pay "all sums which
the INSURED shall become legally obligated to pay as DAMAGES because
of [personal injury or property damage]" caused by an occurrence during the
policy period and within the policy territory.62 As discussed above, the word
"occurrence" is typically defined as "an accident including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in BODILY INJURY or
PROPERTY DAMAGE neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the INSURED. 6 3 Because the occurrence must take place during the
policy period, and occurrence is defined as an "accident," it would seem that
there must be an accident during the policy period in order to trigger
coverage. However, this no longer seems to be the case in Florida. In State
Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. CTC Development Corp.,64 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that when the term "accident" is undefined in
an insurance policy, the term includes not only "accidental events," but also
damages or injuries that are neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured.65 Because the typical definition of "property
damage ' 966 requires that it occur during the policy period, CTC suggests that
59. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Seaworld of Fla., Inc., 586 So. 2d 95, 97-98 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
60. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986).
61. Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 704.
62. Id. at 702.
63. Id.
64. 720 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1998).
65. d at 1076.
66. Property damage means:
(1) the physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs
during the policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time
resulting therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has not been
physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an
occurrence during the policy period.
BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DIsPUTES
§ 7.03(b) (9th ed. 1998).
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it is not necessary for an "accidental event" to occur during the policy period
in order to trigger coverage. Coverage is triggered whenever unexpected or
unintentional damage occurs during the policy period, as long as no other
policy exclusion applies. This interpretation is consistent with either the
injury-in-fact or continuous trigger theories discussed in section II.B. below.
A. The Nature of Environmental Liability
Environmental statutes, such as CERCLA, impose strict liability for the
mere release of hazardous substances. 67 Under CERCLA, liability is joint
and several unless a PRP can demonstrate that the damages are divisible.
68
Accordingly, the mere release of a hazardous substance, regardless of the
quantity released, can render a PRP liable for all cleanup costs at the site as
long as the damages were not divisible. Implicit in the judicial opinions
holding CERCLA liability to be joint and several is the recognition that
multiple releases frequently combine to cause indivisible damage.69 In such
cases, Congress placed the burden on PRP's to show that their conduct
caused only a discrete portion of the contamination at the site.
70
When insurance policies are involved, the corollary question is whether
the insured must bear the burden of proving precisely how much of the
contaminant is traceable to a covered "occurrence," or whether the insured
must prove that the damage caused by the covered "occurrence" is divisible
from the rest of the contamination. This article posits that the language of
the standard CGL policy and Florida's concurrent cause doctrine place the
burden of proving divisibility of damages on the insurer.
Under Florida law, CERCLA cleanup costs constitute "damages" as
that term is defined in the standard CGL policy.71 Similarly, a majority of
courts consider environmental contamination that has already occurred to be
"property damage" within the scope of a CGL policy. 72 Thus, once coverage
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1995). The Florida Legislature has also provided for joint
and several liability for pollution-related damages. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 376.313, 403.727(4),
768.81(4)(b) (1999) (making comparative fault inapplicable to actions for recovery of actual
economic damages resulting from pollution).
68. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1993). See
Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 899 (5th Cir. 1993).
69. See Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d at 894-95.
70. Id. at 912.
71. United States v. Peppers Steel & Alloys, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1574, 1582 (S.D. Fla.
1993), affid in part, rev'd in part, 87 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Hudson Ins. Co. v.
Double D Management Co., 768 F. Supp. 1542, 1546 (M.D. Fla. 1991); but see Hayes v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (N.D. Fla. 1988).
72. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1515 (9th Cir.
1991).
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is triggered, the insurer becomes liable for the full cost of cleanup unless it
can show that the damages resulting from the covered occurrence are distinct
or divisible from the rest of the contamination at the site.
B. Trigger of Coverage
Whether such damage was "caused by an occurrence during the policy
period" is often a difficult question because Florida's courts have not
definitively resolved which "trigger of coverage" applies to long tail
environmental releases, i.e., releases that may have gone unnoticed for many
years only to later be identified as the source of contamination at a site.
73
'"rigger of coverage" refers to the circumstances that "trigger" or activate
the insurer's obligation to indemnify the insured.74 While this term is not
found in CGL policies, it is a term of convenience used to describe what
must happen during the policy period in order to create a duty on the part of
the insurer to indemnify the insured.75 As such, it is largely an issue of
timing.
76
The policy language of the insuring clause and the definition of
"occurrence," and the "owned property" exclusion may be combined as
follows:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of... property damage... caused by... an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in
... physical injury to or destruction of tangible property [of an
entity other than the insured] which occurs during the policy
period.77
Because of the insurance industry's repeated use of the word "which"
instead of "that," this language should be read in less restrictive manner.78
Clauses introduced by the word, "that," on the other hand, are restrictive and
essential; removing it materially alters the sentence. 79 Id. Accordingly, the
73. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 890 n. 12 (Cal. 1995).
74. Id. at 880 n.2.
75. See id. at 880-81 n.2.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 881, 889-900 n.21; MORTON S. FREEMAN, THE GRAmMATICAL LAwYER 25
(1979) (clauses introduced by "which" are nonrestrictive and provide only incidental or
nonessential information about a previous word).
78. FREEMAN, supra note 77, at 25; see also HENRY WE]IHo EN, LEGAL WarriNG STYLE
33 (1961).
79. Freeman, supra note 77; Weihofen, supra ntoe 78.
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policy language quoted above can be restated, without changing its meaning,
as follows: "[t]he company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums
... because of... property damage.., caused by an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions.80 This statement is much
more conducive to coverage than insurance companies would like, and while
technical distinctions between "which" and "that" may seem "nitpicky," the
policy language was drafted by the insurance industry." Florida law is clear
that when policy language is ambiguous, an insurance contract prepared by
an insurance company is to be construed against the insurer and in favor of
the insured. 2
Courts have applied at least four different theories to determine the
appropriate trigger of coverage. 3 The "exposure theory," which is often
applied in asbestos and other toxic tort cases, holds that the insurance policy is
triggered by a third party's exposure to the chemical during the policy period.84
If there are multiple exposures to the contamination, multiple policies may be
triggered. However, this theory is rarely applied to environmental cases
involving property damage because, in such cases, "exposure" has little
meaning beyond actual injury or contamination.
The "injury-in-fact theory," which is more often applied in environmental
pollution cases, posits that the duty to indemnify arises when there has been
actual injury to the property of a third party during the policy period8 5 The
"exposure theory" and the "injury-in-fact theory" are functionally equivalent
when considered in the context of a claim for property damage from
environmental contamination because the injury occurs simultaneous with the
exposure, i.e., once third party property is exposed to the contamination,
property damage has occurred.
The "manifestation theory" considers the duty to indemnify triggered
on the date the damage manifests itself.86 This theory applies the latest of
80. Freeman, supra note 77; Weihofen, supra note 78.
81. Clauses introduced by "which" are nonrestrictive and provide only incidental
nonessential information about a previous word. Thus, even if the clause is omitted, the
meaning of the sentence will remain intact. See FREEMAN, supra note 77, at 33.
82. See Pridgen, 498 So. 2d at 1248.
83. Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474, 478 (E.D. Mich.
1989); Celotex Corp. v. AIU Ins. Co., 152 B.R. 647, 650 n.3 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); but see
Huntzinger v. Hastings Mut. Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 302, 314-15 (7th Cir. 1998) (identifying seven
distinct trigger theories).
84. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977,
982 (8th Cir. 1988); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir.
1985).
85. See, e.g., Bell Lumber & Pole Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 437, 443
(8th Cir. 1995); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 896 F.2d 865, 876 (5th Cir. 1990).
86. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986);
Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1982). Some courts have
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the four trigger dates and is generally considered the most proinsurer of the
four theories. In practice, the "manifestation theory" often converts an
"occurrence-based" policy into a "claims-made" policy because policies that
expired before discovery of the contamination would not be triggered.
8 7
Because, the insured has a duty to provide prompt notice of the occurrence,
coverage will generally only exist under the policy in effect at the time of
such notice.
The fourth trigger theory, the "continuous trigger theory," is essentially
an amalgamation of the aforementioned theories because coverage is
triggered: 1) at the time of the initial exposure; 2) at the time of any actual
injury or property damage; and 3) at the time of manifestation." s The
continuous trigger theory is generally considered the most proinsured of the
theories because it provides coverage for the entire period from the initial
exposure or release through the discovery of the contamination. 89 However,
whether this is actually the case depends in large part on the court's
approach to the scope of coverage by each insurer on the risk when multiple
policies are triggered. If the court applies the Keene "joint and several
liability" approach, discussion Section IV.D. below, then all insurers whose
policies have been triggered would be held jointly and severally liable, up to
their respective policy limits, for "all sums" that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay.90 However, if the court applies a "pro-rata" approach to
allocation, discussed in Section IV.E.2. below, having more triggered
policies can work to the insured's detriment.91
For example, consider a scenario in which the insured becomes liable
for one million dollars in cleanup costs and has ten triggered policies that
each contain a self-insured retention or deductible of $100,000. In such a
scenario, a court applying a continuous trigger and a pro-rata allocation
theory would allocate $100,000 to each policy, which would be promptly
swallowed by the self-insured retention in each such policy. Accordingly,
elucidated three different formulations of the manifestation theory, depending on whether
coverage is triggered when the damage is actually discovered, when it should have been
discovered, or when the insured "knew or should have known" of the property damage.
Huntzinger, 143 F.3d at 314-15; Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328. See CPC Int'l v. Northbrook Excess &
Surplus Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 1211, 1219-20 (1st Cir. 1995).
87. See Huntzinger, 143 F.3d at 315.
88. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Arm, 667 F.2d 1034, 1044-46 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see generally Hunizinger, 143 F.3d at 315; Celotex Corp., 152 B.R. at 651.
89. Celotex Corp., 152 B.IR at 651.
90. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1047.
91. Id.
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the insured would have to pay for the entire one million in cleanup costs,
92with no assistance from any of its triggered insurance policies.
While no Florida court has decided the issue in a published decision,
the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that the injury-in-fact theory is the
approach most likely to be adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida.93
However, based on the supreme court's recent opinion in CTC, it is not clear
how the injury-in-fact trigger would differ from a continuous trigger under
Florida law. Some courts distinguish the injury-in-fact trigger from the
continuous trigger on the rationale that the injury-in-fact trigger does not
provide coverage for continuous injury or property damage that began before
the policy period.94 However, when the release involves active, continuous
leaching, as opposed to the passive persistence of the contamination, the
policy language does not support a trigger theory that provides coverage only
upon the initial discharge of the pollution, because no term in the policy
imposes a "discrete temporal limitation on 'injury"' or "property damage."'9
Because continuous contamination that was both unexpected or unintended
would cause injury-in-fact in each subsequent policy period, both the injury-
in-fact and continuous trigger theories should provide coverage from the date
of the initial discharge until the contamination is cleaned up.
92. The scenario discussed above is just one example of the dramatic impact that given
trigger and allocation theories can have on the extent of coverage an insured might receive.
Whether a court permits an insured to recover on excess policies before exhausting all primary
policies ("horizontal exhaustion"), or whether the insured must recover on all primary and excess
policies for a given year before recovering on other years' policies ("vertical exhaustion"), also
plays an important role in the coverage equation. Similarly, whether a court permits "stacking" of
policies at the same coverage level can be critical to the insured's recovery. A complete
discussion of these issues, and the effect of deductibles and self-insured retentions on an insured's
entitlement to insurance proceeds is beyond the scope of this article. For a thorough discussion
of this subject, see Garrett G. Gillespie, The Allocation of Coverage Responsibility Among
Multiple Triggered Commercial General Liability Policies in Environmental Cases: Life After
Owens-Illinois, 15 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 525 (1996). See also Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 978 F. Supp. 589 (D.N.J. 1997), rev'd, 177 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 1999);
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116 (N.J. 1998).
93. See Trizec Properties, Inc. v. Biltmore Constr. Co., 767 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir.
1985); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 93-132-CIV-J-10 (M.D. Fla. July 20,
1995); Mealey's Litigation Report-Insurance (Dec. 3, 1996) (applying injury-in-fact trigger to
claims under the laws of Florida, Michigan, South Carolina, Indiana, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania); but see Celotex Corp. v. AIU Ins. Co., 152 B.R. 647, 651 n.4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1993) (stating "Trizec does not speak with sufficient certainty that this Court is willing to hold
that injury-in-fact is the trigger in Florida").
94. See Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 997 F.2d
172, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1993).
95. New Castle County v. Continental Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 810 (D. Del. 1989),
rev'd, 970 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1992), affid in part, rev'd in part, 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991).
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C. The Concurrent Cause Doctrine
The question presented in each of the scenarios listed at the beginning
of this article is, to what extent must the insurer indemnify the insured for
damages resulting from a pollution release when some portion of the
contamination was caused by noncovered releases? While Florida law has
not yet dealt with this issue in the pollution context, case law that has
developed in the context of non-environmental claims provides a likely
answer to this question.96
The doctrine of concurrent causes applies when an "indivisible" loss is
caused simultaneously by two separate events.97 When only one of the
events is covered by an insurance policy, Florida courts hold that the insurer
becomes jointly and severally liable for the entire loss.98 In Wallach v.
Rosenberg,99 a sea wall between the Wallachs' home and their neighbor's
collapsed during a storm, precipitating a domino-like crumbling of a portion
of the [neighbor's] sea wall.' The neighbor then sued Wallach and his
insurance carrier.10' The issue was whether the sea wall collapse was caused
by Wallach's negligent maintenance of the wall, an event covered under the
insurance policy, or the water pressure caused by the storm, an excluded
loss. 1 2 On appeal, the court held that "the jury may find coverage where an
insured risk constitutes a concurrent cause of the loss even where 'the
insured risk [is] not.., the prime or efficient cause of the accident."' 10 3 This
policy is consistent with the Florida rule that the duty to defend applies to
both covered and uncovered claims,1°4 as well as the rule preventing an
insurer who pays a judgment on behalf of a Joint tortfeasor from maintaining
a contribution action against other insurers.
96. See Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
97. See id. at 1387.
98. See id; accord Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Snell, 627 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
99. 527 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
100. Id. at 1386.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1387.
103. Id (quoting 11 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INsURmCE 2D § 44:268 (rev. ed.
1982)). See also West American Ins. Co. v. Chateau La Mer II Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 622
So. 2d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
104. See Grissom v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 1299, 1307 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
105. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 So. 2d 162,
163 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1970). "Since tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, and an
injured party after obtaining judgment against multiple defendants may select the one he desires
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The concurrent cause doctrine applies "only when the multiple causes
are not related and dependent, and involve a separate and distinct risk."'" In
a pollution case involving separate releases, some of which are covered
"sudden and accidental" releases and others that are not, this rule is
consistent with the rule applied in Massachusetts in Nashua, Aerovox, and
Millipore. Thus, under Florida insurance law, if two independent events
cause property damage, one of which is covered under an insurance policy
and the other is not, coverage exists.10 As explained in Wallach and West
American, this doctrine is based on common sense: 1 8 if the insured bought
insurance coverage for property damage caused by a sudden discharge of
pollutant or contaminants, it is entitled to get that coverage.1o9
While separate and independent pollution events rarely occur "con-
currently" in the true sense of the word, different releases do often cause
indivisible damage. In this regard, the concurrent cause doctrine simply
reflects the traditional tort method for dealing with indivisible harm-joint
and several liability.110 The modem trend in CERCLA cases to apportion
liability when a site's contamination is divisible reflects the reverse
application of the same tort principle.' When the harm is not divisible,
both the common law and CERCLA impose joint and several liability. In
practice, the same is true under Florida law because comparative fault under
section 768.81, of the Florida Statutes, does not apply to actions for the
recovery of actual economic damages resulting from pollution. 12 Accord-ingly, under the rationale of the concurrent cause cases, the insurer should be
to subject to execution, the carrier must bear the same inequitable burden as is borne by its
insured." Id.
106. Transamerica Ins. Co., 627 So. 2d at 1276.
107. West American Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d at 1108; Wallach, 527 So. 2d at 1387-88.
108. West American Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d at 1105; Wallach, 527 So. 2d at 1388.
109. West American Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d at 1105; Wallach, 527 So. 2d at 1388.
110. See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1987), superceded
by statute by Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993) (providing "[t]he feasibility of
apportioning fault on a comparative basis does not render an indivisible injury 'divisible' for
purposes of the joint and several liability rule. A concurrent tortfeasor is liable for the whole of
an indivisible injury when his negligence is a proximate cause of that damage."); Hernandez v.
Pensacola Coach Corp., 193 So. 555, 558 (Fla. 1940) (stating "[it] is a general principle of
negligence, where an injury results from two separate and distinct acts of negligence committed
by different persons operating concurrently, that both are regarded as the proximate cause and
that recovery can be had against either or both"); see also W. PAGE KEETON, Er AL., PROSSER AND
KEarON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 41 at 266-67 (5th ed. 1984).
Ill. See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs. Co., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2nd Cir. 1993); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-
79 (1st Cir. 1989).
112. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(4)(b) (1999).
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liable for the full extent of the damages paid by the insured, absent policy
provisions further limiting the insurer's liability.
D. Allocation Cases-Asbestos
The issue of allocating insurance policy liability for occurrences that
span several policy periods has been addressed in a line of cases dealing
with asbestos liability. As in the environmental context, asbestos occur-
rences sometimes span decades and call into question dozens of policies.
However, insurers argue that each policy typically limits coverage to losses
occurring within the policy period. Courts are split as to which of two
general theories should be applied to these allocation decisions.
1 3
The joint and several liability theory was most prominently pronounced
in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America.14 In Keene, the court
noted that "when Keene is held liable for an asbestos related disease, only
part of the disease will have developed during any single policy period."'
Based upon the phrase "all sums" in the policy, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the insurer is liable in full for all
damages notwithstanding the fact that some of the disease developed during
other policy periods.' 16 The Keene court stated:
As we interpret the policies, they cover Keene's entire liability
once they are triggered. That interpretation is based on the terms
of the policies themselves. We have no authority upon which to
pretend that Keene also has a "self-insurance" policy that is trigger-
ed for periods in which no other policy was purchased. Even if we
had the authority, what would we pretend that the policy provides?
What would its limits be? There are no self-insurance policies, and
we respectfully submit that the contracts before us do not sup-port
judicial creation of such additional insurance policies." 7
The court noted that the policies did not "distinguish between injury that is
caused by occurrences that continue to transpire over a long period of time
and more common types of injury."' 18 Accordingly, the insured may collect
the full amount of indemnity that is due from any insurer whose coverage is
triggered, subject only to the provisions in the policies that govern the
113. Id.; see also O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989).
114. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 1047.
116. Id
117. Id at 1048-49.
118. Id. at 1049.
1999]
389
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
allocation of liability when more than one policy covers an injury. Other
courts dealing with asbestos trigger issues have followed the approach
enunciated in Keene.119 For example, in ACandS Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,12 the Third Circuit followed the Keene approach for asbestosclaims. The court stated:
The policies require the insurers to pay all sums which ACandS
becomes "legally obligated to pay" because of bodily injury during
the policy period. It is uncontested that under principles of tort law
ACandS may be held fully liable for a personal injury plaintiffs
damages caused in part by ACandS' asbestos during a particular
period, even though plaintiffs damages may also have been
caused, in part, at other times. It follows that if a plaintiffs
damages are caused in part during an insured period, it is irrelevant
to ACandS' legal obligations and, therefore, to the insurer's
liability that they were also caused, in part, during another
period."'
In contrast to the Keene joint and several liability approach stands "the
pro-rata time on the risk" theory ("pro-rata theory") of insurer liability. The
pro-rata theory was most prominently applied in Insurance Co. of North• • •122
America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., and Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
United Insurance Co.12 In Forty-Eight Insulations, the Sixth Circuit,
applying Illinois law, held that defense costs should be prorated over the
course of the occurrence.12 Like the court in Keene, the Forty-Eight
Insulations court looked to the terms of the contract to define the scope of
coverage.12 However, in Forty-Eight Insulations, the court concluded that
the insurer had not contracted to qy defense costs for occurrences that take
place outside the policy period. Accordingly, the different insurance
companies that run the risk over the course of the occurrence were required
119. See J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993); Lac
D'Amiante du Quebec v. American Home Assurance Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549 (D.N.J. 1985);
ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1985).
120. 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1985).
121. Id. at 974 (internal citation omitted).
122. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
123. 650 A.2d 974 (N.L 1994).
124. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1226.
125. Id. at 1215-16.
126. Id. The proration approach applied in Fony-Eight Insulations is inconsistent with
the Florida rule that once the duty to defend is triggered, the insured must provide a defense to
the entire action. See, e.g., Grissom v. Commercial Union Ins. Co, 610 So. 2d 1299, 1307 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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to prorate defense costs among themselves. The court treated the insured as
an insurer for those periods of time that it had no insurance coverage. 127
Although often cited as authority for the pro-rata approach, Forty-Eight
Insulations has limited precedential value because the Supreme Court of
Illinois rejected this approach in favor ofjoint and several liability in Zurich
Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industry, Inc.
In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co.,129 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey applied an allocation method that was related to both the time of
the risk and the degree of risk assumed. 30 The court allocated a portion of
damages to the insured for uncovered years but only when no insurance was
available.13 1 Unlike the Keene and Forty-Eight Insulations courts, the court
in Owens-Illinois was unable to find the answer to allocation in the policy
language. 1 2 Instead, the court looked to policy considerations and conclud-
ed that the Keene joint and several liability rule reduces the property owner's
incentive to insure against future risks.135 As such, the court was unwilling
to allocate costs to the insured for periods in which coverage was not
available.
134
E. Allocation in the Environmental Context
While many of the cases dealing with these scope of coverage issues
have arisen in the context of asbestos claims, several courts have considered
these issues in the context of environmental pollution claims. Results in
these cases have been mixed, with some courts applying a proration formula
as in Forty-Eight Insulations and Owens-Illinois, while other courts have
imposed joint and several liability.13 5
Whether the asbestos cases are truly analogous to hazardous waste
cases is questionable. While all asbestos bodily injury cases have essentially
the same etiology-ingestion of an asbestos fiber, exposure in residence, and
manifestation-environmental pollution cases can differ dramatically. In
dealing with groundwater contamination issues, factual considerations such
as whether rain flushed the same quantity of contaminants into the ground
each year or whether the plume of contaminants advanced in an equal rate
127. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1224-25.
128. 514 N.E.2d 150 (111. 1987).
129. 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994).
130. Id. at 995.
131. Id.
132. Itd at990.
133. IA at992.
134. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 650 A.2d at 995.
135. Id.
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over successive policies can have a significant impact on whether it is
appropriate to apply pro-rata allocation principles.
36
1. Early Cases-Joint and Several Liability
The first cases dealing with the allocation issue in the environmental
context followed the joint and several liability approach enunciated in Keene
and ACandS. In New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co.,137 the court
faced the allocation issue in the context of landfill leachate that caused
groundwater contamination. 138 Citing ACandS, the court held that "there is
no proration of losses under a policy once coverage is triggered." 139 The
court continued by stating "[t]he terms of the contract are not affected by
prior or subsequent coverage. ' 140 Further, the court noted that although the
insurer makes reference to other policies that may be implicated, it cites no
evidence of the terms of those policies. 141 Thus, there was not enough
evidence with which to prorate damages even if the law authorized
proration. 42
That same year, in Federal Insurance Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting
Co.,143 the court addressed the allocation issue with regard to CERCLA
liability under some policies that had pollution exclusion clauses and others
that did not.144 The case involved waste generated by Susquehanna
Broadcasting Company ("SBC") from 1975 through 1983 that contaminated
soil and well water in adjoining residential areas.' 45 The policies in effect
before 1976 or 1977 did not contain a pollution exclusion clause, but
subsequent policies did.' 46 The court concluded that coverage under the
earlier policies was triggered and that damages could not be apportioned.
47
Accordingly, the court followed the joint and several approach applied in
136. Id.
137. 725 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1989), affrd in part, rev'd in part, 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir.
1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1992).
138. Id. at 806.
139. Id. at 817 (quoting ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 968 (3d
Cir. 1985)).
140. Id. (citing Sandoz, Inc. v. Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257, 266
(D.N.J. 1983)).
141. Id.
142. New Castle County v. Continental Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 817 (D. Del. 1989).
143. 727 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1989), amended on reconsideration in part, 238 F.
Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
144. Id. at 169.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 175.
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Keene and ACandS, and held the insurers liable for the full extent of the
cleanup costs.148 In so holding, the court noted that "generators of environ-
mental waste can be held jointly liable for all response costs even though
others may have contributed to the pollution."'149 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the earlier policies covered all of SBC's response cost liability,
"regardless of the presence of the pollution exclusion clause in later
policies. 
IS
1
Similarly, in Detrex Chemical Industries v. Employers Insurance,151 the
court found that for each policy that is triggered, the policy must cover all
damages directly and proximately resulting from the occurrence that caused
the injury-in-fact during that policy period.15 2 Thus, the court held that
without a more complete factual record of the occurrences, the question of
allocation was not appropriate for summary judgment because it necessarily
153
requires a determination as to which policies have been triggered. The
court recognized that damages can only be allocated to policies that have
been triggered.' 54 Thus, if the contamination was caused by a single event,
or if there is only one policy that has been triggered, that policy assumes
liability for all damages directly and proximately resulting from the
155occurrence.
In Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.,156 the court held that
although an insured must prove that actual injury occurred during the policy
period, coverage is not limited to the injury that occurred during the policy
period if the injury is part of a continuous, indivisible process. In Hatco,
Grace operated an industrial chemical manufacturing facility in Fords, New
Jersey between 1959 and 1978. 58 Effluent containing various organic
chemical compound was pumped directly into ditches and streams that
drained into the Passaic River.159 In the mid 1960s, Grace constructed
unlined ponds that were su Uosed to hold the effluent so that the useful
product could be recovered. The ponds were also used to dump other
chemicals that had been used in the manufacturing process, including heat
148. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. at 175.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 746 F. Supp. 1310 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
152. Id. at 1325.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 801 F. Supp. 1334 (D.NJ. 1992).
157. Id. at 1345.
158. Id. at 1343.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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transfer fluids containing Polychloronated Bipheynls ("PCB") that were
dumped by employees from fifty-five-gallon drums directly into the
ponds. 161 Grace eventually sold the facility to the Hatco Corporation. 162 In
1989, Hatco filed an action against Grace to recover all sums expended to
remove hazardous substances disposed of on site. 163 In turn, Grace sued its
primary and excess insurers for indemnification because it claimed that all
the damages alleged fail within the definition of "occurrence" in the
policies.
Applying a continuous trigger theory, the court looked to the language
of the insurance contract to determine the scope of coverage. 165 The court
noted that the policy language did not expressly restrict coverage to the
injury that resulted during the policy period, even though such a provision
could have been expressly included in the policies. 66 The court found that
"because the Insurers agreed to pay all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages," they essentially stepped "into the shoes
of the insured."1 67 Under CERCLA, Grace became jointly and severally
liable for the full extent of damage sustained by Hatco if the harm sustained
was indivisible. 168 Thus, the court would apportion liability only to the
extent that the insurers can rebut a showing that the injury was indivisible. 69
In Ray Industry, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,170 the Sixth
Circuit addressed the allocation issue with regard to CERCLA liability
arising from Sea Ray Boats, Inc.'s disposal of wastes from 1966 to 1979.
The district court had held that because the pollution exclusion clause
appeared in policies issued on or after July 1, 1971, the policies only covered
contamination caused before that date. 17 The Sixth Circuit agreed that the
insurer's duty to defend did not extend to matters that would have no
relation to the 1966 to 1970 policies, but the court recognized that,
considering the nature of CERCLA liability, it was not clear that such
matters existed. 173 The court recognized that the insured was subject to full
liability for events that occurred during each policy period, and held that the
161. Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 1343.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1345.
166. Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 1345.
167. Id. at 1346 (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Id
170. 974 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1992).
171. Id. at 754.
172. Id at 757.
173. Id at771.
[Vol. 24:373
394
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Goldenberg
insured had coverage up to the full policy limits for each year from 1966 to
1970.174 The court specifically refused to further apportion damages via
proration to the insured. 75
In Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Casulty & Surety Co., 76
Chemical Leaman operated a tank truck operation specializing in the
transport of various chemicals and other liquids. 177 From 1960 to 1969,
Chemical Leaman placed contaminated rinse water into a wastewater
treatment system consisting of unlined ponds and lagoons.17 8 This lasted
until 1975 when they installed a wastewater treatment system.179 "By 1977,
Chemical Leaman had drained the ponds and lagoons of liquid, dredged the
accumulated sludge out of the lagoons, and filled all the ponds and lagoons
with brickbat, sand, and concrete.'"' In 1984 the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") placed the site on the National Priorities List ("NPL")
under CERCLA and alleged that Chemical Leaman was strictly liable for the
damages and cleanup costs resulting from the contamination. 18 Conse-
quently, Chemical Leaman notified its insurer and requested indemnifi-
cation.1
82
In Chemical Leaman, the court found that New Jersey law applies the
continuous trigger theory. 8 3 Basing its decision on the Hatco case, the court
held that the insurer was jointly and severally liable up to the policy limits
for all damages resulting from the occurrence, including damage that
occurred before and after the policy period.184 As in Hatco, because
Chemical Leaman was subject to strict liability under CERCLA, the court
held that all policies triggered by a continuous occurrence must bear joint
and several liability.18 5 The court noted that under New Jersey law, the
insured must make two factual showings before imposing joint and several
liability under the continuous trigger theory. 86 First, the insured must showthat some kind of property damage occurred during each policy period at
174. Id. at 770.
175. Ray Indus., Inc., 974 F.2d at 770.
176. 817 F. Supp. 1136 (D.NJ. 1993), rev'd, 117 F.3d 210 (1999).
177. Id. at 1140.
178. Id,
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Chemical Leaman, 817 F. Supp. at 1140.
182. Id.
183. 1d. at 1153.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Diamond Shamrock Chem. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 466 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
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issue.187 Second, the insured must show that the property damage was part
of a continuous and indivisible process of injury. 18r If the insured could
make these showings, then it could recover up to the policy limits of each
policy in effect from 1960 until the manifestation of the soil and
groundwater damage.
1 89
The continued validity of the Hatco and Chemical Leaman decisions is
questionable in light of the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in
Owens-Illinois. 190 On appeal in Chemical Leaman, the Third Circuit held
that because the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected joint and several
liability in favor of a risk-based allocation of liability among applicable
insurance policies in Owens-Illinois, the case should be remanded to the
district court for a reallocation of liability between the insurer and the
insured. 191  Because the district courts in Chemical Leaman guessed
incorrectly as to the Supreme Court of New Jersey's interpretation of these
insurance policies, the district court's opinion has no direct precedential
value.
2. Recent Cases-Pro-Rata Allocation
The Owens-Illinois case has proven quite influential even outside of
New Jersey. Recent cases have departed from the joint and several liability
approach in favor of apportionment in certain circumstances. In Northern
States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 192 the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that contamination of groundwater should be
analyzed as a continuous process in which the property damage is evenly
proportioned throughout the period of time from the first contamination to
the end of the last triggered policy. 193 From 1973 until 1978, power plants
were operated on the insured's facility.' 94 The insured, Northern States
Power ("NSP"), had an insurance program that included standard compre-
hensive general liability policies with self-insured retentions of $25,000 per
occurrence from 1958 to 1970 and $100,000 per occurrence from 1970 to
1973.195 These policies were labeled as excess liability policies, and the
record indicated that no other insurer issued any primary liability policies
187. ChemicalLeaman, 817 F. Supp. at 1153.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1154.
190. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1984).
191. Id.
192. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
193. Id. at 664.
194. Id. at 659.
195. Id.
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between 1958 and 1973.196 In 1981, the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency discovered that the groundwater at the site was contaminated with
coal tars and spent oxide waste and ordered NSP to clean up the
contaminated property.197 NSP settled with some of its carriers, but did not
settle with others. Applying an injury-in-fact trigger theory, the court held
that the insured bears the burden of Xoving that the policy was triggered and
therefore that coverage is available. The court held that the environmental
damage occurred over successive policy periods and concluded that the
damages should be presumed to have been continuous from the point of the
first damage to the point of discovery or cleanup.2 W Accordingly, the court
applied a pro-rata by time on the risk allocation theory similar to that used in
Owens-Illinois.20 1 Thus, NSP was required to pay one deductible per policy
period while being liable for its pro-rata share of any uninsured or self-
insured periods.
More recently, the NSP approach was aplied by a Minnesota court in
Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co. In Domtar, the insured coal-
tar processor sued several of its liability insurers for the costs incurred in
cleaning up coal-tar contamination that occurred between 1933 and 1991.2N
In the absence of any identifiable release during a specific policy period, the
court presumed that the damage was continuous and allocated liability
among the insurers on a pro-rata "time-on-the-risk" basis?' 5  The court
upheld the trial court's allocation of liability to the insured for uninsured
periods and cited Forty-Eight Insulations.2
6
Similarly, in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co.,2 7 the
court determined that all insurers on the risk should contribute in proportion
to their respective policies' liability limits or the time periods covered under
each such policy. "From 1947 to 1982, Montrose manufactured the
pesticide, dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane ("DDT"), at its plant in
196. Id.
197. Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 659.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 662.
200. ML at 664.
201. See id.
202. Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 664.
203. 552 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. CL App. 1996), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 563 N.W.2d
724 (Minn. 1997).
204. Id. at 743.
205. HL at 743-44.
206. Id. at 744 (citing Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633
F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980)).
207. 913 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1995).
208. Id. at 878.
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Torrance, California. 2W Admiral Insurance Company had issued four CGL
210policies to Montrose covering the period from 1982 to 1986. The court
held that, where successive CGL policy periods are implicated, damages that
are continuous over several policy periods are potentially covered by all
policies in effect during those periods. The court suggested that courts
whose analyses failed to draw these distinctions are actually clouding the
issue for the allocation of triggered policies.212
In Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,213 an
appellate court in Illinois applied an allocation formula similar to that
employed in Forty-Eight and Owens-Illinois.214  There, the insured,
Outboard Marine Corp., was a large manufacturer of outboard motors that
operated a dye casting facility in Waukegan, Illinois. 2 15 In its dye casting
process, Outboard Marine Corp. used a hydraulic fluid, pydraul, that
216contained Polychlorinated Biphenyl's from 1953 through 1970.
Polychlorinated Biphenyl's laden effluent was routed to a ditch on Outboard
Marine Corp. property and eventually found its way into Waukegan Harbor
and Lake Michigan. Residual amounts of PCB laden Pydraul remained in
Outboard Marine Corp.'s dye casting machines until approximately 1976.218
In March of 1978, the federal government sued OMC to compel it to
remediate the contaminated areas, and in 1986, Outboard Marine Corp. sued
its primary insurance companies alleging a duty to defend and indemnify
them in connection with the federal environmental litigation.219
In applying the pro-rata theory, the court noted that while the insurers
agreed to indemnify Outboard Marine Corp. for "all sums," it had to be for
sums incurred as a result of property damage during the policy period.20 In
finding that allocation was appropriate, the court stated that:
[t]he contamination of the groundwater should be regarded as a
continuous process in which the property damage is evenly
distributed over the period of time from the first contamination to
the end of the last triggered policy (or self-insured) period, and we
209. Id. at 881.
210. Id.
211. Il at904.
212. Montrose Chem. Corp., 913 P.2d at 904.
213. 670 N.E.2d 740 (111. App. 2d 1996).
214. Id. at 746.
215. Id. at 744.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Outboard Marine, 670 N.E.2d at 745.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 748.
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have also held that the total amount of property damage should be
allocated to the various policies in proportion to the period of time
each was on the risk.2' 1
Following the language in Forty-Eight Insulations, the court treated the
insured as an insurance company for the years in which it had no insurance
coverage, and allocated a portion of liability to the insured.tM  Further, the
court summarily dismissed Outboard Marine Corp.'s joint and several
liability argument:
OMC cites no authority for its novel proposition that, because its
liability under CERCLA is joint and several, the liability of the
excess insurers cannot be apportioned on a pro-rata basis. OMC
ignores the principal that insurance coverage disputes are governed
by contract law. We can find no rationale to support the imposition
of joint and several liability upon the insurers simply because
OMC's liability arose under CERCLA.m
Recently, in Missouri Pacific Railroad. v. International Insurance
Co.,2 4 the court followed its previous holding in Outboard Marine Corp.
and applied the pro-rata theoryYms There, the insured railroad company
sought indemnification from insurers for noise-induced hearing loss and
asbestos exposure claims based on exposures over a seventy-three-year
span.2 6 The insured alleged that the claims each arose from "one proximate,
uninterrupted, and continuing cause" during each of approximately thirty
insurance policies.2 7 The trial court certified two questions to the court of
appeals regarding whether the "all sums" rule of Zurich Insurance Co. = or
the pro-rata, "time-on-the-risk" approach of Outboard Marine Corp. governs
allocation of coverage.229 The court looked to the policy definition of
"occurrence," which by definition must occur during the policy period, to
hold that the insurer is only liable for damages that occurred during the
policy period.230 Accordingly, the court followed Outboard Marine Corp.
221. Id. at 749 (quoting Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523
N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn. 1994)).
222. Id.
223. Outboard Marine, 670 N.E.2d at 750.
224. 679 N.E.2d 801 (IM. App. 2d Dist. 1997).
225. Id. at 804.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Missouri Pac. R.R., 679 N.E.2d at 803.
230. Id. at 804.
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and applied the pro-rata, time-on-the-risk approach because the damage
cannot be measured and allocated to particular policy periods2 31
3. Limits on the Pro-rata Approach-Single Event Causing Indivisible
As the above-discussed cases indicate, the recent trend is toward pro-
rata allocation among insurers that were on the risk during the period of
continuous damage. However, the pro-rata allocation cases discussed above
involved continuous injury in which there was no single event that was the
primary cause of the groundwater contamination. Importantly, although
Forty-Eight Insulations is one of the principal allocation cases, the court
noted that where there is no reasonable means of prorating the cost of
defense between the covered and noncovered items, the insurer must bear the
entire cost of defense.232 In the typical situation, the court noted, suit will be
brought as the result of a single accident, but only some of the damages
sought will be covered under the insurance policy. 3 In these cases, the
court recognized that prorating costs between the insured claim and the
uninsured claim is very difficult, and as a result, courts should impose the
full cost of the defense on the insurer.2
34
Similarly, in Owens-Illinois, the court recognized the difference
between cases involving the gradual release of contaminants and cases in
which the occurrence and the attendant inijuries are easily identified as
falling within a particular policy period.235 Using an explosion as an
example, the court noted that "[e]ven though 'all sums' due from the
accident might not be known with certainty at the time of the explosion, by
the time of trial a claimant would be able to establish, within a reasonable
degree of medical probability, what damages would flow from the injury."'236
In SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,237 the Supreme Court of
Minnesota declined to apply the Northern States pro-rata by time on the risk
approach that it had adopted only one year earlier.238 From 1976 to the end
of 1988, SCSC operated a dry cleaning and laundry supply distribution
facility in St. Louis Park, Minnesota, where it stored perchloroethylene in
two above-ground storage tanks.239 In 1988, perchloroethylene was detected
231. Id. at 807.
232. Fony-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1224.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 989.
236. Id.
237. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995).
238. ld. at318.
239. Id. at 308.
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in the groundwater downgradient of the SCSC facility. 24  At trial, the jury
found that the contamination was caused by a single event in 1977.241 The
trial court gave the jury the opportunity to divide the damages among the
various insurance policies in effect from 1976 through 1988, but the jury
found that the damages were not divisible.242 There was no evidence in the
record to indicate that any post-1977 additions of perchloroethylene to the
groundwater increased clean up costs.243 In refusing to apportion liability
over the policy periods, the court noted that its decision in Northern States
was an equitable decision based upon the complexity of proving in which
policy periods covered property damage arose.244  Because in SCSC the
damage was not divisible and arose from a single sudden and accidental
occurrence, the court held that only the 1977 policy applied.245 Accordingly,
damages in excess of the $1,100,000 aggregate limit were not covered,
consistent with the actual injury theory.246
The only court known to have considered the allocation issue under
Florida law held that the Keene "joint and several liability" theory would be
adopted in Florida.2 47 Thus, when covered events combine with noncovered
events, such as events outside the policy period, causing damage that is not
divisible, the insurer is liable for the full extent of damages. This approach
is consistent with Florida's concurrent cause doctrine.
Based upon the "all sums" language in the standard CGL policy and the
doctrine of concurrent causes, if the contamination at the insured's facility
was caused by multiple events, one of which is a covered loss, then coverage
exists. The insurer cannot avoid its contractual duty to pay "all damages
which the insured is legally obligated to pay" because of the fortuitous
occurrence of a concurrent cause outside of the scope of its policy.248
240. Id. at 309.
241. Id. at 317.
242. SCSC Corp., 536 N.W.2d at 317.
243. Id.
244. Id at318.
245. Id.
246. Id
247. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 93-132 CIV-J-10, Slip. Op. at 9-10
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 1996) at 13-15; see also Carey Canada, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., Co., No.
Civ. A. No. 84-3113 JHP, 1988 WL 169287, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 1988) (noting that "[Florida]
law does not appear to deviate in any significant respect from general insurance principles
recognized in Keene. . . ").
248. See Dimmitt Chevrolet, 636 So. 2d at 700. Interestingly, the concurrent cause
argument was briefed before the Supreme Court of Florida in Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc., but the
court did not reach the issue because it held that there were no covered "sudden and accidental"
releases to trigger coverage. Id.
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V. AN INSURER'S LIABILITY IS NOT LIMITED TO DAMAGES CAUSED
DURING THE POLICY PERIOD
The cases rejecting the joint and several liability approach on the
grounds that the insurer is liable only for damage that occurs during the
policy period are missing the point. While the standard CGL policy provides
coverage only when there is an occurrence during the policy period, such
policies contain no language limiting coverage to damages that occur during
the policy period. As the Hatco court recognized, such a provision could
easily have been included in the policies, but it was not.
249
It is true that the definition of "property damage" indicates that there
must be some injury during the policy period. However, the standard CGL
policy requires the insurer to pay "all sums" the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of such property damage. When an
insured becomes jointly and severally liable for all clean up costs at a site
even though not all such costs were caused by its release, the insurer steps
into the shoes of the insured and may also be held jointly and severally
liable. Thus, while some personal injury or property damage must occur
during the policy period, a rule by which the insured would have to prove
precisely how much damage occurred during the policy period would place
the insured in an impossible situation.2
VI. CONCLUSION
The limited authority available on the issue indicates that Florida courts
would likely adopt the injury-in-fact trigger theory, which is fundamentally
equivalent to the continuing trigger theory under Florida law. Based on the
policies enunciated in Wallach v. Rosenberg 5 1 it appears equally likely that
a Florida court would apply the joint and several approach to the allocation
issue as long as the insured can show that some covered property damage
occurred during the policy period. Since most courts consider environmental
contamination to be "property damage" as soon as it occurs, it generally
should not be difficult to establish that the policy was triggered.
Accordingly, Florida's insured's may be able to obtain full indemnification
249. Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 1347.
250. See New Castle County v. Continental Cas. Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 812 (D. Del.
1989) (insured not required to "prove the impossible" in order to establish coverage); see also
Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 663 (noting "[a]s a public policy matter, this court
cannot ignore the difficulty insureds would face if, as is generally the case, they had the burden of
proving the amount of damages for each policy at issue").
251. 527 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
404 [Vol. 24:373
402
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Goldenberg
when covered occurrences combine with noncovered occurrences to cause
indivisible pollution damage.
Nevertheless, courts in other jurisdictions have become increasingly
willing to prorate defense and indemnity costs when it appears that
environmental damage was continuous or when the date of the occurrence is
uncertain. None of the cases discussed above dealt with the situation in
which the insured had coverage from different carriers throughout the course
of the contamination but elected to proceed against only one of the
insurers.z 2 However, adopting the joint and several liability approach would
suggest that the insured bears the burden of showing that other insurance
policies are implicated if the insurer can show that the damage was divisible
and that only a small portion was attributable to the covered release. In such
a case, the court may hold the insurer liable for a fraction of the clean up
costs while the insured would have to bear the remaining burden.
Nonetheless, this scenario seems unlikely in most cases.
First, it will typically be difficult for the insurer to show divisible
damages in most cases. Second, the rationale for prorating costs to the
insured-that the insured elected to go uncovered and become a self-
insurer-is not present in the case where the insured obtained insurance
during all relevant time periods, but could only sustain a claim against a
single insurer because of more restrictive pollution exclusions in later
policies. Considering the "all sums" language in the standard CGL policy, it
is unlikely that a Florida court would prorate costs to the insured for
damages outside the policy period.
Despite its growing popularity, the pro-rata, "time-on-the-risk"
approach seems to be at odds with an "injury in fact" trigger theory. The
standard CGL policy only requires an occurrence, i.e., some unexpected,
unintended property damage taking place during the policy period, not that
all of the damages occur during the policy period. Thus, once an accident
has caused damage during the policy period, the insurer should be liable for
"all sums" attributable to that occurrence. Allocation among insurers should
be governed by the "other insurance" clauses in the triggered policies.
Finally, the "drafting history" of the standard form CGL policies of
1966 and 1973 indicates that the drafters knew that the occurrence-based
language would result in coverage under successive policies for long tail
claims, that the language would result in the "pyramiding" of successive
policy limits, and that the language contained no allocation method for
multiple policies, thus leaving the insurers to apportion claims among
252. An insured may elect not to proceed against an insurer that was on the risk during the
time the contamination was present for a number of reasons, including inability to locate policies,
difficulty in establishing an "occurrence' during risk policy period, and insurer insolvency. See
New Castle County, 933 F.2d at 1162; Wallach, 527 So. 2d at 1386; Northern States Power 523
N.W. 2d at 657.
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themselves. Nevertheless, the insurers assumed the obligation to
indemnify for "all sums" up to the policy limits, regardless of whether
periods of non-coverage were also "triggered." Under such circumstances,
the insurer should bear joint and several liability just as its insureds do under
most modem environmental statutes.
253. See John E. Heintz et al., Allocation of Indemnity Among Multiple Insurance
Policies, 9 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 5, 11-12 (1996).
406 [Vol. 24:373
404
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Trial De Novo and Evidentiary Presumptions Under the
"Lemon Law": Analysis and Comment
Larry M. Roth**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 409
II. LEMON LAW LEGISLATION ............................................................ 411
A. What is the Lemon Law? ........................................................ 411
B. The Lemon Law Arbitration Board ........................................ 413
C. Legislative History of Section 681 ......................................... 415
D. Other States and Other Laws ................................................. 417
ITI. CASE DECISION ANALYSIS ON TRIAL DE NOVO ........................... 422
A. From Mason I Through Pitsirelos ......................................... 422
B. Mason I and Pitsirelos Were Wrongly Decided .................... 426
1. Mason Is Improper Reliance on Zoning Laws ................ 428
2. Mason /s Inappropriate Reliance on Ad Valorem
Tax Statutes ....................................................................... 433
3. Mason I Misinterpreted Case Law Precedent ................... 435
C. What a Trial De Novo Should Be ........................................... 441
D. How Section 681 Intended A Traditional Trial De
Novo Proceeding .................................................................... 447
IV. THE EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF A LEMON LAW ARBITRATION
BOARD DECISION ......................................................................... 450
A. Background of Evidentiary Presumptions ............................. 451
B. The Pitsirelos Ruling on Presumptions Did Not
Clarify the Issue ..................................................................... 453
V. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ROLE IN THE LEMON LAW
ADMINISTRATION ......................................................................... 454
VI. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS AND ACTIONS ..................................... 461
* A much shorter and less comprehensive version of this Article was published in
the Fall 1998 issue of TrialAdvocate Quarterly, Volume 17, Number 4, at 36.
** B.S., University of Tennessee, 1973; J.D., University of Florida, 1975. The
Author wishes to thank Christi L. Underwood of Foley & Lardner (Orlando office) for her
assistance in reviewing and commenting on this Article.
Author's Note: This article reflects the personal opinions of the author, developed
mostly as a result of particular litigation experiences. The views set forth below are not
intended to represent or to reflect the opinions of any other person, or any motor vehicle
manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or client.
405
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
A . Legislative .............................................................................. 462
B . Judicial ................................................................................... 464
V II. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 467
To consumers, car dealers, wholesale distributors, and manufacturers of
motor vehicles, Florida's statutory framework known as the Motor Vehicle
Warranty Enforcement Act ("section 681")1 has become an important factor
of economic and commercial life.2  In common parlance, this statute is
known as the Lemon Law. 3  The "Lemon" reference pertains to a motor
vehicle. The Lemon Law has also become important to lawyers, as it has
spawned a new and different type of litigation and legal counseling. As the
number of new motor vehicles sold in Florida increases with population
growth, so too does the financial risk exposure arising from Lemon Law
claims. This results in an increasing number of consumers who are unhappy
with their new vehicles.
To date, the judicial analysis of the Lemon Law has been unsettled,
confusing, and even contradictory.4 In September 1998, the Supreme Court
of Florida had the opportunity to establish an understandable and realistic
construction of the Lemon Law. Yet, the court in Chrysler Corp. v.
6 7Pitsirelos missed that opportunity. For example, when confronted with the
trial de novo language of section 681,8 the court followed the Fifth District's
decision in Mason v. Porsche Cars of North America, Inc.,9 a case which this
article will demonstrate was wrongly decided.10 As such, in relying on
Mason I, the Supreme Court of Florida also reached the wrong result.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 681.10-.118 (1999). This article discusses several cases that have
arisen under the 1988-1993 versions of that statute. The present statute has not changed in
substance on the issues discussed herein. Only the numbering scheme has been revised. Unless
otherwise noted, all references are to the 1999 statutes.
2. Automobile dealers have historically been specifically excluded under the Lemon
Law. They are deemed to be the manufacturer's agent under that law. See FLA. STAT. § 681.102
(1991). Only recently has section 681.102(1) of the Florida Statutes been amended to include a
"franchised motor vehicle dealer." Id. § 681.102 (1999). A dealer's liability under the Lemon
Law is precluded, although there are some remedies available to a manufacturer. Id. § 681.113
(1999). This is not an issue for discussion in this article.
3. Id. § 681.102 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
5. Id. at 710.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 713-15.
9. 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) [hereinafter "Mason 1].
10. Id.
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I. INTRODUCION
The genesis for this article derived from trial and litigation experiences
in a particular Lemon Law case, the Mason I litigation referred to above."1
The intent here is to analyze the procedural and evidentiary inconsistencies
that have been judicially read into the Lemon Law, and to ultimately
recommend not only legislative or political changes, but also a different
judicial approach from that which the appellate courts have followed to date.
This article will therefore critique the current law, both statutory and
judicial, as to what a trial de novo is under section 681.1095(12) of the
Florida Statutes, and the evidentiary weight to be given a "decision" of a
Lemon Law arbitration board in a subsequent judicial proceeding. 2
Essentially, Lemon Law arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution
proceeding. It is informal and intended to be inexpensive and expeditious.
The statute does, however, permit a trial de novo in the circuit court
13
subsequent to these informal proceedings. On this issue, precedent was
first established by Mason I in 1993, where the court held that a trial de novo
under the statute is really an "appeal" to the circuit court after an arbitration
award."4 That decision, interpreting the Lemon Law statute, was arguably a
consumer interest driven result, and not a strict judicial interpretation of
11. Id. See also Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 688 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (setting aside the attorneys' fee award for Porsche) [hereinafter "Mason IF'].
Mason I has already had impact beyond section 681 circumstances. In Kahn v. Villas at Eagle
Point Condominium Ass'n, the Second District used Mason I to interpret a different statutory
scheme, section 718.1255(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes. 693 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1997). The statute involved did not discuss an appeal from the arbitration, but whether a
"'complaint' for trial de novo" could be filed in circuit court. Id. at 1030. Kahn involved a
dispute over a deck addition to a condominium unit. Id. The dispute, by statute, was handled in
a non-binding arbitration proceeding. Id. Unlike section 681, these arbitration proceedings are
presided over by the Department of Professional Regulations which employs "ful-time attorneys
to act as arbitrators." FA. STAT. § 718.1255(4) (1995). In Kahn, there was a two-page opinion
requiring the owners to remove their deck. Kahn, 693 So. 2d at 1030. Kahn claimed that the
condo owner had the burden of persuasion to "demonstrate some error in the administrative
decision." Id. The court, however, did not determine burden of proof, so that there was no ruling
on the presumptive validity of the administrative decision. Id. The property owners lost at the
administrative level and then again at the bench trial. Id. The trial judge did not review the
administrative order, which the Second District thought inappropriate. Id. Section 718.1255(4),
unlike section 681, requires that arbitrators have specialized background in that case, being
members of the Florida Bar. § 718.1255(4).
12. The formal name of the statute is Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act. §
681.10(1999).
13. § 681.1095(12).
14. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722-23.
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legislative intent. In Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos,15 the Supreme Court of
Florida adopted the Mason I conclusion, without critique or its own
analysis. 16 Yet, there are patent errors in the case law analysis of Mason I
which should have been discerned by the Supreme Court of Florida, and not
otherwise made the law of Florida in Pitsirelos. As the law now stands, a
manufacturer who loses at the arbitration level and requests a trial de novo
must show up on the courthouse steps as a plaintiff, with the burden of
persuasion to disprove that the vehicle is not a "Lemon."'17 As such, this is
not a trial de novo and is not what the statute intended.
The second major point of the article discusses whether a written
Lemon Law arbitration "decision" should have any evidentiary presumption
of correctness in the subsequent de novo judicial proceeding. The Pitsirelos
court held that it should not, overturning several lower court decisions,
including the Mason II appeal decided by the Fifth District. Yet, this
particular result by the Supreme Court of Florida is inconsistent with its
conclusion in Pitsirelos regarding what a trial de novo is or is not under the
Lemon Law. Regardless of any evidentiary presumption given the formal
written arbitration board "decision," particularly since it is prepared by the
Florida Attorney General's lawyers, it is a powerful piece of evidence on its
own. The Pitsirelos dissent on this issue recognized that point. 19 This
evidentiary presumption issue is inextricably tied to the trial de novo
analysis since the statute mandates this written "decision" be admitted into
evidence.20  As this article will demonstrate, the legislature obviously
intended to protect a consumer who is forced to litigate in a trial de novo
after the arbitration process. This piece of evidence is substantial and
persuasive, with or without any presumption, and affords protection to the
consumer if litigation ensues.
Thus, the courts' struggles in Mason I, Mason II, and Pitsirelos, to
force a consumer protection friendly result were unnecessary. The statute,
section 681, has ample built-in protections so that an individual consumer is
not overwhelmed by a manufacturer's litigational resources. That is the
analytical theme of this article. The ultimate and effective resolution of
these errors, however, must rest with the legislature.
15. 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
16. Id. at 713.
17. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 721.
18. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 711.
19. Id. at 715.
20. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(9) (1999).
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II. LEMON LAW LEGISLATION
A. What is the Lemon Law?21
Simply put, the Lemon Law allows a consumer to obtain a refund or a
22replacement if their motor vehicle meets the requisite statutory criteria. The
law defines the meaning of a "Lemon."3 Once statutory prerequisites are
met, a presumption that the motor vehicle has deficiencies is established for
the consumer.24  This statutory relief is intended to be nonjudicial,
expeditious, and inexpensive.2 An attorney is not needed, although any
party can appear with counsel.26
In order to qualify for relief under the Lemon Law, a motor vehicle
must possess a "nonconformity." The statute defines "nonconformity" as a
21. See generally Robert A. Butterworth, Consumer Guide to the Florida Lemon Law
(1997), which recites, for the lay public, their rights under the law. This article is not intended to
be a practice guide for the Lemon Law. There are no real Continuing Legal Education ("CLE")
publications which are designed to be a tool for the attorney practicing in this field. See Duane
A. Daiker, Note, Florida's Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act: Lemon-Aid for the
Consumer, 45 FLA. L. REV. 253 (1993) for a good overview of section 681. A general overview
of the Lemon Law statutory provisions is contained in Raymond G. Ingalsbe, Florida's New Car
Lemon Law: An Effective Tool for the Consumer, 64 RtA. B.L 61 (Oct. 1990).
22. FA. STAT. § 681.102(15) (1999).
"Motor vehicle" means a new vehicle, propelled by power other than
muscular power, which is sold in this state to transport persons or property,
and includes a recreational vehicle or a vehicle used as a demonstrator or
leased vehicle if a manufacturer's warranty was issued as a condition of sale,
or the lessee is responsible for repairs, but does not include vehicles run only
upon tracks, off-road vehicles, trucks over 10,000 pounds gross vehicle
weight, motorcycles, mopeds, or the living facilities of recreational vehicles.
Id.
23. ld. § 681.104(1).
24. Id, § 681.104(3)(a)-(b).
25. "There is no fee for having your case heard by the Florida New Motor Vehicle
Arbitration Board." Butterworth, supra note 21, at 6.
26. "You are not required to have an attorney represent you, although use of an attorney
is permitted (at your expense)." Id.
27. § 681.102(16). See also § 681.103(1), which provides:
"Nonconformity" means a defect or condition that substantially impairs the
use, value, or safety of a motor vehicle, but does not include a defect or
condition that results from an accident, abuse, neglect, modification, or
alteration of the motor vehicle by persons other than the manufacturer or its
authorized service agent.
Id. § 681.102(16).
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condition that substantially impairs value, safety, or use.2 Basically, it
establishes a defect, but obviously this statutory conclusion can be quite
subjective. 29 A Lemon Law arbitration panel is the one to decide if a non-
conformity in the motor vehicle exists.3 3
A motor vehicle is also defined in section 681. Not every vehicle on
the highways falls within the statute.32 While heavy trucks do not,33 the
nonliving portions of recreational vehicles do. 4 For the vast majority,
however, the Lemon Law operates to benefit consumers who own passenger
cars, sport utility vehicles, and pickup trucks.35
The philosophical foundations for the Lemon Law had their origins in
the consumer protection movement, which began during the 1970s. 31 From
Henry Ford's mass production technology until the advent of this
consumerism, automobile manufacturers and dealers clearly had an
advantage over a purchaser if a car was a "lemon" or was "defective. 37 The
normal relief for a consumer was to file a lawsuit seeking common law
remedies, 38 to file a U.C.C. claim,39 or perhaps an action under the
28. § 681.102(16).
29. See Butterworth, supra note 21, at 2-3.
30. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-32.033 (1993) (Decision of the Board).
31. FLA. STAT. § 681.102(15) (1999).
32. Butterworth, supra note 21, at 2.
33. § 681.102(15) ("but does not include vehicles run only upon tracks, off-road
vehicles, trucks over 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight, motorcycles, mopeds, or the living
facilities of recreational vehicles.").
34. Id. § 681.102(21). "'Recreational vehicle' means a motor vehicle primarily designed
to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, but does not include
a van conversion." Id.
35. See generally, Butterworth, supra note 21, at 2-3.
36. See Barbara E. Herring, Comment, Sweetening the Fate of the "Lemon" Owner:
California and Connecticut Pass Legislation Dealing with Defective New Cars, 14 U. TOL. L.
REv. 341, 341-43 (1983).
37. The philosophical basis for these laws was to even the otherwise unfair economic
interests favoring the big corporation/manufacturer over the individual consumer. See Harvey M.
Sklaw, The New Jersey Lemon Law: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come, 9 SETON HALL LzGIS.
J. 137, 137 (1985) ("The lemon is the apparently irreparable new automobile; the shiny chrome
plated monster which has turned upon its master. Not only has this monster turned upon the
buyer, but the seller has washed his hands of the whole affair.").
38. See, e.g., McCraney v. Ford Motor Co., 282 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1973).
39. See Tom Bush Volkswagen, Inc. v. Kuntz, 429 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Janet A. Flaccus, The Lemon and its Rejection: Code Language and Its Misconstruction,
9 U. ARK. LrrLE ROCKL.J. 303 (1986-87).
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Magnuson-Moss Act.40 Except if brought in small or summary claims court,
an attorney and the full legal process applied. This would then, of course,
take time and money.
To eradicate a perceived imbalance which favors the economic power
of the manufacturers, the Florida Legislature in 1983 determined, as a matter
of public policy, that an automobile purchase is a major event in the
financial life of a person, requiring state protection.42 Section 681.101 of the
Florida Statutes states in part:
The Legislature recognizes that a motor vehicle is a major
consumer purchase and that a defective motor vehicle undoubtedly
creates a hardship for the consumer .... It is the intent of the
Legislature that a good faith motor vehicle warranty complaint by a
consumer be resolved by the manufacturer within a specified
period of time; .... It is further the intent of the Legislature to
provide the statutory procedures whereby a consumer may receive
a replacement motor vehicle, or a full refund, for a motor vehicle
which cannot be brought into conformity with the warranty
provided for in this chapter.43
B. The Lemon Law Arbitration Board
The initial decision-maker in a conflict between a consumer and the
automobile manufacturer is the New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board
("Board"). This structure was first created by legislative amendments to the
Lemon Law in 1988. 44 Before the Board existed, there was no enforcement
mechanism under section 681 for the consumer, except litigation. The legal
rights were created, but the remedy had to be obtained in court.
Arbitration was designed to be an alternative dispute procedure. The
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and Florida Rules of Evidence do not
apply.45 If a qualified motor vehicle under section 681 is found to be astatutory "Lemon," a repurchase by the manufacturer or a new vehicle
40. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 57a.(a)-(c) (1982). See Gates v. Chrysler Corp., 397 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
41. See Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, SB 0462, at 1 (available
at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18, carton 1281, Tallahassee, Fla.).
42. See FLA. STAT. § 681.101 (1991). See generally Ayala Alexopoulos, A New Twist
for Texas "Lemon" Owners, 17 ST. MARY'S U. 155, 156 (1985).
43. § 681.101.
44. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095 (1988).
45. See FA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.032(10)(a) (1993) ('T1he formal rules of
evidence shall not apply.").
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replacement is required.46 In the Mason case, the arbitration panel ordered a
refund.47 Porsche then exercised its statutory right to seek a trial de novo in
circuit court.48
There is no constitutional basis for the New Motor Vehicle Arbitration
Board. Arbitrators, for the most part, have no qualification requirements. 4
They are appointed by the Attorney General's Office, three per panel.50 One
arbitrator on a panel has to be "a person with expertise in motor vehicle
mechanics."
51
Lemon Law arbitrators are not professionally trained. They are not
required to have special training such as administrative law judges,52
American Arbitration Association qualified individuals, or any other
individuals. The Attorney General's Office is responsible for determining
qualifications and training.53 Yet, the Attorney General ("AG") also acts as
legal counsel to the Board. Paradoxically, the AG also provides advice to
55
and answers questions from consumers.
The Mason II arbitration involved a 1991 Porsche Carrera 2 high
performance sports car, and the alleged defect was the transmission, among
other things. The expert on the Mason I panel was a technician from a
recreational vehicle ("RV") facility, with no experience with Porsche
Carreras generally, or with the specific tiptronic transmission that was the
46. FLA. STAT. § 681.104(2)(a)-(b) (1999); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.033(5)(d).
47. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 720.
48. Id.
49. § 681.1095(1); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.003 (1993). "Each Board member
shall be accountable to the Attorney General for the proper performance of his/her duties as a
member of the Board." Id. at 2-32.005(1). In other contexts, of course, Florida requires specific
qualifications for individuals who arbitrate or mediate disputes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 44.103,
.104,723.038.
50. § 681.1095(3); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.004 (1993) (Board Composition;
Compensation; Vacancies).
51. § 681.1095(3) (One member "must not be employed by a manufacturer or a
franchised motor vehicle dealer or be a staff member, a decisionmaker, or a consultant for a
procedure."); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.004(2) (1993).
52. See FLA. STAT. § 120.65 (1999).
53. Id. § 681.1095(3); FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-32.004 (1993).
54. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.006(2) (1993).
55. The consumer testified in Mason I to advice and help received from the Attorney
General's Office. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 719. See Butterworth, supra note 21, printed in inside
cover, for a guide that "represents the Attorney General's interpretation of the [Lemon Law].
... If you have a question or are uncertain about a particular aspect of this law, contact the
Lemon Law Hotline operated by the Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services, or write
the Office of the Attorney General, Lemon Law Arbitration Program." Id.
56. Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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mechanical component in dispute.57 Not one member of the Mason Board
had ever driven such a vehicle, or knew anything about this type of high
performance sports car.5  59
These arbitration hearings usually last about two hours. Test rides are
permitted, 60 but not required. In Mason, only a very brief test ride was used
to help determine that the car was a "Lemon., 61 The entire process lasted
one hour and fifty minutes.62
C. Legislative History of Section 681
There is little, at best, for guidance. The staff analysis fails to define or
explain trial de novo. It simply says: "Appeals to circuit court are to be de
novo." 63 Further, unlike other statutory provisions, neither section 681 nor
its le~slative history says anything about who has the burden in the trial de
novo.
Before the 1988 amendments, section 681 contained no specific
provision about going to circuit court by appeal, trial de novo, or otherwise.
Initially, there were no arbitration boards. Some type of judicial proceeding
was envisioned, however, since the statute referred to bad faith claims, 65 and
the court awarding attorneys' fees to a prevailing consumer.6 The 1988
57. Deposition of Robert C. France, November 15, 1994, P. 8, L. 1-6; P. 28, L. 5-22; P.
40, L. 18-23; P. 55-57 (did not recall anything unique about the transmission).
58. At the deposition, none of the arbitrators remembered anything about the
transmission, or its characteristics. This was the central issue since the 1991 Porsche Carrera 2
had a tiptronic transmission. It provided the driver with the unique opportunity to either drive the
car like an automatic, or a stick shift. See Deposition of Sidney Mehr, November 14, 1994, Case
No. C1 94-1691, at 23-25.
59. Butterworth, supra note 21, at 6.
60. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-32.032(10)(b) (1993).
61. Masonl,688So.2dat364.
62. The audio hearing tape was turned off at 3:05 P.M. and restarted at 3:30 P.M. on
June 16, 1992. In that 25 minute period, two test drives were done. That 25 minutes also
included having to go from the I lth floor of the building, to the parking lot, and back to the 11 th
floor. Estimates on the length of the test rides varied from 5 to 20 minutes. Deposition of
William H. Willis, Nov. 14, 1992, at P. 47, L. 6--11; Trial Transcript, Feb. 7, 1995, Vol. VII, P.
670-671. See Mehr, supra note 58, atP. 35-37, P. 61, L. 1-11.
63. Staff of Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Senate Staff Analysis and Economic
Impact Statement, S.B. 556, at 3 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, carton 1720,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
64. See FLA. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1987).
65. FLA. STAT. § 681.106 (1983) ("found by the court").
66. FA. STAT. § 681.104(5)(b) (1983); HB 885 4/19/83 Report, Committee on
Judiciary.
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revision was "a clarification that an appeal of a board decision to the circuit
court must be trial de novo." 67
What the legislature initially did in 1983 was to create certain statutory
rights for a consumer, while placing legal duties upon the manufacturer.68 In
essence, a cause of action is created for the consumer whereby, if the
statutory requisites are met, a court action could be filed against the
manufacturer. 69 If a lawsuit was filed, the consumer would be a plaintiff and
have to prove his/her case of a statutory violation consistent with traditional
notions of burdens of proof and persuasion. The law also allowed
manufacturers to set up informal dispute resolution panels.7' These have to
be certified by the Division of Consumer Services. 72  If all rules are
followed, a consumer first has to bring the motor vehicle claim there as a
condition precedent to seeking judicial redress under section 681. 73  The
idea, of course, is that this may avoid litigation and informally resolve a
consumer complaint. There are some guarantees of fairness since these
manufacturers' informal dispute panels have to conform to federal
regulations, and must be certified by a state agency.74 Additionally, the
division can appoint "at least one member of the informal dispute settlement
panel."" In 1985, qualifications were put in place to avoid training if a
person was a law graduate qualified arbitrator, mediator, or had already
undergone division training. No such prequalification is required.
Apparently, there is a legislative view that guarantees of fairness
existed in these manufacturer created and state certified informal dispute
67. Conm Substituted for Senate Bill 556, Statement of Substantial Changes, CS/SB
556 (Apr. 14, 1988) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18, carton 1720,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
68. Staff of Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Senate Staff Analysis and Economic
Impact Statement, SB 743, at 1 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18, carton
1402, Tallahassee, Fla.). Staff of Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Senate Staff Analysis and
Economic Impact Statement, SB 0462 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18,
carton 1281, Tallahassee, Fla.). See Maserati Automobiles, Inc. vs. Caplan, 522 So. 2d 993 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988). This case was decided under the 1983 law, prior to the establishment of
the arbitration boards. Id.
69. FLA. STAT. § 681.101 (1991) (legislative intent).
70. Senate Staff Analysis, supra note 41, at 2.
71. FLA. STAT. § 681.109 (1991).
72. FLA. STAT. § 681.108 (1983).
73. Id. § 681.108(1). Some states are similar to Florida in that a consumer must first
seek redress in the manufacturer's informal dispute resolution procedures, if the programs are
certified. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179G) (1999).
74. 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1999).
75. FLA. STAT. § 681.108 (1983).
76. No such training or exempt status prerequisites are required for Lemon Law
arbitration members.
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procedures. Today, a consumer is still required to initially resort to them,77
and if the consumer prevails this result can be admitted into evidence in a
section 681 court proceeding. Underlying this is the obvious fact that a
manufacturer, after going to all the trouble to get its program certified, will
settle the dispute if a loss occurs at its own informal dispute proceedings. If
not, the consumer has a favorable piece of evidence to offer a judge or jury.
D. Other States and Other Laws
The Florida statutory program generally tracks those of other states.79
Florida's 1983 statute was patterned after that of Connecticut' S.8 By 1989,
forty-four states and the District of Columbia had lemon laws.81 When
Florida established it's state-run arbitration program in 1988, Connecticut
New York, Massachusetts, and Vermont already had similar programs.81
Different states, of course, run their programs differently.8
3
No specific reported case decision has been found which interpreted the
statutory language of trial de novo within the context of a lemon law judicial
proceeding after arbitration. A review of other state statutes does not further
clarify the issue. Most statutes only refer to a "trial de novo. Interestingly,
the terminology "appeal," as used in the Florida Statutes, is not uniform. In
86this respect, the Georgia statute is particularly interesting. It uses the word
"appeal," but a consumer may reject the arbitration decision and "request a
trial de novo of the arbitration decision in superior court."' s The Texas
77. FLA. STAT. § 681.108(1) (1999).
78. Id. See Staff of Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Senate Staff Analysis and
Economic Impact Statement, S.B. 743 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18,
carton 1402, Tallahassee, Fla.).
79. The Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement indicated that "[i]n
recognition of consumer dissatisfactions, some states have enacted legislation to allow.., a full
refund of the purchase price on a new car to replace the defective one." Senate Staff Analysis,
note 41, at 1.
80. Id. at2.
81. Lawrence A. Towers, Lemon Law Litigation, TRAL, Feb. 1989, at 22.
82. Senate Staff Analysis, supra note 63, at 6. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-181 to
42-184 (West Supp. 1999).
83. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Consumer Product Warranty Acts § 68 (1990) for a listing of
state statutes on "lemon laws."
84. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 4811-4(d) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 48-907 (Supp. 1999); IowA
CODE ANN. § 322G.8(6) (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325P.665(7) (West 1990); WASH.
REv. CoDEANN. § 19.118.100(1) (West 1999).
85. See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-788 (1994); see also Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 §
7Nl/2(6) (West 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-D:6 (1995).
86. GA. CoDEANN. § 10-1-788 (1994).
87. Id.
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statute is similar. This seems to imply a judicial proceeding that would be
a new one from the outset.
The New York statute provides that arbitrations are to be conducted by
the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). 8 9 The arbitration is final
and binding.9°  In New York, there are "professional" arbitrators or• • • 91
arbitrators from firms who are impartial. There is no right to trial by jury
or trial de novo.92 Constitutional attacks on grounds of denial of trial by jury
and access to courts have been rejected in New York.93
Vermont's statute is interesting in several ways.94 First, that the
Arbitration Board is appointed by the Governor, and at least one member has
to be a new car dealer.95 Members are appointed for three year terms.
"[O]ne member and one alternate shall be persons knowledgeable in
automobile mechanics." 96 The Vermont Arbitration Board receives
"administrative services from the transportation board."97  It is the
Arbitration Board in Vermont which promulgates its own rules, quite
unlike Florida where the Attorney General sets the rules. This Board's
composition seems more analogous to a commission, which may be
appointed in Florida by the Governor, such as the Public Service
Commission. Additionally, Vermont's arbitration board decision is truly
only reviewable by appeal to the superior court.99 A specific statutory
88. See Chrysler Corp. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
89. See In re Subaru of Am., 532 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
90. IcL at 619. In New York, the scope of judicial review is limited. IM at 618; 5 N.Y.
JuR. 2d Arbitration and Award § 180 (1997).
91. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State, 540 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (Sup. Ct. 1989); N.Y.
GENERAL Bus.m ss LAw § 198-a(k) (McKinney 1999).
92. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
93. Id. See also Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Schachner, 525 N.Y.S.2d 127, 130 (Sup. Ct.
1988). In his special Pitsirelos opinion, Justice Overton raised this issue, although it was not
before the court. He was of the view there was no right to ajury trial since a Lemon Law cause of
action did not exist at common law. Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710, 716 (Fla.
1998).
94. New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4176(a) (1993).
95. l § 4174(a).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. § 4174(b).
99. § 4176(a). See Pecor v. General Motors Corp., 547 A.2d 1364, 1365 (Vt. 1988). In
In re Villeneuve, the Vermont Supreme Court described well the review scope after a board
decision. 709 A.2d 1067 (Vt. 1998). Under Vermont's statute, it is a limited review. Id at 1069.
Villeneuve is helpful in understanding the informality and problems which arise at these
arbitration proceedings, referring to a board member's comment about a fist fight. Id at 1070-
71.
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burden was established "by clear and convincing evidence.' 'lro Further, the
grounds for modification or vacation are specified by statute and appear
quite rigorous, such as corruption, fraud, and "evident partiality. ' 101
Connecticut's statute provides for de novo review on "questions of law
raised in the application."1 z This seems more like a certiorari review. The
statute provides, "the court shall uphold the award unless it determines that
the factual findings of the arbitrators are not supported by substantial
evidence in the record and that the substantial rights of the moving party
have been prejudiced." 103  Under the Connecticut statute, arbitrators are
appointed by the Commissioner of Consumer Protection, but only one of the
three member panel can be from the industry. °4 The Department may also
refer the dispute to the AAA.
105
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Ass'n v. O'Neill,1°6 the Supreme
Court of Connecticut held that a manufacturer's right to a jury trial, with a
lemon law claim, had not been unconstitutionally denied.17 The Connecticut
statute allows the consumer, if dissatisfied with the arbitration award, to
100. New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4176(a) (1993).
101. Id. The specific provisions are as follows:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means;
(2) there was evident partiality by the board or corruption or
misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party by the board;
(3) the board exceeded its powers;
(4) the board refused to postpone a hearing after being shown
sufficient cause to do so or refused to hear evidence material to the
controversy or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to the rules
promulgated by the board so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party.
Id. The case of Muzzy v. Chevrolet Division, General Motors Corp. discussed at length the
burden of proof and standard of review on "appeal." 571 A.2d 609, 612-14 (Vt. 1989). One
of the points made was the intent to have the board decisions be similar to an arbitration award
under Vermont's Arbitration Act. Id. at 612. The judicial review of an arbitration award was
the same as under the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 9(d) (1994). See also In re
Villeneuve, 709 A.2d 1067 (Vt. 1998) (ruling on scope of review on due process as to
administrative board with members who did not personally hear the evidence).
102. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-181(c)(4) (West Supp. 1999).
103. Id. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. O'Neill, 523 A.2d 486 (Conn. 1987)
[hereinafter "O'Neill F']. Florida's original statute was intended to be modeled after
Connecticut's statute. Staff of Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Senate Staff Analysis and
Economic Impact Statement, S.B. 794, at 3 (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser.
18, carton 1281, Tallahassee, Fla.).
104. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-181(a) (West Supp. 1999).
105. Id.
106. 561 A.2d 917 (Conn. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in General Motors
Corp. v. Dohmann, 722 A.2d 1205 (Conn. 1998) [hereinafter "O'Neill I'].
107. Id at 921-22.
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initiate a de novo civil proceeding. 108 For the manufacturer, however, its de
novo review is more limited, similar to a judicial review after a formal
arbitration proceeding.109  Although the O'Neill court found it
unconstitutional that the consumer has more judicial opportunities available
than the manufacturer, its analysis centered around the traditional scope of
review depending upon whether the procedure is deemed to be compulsory
versus voluntary arbitration." 0 The Connecticut procedures intend an
altogether different de novo proceeding than in Florida."' Although the
Connecticut statute is silent on the point, apparently the burden is upon the
party challenging the arbitration award.112  I
In a later decision, General Motors Corp. v. Dohmann,'1 - the Supreme
Court of Connecticut reviewed the factual record to determine if substantial
evidence supported the arbitration board's decision. 1 4 That review is more
limited, and by statute the Connecticut Legislature tied judicial review of
lemon law arbitration decisions to the same standard as an administrative
agency. A Connecticut de novo review is not a trial de novo, as arguably
intended in Florida. The court will simply determine whether there is a basis
for the factual findings and it will not substitute its judgment for that of the
arbitration board.! 5  The Connecticut law does provide, however, that116
questions of law are determined de novo by the court. Since an arbitration
board is not a legally trained body, any issue of law must be determined by a
court. This statutory procedure in Connecticut makes it quite different from
that of Florida.
In Minnesota, the statute allows for a trial de novo as well, but nothing
is found to further explain what is meant by that term." 7 This statute does
specifically deal with the admissibility of an informal dispute settlement
award and any presumptive validity to be given it. 11 The Minnesota statuteprovides: "A written decision issued by an informal dispute settlement
108. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-181(f) (West Supp. 1999)
109. See id. §§ 42-179(i)-42-181(c), 52-417-52-420.
110. O'Neill II, 561 A.2d at 924-25.
111. The de novo review is limited to the substantial evidence test. General Motors Corp.
v. Garito, 1997 WL 804876, at *2 (Conn. Super. 1997).
112. Id.
113. 722 A.2d 1205 (Conn. 1998).
114. Id. at 1205.
115. Id. at 1210.
116. Id.
117. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665(1) (West 1990).
118. The Minnesota "arbitration" procedure seems to be based on Magnuson-Moss
certified informal dispute procedures. See Pfeiffer v. Ford Motor Co., 517 N.W.2d 76, 78-79
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994); see also Automobile Importers of Am. v. Minnesota, 871 F.2d 717, 719-
22 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
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mechanism, and any written findings upon which the decision is based, are
admissible as nonbinding evidence in any subsequent legal action and are
not subject to further foundation requirements."'1 9 This type of Minnesota
provision in the Florida Statutes would have changed the procedural and
evidentiary holdings in Mason I and Mason II and rendered Pitsirelos at
least partially unnecessary. The Florida statute does not say anything about
the evidentiary effect of the arbitration award, only that it is admissible. It
would have been better for the Florida Legislature to have said something on
this subject as it has in other contexts, instead of nothing.
In Texas, lemon law disputes are handled by the Texas Motor
Commission. 2°  The Texas law allows a consumer to reject the
Commission's decision and seek a trial de novo. The Commission's
decision is not admissible into evidence. 121 The manufacturer, on the other
hand, can only seek a limited judicial review, with no similar exclusion of an
adverse Commission decision.' 22 A legal proceeding by manufacturers
challenging the makeup of the Commission, incidentally whose majority
number are "automobile dealers," was rejected in Chrysler Corp. v. Texas
Motor Vehicle Commission."3 This case also held that it is constitutional to
allow consumers two shots at a manufacturer where in the subsequent
lawsuit the Commission's decision does not come into evidence. 24 A trial
de novo in Texas for the consumer is truly as if nothing occurred
previously. 125
Finally, a District of Columbia law has some requirements regarding
arbitrator qualifications, which are not present in the Florida Statutes.126 Of
seven board members, two shall be attorneys, one from the Department of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, two shall have training and experience in
119. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665(7) (emphasis added).
120. TE REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07 (West Supp. 1999). See generally
Ayala Alexopoulos, A New Twist for Texas "Lemon" Owners, 17 ST. MARY'S W. 155, 172-78
(1985).
121. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (36), § 6.07 (West Supp. 1999).
122. Alexopoulos, supra note 120, at 172.
123. 755F.2d 1192(5thCir. 1985).
124. Id. at 1202.
125. The court explained:
There is nothing procedurally unfair about allowing a car purchaser a second
shot at a manufacturer. Its effect is to enhance the claimant's chances of
winning, but only because he can first attempt to persuade the Commission of
his case. Failing in this concededly more expeditious and limited claim route,
where a manufacturer faces much less exposure and a successful purchaser's
claims will likely end, the purchaser is back to where he was before the lemon
law - free to pursue his suit as long as his purse and his patience endure.
Id at 1202 (emphasis added).
126. D.C. CT. Crv. ARBrMATIONPROGRAM R. III.
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"arbitration and mediation," one member shall have consumer interests
training, and the final to be a person with experience or training in the
manufacture, wholesale, or retail sales of consumer goods. 27 This statute
seems to present a more balanced and professional arbitration board than in
Florida, where the Attorney General basically selects members, without
requiring any of the skills or experience imposed by the D.C. law.
B. CASE DECISION ANALYSIS ON TRIAL DE Novo
A. From Mason I through Pitsirelos
In 1991, section 681.1095(12) of the Florida Statutes, provided as
follows:
An appeal of a decision by the board to the circuit court by a
consumer or a manufacturer shall be by trial de novo. In a written
petition to appeal a decision by the board, the appealing party must
state the action requested and the grounds relied upon for appeal.12
Clearly, it is not the best written provision. 29  The court in Mason I
acknowledged this.130  The court then held that a judicial proceeding
subsequent to a lemon law arbitration board is more in the nature of an
"appeal," and therefore "it [was] generally the burden of the appellant to
show that the lower tribunal erred.' '131 The lower tribunal being referred to
is the AG-selected arbitration board. The result in Mason I requires the
aggrieved party, no matter who, to have the burden of proof and in essence
be the appellant/plaintiff at the trial de novo. This is really an appeal and
not a trial de novo as if nothing had occurred previously. Mason I also holds
that the manufacturer shoulders the burden of going forward to disprove that
the vehicle is defective, or to prove that it is not presumptively defective. 33
In the first trial after Mason I, which was an interlocutory appeal, the
consumer as the plaintiff went first but Porsche had the burden to disprove
that the vehicle was a "Lemon."'' 3  Mason H criticized the trial court for
127. § 40-1303(c).
128. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(13) (1991). See Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc.,
621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
129. The appellate courts have called this provision "inartfully" worded. Mason 1, 621
So. 2d at 722.
130. Id. at 721.
131. Id.
132. Id.at722-23.
133. Id. at 722.
134. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 722.
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making the consumer be the plaintiff at all135 and characterized those
proceedings in looking glass terms of Lewis Carroll as "curiouser and
curiouser. 136 Of course, this curious procedure arose only because of the
Mason I holding that a trial de novo is not really de novo.137 Mason II,
including the reversal of a directed verdict for Porsche, among other things,
held that a decision of the arbitration board has a presumption of correctness
which goes to the jury like that.138 The party who challenges that decision
has the burden of proof to demonstrate it is invalid. 39 Absent such proof,
the consumer wins.
In Sheehan v. Winnebago Industries, Inc.,14° the Fifth District Court of
Appeal, after Mason I, again determined that although a judicial proceeding
subsequent to an arbitration board hearing is de novo, it is procedurally more
analogous to an appeal.1 41 The party who loses at the arbitration level is the
plaintiff, and has the burden of proof de novo.142 With no independent
analysis, the Third District Court of Appeal, in Aguiar v. Ford Motor Co.,143
followed Mason .144 In General Motors Corp. v. Neu,' 45 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held that an appeal to the circuit court under section
681.1095 of the Florida Statutes should be to the trial division, and not the
appellate division of the circuit court.146 A mandamus was granted directing
the circuit court to conduct a trial, as it was wrong to have transferred the
case to the appellate division of that court. 147 Neu did not address, as did
Mason I, issues of the burden of persuasion, who would be a plaintiff or
petitioner, or how the de novo proceeding was to be conducted. Mason I is
not cited in Neu, although it may be that the Fourth District did not yet know
of the decision.'48
135. Mason I, 688 So. 2d at 364.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. I. at 369-70.
139. Id
140. 635 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
141. Id. at 1067.
142. Id. at 1068.
143. 683 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
144. Id. at 1158.
145. 617 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
146. Id. at 407-08.
147. Id. at 408.
148. Initially, Mason was docketed in the appellate division of the circuit court, and given
an appellate case number, A1-92-34. When the trial court ordered the consumer to file a new
lawsuit, a regular case number was given to the proceedings. See Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 721 n.1.
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Subsequently, in Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos,149 the Fourth District held
that Chrysler had the "burden to demonstrate any error or abuse of discretion
to the reviewing tribunal."15  The "tribunal" being referred to is the
Arbitration Board. The court said Neu is "inapposite,".' 51 and used the same
"appeal" language as Mason I to interpret a de novo proceeding.152 The
Fourth District in Pitsirelos made this statement:
The legislature has deemed the circuit court action as an "appeal"
from an adverse arbitration decision. As in any appeal, it is the
appellant's burden to demonstrate any error or abuse of discretion
to the reviewing tribunal [circuit court de novo]. No other
interpretation of this statutory scheme is reasonable.
1 53
Pitsirelos' reference to "error" or "abuse of discretion" was unfortunate and
only further clouded exactly what type of proceeding is this de novo trial.
154
The lower court's Pitsirelos language gave an even different meaning to trial
de novo than Mason I, although the latter case was cited with approval. 55
Under the Fourth District's Pitsirelos decision, the circuit court presumably
looks at the record similar to how it might review an administrative
proceeding under section 120 of the Florida Statutes or an appellate review
by certiorari. Chrysler then took the case to Tallahassee, and to the Supreme
Court of Florida.
The Supreme Court of Florida, on this trial de novo point, affirmed the
Fourth District. 56 Thus, Mason I is followed by the Supreme Court of
Florida, which states that they "agree with the conclusion" reached by the
Fifth District in Mason. 57  Any in-depth reasoning by the court never
develops on this issue, and Pitsirelos does nothing to examine the analytical
foundation of the case law precedents Mason I found persuasive. Only
149. 689 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997), review granted, 697 So. 2d 1215
(Fla. 1997).
150. Id. at 1134.
151. Id. at 1133.
152. The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Hargrett v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.,
denied certiorari as the appropriate way to handle the burden of proof issue. 705 So. 2d. 1009
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998). The court did not find the presence of irreparable harm. Id. at
1009. Petitioner (consumer) had argued that the trial court placed on her the burden of going
forward even though she won at arbitration. Id.
153. Pitsirelos, 689 So. 2d at 1134. The First, Second, and Third Districts did not have
any opinions in this area.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1133.
156. Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 710, 711 (Fla. 1998).
157. Id. at 713.
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Justice Overton, in a partial dissenting opinion, said that a trial de novo
should be exactly that---"'a new trial... as if no trial whatever had been
held in the first instance.'' 58  Yet Justice Overton made no attempt to
examine the paradox created by the Pitsirelos majority of a trial de novo not
meaning what it is facially intended to mean.
What seems to be motivating the Supreme Court of Florida in Pitsirelos
was the fact that the Lemon Law is an alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") procedure. It is intended to benefit the consumer, be quick and
economical. Pitsirelos adopts, without saying so directly, the "way station"
analogy from Mason I to reach its result. Thus, according to that analogy, if
a prevailing consumer at the arbitration board has to also be the party with
the burden in a subsequent circuit court trial, this does "relegate the
mandatory arbitration to simply being a procedural impediment to the
consumer prior to accessing the circuit court without the counter-balancing
benefit to which the prevailing party in the arbitration should be entitled." 159
As an ADR procedure, the Supreme Court of Florida apparently thought that
if it is any other way, the arbitration proceeding becomes meaningless.
Pitsirelos takes a pro consumer approach on the trial de novo, but then
undermines the same rationale by holding that the arbitration result carries
no evidentiary presumption.
The supreme court in Pitsirelos did not examine too deeply section
681. 6o Admittedly, there is sparse legislative analysis for guidance. As
noted, nowhere in the legislative history is "trial de novo" defined or
explained. Unlike other statutory provisions, neither section 681 nor its
legislative history says anything about who has the burden in the trial de
novo. Mason I and Pitsirelos superimposed a specific legislative intent onto
the statute. Yet, the Staff Analysis simply said: "Appeals to circuit court are
to be de novo."161 Arguably, if the legislature intended the burden to be on
the party wanting a trial de novo, it could have said so as it has in other
statutory provisions-for example, section 194.036(3) of the Florida
Statutes.
16T
The ink had not yet dried on Pitsirelos before the Fifth District began
demonstrating how this strained concept of a trial de novo works in practice.
This most recent Fifth District case, Ford Motor Co. v. Starling63 reinforces
158. Id. at 715 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1505 (6th ed. 1990)) (emphasis
added).
159. Id. at 713.
160. Id. at 710.
161. Senate Staff Analysis, supra note 63, at 3.
162. FLA. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1997).
163. 721 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 1998). Starling was decided on October 9,
1998. Id. at 335. Pitsirelos was decided on September 17, 1998. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 710.
Roth
423
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
that court's view of the de novo trial as an appellate proceeding. 64 There,
the court affirmed a finding for the consumer after a bench trial. 65 Ford
"appealed" the arbitration board's decision in favor of the consumer, a
recreational vehicle purchaser. 166 Even though Starling uses the de novo
language, the circuit court proceeding was more analogous to an appeal. This
conclusion is supported by the following language from Starling: "Even
though this was a de novo review, it was still an appeal. Issues not raised
before the arbitrator should not be presented during the de novo review or
else the entire statutory arbitration process becomes a nullity."' 67 As such,
Starling criticizes Ford for raising a new issue at trial that they had not
argued earlier in the arbitration. A pure trial de novo, however, would not
preclude the presentation of new issues and evidence. The Fifth District
treats this like a matter that has not first been raised at the lower "tribunal,"
which cannot then be asserted on "appeal" for the first time.168 The Fifth
District's application of de novo to the Starling facts is no different from
looking at an appellate record. That is, if Ford did not first raise the issue
before the lower "tribunal," or the arbitration panel, then they could not then
first assert it on "appeal" to the circuit court. On this issue, the dissent in
Starling argues that on a trial de novo, new issues can be raised, and even
implies a constitutional deprivation if such is not the case.169 Although this
dissenting opinion is more correct in its "de novo" application, unfortunately
the theory being espoused is also contrary to the rationale behind Pitsirelos
and the Fifth District's own Mason I decision.
B. Mason I and Pitsirelos Were Wrongly Decided
In Mason I, the court attempts to grapgle with what it thought, with the
help of the Attorney General's Office, is a "clear" statute, although
inartfully drafted, but one which should not be interpreted to "lead to an
inequitable and absurd result. ' 171  Nevertheless, an "absurd result" is
reached. The pivotal issue of first impression in Mason I, which is
subsequently relied on by Pitsirelos became the interpretation of section
681.1095(12) of the Florida Statutes. 72
164. Starling, 721 So. 2d at 335.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 336.
167. Id. at 338. This comment by the court harkens back to the "way station" analogy of
Mason I and the arbitration process becoming meaningless.
168. Starling, 721 So. 2d at 338 n.7.
169. Id. at340-41.
170. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 722.
171. Id. at 723.
172. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
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The Mason I trial court had ruled in favor of the manufacturer and
ordered a traditional trial de novo on the issues of section 681, and the
consumer's other claims under Magnuson-Moss and revocation of the sale
against the dealership.173 Mason rs conundrum arises since section
681.1095(12) uses the dual terminology of "appeal of a decision by the
board," and that a manufacturer or consumer shall be entitled to a "trial de
novo."174 The Fifth District attached primary significance to this "appeal"
language.175 Mason I, however, fails to consider the possibility that this
"appeal" reference is only procedural, with no substantive force. 17
Certainly the Attorney General's amicus argument in Mason I that the
1988 revision intended to "balance the economic interests of litigants who
otherwise might be unevenly matched"177 had, arguendo, an unstated social
or philosophical impact on the panel.1 78 That is, from the societal
standpoint, if an economically undermatched consumer wins at arbitration, it
is unfair to have that same party file a lawsuit and then to have the burden of
proof against a manufacturer who sits in a superior economic position.
During oral argument in Mason I, questions were asked that
demonstrated a concern for the consumer being worn down by litigation, if
all the manufacturer had to do was request a trial de novo every time it lost
at arbitration. 179 The panel's view was that the litigation resources of a
motor vehicle manufacturer were greater than an individual's and potential
abuse of the consumer's rights would occur. 10 This theme permeates Mason
L The Fifth District says as much when it speaks of the arbitration board
becoming meaningless, if all a manufacturer has to do is ask for a trial de
novo, since arbitration would then "amount to nothing more than a way
station for a disgruntled party en route to circuit court.'"8I In other words,
manufacturers would use the de novo proceedings as a strategic weapon to
the detriment of a weaker consumer and the litigation flood gates would then
be opened.
As noted in the published opinion, the court in Mason I thought the
manufacturer's argument that trial de novo means a completely new
proceeding was disingenuous. 8 2 That panel did not think the manufacturer
173. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 721.
174. l
175. Id.
176. Id. at 723.
177. Id.
178. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 723.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. l at 722. This "way station" analogy was from Bystrom v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 416 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
182. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 722.
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would be making the same interpretation of trial de novo if it had prevailed
at the arbitration level. 183 This is wrong. Adopting Porsche's argument on
trial de novo would not have resulted in the consumer being treated any
differently than a manufacturer in a subsequent lawsuit. The usual burdens
of proof and persuasion would apply. Also, the manufacturer, just like a
consumer, would then get the statutory benefit of having the arbitration
result go into evidence.
Mason I did not attempt to fully analyze section 681, as undertaken in
this article. Neither did that court accurately analyze in detail the statutory
provisions and case law upon which it relied as precedent to conclude that
the trial de novo provisions of section 681.1095(13) of the Florida Statutes
were meant to be like an appeal with the burden on the appealing party, the
appellant. Section 681 the court in Mason I stated, does not provide for the
classical trial de novo.
[T]he statute is clear that once the arbitration board makes its
findings, the aggrieved party may appeal to the circuit court.
Although most appellate proceedings do not include a trial or
evidentiary hearing, the statutory appellate procedure for Florida's
lemon law authorizes a trial de novo. Nevertheless, it is generally
the burden of the appellant to show that the lower tribunal erred.
The issue in this case has arisen because section 681.1095 does not
explicitly place the burden of persuasion on either the appellant or
appellee. 185
What the court in Mason I used as precedent for its holding were zoning and
ad valorem tax statutes.186 When analyzed and broken down, these statutes
are not support for the construction given to section 681.1095(12) by Mason
I. The Lemon Law statute is a totally different statutory scheme, for
example, from a property appraiser's valuation of property and the
subsequent legal disputes over those taxes.
1. Mason I's Improper Reliance on Zoning Laws
Some of the statutes discussed in Mason I have been repealed. 187 City
of Ormond Beach v. Del Marco,188 relied on in Mason I, also has as its origin
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 721.
186. Id. at 722.
187. Ch. 85-55, § 19, 1985 Fla. Laws 207, 235.
188. 426 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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the Fifth District.1 8 9 There, section 163.250, a zoning statute, allowed for
either a review by the circuit court trial de novo or by certiorari.' 90 Del
Marco involved a Board of Adjustment denying a zoning variance for a
windmill. 91 The case is silent on what happened at the zoning officer level
before the property owner went to the Board of Adjustment. 19z Presumably,
the property owner lost, otherwise there would have been no necessity for
Board action. This is important because the Board of Adjustment could ste
into the shoes of the administrative official and provide the same relief.A
Thus, unlike Mason I, where the arbitration board is the first stop, the Del
Marco complaining party has already initially been rebuffed by an
administrative official at the first level.
When looking at what Del Marco says about trial de novo under then
section 163.250, it is not a statute that Mason I should have analogized to the
Lemon Law. This is what the Del Marco court states about a trial de novo:
A "trial de novo" then must signify the legislative intent that circuit
court review involve something more than a mere examination of
the record of the board of adjustment. The "trial de novo" signifies
to us the legislative intent that the circuit court take new evidence
and conduct a new proceeding, not for the purpose of reviewing the
action of the board of adjustment, but for the purpose of acting as
the board of adjustment to review the original action of the
administrative official, and to grant such relief as the board of
adjustment could grant, if a proper showing is made.194
This language makes the point that in a trial de novo, the circuit court
essentially steps into the shoes of the board of adjustment, and can grant the
variance. The court does so, however, on a clean slate conducting a "new
proceeding" de novo and taking "new evidence."
Mason I seemed to miss that point. The property owner in this zoning
context had the burden of establishing the basis for a variance, which the
circuit court could grant just like the Board of Adjustment. 19 That property
owner also had the burden in court to establish entitlement to the variance,
which is no different than his or her burden before the Board of
189. Id. at 1029. Judge Dauksch, a member of the Mason I panel, was also on the City of
Ormond Beach court.
190. Id. at 1032.
191. Id. at 1030.
192. Id.
193. DelMarco, 426 So. 2d at 1032.
194. Ua
195. Id.
Roth
427
: Nova Law Review 24, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
Adjustment. 196 The "aggrieved party," or the party seeking relief in Del
Marco, was the property owner.' 9 If the Board of Adjustment permitted the
variance, there would have been no need for any court proceeding. 9 8 "So, to
secure relief in a trial de novo before the circuit court, the aggrieved party
must make the showing required by section 163.225, and where, as here, the
petition is based on hardship, the aggrieved party has the burden of
demonstrating that a hardship exists."' The underlying "aggrieved paty"
in Mason L the consumer, is the one making the Lemon Law claim, just
like the person seeking a zoning variance. Yet, Mason I says the
manufacturer is the "aggrieved party" because it lost at arbitration.
201
However, in a subsequent trial de novo context, who is the aggrieved party at
an administrative level should not matter.
Neither the Del Marco case nor Mason I evaluates what the trial de
novo proceeding should have been if someone other than the property owner,
as the aggrieved party, files in circuit court under section 163.250 of the
Florida Statutes. Section 163.250 seems to contemplate this, although its
provisions do not define an "officer, department, board, commission, or
bureau of the governing body" as an "aggrieved party.' ' 2  Thus, it is left
open as to who has the burden and who is the plaintiff. An aggrieved party,
under this zoning statute, is referring to the property owner since that is the
person who has to demonstrate "that a hardship exists." 2°3  If the
governmental authority, however, requests a trial de novo, then under the
Del Marco language cited above, the court stands in the shoes of the Board
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Del Marco, 426 So. 2d at 1032.
199. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 163.225(3)(a) (1981). The analogy of the "aggrieved" party
under section 163 to the issue at the arbitration board under section 681 is out of place. In the
zoning variance situation, the property owner will probably always be the "aggrieved" party.
200. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 720.
201. Id. at 721-22.
202. See FLA. STAT. § 163.250 (1981). Section 163.250 states:
Judicial review of decisions of board of adjustment. - Any person or
persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any decision of the board of
adjustment, or any officer, department, board, commission, or bureau of the
governing body, may apply to the circuit court in the judicial circuit where
the board of adjustment is located for judicial relief within 30 days after
rendition of the decision by the board of adjustment. Review in the circuit
court shall be either by a trial de novo, which shall be governed by the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, or by petition for writ of certiorari, which
shall be governed by the Florida Appellate Rules. The election of remedies
shall lie with the appellant.
Id.
203. Del Marco, 426 So. 2d at 1032. See FLA. STAT. § 163.225(3)(a) (1981).
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of Adjustment. The circuit court would hear and decide whether a zoning
variance should be awarded if the property owner proves entitlement, for
example, if a "hardship" can be demonstrated.204 It should not matter,
because it is a new proceeding, de novo. Thus, the person seeking the
variance, no matter the forum, still has the burden to prove the "hardship."' 5
The intent of this zoning statute, arguably, was to have an all new
circuit court trial de novo proceeding. The burden on the party trying to
obtain the variance is no different from the consumer trying to show a
Lemon Law violation under section 681. 206 In a trial de novo, the consumer,
among other things, is trying to prove the motor vehicle was a lemon, and
has the benefit of certain statutory presumptions. 2W To be consistent with
how the Fifth District discusses trial de novo in Del Marco, their
interpretation of that same concept in Mason I should have resulted, instead,
with the trial court being affirmed and the consumer designated as the
plaintiff in the section 681 trial de novo. Yet, the court in Mason I says this
about Del Marco:
The case law interpreting this statute [Section 163.250] made clear
that the aggrieved party seeking a trial de novo had the burden of
proving his claim.... As this court stated in Del Marco, in a trial
de novo the circuit court can take any action the Board of
Adjustment could have taken upon a proper showing by the
aggrieved party.2 8
Unlike section 681, however, in section 163.250, the aggrieved party
had to be the property owner seeking the variance, no matter what the
situation.209 The Lemon Law has no words about an "aggrieved party.i21 In
Mason I, the court implies that the manufacturer is the "aggrieved party.211
Whereas section 163.250 talks about any "aggrieved party" going to the
circuit court, the only aggrieved party under that zoning law is the property
owner, the one seeking a variance. 2  Therefore, that party has the burden of
proving entitlement to a variance. Even if adjoining property owners go to
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See generally FLA. STAT. § 163.255 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 681.102 (1991).
207. FLA. STAT. § 681.104 (1991).
208. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722.
209. FLA. STAT. § 163.250 (1981).
210. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
211. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722.
212. FLA. STAT. § 163.250 (1981).
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court in a de novo proceeding, the property owner still has the burden to
demonstrate the variance entitlement. 2"
The Lemon Law is also silent on any equivalent point.214 Under the
Mason I reading of Del Marco, anyone requesting a trial de novo becomes
the "aggrieved party" regardless of which party or who is saying the vehicle
was a lemon.21 ' To the contrary, in Del Marco, the property owner always
had to affirmatively prove why the variance should be granted by
demonstrating a hardship.
The underlyin statutory basis for this zoning statute and the Lemon
Law are different. In Del Marco, the de novo proceeding is not an appeal;
218it is one that starts anew as if nothing occurred previously. There the
circuit court sits ab initio like the Board of Adjustment, and must decide
219whether the property owner proves that the variance should be granted.
Under the Lemon Law, the circuit court has to decide by trial de novo or
otherwise whether the consumer proves a statutory violation. 2W In these
contexts, a trial de novo cannot be anything like an appeal. Thus, on this
point, Mason I's analogy to Del Marco was misapplied and misconstrued.
There was another inconsistency between section 681 and Del Marco's
zoning statute that Mason I failed to grasp. Under the Lemon Law, the trial
court may be faced with having to determine other legal claims between the
parties.Y In section 163.250, the circuit court is sitting as the Board of
Adjustment, doing just what the Board does.2 In the motor vehicle Lemon
Law context, however, a circuit court is deciding, as in Mason, other claims
like Magnuson-Moss, which an arbitration board cannot handle.223 Mason I
only makes it more convoluted procedurally by requiring everyone to have
the burden on their own separate claims, i.e., the manufacturer as aggrieved
by the arbitration finding being the plaintiff, and the consumer as the
proponent of a Magnuson-Moss claim as some alternative plaintiff, co-
plaintiff or counter-claimant. It would have been more consistent forMason 1, and practical, to have the trial de novo proceed with the consumer
213. Del Marco, 426 So. 2d at 1032.
214. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095 (1999).
215. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722.
216. Del Marco, 426 So. 2d at 1032.
217. See id. at 1029.
218. Id. at 1032.
219. Id.
220. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095 (1981).
221. Id.
222. § 163.250.
223. Id. § 681.1095.
224. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 721-22.
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who is able to put into evidence the Arbitration "Decision" as plaintiff on all
claims just like any typical plaintiff at trial.
One might argue a zoning statute cannot be analogized to the Lemon
Law. Yet once that analogy is undertaken it should be correctly compared.
Mason I failed in this task. That result, therefore, demonstrates the Fifth
District did not thoroughly analyze the case it relied on, and instead may
have forced a result more consistent with a particular social philosophy
rather than a sound judicial construction. That is to say, a consumer friendly
result.
2. Mason Is Inappropriate Reliance on Ad Valorem Tax Statutes
When the other precedent Mason I relied on is scrutinized, an even
more serious misapplication of the law occurs. The other statute referred to
by Mason I is section 194.226 Neither upon facial comparison nor by
analytical construction does section 194 bear any resemblance to the Lemon
Law. Section 194 involves ad valorem taxation and relief from valuations
on property. m It is a complicated statute which has often been amended
over the years. As to what is pertinent on the trial de novo issue, a previous
version of section 194 created a Board of Tax Adjustment. That Board
was used by Mason I for comparison to a lemon law arbitration panel.29
They are, however, entirely different entities. The Board of Tax Adjustment
is comprised of elected public officials who are from the governing body of
the county,20 i.e. county commissioners and two members of the school
board.231 All of these individuals are elected public officials. This Board
has no similarity to members of a lemon law arbitration panel who are
selected by an Assistant Attorney General, who are not publicly elected, and
who have no qualifying substantive prerequisites for appointment. z 2
This Board of Tax Adjustment hears tax complaints.z3 Section
194.032(6)(c) is more precise than the later enacted Lemon Law. Section
194.036(3) specifically provided: "The circuit court proceeding shall be de
225. See id. at 722.
226. Id.
227. FLA. STAT. § 194.011 (1999).
228. 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 69-140; FlA. STAT. § 194.015 (1975). Section 194 was altered
by the legislature in 1997. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-85 (eff. May 23, 1997). See Kent Wetherell,
The New Burdens of Proof in Ad Valorem Tax Valuation Cases, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 185
(1997).
229. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 722.
230. See Bath Club, Inc. v. Dade County, 394 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla. 1981).
231. FLA. STAT. § 194.015 (1999).
232. Id. § 681.1095(1).
233. See Ch. 77-69, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 120, 120 (codified at FlA. STAT. § 194.015).
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novo, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party initiating the
action., 234 This provision expressly sets forth who has the burden-the
initiating party. Thus, if someone is precipitating the action in circuit
court that party is the plaintiff, and has the burden of proof. The Lemon
Law is significant by the absence of this type of statutory language. Yet, the
Fifth District, in Mason I, read these otherwise absent words into the
statute.236 Did section 194, as relied upon by Mason I, support a conclusion
that section 681.1095(12) of the Lemon Law should be construed this same
way? The answer is "No."
An "appeal" from a tax adjustment board is quite different from a
lemon law arbitration panel. First, the adjustment board is made up of
publicly elected officials who are constitutional officers. 37 These officers
serve terms at the pleasure of the electorate, and presumably answer to the
public. No similarity exists between a lemon law board member who serves
238
at the pleasure of the AG and who is answerable only to that office. There
are basically no checks or balances, unlike an elected official, on the
arbitrator selected by the AG.
Second, the ad valorem valuation of property and how it's
accomplished is a more complicated and a much different process than the
Lemon Law.239 Special Masters can be appointed by the adjustment board,
and outside experts employed to present testimony on just valuation. 240 The
property might be a large, sophisticated commercial complex. Not much
needs to be said on how that differs from Mason, where the consumer's
claim is that the motor vehicle shudders as a result of the transmission. 241
Third, under then section 194.032(6), not everyone "aggrieved" can
242have a trial de novo. Property appraisers, the taxing authority, cannot
"appeal" from the Adjustment Board's decision, except in certain limited
circumstances. 243 Yet, under section 681.1095(12), either a manufacturer orconsumer can "appeal" with no restrictions on the circumstances.2 4
234. FLA. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1999).
235. Id.
236. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 722.
237. Bath Club, Inc., 394 So. 2d at 112. There is, of course, a constitutional basis to the
Board whose members are constitutional officers. Id Lemon law arbitration board members are
not constitutional officers nor are they publicly elected.
238. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095 (1999).
239. See FLA. STAT. § 194.032(1)(a) (1977); FLA. STAT. § 194.035 (1999).
240. Id. § 194.032(9) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
241. Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 688 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
242. § 194.032(6) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
243. Id. § 194.032(6)(a)(13) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
244. Id. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
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Fourth, Mason I views a decision by the Board of Tax Adjustment 245 as
carrying the same validity as a lemon law arbitration "decision." 246 In other
words, even though under section 194 a taxpayer always has the right to a
trial de novo, he or she has the burden to prove the ad valorem valuation was
in error. Even if the Property Appraiser or Tax Assessor appeals, as the
court in Mason I stated, "he [the taxpayer] would have the burden of
persuasion., 247 This is because, a fact not alluded to by Mason I, the board
of adjustment for ad valorem taxation is a public office, with constitutional
officers making the decisions.m As the Supreme Court of Florida has
stated, "[p]ublic officials are presumed to perform their duties in a proper
and lawful manner."249 That quoted statement is made within the context of
a challenge to a Board of Adjustment's tax decision. A board of adjustment,
with its publicly elected officials, is presumed to be correct. Nowhere in the
Florida Constitution, statutes, regulations, or case law does Mason I indicate
the authority to elevate a lemon law arbitration board to the status of a board
of tax adjustment or property appraisal adjustment board., 0  Such an
elevated political body has not a scintilla of comparison to a lemon law panel
appointed, without restrictions, by the Attorney General.
3. Mason I Misinterpreted Case Law Precedent
The other principal case discussing trial de novo and burden of proof
relied on by Mason I was Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance SocietyY
That case, however, did not support the holding of Mason L252 In fact, when
correctly read, Bystrom totally undermines the rationale that a lemon law
arbitration panel should be presumed correct with the resultant burden on the
"appealing" party.2 3
Bystrom, for sure, is not an easy case to understand or to read. Simply
put, it involved the assessed value of the Omni International Hotel in Miami
in 1978.24 The Omni was described as a "multi-purpose megastructure. ' 255
245. Now known as the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board, under section 194.
246. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722.
247. Id.
248. FLA. STAT. § 194.015.
249. Bath Club, Inc. v. Dade County, 394 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla. 1981) (citing Boardman
v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975); Hunter v. Carmichael, 133 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1961)).
250. See Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 719.
251. 416 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
252. Seeid. at 1133.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1136.
255. Id.
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It was not only the value placed on the Omni that was in dispute, but also
how that value was determined.256  The appellant was the Property
Appraiser, while the taxpayers were the appellees.25 7  These taxpayers
originally contested the Property Appraiser's initial valuation of the Omni
and went to the PropertV Appraisal Adjustment Board stating that the
valuation was too high. The Board agreed, to an extent, and partially
reduced the assessment.259 The Property Appraiser filed suit in circuit court
since the statutory criteria allowing it to contest the Board's decision had
been met.260 An answer and counterclaim were then filed by the taxpayers
since they believed the Board's reassessment was still too high.
261
The first error in Mason I was to cite as controlling authority an issue
262from Bystrom that did not carry a majority of Third District judges. As to
what party has the burden of proof and who is theplaintiff, Mason I refers to
.. . . . . . 053
language in Bystrom which is a minority opinion. Yet, Mason I construes
that portion of Bystrom as if it is the majority view.264 This mistake by the
Fifth District26 is brought to light when Robbins v. Summit Apartments,Ltd.266 is reviewed; a case not mentioned in Mason L267
Bystrom v. Equitable Life is easily misunderstood. In that case
there is a lengthy majority opinion covering a number of legal
issues. However, the portion of the main opinion entitled 'The
Burden of Proof," id. at 1140-43, represents the view of only one
member of the three-member panel. Two judges joined a special
concurrence, ia at 1145-47, which took a different view of the
burden of proof issue. On the question of burden of proof, the
concurring opinion was joined by a majority of the panel and
256. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1137.
257. Id. at 1136.
258. Id. at 1137.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1137.
262. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722; Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1136.
263. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722.
264. Id.
265. Id. (citing Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 416 So. 2d 1133, 1140-43
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). These pages were from Judge Nesbitt's opinion for the court, but
on the burden of proof issues for which it was cited, this was not the majority opinion.
266. 589 So. 2d 460,461 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
267. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 719.
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therefore represents the decision of the court. The trial court
should have followed the concurring opinion on that issue. 8
This misreading of Bystrom by Mason I is without doubt. A proper
interpretation of Bystrom actually undermines the Mason holding.
According to Mason I, "[t]he third district [in Bystrom] stated that the
board's assessment of the property value in question would be accorded
presumptive validity." 269 This statement was then used to equate a lemon
law arbitration panel decision in favor of the consumer, as in Mason, having
the same presumption of correctness as that of a public official. 27° The
effect is that a manufacturer at a trial de novo has to overcome the
presumptive validity of the Arbitration "Decision," and it does so as the
plaintiff on this issue. That is, the manufacturer has to prove up the
negative; to disprove that the motor vehicle is defective. Under this
rationale, a trial de novo according to Mason I is not what it has always been
commonly understood to be-a fresh start, a new proceeding.
The paradox is that a majority of judges in Bystrom say the exact
opposite from what Mason I attributed to them.271 The burden in Bystrom
rests on the party initiating the circuit court action.27 2 But that result was
required by express statutory language, words which were conspicuously left
out of the Lemon Law.27* As the actual Bystrom majority states, the
presumption of validity is not to be attributed to the Board of Adjustment's
decision, 27 as Mason I interprets, but instead to the Property Appraiser's
275initial tax assessment. Judge Pearson's majority opinion in Bystrom states
the following:
Moreover, the presumption in favor of the validity of the property
appraiser's assessment is unaffected by the fact that the burden of
proof in the Circuit Court is upon the party initiating the action and
that an appraiser may, by virtue of a recent change in the law,
initiate the action. To accord presumptive correctness to the Board
of Adjustment valuation would effectively vitiate the presumptive
correctness accorded the property appraiser's assessment.
276
268. Robbins, 589 So. 2d at 461.
269. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722.
270. Id.
271. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1145-47.
272. Id. at 1140-41.
273. See FLA. STAT. § 194.032(6)(c) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
274. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1147.
275. Id. at 1143.
276. Id. at 1146 (Pearson, J., concurring).
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The majority in Bystrom, consisting of two judges in Judge Pearson's
concurring opinion, in fact concluded the exact opposite from what Mason I
accredited to that case.277 Judge Pearson, for the majority on this burden of
proof analysis, says that the Board is not to have its decision carry any
presumptive validity at the trial de novo.2 78 Only the property appraiser's
initial tax assessment was to have that presumptive correctness. 7 This is
the antithesis to the Mason I rationale which makes no reference or citation
to Judge Pearson's actual majority opinion.280 Instead, only Judge Nesbitt's
opinion is highlighted, which on the issue cited by Mason I is not a majority
holding.281
To compound this, Mason I then ties its analysis of who has the initial
burden of proof to whichever party challenges the lemon law arbitration
282 283board decision. In Mason, it was the manufacturer. Thus, if the
manufacturer wants a trial de novo after an adverse lemon law arbitration
hearing, since the panel's decision has presumptive correctness, the burden
of proof will always be on the party attacking or challenging that decision.2
4
In essence, therefore, this proceeding is not truly de novo. As stated by
Mason I:
The third district reasoned that if it were otherwise, the proceedings
before the board [of tax adjustment, later called property appraisal
adjustment board] would amount to nothing more than a way
station for a disgruntled party en route to circuit court. Therefore,
the party attacking the decision of the value adjustment board
277. Id.
278. Id. Under section 194, the burden varies depending upon whether the Property
Appraiser has followed statutory requirements. If so, the initiating taxpayer has a burden of proof
of "clear and convincing evidence." Otherwise, the burden is by the preponderance of the
evidence. FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (1999). The Legislature changed the burdens which were
discussed in Bystrom, and lessened them to favor the taxpayer. Wetherell, supra note 228, at
229.
279. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1147. Property Appraiser is a constitutional officer. FIA.
CONST. art. VIII, § l(d). See District Sch. Bd. v. Askew, 278 So. 2d 272, 276 (Fla. 1973).
280. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 719.
281. Bystrom, 416 So.2d at 1146 n.15. "Judge Pearson's concurring opinion, joined by
Judge Hubbart, is actually the majority opinion with respect to the portion of the decision relating
to the taxpayer's burden of proof in an 'appeal' of the VAB's decision." Wetherell, supra note
228, at 195.
282. Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., 621 So. 2d 719, 722 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
283. Id. at 721.
284. Id.
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would have the burden of overcoming of the presumption of
correctness. U
5
This Bystrom reference is from the minority statements by Judge Nesbitt.28
6
Mason I, of course, said nothing about adopting a minority opinion of a
Third District panel. This erroneous Bystrom analysis by the Fifth District is
the same interpretation argued by the Attorney General in its Mason I
amicus curiae brief. 287 It seems, perhaps, the Mason I panel may have
blindly relied on what the Attorney General said without digging any deeper.
The "way station" metaphor in Mason I, attributed to Bystrom, is
likewise used in error. Mason I thought that if the burden is not placed on
the party who challenges the lemon law arbitration decision, the Board
becomes meaningless and in that case manufacturers, by filing in circuit
court, could force the consumer to start all over with the burden to prove his
or her claim. This would seem unfair.
This "way station" analogy is, however, also used by Judge Pearson for
the majority in Bystrom, but to make an entirely different point from the
Mason I interpretations.' 8 While Mason I is concerned about the arbitration
board becoming meaningless,2 9 the Bystrom majority, in contrast, does not
want the Board of Adjustment being used manipulatively by taxpayers to
circumvent the presumptive validity of the Property Appraiser's initial tax
assessment.2 ° Unlike Mason I, the Bystrom majority is not concerned about
the Board of Adjustment becoming meaningless.291 The Bystrom majority
says it can become so. 2 The majority of Bystrom judges were not worried
about the Board of Adjustment, but instead about the Property Appraiser's
initial assessment becoming meaningless. 2 93 Only the Property Appraiser's
assessment should have a presumption of correctness, not the Board's. The
285. Id. at 722 (quoting Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 416 So. 2d 1133,
1140-43 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1982).
286. Id.
287. See Amicus Brief, at 9-10; Mason 1, 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(No. 92-3074).
288. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1142. "Consequently, the identical public policy
considerations exist to accord the Board's reevaluation presumptive validity.... If it were
otherwise, proceedings before the Board would amount to nothing more than a way station for a
disgruntled party en route to circuit court." Id.
289. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 721.
290. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1142.
291. Id.
292. See Robbins v. Summit Apts., Ltd., 589 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App.
1991).
293. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1147.
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Mason I court actually concluded just the opposite with regard to the Lemon
Law of the Bystrom holding.294
When properly read, the Bystrom majority opinion states that, in a de
novo trial context, the Board of Adjustment decision can indeed be
meaningless. 295 "Lastly, because the very nature of the proceeding in the
Circuit Court is de novo, there is no presumption of correctness which
attaches to the valuation made by the Board of Adjustment. 296 Law review
commentators dealing with section 194 have pointed out that Bystrom does
not stand for the proposition that the Adjustment Board's decision is entitled
to any presumptive correctness. 297  Thus, the Board of Adjustment
proceeding can indeed appear as if it had never occurred. Mason I misreads
and misapplies Bystrom as support for the Fifth District's conclusion that
anyone who challenges a lemon law arbitration decision has the initial
burden, ergo, becomes the plaintiff on that issue.
Mason I should have reached a different result, and not held that the
party losing at arbitration has to be the plaintiff in the trial de novo on that
issue. As a correct analysis of Bystrom demonstrates on this point, Mason I
should not have stood for any precedential authority and its rationale behind
the trial de novo issue should have been overruled by the Supreme Court of
298Florida in Pitsirelos. This is particularly true since Pitsirelos implicitly
agreed with the Bystrom majority when holding that the lemon law
arbitration board decision does not have a presumption of correctness. 2 99
Thus, Pitsirelos should have repudiated Mason I on this de novo issue
instead of adopting it.
The theory upon which a property appraisal for tax purposes operates,
like in Bystrom, is totally different from the Lemon Law statute. Mason I
either did not understand these differences, or chose to ignore them.
According to the Mason I rationale, based on its Bystrom reliance, the
prevailing consumer becomes one in the same as the arbitration panel in the
circuit court suit.30 Bystrom, however, held that even if the taxpayer wins at
the adjustment board level and the Property Appraiser appeals, the
presumption of correctness attaches only to the Appraiser's initial
assessment, and not with the Board of Adjustment's subsequent decision.30 1
294. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722.
295. Id.
296. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1147.
297. Wetherell, supra note 228, at 195.
298. Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
299. Id. at 714.
300. See Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
301. See Robbins v. Summit Apts., Ltd., 589 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
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Thus, the taxpayer cannot simply rest on the Board's decision. The Property
Appraiser, if it appeals, may have to be a plaintiff because it is the person
who initiates the circuit court action under that particular statutory language,
but its initial tax assessment was still presumptively correct. 302 The assessor
only has to demonstrate following its statutory guidelines in making the
assessment.0 3 The Board of Adjustment decision simply has neither
importance nor precedence.
304
In its reliance on Mason I, and by not discerning the error in that court's
citations of Bystrom, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Pitsirelos, reached an
unsupportable result. °5 As noted, one of the reasons Mason I concludes that
a party challenging the arbitration panel's decision has the burden is because
a lemon law arbitration board is a public body like the Board of Tax
Adjustment in Bystrom.306  The arbitration panel's decision, therefore,
carries the presumption of correctness. 307 Thus, the party challenging the
Board's ruling de novo has to be the plaintiff on the Lemon Law issue
because arbitration panels are presumed to be correct. Otherwise, the Lemon
Law arbitration process becomes meaningless. Yet, despite adopting Mason
I's conclusions about trial de novo, Pitsirelos, to the contrary, holds that a
lemon law arbitration panel decision does not carry any presumption of
correctness. 308 As a matter of logic, therefore, it should have been
impossible for the Supreme Court of Florida to reach the same conclusion as
Mason I on the trial de novo issue. To have done so can only mean that
Pitsirelos is also wrongly decided.
C. What a Trial de Novo Should Be
In legal history de novo trials have been seen differently than the
Pitsirelos and Mason I interpretations. Pitsirelos creates an amalgam status
for a trial de novo, existing somewhere between the pure concept and a
traditional appellate procedure.3 09 True, section 681.1095(12) uses the word49 010
appeal. Pitsirelos, relying on Mason I, seizes upon that terminology to
conclude the legislature intended, although without saying so, that the trial
de novo in circuit court is like an appeal.ml Pitsirelos and Mason I together,
302. See id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 710.
306. Mason I, 621 So. 2d at 721.
307. See Robbins, 589 So. 2d at 461.
308. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 714.
309. See id. at 710.
310. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
311. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 713-14.
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hold that the party asking for the trial proceeding has the burden and
becomes the plaintiff.312 Thus, the de novo proceeding is not truly a new
one. Pitsirelos and Mason I places a lemon law trial de novo under section
681 into a twilight zone lying somewhere between the polarity of a
completely new trial proceeding, and an appellate review for adequacy of a
lower tribunal's record. In his partial dissent, Justice Overton would have
found otherwise in Pitsirelos, arguing that a trial de novo is exactly what it
has always been thought to be-a new proceeding as if nothing had taken
place earlier.313
From a definitional standpoint, a de novo trial has been viewed in the
pure sense. It is defined as follows, "[a] new trial; or retrial had in which the
whole case is retried as if no trial whatever had been had in the first
instance. 314 Read literally this definition itself undermines the rationale
upon which Pitsirelos is decided. A trial de novo proceeding is an entirely
315fresh one, without encumbrance of what has already occurred. Of course,
the legislature can alter this traditional application of de novo in its statutory
provisions, as it has done in other instances. For example, section
194.032(6)(c), as now written, qualifies the de novo procedure by stating
that "the burden of proof shall be upon the party initiating the action."
Inherent in this is the existence of an earlier proceeding which carries some
evidentiary weight to the subsequent trial de novo.
Section 681.1095(12) does not have the type of qualifier like section
194.032(6)(c). 317 One must assume this omission from the Lemon Law is
intentional. Since its inception in 1988, this langage in section 681 has
remained unchanged: "shall be by trial de novo."3r 8 One can argue that the
legislature does not see a lemon law arbitration panel on the same elevated
plane as a public official or public body, such as the constitutionally
312. Id. at 714; Mason L 621 So. 2d at 721-22.
313. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 715.
314. BALLNTNE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1505 (6th ed. 1990); "de novo": "Anew; afresh;
a second time." Id. at 435. Accord, BLACK's LAW DiCTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). The de
novo concept has its roots deep into common law jurisprudence. The concept of trial de novo
apparently derives from "venire de novo." See Day, Common Law Procedure Acts 290
(1872). The precursor procedure would allow for a second trial on the issue with a new jury,
and is different from a new trial concept. 8 Definitions of Words and Phrases 7291 (1905).
There were different situations where the de novo second trial was grantable. See 2 Tidd, The
Practice of the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas 921-22 (1840). It is clear from
this history that this second trial would be as if the first one never occurred. See Sewall v.
Glidden, I Ala. 54, 58 (1840) ("means according to our practice, nothing more, than
submitting the case to another jury for trial.").
315. BALLAiN's LAwDIcTnoNARY 1505 (6th ed. 1990).
316. FL.A. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1999).
317. Id. §§ 681.1095(12), 194.036(3).
318. Id. § 681.1095(12).
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established property appraiser. That official's public duty of setting property
valuations for ad valorem taxation is quite different from determining
whether a transmission rattles or the brakes squeal on a car. Pitsirelos,
inconsistent with its holding on the trial de novo issue, impliedly recognizes
this by concluding that a lemon law arbitration panel's decision does not
carry with it a presumption of correctness. 319 Thus, by definition it has to be
different from a public official or body. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of
Florida should not have interpreted trial de novo to be the same as an appeal.
By doing so Pitsirelos goes contrary to legislative intent.
The provisions within the Lemon Law address the situation where a
trial de novo request is not undertaken for proper reasons.3 20 This is quite
contrary to the underlying decisional themes in Mason I and Pitsirelos who
thought manufacturers might abuse consumers by always seeking a trial de
novo. To the contrary, section 681 has built-in protections to keep the
consumer from being bludgeoned by the superior economic and litigational
321weapons of the manufacturer. There are, quite simply, serious
consequences to a manufacturer for bringing a frivolous de novo
proceeding. These statutory protections, which are neither analyzed nor
referred to in Pitsirelos or Mason I, support the conclusion that the
legislature has always intended the "trial de novo" to be a new trial, starting
from scratch.
Over the years and in other contexts, the Supreme Court of Florida has
interpreted trial de novo in a different way from it's holding in Pitsirelos.
These historical cases viewed de novo in the pure definitional sense. 3 For
example, in 1909, the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted an old
constitutional provision which said "appeals from justices of the peace
courts in criminal cases may be tried de novo under such regulations as the
legislature may prescribe[.] '324 That case, Nichols v. Bullock,32 5 involved a
situation where the circuit court had allowed new charges and proceedings to
be filed after the appeal from a county court conviction, but not from the
Justice of the Peace ("JP") Court.326 The Bullock court held that the circuit
court's jurisdiction under this provision is truly appellate, and it cannot
conduct a de novo trial proceeding.327  Even though the constitutional
319. Pitsirelos,72l So. 2d at7ll.
320. FLA. STAT. § 681.106 (1999). That statute deals with bad faith claims by a
consumer. Id.
321. See id. § 681.1095(13).
322. Id.
323. See, e.g., Nichols v. Bullock, 50 So. 418 (Fla. 1909).
324. Id at 419 (interpreting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 22).
325. Id. at418.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 419.
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provision there talks in terms of "appeals" from the JP courts, for the trial de
novo in circuit court Bullock is quite clear that this is a totally new
proceeding.
[I]t is provided that appeals from justice of the peace courts in
criminal cases may be tried de novo under such regulations as the
Legislature may prescribe, but this last provision is there expressly
confined to appeals from courts of justices of the peace, and does
not authorize a trial de novo in the circuit court in a criminal case
arising before the county judge and appealed from his court to the
circuit court. [The statute] also expressly confines its provisions
for trials de novo in the circuit courts to appeals in criminal cases
from courts ofjustices of the peace. So far, then, as appeals in civil
or criminal cases are concerned from county judge's courts to the
circuit courts, the jurisdiction of the latter is appellate only, and in
such cases the circuit courts cannot exercise any original
jurisdiction, such as permitting new or amended affidavits or
charges to be there for the first time filed, or by trying the case
328anew before the circuit judge or before a jury.
Here, the Supreme Court of Florida delineates the contrast between a true
appellate proceeding and a trial de novo which starts "anew," even if the
procedural avenue to circuit court is by way of "appeals. 329 This "appeal"
language used is the same language as in section 681. Yet, Pitsirelos and
Mason I interpret "appeal" in a completely different way from Bullock.
In a later case under the same constitutional and statutory provisions,
the Supreme Court of Florida, in Baggs v. Frederick3 describes again what
a trial de novo should be.331 The issue in Baggs involved whether an
accused can have a trial de novo in circuit court after entering a guilty plea
before the Justice of the Peace.332 The Supreme Court of Florida found there
could be a trial de novo in circuit court even after a guilty plea below.
333
There are two clear points from the Baggs decision which demonstrate why
the results reached in Pitsirelos and Mason I are in conflict.
First, Baggs uses the classical definition of trial de novo even in the
context of the "appeal" language.33 The constitutional and statutory
provisions in Baggs use the trial de novo language within the aegis of an
328. Bullock, 50 So. at 419.
329. i
330. 168 So. 252 (Fla. 1936).
331. Id. at 252.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 252-53.
334. Id.
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"[a]ppeal from the Justices of the Peace Courts."335 The court in Baggs did
not, unlike Pitsirelos, construe the de novo concept any differently because
the proceeding came to the circuit court as an "appeal." 336 To that end,
Baggs contains the following statement: "[Tihat the circuit court 'shall'
proceed to try all criminal cases on appeal from justice of the peace courts de
novo as though the proceedings had been originally begun in the circuit
court."337 Baggs did not read into the law limitations which do not appear
from its language, such as restrictions on the right to trial de novo. This
rationale is quite unlike what the same supreme court later did in
Pitsirelos.
33 8
Second, Baggs analytically reveals the true nature of a JP court, and
why a trial de novo is so important to proceed later as an original
proceeding.339 The description of the JP courts from Baggs is not much
different from how a lemon law arbitration board operates in practice:
Justice of the peace courts in Florida are not courts of record. On
the contrary, they proceed with the utmost informality. For the
latter reason, no doubt, the Constitution itself recognizes that
appellate proceedings from such courts are best made to serve the
purpose of justice through, according to the accused, an
unconditional trial de novo in the circuit court, under proper forms
of accusation and before a judge and jury of the highest degree of
capability. 4
In the old days, Justices of the Peace did not have to be attorneys. This
system was abolished by the major Article V revision in 1973. Lemon Law
arbitration panels proceed in similar ways, without rules of evidence or
judicial oversight, informally with a verbal free-for-all akin to "Judge Judy"
or 'The People's Court." This same analysis could have been undertaken
first in Mason I and then later in Pitsirelos. If so, Baggs and Pitsirelos,
decided by the same court, might not have been so divergent in their
rationale.
There are other inconsistencies between Baggs and the Pitsirelos and
Mason I holdings. As noted supra, Mason I, relied on by Pitsirelos,
misreads a minority opinion in Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Society
335. Baggs, 168 So. 2d at 252 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 22).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 253. "[We perceive no good reason for reading into the statutory right of
appeal a limitation on its enjoyment not found in its language" Id.
339. Baggs, 168 So. 2d at 253.
340. IH See In re Villeneuve, 709 A.2d 1067, 1070-71 (Vt. 1998) for a good example of
what happens, in reality, at a lemon law arbitration proceeding.
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to be the majority.341 Yet, the majority opinion in Bystrom, not the minority
opinion relied on by Mason I, cited to both Baggs and Nichols. 342 This
citation from Bystrom further supports the argument that the word "appeal"
as used in section 681.1095(12), and contrary to the interpretation in
Pitsirelos/Mason I, is only of procedural and not of substantive importance.
The "appeal" language is just the procedural vehicle to get to circuit court.
Judge Pearson in Bystrom referred to Baggs and Nichols for the following
proposition: "Where a statute vests jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to
conduct a review or hear an appeal de novo, rules of ordinary appellate
proceedings do not apply. 343
Pitsirelos and Mason I interpret trial de novo as a second proceeding,
but it is more like an appeal from a lower tribunal (the lemon law arbitration
panel) so that the earlier proceeding still has effect and the circuit court de
novo action is not truly original. This analysis is contra to Nichols/Baggs,
and the historical view of trial de novo. Neither Baggs nor Bullock are
distinguishable because they are criminal cases. There has never been one
definition for trial de novo in a criminal context and a different one in civil
proceedings. Interestingly, the Attorney General makes this statement in its
public reports on the Lemon Law: Decisions by the state-run board are final
and binding upon the parties, unless within thirty days of receipt, a party
files a petition in the circuit court for a trial de novo.344 The Attorney
General, for whatever reason, saw fit to omit the "appeal" language. Yet, in
Mason I and Pitsirelos the AG was arguing that the circuit court proceeding
is like an appeal.
Another case supporting a different trial de novo interpretation from
Pitsirelos is Adams v. Dade County.345 Adams involved a statute whereby
one could appeal to the circuit court when the election supervisor has
stricken an elector's name from the voting rolls.346 On appeal for a de novo
proceeding, the circuit court issued a notice to show cause why the voter's
name "should not be removed from the registration books. 3 47 In rejecting
that procedure as not being a trial de novo, the Third District stated the
following:
341. Bystrom, 416 So. 2d at 1133.
342. Id. at 1147 n.16.
343. Id.
344. See FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
345. 202 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
346. Id. at 586 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 98.201 (1965)). "Appeal shall be to the circuit
court in and for the county wherein the person was registered.... Trial in the circuit court shall
be de novo and governed by the rules of that court." Id.
347. Adams, 202 So. 2d at 588.
446 [Vol. 24:407
444
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
1999]
The defect in that procedure which causes us to reject it is that it
places the burden of proof on the electors and requires them to
disprove the supervisor's charges on which he claims their
disqualification. That result should not obtain, because it is the
county or the supervisor of elections who is the complaining party
and who, therefore, should occupy the position of plaintiff or
complainant in the circuit court and have the burden of proof on
the issues to be tried34
Adams is consistent with the correct interpretation of de novo as set
forth in this article. Even though the voter in Adams initially loses and
appeals, he did not have the burden as plaintiff to overcome removal from
the registration list. Fundamentally, the Supervisor of Elections is the
complaining party even if he or she prevails below. This is no different from
a lemon law claim where the consumer, like the Supervisor, is the underlying
complaining party-the one seeking relief under the law.
D. How Section 681 Intended A Traditional Trial De Novo Proceeding
Pitsirelos and its forerunner, Mason I, could have reached results in line
with the historical view of trial de novo and yet remained consistent to the
legislative intent behind section 681. The Lemon Law statute has a number
of provisions which afford adequate protection to a consumer vis-A-vis
greater litigational resources available to a manufacturer. This concern over
the unequal interests between consumer and manufacturer is a major theme
in Mason L Yet, the statutory provisions of section 681 do balance fairness
for the consumer in a trial de novo, even if he or she has already prevailed at
the arbitration level.
First, in the judicial proceedings at circuit court, under section
681.112(1) of the Florida Statutes, attorneys' fees can be awarded.349 This
is a substantial factor. In Pitsirelos, at the trial level, the consumer was
awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $171,000.35° The threat of
attorneys' fees being imposed cannot be lightly taken.
Second, if the manufacturer requests a circuit court action after
arbitration, but for bad motives or intentions, section 681.1095(13) allows
for additional monetary penalties to be imposed.351 The statute provides in
part: "If a court determines that the manufacturer acted in bad faith in
348. Id.
349. FLA. STAT. § 681.112(1) (1999).
350. 17 Fla. Jury Rptr. No. 3, at 56-57 (Mar. 1996). See Ford Motor Co. v. Fowler, 705
So. 2d 662,663 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (awarding attorneys' fees against Ford).
351. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095 (13) (1999).
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bringing the appeal or brought the appeal solely for the purpose of
harassment.... the court shall double, and may triple, the amount of the
total award." 352 There is no similar provision applicable to a consumer. This
creates a significant disincentive for a manufacturer to act improperly when
bringing a subsequent judicial action under section 681.1095(13). In Mason,
the consumer had pled "bad faith" in Porsche bringing the "appeal" to the
circuit court, and double and treble damages were sought against the
manufacturer. 353 Although the trial judge had determined Porsche did not
act in bad faith, the potential risk exposure created could have been well into
six figures for an enhanced award. The punitive imposition on a
manufacturer for bringing an appeal in bad faith and the consequences can
be seen in Ford Motor Co. v. Starling.355 In that case, the manufacturer was
sanctioned with treble damages on a $59,589 repurchase award.356 It is
submitted that this type of award can be effective in protecting the consumer
from unwarranted litigation after a successful arbitration proceeding. The
potential for such an award has a chilling effect, with the trial court then able
to protect the consumer to ensure the litigational playing field remains level.
Third, section 681.1095(9) permits the arbitration "decision" to be
admitted into evidence.357 Justice Overton in his separate Pitsirelos opinion
recognizes that this "decision" is a significant piece of evidence for the
consumer.358 This is so even without any presumptions attaching. The
manufacturer, just as a practical matter, is put to the daunting task of
convincing a judge or jury that all the "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions
of Law" in the "decision" finding the motor vehicle to be a "Lemon" is not
persuasive.
Fourth, the manufacturer is subject to a twenty-five dollar per day
liquidated damages award computed from forty days after the arbitration
decision is received.359 The intent behind section 681.1095(13) is to provide
monetary relief so the consumer can obtain replacement transportation
during the delay on the disposition of the litigational issues. Pitsirelos
upholds this provision against a constitutional challenge, but also finds that
the damages must be proven.360 In Mason, this potential damages exposure
352. Id.
353. Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 363.
354. Id.
355. 721 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
356. Id. at 335.
357. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(9) (1999).
358. Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
359. § 681.1095(13).
360. Starling, 721 So. 2d at 335. Pitsirelos quashed the District Court of Appeal decision
on the issue of presumption of correctness of an arbitration award. Pirsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 710.
It also upheld the $25.00 per day "penalty" as constitutional, if prove to be a loss. Id. A
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totaled nearly $50,000. Again, not an insignificant sum and one which is an
incentive against the manufacturer acting unreasonably in asking for a trial
de novo.
Fifth, section 681.1095(12) seems to impose an affirmative duty on the
appellant to make sure the petition is well founded.361 The requests for trial
de novo must be in a "written petition" and "state the action requested and
the grounds relied upon for appeal."362 Mason I finds this provision to be
analogous to filing a notice of appeal, and is contrary to starting a legal
proceeding "anew" or de novo which ignores the benefit of the previous
arbitration hearing. It is just as reasonable, however, that section
681.1095(12) requires the "petition" to appeal as one more guarantee of
protection that litigation abuse, by either side, does not occur. Justice
Overton, again in his minority view in Pitsirelos, believes similarly.363 The
trial court under the statute essentially screens the "petition" to ensure it is
legally based before letting a "trial de novo" go forward. This provides a
"gatekeeper" role to help prevent litigation abuse.
None of the other statutes analogized in Mason I or Pitsirelos have any
type of protective infrastructure like section 681. These failsafe provisions
distinctively separate the Lemon Law from any other statutory blueprint, and
are essentially directed unilaterally at the manufacturer. Yet, Pitsirelos and
Mason I seem oblivious to these details and differences. With these built-in
disincentives, finding that a trial de novo is a new proceeding altogether does
not contravene the Lemon Law's legislative intent of protecting the
consumer. Even before Pitsirelos and Mason I manufacturers were not
routinely seeking appeals to the circuit court. During 1990 and 1991, a total
of only nine appeals were brought from hundreds of arbitrations. In 1992,
for example, of the total number of cases arbitrated manufacturers
"appealed" only nine percent. 36 By' 1995 only twelve percent of the Board's
decisions were being appealed. This is hardly an opening of the
floodgates. 66
Washington state statute imposing a $25.00 a day fine, although a little different from Florida's
statute, survived constitutional challenge in Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 800 P.2d 367 (Wash.
1990). Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 710.
361. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(12) (1999).
362. Id. § 681.1095(12).
363. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 715-16.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 713-14. Excessive appeals have not proved to be the case in reality.
Manufacturers, having lost at arbitration, do not routinely file for trial de novo proceedings in
circuit court. According to the most recent annual reports available, in 1995, 12%, or 24 out
of 200 consumer awards were "appealed" by manufacturers. Id. at 713.
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From a realistic, legal, economic, and public relations standpoint, a
manufacturer does not routinely want to go into court after an arbitration
loss. Serious thought and evaluation has to go into any such decision. Even
by the AG's own data, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that
manufacturers arbitrarily or unreasonably force consumers into a post
arbitration judicial proceeding.
IV. THE EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF A LEMON LAW ARBITRATION BOARD
DECISION
It naturally follows from Mason I, where the manufacturer has the
burden to overcome the arbitration award that the issue of what evidentiary
effect to give that "decision" would arise.567 Section 681.1095(9) states that
"[iun any civil action arising under this chapter and relating to a dispute
arbitrated before the board, any decision by the board is admissible in
evidence." 368 In this section of the article, various legal interpretations by
the courts regarding the evidentiary effect to be given to a lemon law
arbitration decision are reviewed and discussed. These analyses have ranged
from a presumptive correctness of validity to be given the "decision" with an
affirmative duty on the challengers to prove why it is invalid, to the Supreme
Court of Florida's Pitsirelos statement that the "decision" comes in like any
other evidence but with no presumption. 369 Despite this straightforward
approach in Pitsirelos, there needs to be further clarification due to the
logical inconsistency in the Supreme Court of Florida's trial de novo holding
and then its determination that no presumption attaches to an arbitration
result.
The Pitsirelos court seemingly has no idea of what form or manner
these lemon law arbitration "decisions" are to be written and prepared, or
from a practical standpoint the impact such a "decision" has at trial. A
"decision" by the Board contains official "Findings of Fact" and
"Conclusions of Law." The lay people on the arbitration panel do not write
this document-the Assistant Attorney General who acts as counsel to the
Board does. This document, written by the Attorney General, usurps both
the judge and jury function in the circuit court's trial de novo. Obviously,
the court in Pitsirelos did not realize this fact or its true impact at trial.
Justice Overton, whether or not he understood, makes oblique reference to a
favorable "decision" being a strong piece of evidence to present.370
367. The statute makes these Decisions of the Board admissible in evidence in any civil
action. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(9) (1999).
368. Id. § 681.1095(9) (1999).
369. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 713.
370. Id. at 715-16.
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As a practical matter this "decision" as evidence is indeed significant,
particularly in a jury trial. From a trial lawyer's standpoint these "Findings
of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law" are daunting to overcome after the jury
sees them, usually in a trial board poster size format. Just looking at the
document may be persuasive to the jury-especially with its large print of
"Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law." Moreover, this also may
potentially confuse a jury since the trial judge tells them, through
instructions, that the court decides questions of law and they, the jury, decide
the facts.171 Yet, in the arbitration "decision" both are already recited.
A. Background of Evidentiary Presumptions
In order to have any presumption in Florida, the Lemon Law
Arbitration Panel has to be elevated to the status of a public official or body.
Several districts, most notably the Fifth District in Mason II, gave the
arbitration decision a presumption of validity.372  To the extent it is
inconsistent with Pitsirelos, Mason II is overruled by the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision.373 None of these courts, however, truly analyze why this
statutory Board should or should not be elevated to such a lofty plateau.
Although Pitsirelos reaches the correct result in denying a presumption, it
gives little rationale for the decision on the issue.374
The court in Mason II held that the arbitration award was to be given a
presumptive validity of correctness.375 This presumption is like a lower
tribunal decision in "the context of an appeal." That court stated: "[T]he
'presumption' terminology we utilized in Mason and Sheehan was intended
to refer to the presumption of validity of a lower tribunal's decision in the
context of an appeal." The trial judge in Mason entered a ruling that the
presumption for the arbitration decision was a "bubble-bursting" type.
378
Once competent evidence is adduced, however, that presumption vanishes.
That analysis is rejected in Mason II. The appellate court, for support,
371. FLA. STANDARDJURYINSTRUCflONS §§ 1.1,2.1 (1998).
372. Mason I, 688 So. 2d at 370.
373. See Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
374. Id. at 715.
375. Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 370.
376. l
377. Id.
378. Id A property appraiser's valuation carries a presumption of correctness. Id. It is a
"burden" shifting presumption, and not a "bursting bubble." Mason 11, 688 So. 2d at 370. Public
policy considerations governed the establishment of that burden shifting. Id. Thus, in a circuit
court action initiated by a taxpayer they have the burden to produce evidence of the "non-
existence of the fact presumed-that is, that the Property Appraiser's assessment is not correct."
Wetherell, supra note 228, at 226.
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looked to its conclusionary language in Sheehan and Mason I that a "trial
court is to grant the Board's decision a presumption of validity." 379 As such,
the Fifth District in Mason II holds that it is error for the trial court not to do
so in the de novo proceeding.
3 80
This Mason-Sheehan presumption of validity means it also affects the
burden of proof.381 In a way, this determination is the tail that wags the dog.
Because the arbitration decision carries a presumption which shifts the
burden of proof to the party attacking it, at the de novo trial the party
opposing that decision is the plaintiff. In effect that presumption alters the
nature of the de novo proceeding and makes it something different from
what a trial de novo has traditionally been understood to be. This
evidentiary presumption forces the de novo proceeding to be more like an
appeal. Of course, in all appellate cases as amicus curiae the AG's argument
has been for the highest possible evidentiary presumption for an arbitration
decision.
Although Mason II came after Mason I and Sheehan, its result can be
said to have been driven by the Fifth District's initial view in those earlier
cases, that arbitration boards are analogous to a court, a formalized
arbitration proceeding, or some public body. Thus, the "decision" comes to
the reviewing court de novo with a presumption of correctness. One
problem from Mason II on this issue, and not addressed, is what happens if
the presumption is rebutted?382 Does the jury or trier of fact merely decide
who wins on a general verdict form, or is there to be a specific verdict
finding that evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption has been
presented?383 No appellate case has ever tried to evaluate the basis of this
rebuttable presumption as it applies to a lemon law arbitration board
decision. That is to say, is it public policy or something else?384 Is the
arbitration board a public or elected official? 385 (The AG's amicus briefs
have argued as such.) Does this concept of the arbitration board being a
lower tribunal mean that the decision is to be considered a "judgment" which
is presumed to be correct?386 And, what is the burden of proof necessary to
overcome this presumption, the greater weight or clear and convincing
evidence? 3
87
379. Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 369 (emphasis omitted).
380. Id.
381. Sheehan was a bench trial, and one not by jury.
382. See Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987).
383. See generally, C. Earhardt, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 302.2, at 83-84 (1997).
384. IM §304.1 at90.
385. See generally Palm Beach v. State, 342 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1976); Boardman v. Esteva,
323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975).
386. See Melbourne State Bank v. Wright, 145 So. 598, 601 (Fla. 1932).
387. See Caldwell v. Division of Retirement, 372 So. 2d 438,440 (Fla. 1979).
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The legislature could have said that arbitration board decisions under
section 681 are to be given presumptive validity in a subsequent judicial
proceeding. The legislature has done so in other situations.388  Yet, in
section 681 they did not.
The only authority on this point within Mason II is Hollywood Jaycees
v. Department of Revenue.389 Hollywood Jaycees is a constitutional due
process case where the Department of Revenue ("DOR") reversed a board of
adjustment tax exemption without affording notice or a hearing to the
adversely affected taxpayer.39 It is a case decided under section 120 and
has, therefore, no application to section 681 which specifically excludes the
Arbitration Board from the administrative procedures of section 120.391 Of
course, an administrative law proceeding is conducted in accordance with
the rules of evidence. In Lemon Law arbitration, the rules of evidence do
not apply.
B. The Pitsirelos Ruling on Presumptions Did Not Clarify the Issue
In Pitsirelos, the Supreme Court of Florida, as noted, held that there
was no evidentiary presumption of correctness to be given a lemon law
arbitration decision.3 2 Pitsirelos overruled Mason II on that point.393 The
court interpreted section 681 at face value, whose provisions only say that
the "decision" is admissible. 94 To give it some evidentiary presumption395
would raise serious constitutional problems. Despite this correct ruling,
the Pitsirelos court did not go far enough in its analysis. Also, Pitsirelos
does not grapple with the practical effect such. a decision has when
introduced into evidence.
396
It is imperative for the Supreme Court of Florida, and other courts, to
recognize the true nature of these arbitration board "decisions." As afi
example, the Mason "decision" is attached as an Appendix to this article.
Perhaps, if judges do understand the true nature of this type of "decision,"
then some evidentiary restriction of its use might occur. Justice Overton, in
his Pitsirelos concurring and dissenting opinion, indicates a better
388. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.46 (1999); Department of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v.
Bonanno, 568 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1990); Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So. 2d 421
(Fla. 1976).
389. 306 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1974).
390. Id. at 109.
391. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(11) (1999) ("exempt from the provisions of [section]120").
392. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 711.
393. L
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. See id.
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understanding of the nature of the document and its impact if introduced into
evidence. 397 What Pitsirelos should have done is to hold that the "Fact" of
the Arbitration Board's decision is admissible, that is to say, the result
only. 398 Such a holding still is consistent with section 681.1095(9). On the
other hand, if the Supreme Court of Florida wants to let the "decision" in its
entirety come into evidence, then it should revisit its foundational decision
that the trial de novo is not an altogether new proceeding but something
closer to an appeal.
Under the analysis of this article, with a trial de novo at circuit court
being truly a new proceeding, the plaintiff/consumer already has a
substantial piece of evidence to support his or her case. The administrative
regulations require that a lot of information be contained in the "decision"
including "findings of fact," "a conclusion with supporting rationale of
whether the standards for refund or replacement have been met," and "a
statement of the remedy," among other things. 399 It is just as usable to a
manufacturer should it win and the consumer requests a judicial proceeding.
At trial this document carries persuasive impact even without any
evidentiary presumption, particularly on a lay jury. It is an affirmative0-iece
of evidence for a consumer to have, as any trial lawyer can clearly see.
This written "decision" comes into evidence almost like an expert's
report, yet no foundation or predicate has to be established. There is hearsay
and double hearsay in the "decision," conclusions of law, and findings of
fact. This all has formidable evidentiary persuasiveness, even in a real trial
de novo. Thus, the arbitration board and its "decision" do not become a
meaningless "way station" on the road to the courthouse, as feared by Mason
1.401
V. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ROLE IN THE LEMON LAW ADMINISTRATION
Neither the legislature nor any court has examined the role played by
the Attorney General in these Lemon Law proceedings. There is a potential
397. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 715.
398. See id.
399. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 2-32.033(5)(a)-(f), (6) (1993).
400. This procedure might also benefit the Attorney General since, with the presumption,
it may be less likely anyone will want to depose arbitrators which the Attorney General so
vehemently opposes.
401. See Bystrom v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 416 So. 2d 1133, 1147 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Pearson, J., concurring in part). "[T]he Circuit Court litigation will proceed
as any other original litigation, unaffected by the results of the administrative resolution. In our
view, the Legislature, by providing that the Circuit Court proceeding be de novo, intended it to be
no other way." Id.
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conflict of interest which is being ignored by the AG. This can be readily
seen when the Lemon Law role of the AG is examined.
The true administrative power behind the Lemon Law program is the
AG's Office.40 The regulations controlling how the arbitration process
works are formulated by the AG.4 °3 An entire division and staff within the
Attorney General's Office has been created to regulate and administer the
Lemon Law.4°4 Although the Division of Consumer Services is also
involved in the program, its role is limited and inconsequential when
compared to that of the AG.
The AG's role here creates a potential conflict of interest which in turn
taints the objectivity of the arbitration process, or at a minimum creates an
appearance of impropriety. This is because the AG's Office wears different
hats in its roles as Lemon Law administrator and counselor. As noted, the
AG's Office promulgates the regulations which control the process. On a
practical basis, it answers questions from consumers. Its consumer manuals
provide, in essence, legal advice to those wanting to utilize the Lemon
Law.40- The AG also selects the arbitrators and qualifies those who sit on
the panels.406 Moreover, the AG serves as legal counsel to the arbitration
board.4w According to the sworn testimony of the arbitrators in Mason
depositions, their "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusion of Law" to support the
"decision" were drafted/written by the staff counsel from the AG's Office.
408
The Mason Arbitrators did not see the final written "decision" after it was
402. See RtA. STAT. § 681.109 (1999); RtA. ADMI. CODE §§ 2-30.001(1), 2-32.002(1),
(2) (1993). The Executive Director of the Lemon Law Arbitration Program is a member of the
Attorney General's Office. "The Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board is administered
by the Office of the Attorney General." Butterworth, Consumer Guide to the Florida Lemon Law
5 (1997) (emphasis added). The Division of Consumer Services of the Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services also has a role, more limited than the AG, under Section 681.
See id § 681.102(7). The Division becomes more involved with administration aspects of a
consumer filing a request for arbitration. Their role is, however, limited. Idt § 681.109(2)-(6).
The Division is also involved in certifying manufacturer's informal dispute settlement programs.
Idt § 681.108.
403. FLA. STAT. § 681.118 (1991).
404. Id. The Lemon Law Arbitration Program is substantial within the Attorney
General's Office. For 1997-98, the total operating budget is $1,675,851. Ofc. of Attorney
General Budget, provided by facsimile on 3/17/98 at 11:00 AM. Salaries and benefits were
budgeted at $1,086,058. In 1995-1996, salaries and benefits were $890,331. Id
405. See FLA. STAT. § 681.103(3) (1999); Butterworth, supra note 21 (discussing the
contents of the Lemon Law rights booklet provided to consumers).
406. FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(1) (1999).
407. Id.
408. Deposition of William H. Willis, Nov. 14, 1994, Case No. CI 94-1691, at 36, Trial
Transcript, Feb. 7, 1995, Vol. VII, at 671-72,75,87.
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drafted by the AG, which was based on the AG's staff attorneys' notes taken
during the proceedings.409
The AG has a vested interest in the Lemon Law operation. The AG
certainly obtains political benefits from a program that helps consumers, and
this should not be minimized. For example, elaborate compilations of
statistical data are prepared by the AG to publicize the effectiveness of the
program. In addition, press releases are issued to trumpet Lemon Law
achievements, thanks to the Attorney General. 41 The Lemon Law provides
a political vehicle which allows the AG to champion, rightly or wrongly, a
philosophical position of consumerism. In a rhetorical sense, what politician
is going to stand up and say that consumers in the electorate are getting too
much? Certainly not a popularly elected AG. In its political and
administrative roles, the AG wields essentially unrestricted power, unless the
judiciary becomes involved. Accordingly, the AG's Office may not be
totally without bias in its Lemon Law involvement.
409. Trial Transcript, Feb. 7, 1995, Vol. VII, 672, L. 3-6.
410. See generally, Robert Butterworth, New Motor Vehicle Make, Model and
Manufacturer Study 1992-1994; Robert Butterworth, THE CAPrroL ANNUAL REPORT, 1992.
411. Here is a sampling of some News Release(s) from the Office of the Attorney
General:
November 25, 1996 - "Florida's Lemon Law Arbitration Program has crossed
the $100 million mark in refunds and replacements for consumers whose new
motor vehicles were chronically defective, Attorney General Bob Butterworth
and Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services Commissioner Bob
Crawford announced today. * * * 'To provide this amount of consumer relief
in fewer than eight years of operation is remarkable,' Butterworth said. 'It
shows that Florida's Lemon Law program is probably the most effective in
the nation."'
Florida Lemon Law Program Reaches $100 Million Milestone, NEws RELEASE (Fla. Atty.
Gen.), Nov. 1996.
February 19, 1996 - "Walter Dartland has returned to the attorney general's
office to oversee the agency's Lemon Law Arbitration Program and develop
consumer protection strategies for Attorney General Bob Butterworth."
Walter Dartland Returns to Attorney General's Office, NEws RELEASE (Fla. Atty. Gen.), Feb.
1996.
August 15, 1997 - "Attorney General Bob Butterworth has announced that his
office's Internet home page now contains a list of vehicles bought back by
manufacturers in connection with Florida's Lemon Law since 1989. 'Using
that list, a shopper can determine whether the vehicle they are interested in
buying was repurchased in Florida by a manufacturer because of complaints
of chronic problems,' Butterworth said."
Consumers Can Check Out "Lemons" on the Web, NEWS RELEASE (Fla. Atty. Gen.), Aug.
1997.
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Thus," the administrative and legal roles of the AG's Office should be
recognized for what they really are. The Lemon Law is big political
business.412 The AG's Office, for all practical purposes, acts as Ombudsman
counsel for the consumer. For example, on every known reported appellate
opinion discussed in this article, the AG's Office has argued as amicus
curiae for a strong consumer position.413 It did so again before the Supreme
Court of Florida in Pitsirelos.414 When the briefs of the AG are read, one
has no doubt that they are committed, single-mindedly, to expanding the
program and consumer rights and to protecting their political fiefdom, and
power base.4 15 There is nothing wrong with this. One should not be,
however, naive about it or turn away from this political reality.
As the Mason litigation demonstrates, the AG is an aggressive
watchdog in protecting the legal and statutory turf it has created for itself.
416
As with any governmental power, the potential for creeping abuse and
expansion is endemic. Mason is the first case where arbitrators were
actually deposed. 17 The AG's Office vigorously fought to prevent these
depositions, entering appearances in the Mason case on several different
occasions.
418
The absence of something less than an objective interest can be clearly
seen in Mason II, where the AG once again appeared as amicus for the
412. The Attorney General's record during an election revealed that work done for
consumers in the Lemon Law area obviously proved valuable.
413. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Singh, 664 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); General Motors Corp. v. Neu, 617
So. 2d 406 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Sheehan v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 635 So. 2d 1067
(Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1994).
414. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at710.
415. See Amicus Brief for the Attorney General of the State of Florida; Mason v.
Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
416. Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 688 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App.
1997); Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 621 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In
Mason, the Attorney General was involved both at the trial level and the appellate level, and even
after the second appeal. Additionally, the Lemon Law Arbitration Program had a staff budget of
$1,675,851 in 1997-1998. Between July, 1996 and June, 1997, the Department of Revenue
collected $1,877,997 for fees on the $2 per vehicle charge required by section 681.117 of the
Florida Statutes. Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 719; Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 361.
417. Mason 1f, 688 So. 2d at 370.
418. The manufacturer subpoenaed for deposition the three arbitrators from the Mason
panel. The AG filed a motion to quash and for protective order. The trial judge, on October 14,
1994, denied that motion in part and granted a protective order in part. The trial court also denied
the AG's motion to quash trial subpoenas. The three arbitrators testified in the first Mason trial.
In Mason 1H, the AG was an amicus again. Mason 11, 688 So. 2d at 364. The Fifth District
expanded the scope of the discovery. Id. The arbitrators testified also in the second trial. Id. at
366.
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consumer.419  In that appeal, while on the one hand arguing for a hig
threshold rebuttable evidentiary presumption for an arbitration decision,
the AG on the other hand also argued to preclude any depositions or trial
testimony from arbitrators. 421 This latter position would have prevented a
manufacturer, or even a consumer, from developing evidence to overcome
the strong resumption of correctness the AG Office wanted for arbitration
decisions. The Attorney General in Mason II, after arguing that a
manufacturer should not be able to depose an arbitrator or subpoena one for
trial in order to overcome a presumption of correctness of the "decision," 423
attempted to elevate the Board to the status of a constitutional public official.
Their Brief stated:
[T]he New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board was established by the
Legislature within the Department of Legal Affairs and consists of
members appointed by the Attorney General, a officer.... The
Arbitration Board acts collectively in the capacity of a public
official and the party aggrieved by its decision may seek trial de
novo in circuit court.
424
Their argument is that the Board's "decision" should have a presumptive
validity which shifts the burden of proof to the challenging party, but that
party should not then be able to develop testimony to rebut the "decision" or
to undermine it.425 The AG clearly wants to have its cake and eat it too.
426
Even after Mason II, when the Fifth District had ruled that arbitrators
could testify and be deposed, the AG again entered an appearance in the trial
court with new motions for protective orders, arguing that their handpicked
419. See Mason II, 688 So. 2d at 363.
420. Initial Brief ofAmicus Curiae, at 17-21, Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 689
So. 2d 349 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
421. Id.
422. Let there be no mistake, the AG's Office views these arbitrators as quasi-judicial,
deserving the same protection from discovery as a judge. See Motion to Quash and for Protective
Order, Case No. CI 94-1691, § 4, at 2-4 (Sept. 23, 1994).
423. Initial Brief of Amicus Curiae, at 12-17, Mason v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 689
So. 2d 349 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
424. Id. at 18-19.
425. Id.
426. This is an example as to why the AG's Office may not fairly and impartially handle
its role, and that either its involvement should be recognized for what it is or a different procedure
established. There is, it is submitted, an appearance of impropriety with the way it is involved
and the power the Attorney General wields in this area. Cf., Migliore v. City of Lauderhill, 415
So. 2d 62, 64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing that a police department complaint
review board, composed exclusively of law enforcement personnel, "gives the impression of
impropriety" when asked to determine the rights of the public "and one of its own.").
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arbitrators were exempt from testimony.427 This evidence had been sought in
Mason, for litigation strategy purposes even if the arbitrators remembered
nothing, in an attempt to diminish the putative importance of the arbitration
"decision." To win the Mason case at trial, that "decision" had to be
undermined since the Fifth District had given it presumptive validity.
Regardless of the case, jurors should have the opportunity to see and hear
these arbitrators before deciding whether to defer their own judgment to that
of the arbitration "decision." This is particularly necessary if the written
"decision" document comes into evidence. This "decision," like any piece
of evidence, should be subject to cross-examination and to challenge.
The administrative procedures promulgated by the AG establish a
quasi-judicial function for these arbitration boards which creates a
separation of powers issue.428 For example, the Attorney General's public
position in court has been that these board members are "public officers."
429
That is because these arbitrators are appointed by the AG, who is a public
official and a constitutional officer.430 Thus, the AG regulates the system,
provides legal advice to one of the parties as well as to arbitrators
themselves, and then actually writes the "decision" for the board. These are
just too many hats for the AG to wear. The supreme court, in Pitsirelos, did
not really have this type of evidence presented to it in deciding that case, so
that separation of powers was not violated.431
As discovered in Mason, arbitrators are not required to be lawyers, or
members of professional arbitration organizations like AAA.4 32 Many are
retired and participate either for the money or as part of community service,
or both. All of that is fine. But it does not make them public officials or
427. See Arbitrators Motion for Protective Order, Case No. CI 94-1691, § 3 (Oct. 14,
1997). This motion attacked the trial subpoena for the three arbitrators on the retrial. It was
argued the arbitrators, even after Mason II, "be protected from testifying at all in the second trial
of this case, as any testimony they may have would be irrelevant to the issue on appeal and at
best, such testimony would be merely cumulative of the Board's written decision, which is
admissible in evidence." id.
428. See Robert C. Downie, Quasi-Judicial Proceedings and Constitutional Right: What
is Happening to Separation of Powers?, 71 FLA. BJ. 44, 46 & nn. 26-29 (1997). The Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Pitsirelos rejected that challenge. Pitsirelos, 689 So. 2d at 1134.
429. Mason 1I Brief, at 19 n.5.
430. Id. at 18-19.
431. Pitsirelos, 689 So. 2d at 1134.
432. Section 681.1095(3) of the Florida Statutes only requires arbitrators to "be
trained in the application of this chapter...." FLA. STAT. § 681.1095(3) (1999). However,
"at least one member of each board must be a person with expertise in motor vehicle
mechanics." Id. No member may be employed by an automobile manufacturer or dealer "or
be a staff member, a decisionmaker, or a consultant for a procedure." Id. A "procedure"
means "an informal dispute-settlement procedure established by a manufacturer to mediate
and arbitrate motor vehicle warranty disputes." Id. § 681.102(17).
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constitutional officers, or elevate them to a higher level. They do not seem
to fit anywhere within the Article II, section 5 definition of the Florida
Constitution, 433 or as defined by other statutory provisions.
434
The AG's public reliance on section 112 of the Florida Statutes in its
briefs to create a legal status for these board members is misplaced. Section
112.061(2)(c) defines a public officer as follows:
An individual who in the performance of his or her official duties is
vested by law with sovereign powers of government and who is
either elected by the people, or commissioned by the Governor and
has a jurisdiction extending throughout the state, or any person
lawfully serving instead of either of the foregoing two classes of
435individuals as initial designee or successor.
Lemon Law arbitrators are not employees or public employees since they are
._. ,,436
not fulfilling a "regular or full-time authorized position. Despite this
argument, surely it would be the AG's position that these "officers" or quasi-
judicial officials are not subject to the financial disclosure provisions of
section 112.3145 .
The issue arises, therefore, about whether it matters that the AG's
Office has a purported conflict of interest due to its various roles within the
Lemon Law process. It is somewhat analogous to Migliore v. City of
Lauderhill, 43 where the court saw a potential conflict of interest, although in
a different context, but arguably not unlike the role the AG plays in the
Lemon Law.439 Migliore points out the following:
Further, the fact that the board is required to be composed of law
enforcement personnel belies the kind of impartiality and lack of
bias that are ordinarily requisites of a panel established to
determine substantive rights between the body politic (standing in
433. See Talbot D'Alemberte, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTrUTION - A REFERENCE GUIDE,
37-38 (1991).
434. FLA. STAT. § 163.340(20) (1999). "'Public officer' means any officer who is in
charge of any department or branch of the government of the county or municipality relating to
health, fire, building regulations, or other activities concerning dwellings in the county or
municipality." Id. §§ 843.0855(1)(c), 219.01(1).
435. Id. § 112.061(2)(c) (1999).
436. Id. § 112.061(2)(d).
437. Section 112.3145 of the Florida Statutes requires specified state employees and
state officers to file a "statement of financial interests" with the Secretary of State every year,
detailing enumerated items of income. Id. § 112.3145.
438. 415 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
439. Id. at 64.
[Vol. 24:407
458
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
1999]
the shoes of the taxpayer) and one of its own whose right to
continue to represent and therefor to financially benefit from that
body politic has been challenged. We do not mean to suggest that
a complaint review board so constituted would necessarily act in a
biased manner; only that it gives the impression of impropriety,
which the legislature would obviously have avoided at all costs.
440
This quotation highlights a fundamental flaw in the Lemon Law. It now
functions with the pervasive involvement of the AG's Office. This factor
should not be overlooked when determining whether or not to overhaul the
statute.
VI. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS AND ACTIONS
Probably on different levels of interest, none of the competing and
contesting parties in the Lemon Law debate are happy with its present status.
For example, things have not gone far enough for the consumer or the
Attorney General. For the manufacturer, the Lemon Law has become a
business sensitive process, particularly in a marketing era when "customer
satisfaction" totally fuels the quest for selling the product.
To be sure, however, whether it is the courts or the legislature someone
needs to examine closely the role the AG's Office plays in the Lemon Law.
At present, it basically roams the Lemon Law plains unrestricted and
unfettered. The public positions taken by them are legally insupportable.
The AG's amicus curiae arguments illustrate a lack of objectiveness, while
demonstrating a constant interest in protecting it's statutory kingdom.41
One thematic basis of this article has been that the courts should not
step into this political fracas, which so clearly highlights the contentious
arguments over divergent Lemon Law positions. Whether a judge
philosophically believes any of this is good or bad legislation, or despite his
or her own personal experiences with buying a motor vehicle-and everyone
has had them--none of this should be a factor. But, of course, no one in the
real world believes this is very likely.
Nevertheless, any structural modifications to section 681 should be
accomplished through the legislative process. That branch of government
can best examine the experiential data, what the courts have done, political
factors, and the empirical evidence to decide what changes, if any, to make.
For example, one law student commentator, in light of appellate court
440. Id
441. See Anilcus Brief for the Attorney General of the State of Florida, Mason v.
Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., 620 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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decisions, proposes to have the legislature eliminate the trial de novo
provision altogether.
442
The judiciary should not attempt to play a superlegislative role here. Its
participation should be more in line with the "nature of the judicial process,"
and not taking sides on what is in essence a political issue. A judicial role
can be best undertaken by a more historically accurate approach to the legal
analysis when deciding a dispute under this law. For example, the Supreme
Court of Florida, in Pitsirelos, tries to take the approach of Solomon.43 It
adopts the AG's strongly consumeristic position-that the manufacturer who
lost at arbitration is the plaintiff and a trial de novo does not retain its
traditional meaning with the consumer starting over.444 Then, it rejects the
AG's consumerism position that the "decision" of the Board must have a
rebuttable evidentiary presumption. 445 In doing so, the Supreme Court of
Florida only creates more inconsistency between legislative intent, strict
judicial construction, and the "real" world within which Lemon Law lawyers
have to operate.
Listed below are several action plans that are options for these different
branches of government to consider.
A. Legislative
To properly balance the competing social and economic interests
existing between consumers and manufacturers, the legislature is more
ideally suited to take up this task. Through the legislature, the debate and
decision-making can, for political considerations, better dictate the future of
the Lemon Law. The AG can weigh in on the political side, as he has done
in the past, to argue a particular position. After all, the Attorney General is a
political post, not an ostensibly neutral or unbiased position, nor should it be.
Into this political recipe, motor vehicle dealers, distributors, manufacturers,
and trade associations can bring whatever influence their positions can bear
to the process. It is better to allow these competing interests, all vested, to
battle there between AG/consumer and manufacturer rather than in a judicial
forum where the fundamental analysis should be different from what is
utilized in the political arena.
First, the legislature should decide what is the proper role for the AG's
Office. It is now hard to see an unbiased interest in the AG as the law
presently exists and operates. The appearance of impropriety overwhelms
the AG's involvement since it is charged with selecting the arbitrators,
442. Daiker, supra note 21, at 270.
443. See Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1998).
444. See id. at 713.
445. See id. at 714.
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giving advice to consumers, running the program, providing legal counsel to
the panels, writing the "decisions," making legal interpretations for the
board, while at the same time performing the executive branch role of
enforcing the law against the manufacturers. This juggles too many different
responsibilities.
One solution is to codify for the Attorney General what it already does
anyway, which is to act as ombudsmen counsel for the consumer and create,
in turn, a different arbitration process like some other states have done using
professional arbitrators. Hearings can still be held geographically and
proceed expeditiously. The integrity of the process, however, might be less
suspect. Manufacturers are now routinely appearing with counsel at
arbitration proceedings because they are so important and the adverse
consequences too great. Let the AG's staff participate for the consumer
since it is their position to interpret section 681 to benefit the consumer, as a
matter of public policy. It is most essential to elevate the skill and
professional level of the arbitration process.
Several years ago, a proposal was circulated to have the arbitration
hearings handled as an administrative law procedure under the auspices of
the Office of Administrative Law Judges ("AUl"). Although this would
formalize the procedure, it would also serve to more clearly reflect the
realities of the Lemon Law process. If an ALU is involved the evidentiary
integrity of the proceedings is maintained. Thus, if the burden of going
forward remains on the party appealing to the circuit court, then the
underlying process should have more guarantees of trustworthiness to create
more reliable results. Also, the AG's Office can act as legal counsel to the
consumer and be officially designated as such, which it is anyway at least de
facto under the present system.
Finally, increased program costs can be handled by user fees. Already
two dollars per motor vehicle is charged to fund the program.446  Under
section 681.117(1) these fees ."shall be transferred monthly to the
Department of Legal Affairs for deposit into the Motor Vehicle Warran
Trust Fund."447 This fee is collected when each "new" vehicle is sold.
Needless to say, quite a few new motor vehicle registrations occur in Florida
each year, and this will only continue to increase. This or a slightly higher
446. FLA. STAT. § 681.117(1) (1999).
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. According to Department of Revenue figures, the remittance fees collected for the $2
per vehicle charge from July, 1996 through June, 1996 was $1,877,977. (Data from D.O.R.
Research and Analysis Div., 3/23/98). There are certainly an ample number of new vehicle
registrations in Florida from which fees can be generated. The R.L. Polk Company's National
Vehicle Population Profile, as of July 1, 1996, indicates for the 1996 model year that 834,669
domestic cars, import cars, and light trucks were registered in Florida.
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fee could generate ample funds to support any basic structural changes to
section 681.
Second, if fundamental legislative changes are not implemented then
ambiguities in the present law should be addressed. If the legislature intends
that trial de novo be just that, then the law should be clarified. The "appeal"
language can be eliminated, and a clearer statement made as to what a trial
de novo is. Still, the "decision" can come into evidence for whichever party
benefits, just like any other evidentiary matter, but without foundational
hurdles having first to be satisfied. If the legislature intends the "appealing"
party to have the initial burden and the proceeding in circuit court be like an
appeal, as Pitsirelos and Mason I have held, then it can be specifically
stated.450 The legislature has done this with other statutes, such as section
194.451 Additionally, if the "initiating" party is not to carry a burden, then
the statute can also be amended to state that. Finally, the issue of whether
the "Decision of the Board" is to have an evidentiary presumption should be
addressed. The legislature can specify whether it should or should not, and
if so what type of presumption. For example, section 681.1095(9) might be
rewritten to say only that the fact or result of the arbitration decision can be
admitted into evidence, but not the physical "decision" document itself.
These are basic language changes that can be effectuated easily, and would
clear up much legal uncertainty.
B. Judicial
The cases of Mason I and Pitsirelos were wrongly decided on what is a
trial de novo under section 681.1095(12). Regardless what the legislature
does, or fails to do, these Lemon Law issues will not go away. Thus, here
are several suggestions for attorneys and judges to consider and analyze.
First, the Supreme Court of Florida, if the opportunity comes again,
should follow more closely the analysis set forth in this article. It should
revisit its erroneous trial de novo ruling in Pitsirelos. As argued herein, a
different result than the one reached from Mason I and Pitsirelos would still
be consistent with the existing legislative intent behind section 681.
Second, constitutional challenges to the statute must be well founded.
Any broad-based constitutional attack on section 681, or its individual
provisions, will likely fail. Certainly, at the trial courts and the appellate
districts. The Supreme Court of Florida's response to the constitutional
challenge in Pitsirelos, signals where that presently constituted court wants
450. See Mason 1, 621 So. 2d at 722; Pitsirelos, 721 So. 2d at 713.
451. See FLA. STAT. § 194.036(3) (1999). 'The circuit court proceeding shall be de
novo, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party initiating the action." Id. §
194.034(6)(c).
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the districts to go. Courts from other jurisdictions have also rejected broad-
based constitutional challenges to Lemon Laws. a52 If a constitutional attack
is mounted it should be directed, under the present procedures, at how the
law operates and its effect on a case specific basis. The court in Pitsirelos
left this door open. The law may be facially constitutional, but as applied it
may be another matter. To make a constitutional argument effective, the
challenging party must develop record support for the applicational
unfairness and deficiencies in the law. This should include empirical data,
experiential support, and attacks on the arbitration process, its selection,
implementation, and source. Simply, a "Brandeis Brief' approach is
required. Discovery directed to the AG's Office would be a necessity,
although quite naturally the substantial resources of that office would object.
A court hearing such a constitutional challenge must be able to see and
understand how this arbitration system works. Videotaping hearings,
retaining university professors to study the fairness of the lemon law
arbitration process to provide expert testimony, and deposing arbitrators all
would be necessary tools to mount such a valid constitutional challenge. In
short, this would be a substantial and costly effort for both sides, which
might be better compromised in a political and not a judicial venue.
Third, if the courts are going to let the entire written "decision" with
"Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law" come into evidence, then the
proceeding in circuit court should truly be de novo. The consumer can
present evidence of the arbitration award, and that may be all that is needed.
The initial burden of going forward with proof, however, should still rest
with the party claiming the motor vehicle to be a "Lemon." From a practical
standpoint, particularly in a jury trial, having the evidence of the arbitration
award of "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusions of Law" will obviously be
powerful. Subliminally, in and of itself this may carry the day.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Florida can later read the statute to
require only the fact or result of the arbitration "decision" be put into
evidence, and not the physical document itself.
Fourth, the Supreme Court of Florida should prepare a new standard
Jury Instruction relating to the legal effect of a board's "decision." This will
help clear up confusion on the jury's part if the full document comes into
evidence. It will also ensure that too much influence is not placed on it at
trial.
Fifth, the courts should not perform a legislative role in interpreting
section 681 to effect a particular philosophical or social result. In light of
the way the Lemon Law is set up and the AG's involvement, a strict judicial
interpretation of the statute should be followed. Ample protections are built
452. See, e.g., Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 929 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1991); Chrysler Corp. v.
Texas Motor Veh. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1985).
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in the statutory scheme to prevent unfairness to the consumer.453 The
judiciary should not help rewrite the statute.
Finally, it might be argued that the latest Fifth District case of Ford
Motor Co. v. Starling454 highlights the problem of literally applying the trial
de novo analysis set forth in this article.455 Starling, in fact, does just the
opposite. What Ford did was to stipulate away its right to argue that the
coach builder had created the problem.456 It is a stipulation and Ford should
have been bound by it whether this circuit court action was a true de novo
proceeding or not. That simply was not an issue on the lemon law claim.
Certainly Ford could have requested the trial court for leave to bring in
Coachmen, the coach builder, on that issue. The trial judge could entertain
that, if good cause existed, in a trial de novo or not. The opinion in Starling
is silent about the record before the arbitration panel. 457 That is, whether the
manufacturer's written responses, its written declaration of a final repair
attempt, or anything in the repair records indicate if Ford had even looked at
the "puck" issue before going to circuit court. On the record presented, this
seems to be simply a case where the manufacturer stipulated away one of its
458defenses. Trying to argue it thereafter was one of the reasons for the trial
court's finding of bad faith in bringing the circuit court action.45 9
If anything, Starling demonstrates the effective reins put on a
manufacturer if it brings a subsequent legal action in bad faith. The
consumer is afforded the same level of protection under the pure trial de
novo theory. The manufacturer in Starling simply did not overcome
evidence presented of a nonconformity, and in its effort to do so tried to use
a defense that had been stipulated away. 461  And for that conduct the
manufacturer paid an enhanced price, plus attorneys' fees-which was not
highlighted in Starling. The legislative intent of section 681, to protect the
consumer, is satisfied in Starling not because the de novo was in the nature
of an "appeal," but due to the manufacturer bringing an action to circuit
court it should not have. This will be a deterrent next time. Starling's result
should not have been different had the trial been truly de novo.
453. See FLA. STAT. § 681.
454. 721 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
455. Id. at 335.
456. Id. at 336.
457. See id.
458. See id.
459. Starling, 721 So. 2d at 340.
460. Id.
461. Id
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VII. CONCLUSION
This article has been intended to provide an analysis of why it is
necessary to change the lemon laws from their present existence to a more
evolved and comprehensive law. The business of the Lemon Law is only
going to grow in the future. Its economic consequences will continue to be
profound to all interested parties. As the law presently exists, both from a
statutory and judicial standpoint, it is flawed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
School vouchers and private school choice have been coined the "civil
rights movement of the 1990s," galvanizing a passionate political debate
throughout society. Not since school desegregation has there been a
controversy of such great social impact, polarizing so many different
1. Dominick Cirelli Jr., Utilizing School Voucher Programs to Remedy School
Financing Problems, 30 AKRON L. REv. 469, 469 (1997). See also David Wasson, With
Vouchers Signed Into Law Options Begin, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE, June 22, 1999, at 1 (quoting
Florida Senator Tom Lee who acknowledged the tense political debate over vouchers and would
have preferred that vouchers were introduced as a pilot project: "I called it on the [Senate] floor
the abortion issue of education, because everyone has strong feelings about the subject.").
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political parties. While twenty states have introduced voucher bills, only a
handful have been enacted.2  Additionally, although politicians herald the
importance of vouchers, "when offered the opportunity to vote on voucher-
like programs, the public has consistently rejected them."3
On June 21, 1999, Florida Governor Jeb Bush sent legal ripples through
the voucher debate by signing into law one of the most disputed educational
reform packages in Florida's history, entitled the Bush/Brogan A+ Plan for
Education.4 The very next day, outraged civil rights groups, public
education advocates, educators, parents of children attending public schools,
and school board members filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
the Florida voucher program.5 The bulk of this controversy originates over
the legislation, which contains an unprecedented statewide school voucher
plan.
Governor Bush's voucher plan is the nation's most far-reaching and
contentious voucher experiment. Florida is the largest state in the nation
thus far to enact a form of voucher legislation.6 The voucher plan, named
the Opportunity Scholarship Program ("OSP"), grants tuition subsidies for
students in chronically failing public schools.7  It is the first statewide
voucher program and the most expensive.8 Additionally, unlike other
programs that base the receipt of vouchers on poverty levels, Florida bases
its voucher plan solely on student performance. 9 This law has received
nationwide attention, placing the voucher debate, once again, into the
limelight. 10 Its enactment has not only electrified the debate throughout the
State of Florida, but has ignited a controversy that continues to reverberate
2. School Vouchers: The Wrong Choice for Public Education (visited July 28, 1999)
<http:fl www.adl.org/vouchers.vouchers notLuni-popular> [hereinafter School Vouchers].
3. Id. "Voters in 19 states have rejected voucher proposals in referendum ballots." Id.
For example, in the November 1998 election, Colorado voters rejected a proposed amendment to
the Colorado Constitution that approved a tuition tax credit allowing religious schools to receive
public funds. Id. In fact, over the past 30 years, voters have only accepted one of the tuition
voucher proposals. Id.
4. FLA. STAT. § 229.0537 (1999). See also Jeb Bush, Florida Gives Kids an
Alternative to Failing Schools, THE WALL STREET JoURNAL, June 21, 1999, at A26; Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQ's) About School Vouchers, (visited July 30, 1999)
<http.www.aclufl.orgbodyfaqs-com899.html> [hereinafter FAQ's].
5. Holmes v. Bush (visited July 30, 1999) <http://aclufl.org.bodyschoolvouchers_
complaint.html> [hereinafter Hobnes].
6. FAQ's, supra note 4.
7. FIA STAT. § 229.0537 (1999).
8. FAQ's, supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. FAQ's, supra note 4; See generally Jo Becker, Groups File Suit to Kill Vouchers, ST.
PETERSBERG TIMEs, June 23, 1999, at B1 (discussing the impact of the Florida voucher program
along with various other state programs).
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throughout the entire nation. As the conflict over the scope and
constitutionality of school vouchers continues to percolate throughout the
nation, ultimately, the issue will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
The Bush/Brogan A+ Plan for Education allegedly "puts the
educational needs of students over the bureaucratic needs of the system,"
guaranteeing Florida students a better quality education." Proponents of
educational vouchers have launched an assault on the fundamental tenets of
public education. They believe that vouchers would give parents greater
control over their children's education, forcinf the public school system to
compete for students with nonpublic schools. In return, the competition
would beget greater efficiency and quality in the public school system.
13
Hence, school vouchers would become the antidote that would resuscitate
American education.
Opponents of school voucher programs argue that it is deceptive to
frame school vouchers in the language of free enterprise. 14 They assert that
vouchers are not a remedy, but rather a virus that will contaminate the public
school system.15 Voucher opponents contend the OSP is inherently flawed
because the problem with public schools is not efficiency in the marketplace,
but rather the lack of state financial support.16 They maintain that school
11. Bush, supra note 4, at A26.
12. Jack Alan Kramer, Vouching for Federal Educational Choice: If You Pay Them,
They Will Come, 29 VAL U. L. REV. 1005, 1009(1995).
13. See generally Milton Friedman, Reading, Writing & Vouchers, ST. PErERSBURG
TIMs, February 21, 1999, at D5. Friedman is a Nobel Prize winning economist who argues
school vouchers will maximize the quality of education by destroying the public schools'
monopoly and increasing competition. Friedman maintains that public schools will only progress
if forced to compete with private schools:
'[O]pportunity scholarships' are so promising. They give parents a choice.
The end result will be to strengthen, not weaken, the public school system,
just as the competition from Sprint and MCI forced AT&T to serve its
customers better and foreign producers of automobiles forced General
Motors, Ford and Chrysler to improve the quality and lower the cost of their
cars.
Id.
14. See generally Steven K. Green, The Legal ArgumentAgainst Private School Choice,
62 U. ON. L. Rnv. 37 (1993) (discussing the policy and legal arguments against school voucher
programs); Kramer, supra note 12, at 1016 (explaining the origin of the voucher concept).
15. Green, supra note 14, at 39.
16. As Rabbi A. James Rudin, from the American Jewish Congress expressed:
"Financially strong and educationally sound public education is imperative to prevent America
from becoming 'balkanized' according to race, ethnicity, religion, creed or culture." A. James
Rudin, Florida's School Voucher Plan Doesn't Solve Education Woes, TuE STUART NEWs/PORT
ST. Lucr NEws (Stuart, FL), July 17, 1999, at D8.
1999]
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vouchers purport a dangerous proposition; a proposition that will result in
the unnecessary expansion of private schools, while simultaneously leading
to the decay of the public school as an educational institution. 17 Thus, the
voucher program will become a national disgrace, creating the
"impoverishment of I ublic schools and the establishment of a two-tiered
educational system."
There is also great skepticism that private school choice will create
enhanced educational opportunities and true empowerment for lower income
parents.' 9 Voucher students have not shown any discernable academic
improvement over their public school peers.20 In fact, public schools often
provide a curriculum as equally competent and challenging as private
schools, resulting in the same level of student achievement.21
Aside from significant public policy concerns, opponents maintain that
choice proposals, by their very nature, violate the Establishment Clause. 2
The majority of private elementary and secondary schools in America are
undeniably religiously affiliated, with religious schools accounting for more
than ninety-five percent of all private school enrollments.2 3 Many religious
schools have been termed "pervasively sectarian" by the courts, indicating
that the educational curriculum includes religious indoctrination, worship,.. .. . 24
and general education from a religious-centered viewpoint. "Under
traditional Establishment Clause jurisprudence, public assistance to sectarian
schools is unconstitutional because such aid invariably advances the
religious mission of the sponsoring institution, thereby violating the
principle of government neutrality toward religion."5
Additionally, the Bush/Brogan A+ Plan is completely inconsistent with
the Florida Constitution. By forcing taxpayers to publicly fund religious
education, the OSP explicitly violates Florida's requirement of separation of
church and state.26 The law also directly ignores the voters' demand to make
education a fundamental value, by preventing all students from receiving
17. Green, supra note 14, at 39.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. WEAC Research Paper, (visited Aug. 4, 1999) <http://www.weac.org/resource/
may96/voucher2htm. (citing Denise M. Topolnicki, "Why Private Schools are Rarely Worth the
Money," MONEY MAGAZINE, Oct. 1994, at 98-112).
22. Green, supra note 14, at 40.
23. Id. at 41.
24. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973); see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971).
25. Green, supra note 14, at 41.
26. RA CONST. art. I, § 3.
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high quality public education.27 Finally, the OSP will use the state school
fund for a purpose other than the "support and maintenance of free public
schools" in express violation of the Florida Constitution. 28
This Comment will explore the conflict over school vouchers,
specifically focusing on the statewide voucher plan proposed in the
Bush/Brogan A+ Plan for Education. Part II will explain in detail the
statutory requirements of the OSP. Parts EII and IV will analyze the OSP
under the United States and Florida Constitutions. Part V will highlight the
consistent failures of voucher programs and compare the OSP to other plans
throughout the country, focusing specifically on the lessons learned from the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program.2 9 This paper will ultimately conclude
that the OSP is unconstitutional as well as detrimental to Florida citizens.
While this Comment is concerned primarily with refuting the Florida law, its
analysis is applicable to all voucher proposals. Consequently, the issues and
solutions presented in this paper are not endemic to the State of Florida, but
to any state considering a similar proposal.
HI. BUSH/BROGAN A+ PLAN FOR EDUCATION: OPPORTUNITY
SCHOLARSHIPS
A. Statutory Requirements
The OSP was enacted as a part of the larger Bush/Brogan A+ Plan for
Education.30 Beginning in the 1999-2000 school year, qualifying Florida
residents in Pensacola will have an opportunity to choose from three
educational alternatives for their children: public schools, private schools,
and parochial schools. 31 The purpose of the voucher program is to provide
an enhanced opportunity for students to gain the knowledge and skills
necessary for postsecondary education, a technical education, or a
vocation. Governor Bush contends that increasing public school
accountability will ensure that students are "no longer trapped in chronically
failing schools. 33 However, opponents of the OSP avidly claim that the
plan is too simplistic, educationally unsound, fiscally irresponsible, and
27. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
28. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
29. See generally Kristen K. Waggoner, The Milwaukee Parental Choice: The First
Voucher System To Include Religious Schools, 7 REaENr U. L. REv. 165 (1996) (analyzing the
evolution, statutory requirements, and constitutionality of the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program).
30. Bush, supra note 4, at A26.
31. Id.
32. FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(1) (1999).
33. Bush, supra note 4, at A26.
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unconstitutional.34 Voucher opponents believe the program will subsidize
and facilitate impoverishment of Florida's public school system, while
establishing a second and third rate educational system.
Under the Bush/Brogan A+ Plan for Education, each public school will
receive a grade of A through F, based upon the schools performance on
36
standardized tests. In order to receive a voucher, a child must fall within
one of two categories.37 The first category permits a parent to be eligible for
a voucher, when during the previous school year, the child attended a public
school that for the second year in a four-year period has been designated a
"failing" school, pursuant to the school performance grading system.38 The
second category permits the parent of a child who has been newly assigned
to a designated public school, "[to] request and receive from the state an
opportunity scholarship for the child to enroll in and attend a private
school .. .
Students at schools that fall under the first category will have three
options if they wish to transfer to another school.40 First, students may
attend a designated higher performing public school within their school
district.41 Second, such students may attend any public school in an adjacent
school district that has available space.42 Third, students may attend any
Florida private school, including a sectarian or nonsectarian school, which
34. John Kennedy, Bush Can't Rest on Voucher Victory, ORLANDO SEqNEL, June 21,
1999, at Al (quoting David Clark, spokesman for the Florida Teaching Profession-National
Education Association). See Holmes, supra note 5.
35. Green, supra note 14, at 39.
36. FLA. STAT. § 229.0537 (1999). The public school grade will be based on student
performance on the Florida Writes Test and the FCAT or the Florida Comprehensive Assessment
Test, which tests students skills in reading, math, writing and, ultimately science. Diane Rado,
Grading Florida's Schools, ST. PmTERSBuRG TIMEs, June 25, 1999, at Al. This method of
determining whether a school is successful raises the question of whether standardized tests are
truly indicative of a school's academic performance. There are many factors that determine a
school's fitness. This type of grading scale will force schools to focus solely on performing
successfully on standardized tests, rather than attempting to provide a well rounded education that
will prepare students to be assimilated into society.
37. FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(2)(a) (1999).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 229.0537(1), (4).
41. Id. § 229.0537(3)(a)(2). In order for a student to attend a different public school
within the district, that school must be designated as a school performing higher than that in
which the student is currently enrolled or to which the student has been assigned, but not less
than performance grade category "C". FLA STAT. § 229.0537(3)(a)(2) (1999).
42. FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(3)(b) (1999). The school in the adjacent school district must
also be designated a higher-performing school. Id.
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agrees to admit the student and to comply with the requirements set forth in
the OSP.43
Once a student receives an OSP voucher, the student may continue to
attend a private school at public expense, at least until he or she finishes
middle school.44 The student may remain at the private school, regardless of
any change in the "grade" assigned to the student's public school in the
interim.45 Unless the student has chosen to attend a private school that does
not offer a high school education, the student will remain eligible for an OSP
voucher throughout high school.46 The student can continue to receive an
Opportunity Scholarship, even if the school to which he or she would have
been assigned has never been designated a failing school.47
OSP vouchers will be in a "calculated amount" determined by a
formula, which is roughly equivalent to the public funds that would be spent, 45
on the student's education in a public school. The expenditure could range
from 13000 to $25,000, depending on what extra services the student
needs. 9 As a condition of participation in the OSP, private schools are
required to accept the OSP voucher as full payment of the tuition and fees of
OSP students 50
43. Id. § 229.0537(4)(a), (k). The private schools are not graded on a scale of A through
F. They have different accountability measures. Critics contend that this practice is unfair and
does not guarantee that students will get a better education. See Jon East, A Voucher Plan Full of
Holes (visited July 28, 1999) <http:llwww.sptimes.comlNews/32899/PerspectivelA_.voucher_
plan full_o.html>.
44. FAQ's, supra note 4.
45. FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(2) (1999). See also Holmes, supra note 5.
46. § 229.0537(2).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 229.0537(6)(a)(1). This section provides:
The maximum opportunity scholarship granted for an eligible student shall be
a calculated amount equivalent to the base student allocation multiplied by
the appropriate cost factor for the educational program that would have been
provided for the student in the district school to which he or she was
assigned, multiplied by the district cost differential. In addition, the
calculated amount shall include the per-student share of instructional
materials funding, technology funding, and other categorical funds as
provided for this purpose in the General Appropriations Act. The amount of
the opportunity scholarship shall be the calculated amount or the amount of
the private school's tuition and fees, whichever is less.
Id.
49. FAQ's, supra note 4.
50. § 229.0537(4)(1). However, this section does not prohibit a participating private
school from raising the tuition and fees it charges to OSP students to a level that permits the
school to capture the full "calculated amount." Id. See also FAQ's, supra note 4.
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The Department of Education is required, for each student receiving an
OSP voucher, to transfer the "calculated amount" from each school district
to a separate account. 1 The Opportunity Scholarship will then be disbursed
in quarterly disbursements to the parents or guardians of participating
students.52 Such disbursements will be in the form of warrants made out in
53the name of the participating student's parent or guardian. However, the
disbursement will be sent only to the chosen4Private school and must be
exclusively endorsed by the parent or guardian.
Under the OSP, private schools must also agree not to "compel" any
OSP student "to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, or to
worship. ' 55 Participating private schools must determine "on an entirely
random and religious-neutral basis, without regard to the student's past
academic history" 56 whether a student will be admitted into the school. The
private school will maintain discretion over who can attend the institution
and is not required to accept all students. Additionally, private schools must
comply with the prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or national origin set forth in Title 42 of the United States Code,
Section 2000d.57
51. Id. § 229.0537(6)(b)(3). The "calculated amount" is withdrawn from the public
school districts account even if it exceeds the amount of tuition actually paid under the OSP. Id.
52. Id
53. FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(6)(b) (1999).
54. Id. This section provides, however, that the Department is to mail the check directly
to the student's private school, rather than to the parent or guardian, and it directs that "the parent
or guardian shall restrictively endorse the warrant to the private school." Id. Hence, the effect is
that the financial aid is not going to the student as primary beneficiary, rather directly to the
religious school.
55. Id. § 229.0537(4)0). Although the OSP forbids private schools from "compelling"
students "to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, or to worship," the OSP does not bar
participating private schools from compelling OSP students to participate in other religious
activities, such as, religious training and instructions. Nor are such schools prohibited from
requiring the passive attendance of OSP students at worship services and prayers. See Holmes,
supra note 5.
56. § 229.0537(4)(e). This section also provides that a private school may give
preference in accepting applications to siblings of students who have already been accepted on a
random religious-neutral basis. Id. Although the OSP requires that participating private schools
admit OSP students on a "religious-neutral basis," it does not prohibit such schools from
discriminating on the basis of religion in the admission of other students or in the employment of
faculty and staff. See Holmes, supra note 5.
57. FLA. STAT. § 229.0537(4)(c) (1999).
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B. Legal Challenges to the Opportunity Scholarship Program
Governor Bush contends that the statewide voucher program is a
renaissance in educational reform that will revitalize Florida's public
educational system.58 To the contrary, if the OSP is implemented, "children
of the poorest and least empowered [socioeconomic classes] will be
abandoned to residue schools that function as mere warehouses." 59 Vouchers
will only serve to drain energy and resources from an already struggling
public school system.
Florida's first statewide performance grades were rather disconcerting:
185 schools received an A; 317 earned a B; 1215 earned a C; 600 received a
D; and 78 received an F.60 Ironically, one of the schools earning a D was the
Liberty City charter school that Bush created before he became Governor.
61
As drafted, the OSP has the potential to increasingly expand, putting an
exorbitant burden on taxpayers. 62 Florida's public schools are in a state of
emergency and the OSP does not present any real solutions, but only further
aggravates the educational crisis.
This unprecedented, broadsweeping legislation is merely a simplistic
solution to educational reform that may help a small percentage of students
in the short term. However, the long-term ramifications for the students who
remain in their local schools will be devastating.63 Vouchers ignore the
58. Florida's Bad Grades, ST. PrRSBURGTMES, June 27, 1999, (Editorials) at 2D.
59. Bob Chase, Vouchers: Just What Schools Don't Need (visited July 28, 1999)
http:llwww.texnews.comlopinion97/con120197.html [hereinafter "Vouchers"].
60. Bill Hirschman, State Gives Schools Low Grades, SUN-SENmNmL (Fort Lauderdale),
June 25, 1999, at Al.
61. Critics argue that the Liberty City Charter School, co-founded by Bush, should
illustrate that implementing more school choice and withdrawing governmental control is not
the solution to improving the public educational system. David Clark, spokesman for the
FTP-NEA, the state's largest teachers union stated:
It's very ironic that in this world, where everyone is more closely scrutinized
and we're all struggling to meet higher standards, that this school that was set
up as a model of how it should be done is a failure. It's only evidence of what
we've said all along - educating children is a difficult thing to do.
Jo Becker, Bush's Liberty City Charter School Scores a D, ST. PETERSBURG TIMs, June 26,
1999, at Al.
62. See infra note 162.
63. Leon Russell, President of the Florida NAACP, noted:
It is understood that Florida schools are already under-funded. Overcrowded
classrooms and lack of adequate textbooks and the use of portables for
classroom space are rampant [in every district in the state] .... A reduction
in the overall budget of a school will lead to an overall reduction in the
number of teachers and the inability of the school to obtain materials [and
1999]
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fundamental reasons behind school failure.64 Opportunity Scholarships will
create a mass exodus to private schools, while draining public schools of
their funding. 65 The cure lies in reducing class size and increasing school
funding, not in profit driven short cuts.66 The next section of this Comment
will address the OSP's legal shortcomings and illustrate how the OSP
contradicts the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution.
Ill. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The First Amendment of the Constitution clearly states: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."67  Since 1947,
the United States Supreme Court and lower courts have closley scrutinized
programs that either directly or indirectly involved government aid to
religious schools. 68 While recognizing that religious schools make a vital
supplies and purchase equipment]. Students who remain in these schools will
be doomed to second and third-class education.
Linda Kleindist, Opponents Challenge New Voucher Law, SUN-SENTNEL (Fort Lauderdale), June
23, 1999, at 6B.
64. FAQ's, supra note 4.
65. Id.
66. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Professor Alex Monar reviewed voucher
program data throughout the country and concluded that a student's participation in a voucher
program does not necessarily ensure that the student's performance will improve. However, he
did emphasize, "[t]here is no longer any argument about whether or not reducing class size in the
primary grades increases student achievement. The research is quite clear. It does." School
Vouchers: The Emerging Track Record, (visited Aug. 4, 1999) <http.//www.weac.org/
resource/1998-99/april99/vouchertrack.htm > [hereinafter "Emerging Track Record'].
The amount of failing schools can be attributed to a lack of public commitment, not to lack
of competition. For example, Florida schools also rank 26th out of the 50 states in per-student
funding, spending less than the national average. Salaries for teachers lag behind the national
average. Children in at least 24 school districts are not supplied with their own textbooks.
Additionally, class sizes are extremely large. In 27,433 kindergarten through third grade
classrooms in Florida, 22,172 still have more than 20 students. Diane Rado, The High Cost of
Vouchers, ST. PMTMBURr, TEs, Feb. 21, 1999, at 1D.
67. U.S. CONST. amend I. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment and
prohibits any state from enacting a law "respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
68. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 2, 17,18 (1947). In holding that the First
Amendment did not prohibit a state from reimbursing parents of parochial school children for
school bus fares, Justice Black noted that the Founders believed that any form of religious
assessment, regardless of size, offended the Establishment Clause, as well as notions of religious
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contribution to the overall quality of education, the Supreme Court has
consistently limited religious school's role in public education because theyS••,,69
exist "primarily as arms of religious ministries.
Generally speaking, programs that use public funds to support or aid
religious-based education have been deemed unconstitutional. Courts are
sensitive towards the relationship between government and religion in the
education of our children.71 In limited circumstances, however, the Supreme
Court has validated programs that provide direct aid to religious schools
when subsidies are created for nonsectarian uses, such as granting funds for
bus transportation to all students.7 2  Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
especially when dealing with the realm of school aid lacks a bright line
stance, resulting in convoluted, controversial decisions.
Due to the ambiguities over the application of the Establishment
Clause, conflict over its scope is one of the main disputes in the OSP.
Proponents maintain the program is religion neutral in its benefits by
allowing Florida students to be liberated from chronically failing public
schools. Opponents claim that the Florida voucher program is simply a
diversion that actually directly funds religious institutions, expressly
violating the separation of church and state.75 Although the constitutionality
of a school voucher program has never been addressed by the United States
liberty and freedom of conscious. As Justice Black summarized, the Establishment Clause
means, at the very least, that: "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion." Id. at 16.
69. Green, supra note 14, at 46. See also Robert F. Drinan, REiGION, TiE COURTS,
AND PuBuc PoucY 39 (1963) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 23-24). In his dissent in Everson,
Justice Jackson expounded on the importance of keeping schools and religion separate stating,
"Our public school ... is organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all
religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also
maintain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion." Id.
70. Green, supra note 14, at n.27.
71. Id. at 39 (citing Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985). The
author further noted that "[t]he government's activities in this area can have a magnified impact
on impressionable young minds, and the occasional rivalry of parallel public and private school
systems offers an all-too-ready opportunity for divisive rifts along religious lines in the body
politic." Id. n.26 (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,383 (1985)).
72. Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
73. The Court has acknowledged the confusion in discerning its opinions. "We have
acknowledged before, and we do so again here, that the wall of separation that must be
maintained.., is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of
a particular relationship." Waggoner, supra note 29, at n.109 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229,236 (1997)) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,614 (1971)).
74. Holmes, supra note 5.
75. Id.
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Supreme Court, legal precedent suggests that such programs would violate
the United States Constitution.
Any analysis of the Establishment Clause should begin with the legal
precedent established in Lemon v. Kurtzman.76 In Lemon, the Court set forth
a three-part test for determining when an Establishment Clause violation has
occurred.77 Despite the Court's reliance on the three-pronged test, Chief
Justice Warren Burger, author of the majority opinion, warned that the
Establishment Clause should still be examined "with consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years." 78 The Lemon
test has been deemed only a "helpful signpost" in dealing with Establishment
Clause challenges.79  Nevertheless, Lemon has not been overturned and
continues to be controlling authority when examining Establishment Clause
challenges.80
Under Lemon, all three prongs of the test must be met for a challenged
statute to survive constitutional scrutiny.8 First, the statute must have a
82secular purpose. Second, the statute must have a principal or primary
83effect that neither inhibits or advances religion. Finally, the statute must
not further excessive government entanglement with religion.84
1. Secular Legislative Purpose
The fact that religious or parochial schools participate in voucher
programs will not likely violate the first prong of the Lemon test. The Court
will typically uphold a statute if any valid secular purpose for it can be
76. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Supreme Court emphasized that the
Establishment Clause explicitly afforded protection against three perceived evils: "sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Waggoner,
supra note 29, at 186 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612).
77. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
78. Id at 612.
79. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
741 (1973)).
80. The application of the Establishment Clause is one of the most ambiguous and
confusing constitutional principles. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 750-51 (1994) (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("[The Court has created a] convenient
relationship with Lemon, which it cites only when useful .... The problem with (and the allure
of) Lemon has not be that it is 'rigid,' but rather that in many applications it has been utterly
meaningless, validating whatever result the court would desire."). Id.
81. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602,612-13.
82. Id. at 612.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 613.
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85discerned. Legislation intended to improve Florida's educational system
most likely would be designated a "secular purpose." 86  The intent to
improve student learning and the quality of education received by all
children, including those who attend religious schools, would be sufficient to
satisfy the first prong.87 However, the fact that Governor Bush has a
legitimate purpose in enacting the OSP does not necessarily mean the
legislation will be upheld.
2. OSP's Primary Effect Advances Religion
The OSP is going to have a more difficult time overcoming the
standards set forth in the second prong. Calling for an examination of the
effects of the statute, the Court balances certain broad concepts as neutrality
and separation of church and state.88 When evaluating this prong, the Court
has outlined several factors that must be taken into consideration when
determining if there has been an Establishment Clause violation.
8 9
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,9° the
Court set forth the standards that should be used as a guideline in
determining the constitutionality of school voucher programs. The Court
struck down a New York program that permitted parents of students that
attended private schools to recover a portion of their private educational
expenses from the state.92 The program was solely limited to parents of
85. The Court is reluctant "to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly
when a plausible secular purpose for the State's program may be discerned from the face of the
statute." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-95.
86. See generally Douglas A. Edwards, Cleveland and Milwaukee's Free Market
Solution for the "Pedantic Heap[s] of Sophistry and Nonsense" that Plague Public Education:
Mistakes on Two Lakes, 30 AKRON L. REv. 687, n.70 (1997) (explaining the trend of the United
States Supreme Court to uphold statutes if any secular purpose can be given).
87. Bush/Brogan A+ Plan for Education, (visited Aug. 5, 1999) <http://fcn.state.
fl.us/eog/aplusplan/A+_..plan/ A+_revised.html>.
88. Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis, 28 Colum. J.L
& Soc. PROBs. 423,435 (1995).
89. Id. at 435.
90. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). In Nyquist, parents were entitled to subtract a designated
amount from their adjusted state income tax for each tuition paid to a religious school. Id. at 764.
See also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832-35 (1973).
91. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773.
92. Id. at 798.
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children attending private schools. 93  Not surprisingly, an overwhelming
majority of eligible children attended sectarian schools.
In its opinion, the Court reasoned that by allowing parents to recover a
portion of their costs for sending their children to a religious school, the state
was essentially seeking to relieve the financial burden of religious
education.95  Justice Powell concluded that the primary effect was to
financially support religious schools, thereby impermissibly advancing
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, stating:
[I]f the grants are offered as an incentive to parents to send their
children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash payments
to them, the Establishment Clause is violated whether or not the
actual dollars given eventually find their way into the sectarian
institutions. Whether the grant is labeled a reimbursement, a
reward, or a subsidy, its substantive impact is still the same.96
It was also imperative to the Court's rationale that the programs
bestowed unrestricted benefits toward a religious education. 97 The govern-
ment failed to make any endeavor to maintain the separation between church
and state.98 Since parents were given the sole discretion to apply the state
aid toward any purpose, including refunding the tuition of sectarian
education, there was no attempt to maintain a barrier between secular and
religious education. 99 The Supreme Court also focused on the fact that the
aid was limited specifically to children enrolled in private school, and not
available to the general public. 1°° Consequently, the program in Nyquist was
distinguishable from other valid programs, including bus transportation and
school textbooks, because the New York programs did not prescribe aid in a
purely secular capacity.
101
Under a Nyquist analysis, Bush's Opportunity Scholarships have little
chance of success. First, the OSP grants unrestricted aid to parents.1°2 The
OSP places no restrictions on how participating private schools may utilize
93. Green, supra note 14, at 58 (citing Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 768 (1973)). "In New York, 85% of eligible children attend
religious schools." Id. n.104
94. Id.
95. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 791.
96. Id. at 786.
97. Id. at 783.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783.
101. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
102. FAQ's, supra note 4.
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the public funds that are paid to them. 03 The OSP fails to guarantee that the
vouchers will fund programs that are identifiably secular.1  Thus, sectarian
schools are free to use these public funds for religious purposes, such as
worship, prayer, and religious instruction, regardless of whether participa-
tion in such activities is voluntary or compelled.
105
Second, the OSP creates an incentive for parents to send their child to
religious schools, hence removing the government from a position of
neutrality towards religious education.1°6 In Escambia County, the first
county to implement the program, four out of the five private schools that
volunteered to participate in the OSP are Catholic schools.1 7 In Florida, the
OSP vouchers that enable parents to send their children to religious schools
would have the same "purpose and inevitable effect" of advancing religion
in the same manner as the reimbursements in Nyquist.l08 The OSP fails the
second prong of the Lemon test by financially aiding the religious missions
of the private schools, therefore, advancing religion.
Finally, the fact that the OSP requires a parent or guardian to endorse a
check in order for the private school to receive funds, does not automatically
qualify and exempt the aid as indirect. 1°9 In fact, as currently drafted the
parents never directly receive the money. 11  Therefore, the voucher's
financial benefit flows directly from the state to the private school. The
Supreme Court has expressed concern with the substantive impact of private
school aid.' Even if the courts determine that the aid to the schools is
merely indirect, the OSP still remains unconstitutional because the economic
effect of direct and indirect assistance often is indistinguishable and because
the "aid may have [the] effect [of a direct subsidy] even though it takes the
form of aid to students or parents."'
12
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Public funds provided under the OSP could be used, for example, to pay the salaries
of clergy and others who provide religious training and instruction, to purchase Bibles, religious
textbooks, textbooks that present other subjects from a religious point of view, and other religious
literature, to purchase and display crucifixes and other religious symbols, and to build and
maintain chapels and other facilities used for religious worship. Holmes, supra note 5.
106. Green, supra note 14, at 39.
107. David Wasson, Foes Find Vouchers Real Joke, THBTAMPATRmuNr, July 7, 1999, at
1.
108. See generally Harlan A. Loeb & Debbie N. Kaminer, God, Money, and Schools:
Vouchers Programs Impugn the Separation of Church and State, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 15
(1996) (quoting Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
793 (1973)) (discussing the unconstitutionality of voucher programs).
109. FAQ's, supra note 4.
110. Id.
111. See Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487 (1986).
112. Id.
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In Mueller v. Allen,'13 the Court began to apply the Lemon test less
stringently, as it upheld a statute which involved an income tax deduction for
tuition, textbooks, transportation, and other expenses for students attending
both public and private schools." 4 The Court reasoned that because the
deduction could be applied toward educational expenses incurred by all
parents, it would be deemed constitutional." 5 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist
noted that, although distributing the aid to the religious schools through the
parents minimized Establishment Clause controversy, it still had the basic
effect of giving direct aid to the religious schools." The key point under
these circumstances for Justice Rehnquist was that the aid only became
available "as a result of numerous private choices of individual parents of
school-age children."
'' 17
Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist stopped short of overturning Nyquist
on this point. "8 Even though the private choice aspect was a "material
consideration in Establishment Clause analysis," Rehnquist wrote that it was
not the sole determinative factor." 9 However, the Court appears to have
erroneously overlooked the fact that the program primarily benefited the
parents of students attending private schools, due to the fact that private
school tuition was the major tax deduction.' 2° Regardless, the OSP will not
be upheld just by the very virtue that the money is funneled from the parents
to the sectarian schools.1
In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,'22 the
Court upheld, in limited circumstances, the use of state-funded scholarships
for the disabled to pay bible college tuition.'2 The Court reasoned that the
scholarship was not skewed as benefiting religion because it was broad in
nature.'24 Additionally, the neutral aid could be applied towards an
extensive range of vocational and career programs, where only a small
113. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
114. Id.
115. The court found because the tax exemption was applied equally to parents of both,
public and private schools, it did not impermissibly advance religion. Id. at 398.
116. Id.at 399.
117. Id.
118. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
119. Mueller, 463 U.S. at388.
120. Id. at 409 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Of the total number of taxpayers who are
eligible for the tuition deduction, approximately 96% send their children to religious schools." Id.
121. "At best, the funneling of aid through private individuals removes only the
imprimatur of government approval; it has no effect on the issue of whether the religious
institution has been advanced in an impermissible manner." Green, supra note 14, at 70.
122. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
123. Id. at 481.
124. Id.
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handful were, in fact, sectarian. 25 In determining if the scholarships met the
requirements of the Establishment Clause, the Court focused on the effect of
the program "as a whole."
1 6
When looking at the OSP "as a whole," it primarily benefits the
religious schools. Unlike the program in Witters, the OSP creates a
"financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education" because
most of the eligible private schools are religion centered. 127 The effect of the
OSP is to siphon tax dollars from public schools, while increasing funding
for private religious schools.
Moreover, voucher advocates wrongly rely on Witters, because this case
would not apply to elementary and secondary schools. Primary and
secondary students tend to be more susceptible to religious indoctrination,
while college students are not as impressionable. 12 The Supreme Court has
consistently noted the vulnerability of elementary and secondary students
because "many of the citizens perceiving the governmental message are
children in their formative years.'
'129
Furthermore, Witters dealt solely with a college scholarship that was
created for nonreligious purposes.130 The scholarship had existed for a long
period of time and only one individual attempted to extend the scholarship to131
use public funding for religious schooling. The OSP, however, was
designed exclusively for elementary and secondary education.132 It was
designed to impact more than one individual; in fact, Governor Bush plans133
for it to be applicable to all Florida students. Additionally, the OSP was
created as a way to primarily fund and advance religious education and
morals, because most participating private schools in Florida are sectarian. 3
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,135 the Supreme Court
held that providing funds to pay for a hearing impaired student attending a
125. Even though the grant recipient clearly would use the money to obtain religious
education, the Court observed that the tuition grants were "made available generally without
regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited." Id.
at 487 (quoting Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
782-83 n.38 (1973)).
126. Witters, 474 U.S. at488.
127. Id.
128. Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 108.
129. Green, supra note 14, at 50 (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
390 (1985)).
130. Witters, 474 U.S. at 481.
131. Id. at488.
132. See Wasson, supra note 107.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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sectarian high school was constitutional."' In this limited situation, Justice
Rehnquist cited to Mueller and Witters, stating that the Court has
"consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits
to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not
readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian
institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit."' 37 The Court
stressed that the handicapped child is the primary beneficiary, while the
school receives only an incidental benefit. 13  Accordingly, the OSP should
be deemed unconstitutional because the private schools are the primary
beneficiaries, while the students onl receive an incidental benefit.
Finally, in Agostini v. Felton, the United States Supreme Court again
challenged the stability of Lemon v. Kurtzman,'40 allowing a federally
funded program to provide remedial instruction by public school employees
at religious schools.' 4' The Court's rationale was premised on the fact that
no funds ever reached the "coffers of religious schools."'142 Additionally, the
Court maintained that a public employee, such as a teacher, would not
abandon "assigned duties and instructions and embark on religious
indoctrination" simply because the employee enters a parochial school
classroom.143 However, it is important to note that, writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor still failed to create a new test for Establishment Clause
cases; therefore, not overturning Lemon.144 Under the OSP, not only does
money reach the "coffers of religious schools," but part of the employees
qualification to work at the religious schools is to be a scholar in religious
indoctrination. Therefore, the OSP is distinguishable from this holding
because it is not neutral toward religion.
After the rulings in cases like Mueller,'45 Zobrest,146 Witters, 47 and
Agostini,148 choice proponents immediately claimed constitutional victory
for voucher programs. However, a close reading of each case indicates that
136. Id. at 13-14.
137. Id. at 8.
138. Id. at 12.
139. 521 U.S. 203 (1997), rev'd, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). Aguilar
deemed a publicly funded program permitting school teachers to provide remedial assistance
in parochial schools unconstitutional. Id.
140. 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
141. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232.
142. Id. at 228; cf Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 657-59 (1980).
143. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226.
144. Id. at 239.
145. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1982).
146. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1992).
147. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1985).
148. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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the circumstances where the state was permitted to aid religious schools, are
quite distinguishable from the OSP. Voucher proponents often erroneously
cite to the rulings after the Nyquist decision to uphold the constitutionality of
the voucher plan. It is true that since Nyquist, the Court has upheld neutral
and indirect educational aid programs.14 - However, "the Court has never
upheld a program when it has been clearly foreseeable that it would
substantially aid religious schools."'1 50 Voucher proponents misinterpret the
type of aid that is permissible under the Establishment Clause. Because
Nyquist remains valid legal precedent, the OSP should be found
unconstitutional.
3. Excessive Entanglement
Assuming arguendo, that the OSP satisfies the first two prongs of the
Lemon test, it would still have to satisfy the requirements set forth in the
third prong. This prong requires that the statute in question does not result
in excessive government entanglement with religion. 151  To access
entanglement, the Court has looked to "'the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides,
and the resulting relationship between the government and religious
authority." ' 152 Although the OSP may be able to satisfy the elements of this
prong, if the Court emphasizes the statute's effect, the OSP will not be able
to survive constitutional scrutiny.
There are two types of entanglement: administrative entanglement and
political divisiveness. 3  Administrative entanglement is created when a
149. Recent Case, Establishment Clause School Vouchers Wisconsin Supreme Court
Upholds Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Jackson v. Benson, 112 HARV. L. REV. 737,740-
41 (1999) [hereinafter Establishment Clause] (discussing the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
erroneous analysis of Establishment Clause jurisprudence when analyzing voucher programs that
include a sectarian institution).
150. Id.
151. Stick, supra note 88, at435.
152. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,615 (1970)).
153. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1970). Administrative entanglement refers
to state involvement in the administration of a program. Under the form of entanglement referred
to as political divisiveness, government action that promotes political fragmentation along
religious lines may be held to be unconstitutional. See Stick, supra note 88, at 450-53. For
purposes of the OSP, political decisiveness does not apply because it has been confined to cases
where direct financial subsidies were paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools.
Id. (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1980)). Since the OSP creates a financial
subsidy to parents, rather than religious schools, this factor is inapplicable. Arguably, the
program is not exempt because it funnels the money through the parents, however, the prospect of
political divisiveness has never alone warranted the invalidation of a state law. Id. See generally
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,778 (1973).
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"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" is
required to guarantee that the government aid does not impermissibly
advance religion.154 This type of excessive entanglement between church
and state compromises the religious freedom of individuals who are not
followers of that particular religious denomination.15 5  This government
entanglement also infringes upon the religious liberty of the adherents to the
denomination by imposing government regulations upon the sanctity of the
religion.
156
In voucher plans that include sectarian institutions, administrative
entanglement will be avoided when the program does not require distinctions
between sectarian expenses and secular expenses, thereby surveillance and
monitoring become unnecessary. Hence, there would not be any excessive
administrative entanglement because the government is not forced to monitor
whether the money is advancing religious initiatives. This program,
however, as previously noted, would violate the effects prong of the Lemon
test due to the lack of regulation. 157
Furthermore, because the very purpose of many religious schools is to
provide an integrated secular and religious education, the Court has
reasoned that the two functions may be "inextricably intertwined," such that
they become inseparable. 15 9  Religous and parochial schools have been
considered "pervasively sectarian,"'ou meaning the primary reason for their
existence is to function as "arms of religious ministries." 61 As a general
rule, religious schools teach from a limited viewpoint, often expressing
conservative views regarding abortion, marriage, homosexuals, and theories
of evolution. 162  Hence, if Florida provides public support to religious
schools, it is condemning OSP students to a one-sided education.
63
154. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
155. Stick, supra note 88, at 450-51 (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10
(1985)).
156. Id. (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985)).
157. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756.
158. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,366 (1975).
159. Green, supra note 14, at 48.
160. The Supreme Court has defined "pervasively sectarian" schools as those that:
[I]nclude prayer and attendance at religious services as part of their
curriculum, are run by churches or other organizations whose members must
subscribe to particular religious tenets, have faculties and student bodies
composed largely by adherents of the particular denomination, and give
preference in attendance to children belonging to the denomination.
Id. at 47 n.48 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971)).
161. Green, supra note 14, at 46.
162. Seeid. at 48.
163. American public education is founded on the fundamental concept of the common
school. WEAC Research Paper (visited Aug. 4, 1999) <http://www.weac.org/resourcelmay
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Most of the private schools that participate in the OSP are pervasively
sectarian. These pervasively sectarian schools will enroll an even larger
proportion of the students who receive OSP vouchers. In Escambia County,
twenty out of the twenty-five private schools are sectarian.1 4  These
sectarian schools enroll over ninety-three percent of the private school pupils
in Escambia County.
1 65
In fact, most of the Escambia County schools are pervasively sectarian.
For example, the "philosophy of education" of Little Flower School explains
that:
[Tihe school is committed to educating our students in accord with
the educational mission of the Church .... We believe that the
mission of Catholic education is the Christian formation of
students. The young people in Little Flower School must
experience the Gospel in order to proclaim it now and throughout
their adult lives.
16
The Little Flower School illustrates how difficult it is to separate secular
education from a religious school's mission.
Since four out of the five schools that have presently volunteered to
accept OSP students are Catholic schools, the state is going to have to
provide constant surveillance to guarantee that the opportunity scholarships
are not advancing religion. Although the OSP does not violate the excessive
entanglement prong, by not requiring the schools to be accountable for how
they spend the public funds, the OSP violates the Establishment Clause
96/voucher2.htm> [hereinafter WEAC]. Initiated by Horace Mann in the 1830s, public
schools were viewed as an essential part of children's development. Id. Only through public
schooling, would children from different ethnic, religious, and class backgrounds learn to live
as responsible citizens in a democracy. Id. Accordingly, public schools provide children with
opportunities and experiences that benefit society as a whole. Id.
A public school in Iowa creates approximately the same social experience for
its pupils as a school in Massachusetts. This experience.., has in the past
been fairly successful in conveying a set of common values to many
generations of young children. It is probably the only unifying and
democratizing process that young people undergo in a highly diversified
society with no compulsory military service.
Id. (quoting Martin Canroy, School Imporvement: Is Private the Answer?, in
DECENTRALIZATION AND SCHOOL IMPROvEMENT 167 (Jane Hannaway & Martin Canroy eds.,
1993)).
164. FAQs, supra note 4.
165. l
166. Holnes, supra note 5, at7.
48919991
486
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
because it will be unable to ensure that the funds are not being used for
sectarian functions.
Additionally, even religious schools are wary of the intrusive nature of
the OSP. They fear that by acceptin6 state funds, they are going to, in
return, have to accept state regulations.' Accordingly, a 1998 United States
Department of Education report, performed at the request of Congress,
shows that private and religious schools are not likely to participate in
voucher programs that would require them to meet accountability standards
in key policy areas "such as admissions, student testing, curriculum, and
religious training."
B. Analysis of the OSP Under the Florida Constitution
The OSP conflicts with several provisions of the Florida Constitution.
Because the Florida Constitution is more stringent than the United States
Constitution when protecting the separation of church and state, the OSP is
not going to be able to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The OSP
diminishes the high quality of education that is mandated by the Constitution
and facilitates the widening of the educational gap between economic
classes. Finally, the OSP puts too heavy a burden on the state school fund,
as the Florida Constitution places strict requirements on how the funds can
be allocated. In fact, the provisions of the Florida Constitution provide a
basis to strike down the OSP, without even delving into federal
constitutional questions.
1. Article I, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution
The Florida Constitution is unambiguous when it comes to the state's
independent discretion to spend public funds. 169 The state cannot use public
funds if it will infringe on an individual's religious liberty and disturb the
delicate balance of separation of church and state. Article I, section 3,
clearly makes it unconstitutional to force Florida taxpayers to fund school
voucher programs that include religious schools, stating:
167. Donna McCurdy, vice principal of West Florida Baptist Academy stated that
"[m]ost Christian schools are worried that when you accept state funds you accept state
regulations, and we don't want to be locked into state regulations and state text books. The
state's saying there are no strings now, but down the road there could be strings." Paul
Wilbom, Voucher Program off to a Wary Start, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 2, 1999, at IA.
168. Emerging Track Record, supra note 66.
169. Voucher Issue Up to the Courts, TBE LmGER (Lakeland, FL), June 24, 1999, at Al0.
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There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or
prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious
freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals,
peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political
subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public
treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious
.. • 170denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.
The very premise of the OSP violates this provision because it
distributes public funds directly to sectarian institutions, blanketed in the
deceptive name of Opportunity Scholarships. The OSP is not revenue
neutral because schools earn funds from the state based upon the size of their
enrollment.171 When a child leaves to attend a religious institution the
public school will lose funds, while the private school gains the tuition.
112
Not only does the Florida Constitution explicitly forbid state aid from
directly going to religious schools, but examination of legislative history
indicates that the provision was intended to ban state aid to parochial
schools. According to Jim Redman, a member of the 1968 constitutional
revision commission the topic of state aid to religious schools was fully
debated at the time.9 3 Members of the commission specifically intended to
prohibit vouchers from being used to support any religious schools.
174
It is also important to note that any examination into "'the proper
interpretation of a constitutional provision must begin with an examination
of that provision's explicit language."' 1 75 Unless text suggests that specific
words have been used in a technical sense, words and terms of the Florida
Constitution should be interpreted in their most usual and obvious
meaning.176  Moreover, less latitude is permitted when interpreting
constitutional provisions than when interpreting statutes.177 This stringent
rule of construction is based on the presumption that constitutional
170. FLA. CoNsr, art. I, § 3.
171. Martin Dyckman, Who's Misinforming Whom? Do the math Series, ST.
PEERSBURGTMES, July 1, 1999, at 19A.
172. Id.
173. Jo Becker, Voucher Debate Entwined with a Century-old Fight, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMEs, July 6, 1999, at 4B.
174. Id.
175. Chiles v. Phelps, 714 So. 2d 453, 457 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Florida Soc'y of
Ophthalmology v. Florida Optometric Ass'n, 489 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1986)).
176. Advisory Opinion to the Govemor-1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So. 2d
278, 282 (Fla. 1998) (citing City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 151 So. 488, 489-90
(Fla. 1933)).
177. Department of Envtl. Protection v. Millender, 666 So. 2d 882, 886 (Fla. 1996)
(citing City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 151 So. 488, 489 (Fla. 1933)).
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provisions have been more carefully framed. 178 The language of Article I,
section 3 expressly forbids public funds from directly or indirectly aiding
sectarian institutions. 79 Therefore, the OSP is unable to constitutionally
distribute funds to religious schools.
This provision has never been interpreted by Florida courts simply
because until now, no legislature has deemed it proper. However, Florida
case law dealing with aid to religious schools indicates that the OSP would
be deemed unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida has stated that
legislation may provide indirect aid to religious interests in specific
circumstances."rS Therefore, while a state cannot pass a law to aid one
religion or all religions, state action to promote the general welfare of
society, apart from any religious considerations is permissible. 18' The OSP
does not promote the general welfare of society because the OSP facilitates
the balkanization of public schools, leaving them as the last refuge for
students whom private schools deem undesirable. 182 Vouchers harm society
as a whole as they create an uneven playing field and institutionalize a two-
tiered educational system.
183
Moreover, Florida courts have expressly stated that neither a public
school system nor its property can be employed in permanent promotion of
any particular religious sect or denomination. For example, the court held
that distributing the Gideon Bibles through the public school system equals
the annual promotion and endorsement of a particular religious sect.8 5
Because public school students are being given the opportunity to attend
private religious schools with state funds, those students should not have to
be subjected to religious indoctrination. Under the OSP, using state funds to
aid sectarian institutions results in the endorsement of a particular
religion.1
8 6
Finally, the Florida Attorney General determined that a school board
could provide instructional materials purchased solely with school district
funds to private or sectarian schools for the benefit of the students without
178. Id.
179. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
180. See Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla 1971).
181. Id. at 307.
182. Nadine Strossen, Pro & Con: False Choices (visited Aug. 15, 1999) <http:ll
www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/issuel67/iteml9l3.asp> [hereinafter Pro & Con].
183. MythConceptions About School Choice (visited Aug. 15, 1999) <http.//www.
schoolchoices.org/roo/myths.htm> [hereinafter Myths].
184. Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181, 184 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1960).
185. Id. at 185.
186. FAQ's, supranote4.
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violation of Article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. 187 However, the
opinion stressed that the pubic school property still could not be used "in a
manner which would appear to place a stamp of approval upon a particular
religious practice.
Accordingly, the OSP does place ",a stamp of approval" on religion
because most private schools are overwhelmingly sectarian."' The OSP is
clearly entwined with religious worship and instruction, as OSP students will
be forced to passively participate in religious ceremonies. 19° The effect of
including religious schools in the program is that the State of Florida instills
religious ideology in Florida students. In conclusion, looking at the plain
meaning of the statute, legislative history, and case law indicate that the OSP
would violate this provision.
2. Article IX, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution
In November 1998, Florida passed a referendum that went into effect in
January 1999, establishing education as a fundamental value. Recognizing
the inherent inequalities in the educational system, Florida voters wanted to
bridge the education gap and provide higher quality education for all
children. The constitutional amendment evidences the dedication of Florida
citizenry to make education the state's highest priority, declaring:
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of
the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state
to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing
within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public
schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for
the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of
higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of
the people may require.
The OSP completely contradicts the desires of Florida voters. The OSP
blatantly ignores the state's paramount duty to make adequate provisions for
the education of all children residing within its borders by providing
187. 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 422 (1972).
188. Id. (citing Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2d
Dist. CLt. App. 1960)). The opinion also emphasized that the program must promote the general
welfare of society, be available to both public and private schools, and not relate to religious
worship or instruction. Id
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. FA. CONs. art. IX, § 1.
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vouchers to only a limited amount of students. While some students reap the
benefits, others are abandoned and destined to a low quality education.
For example, there is no guarantee that a student who is eligible for an
OSP will in fact receive a voucher.19 Since only five private schools in
Escambia county agreed to honor state vouchers, officials were forced to
hold a lottery to determine which kids would be accepted. 193 While 800
elementary students were eligible, only ninety-one expressed interest. 194 Out
of the ninety-one students that expressed interest to attend a private school,
there were only a mere sixty private school slots available. 95 As Senate
Democratic Leader Buddy Dyer notes, "[the voucher bill] will only help a
select few while it will leave thousands of students behind."'
196
Moreover, there is no evidence that indicates private school students
will necessarily receive a better education. In Milwaukee, an evaluation
shows no achievement differences between voucher students and comparable
Milwaukee Public School students. 197 In fact, subsequent research has
shown that differences in public and private school achievement levels are
insignificant and primarily attributable to factors such as differences in
student backgrounds.
The OSP is further flawed because private schools will not be subjected
to the same grading scale as public schools. 199 Therefore, they are not going
to be as accountable as public schools.2'0 Parents may be disillusioned that
private schools provide a better education. However, there is great danger
that an OSP student may attend a private school that would receive a failing
grade, resulting in the student receiving an inferior quality education. 20
Additionally, in contrast to public schools, which must accept and teach
all students, private schools may discriminate on many bases, including
mental or physical disability, IQ scores, achievement scores, income and
sexual orientation. Private schools also may refuse to admit children in need
of special services, such as remedial education.a Therefore, the OSP does
not facilitate uniform education for all students, but instead creates a level of
hierarchy that is governed by the religious schools.
203
192. Wasson, supra note 107.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Kennedy, supra note 34.
197. WEAC, supra note 163.
198. IR
199. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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Finally, the OSP is going to drain funds from public schools, the very
institutions the plan is intended to improve. Even at a conservative estimate
of an annual $3000 per student for up to 156,000 students, for a total of
roughly $500 million, the OSP will put a heavy burden on Florida
taxpayers.2 4 Vouchers would further limit the already tight financing that
causes districts to use outdated textbooks, computers, and increase class
sizes. As one critic notes, "[flunds allocated to pay for vouchers inevitably
come out of the overall public school budget. In a time of shrinking state
revenues and substantial cuts in federal education assistance, it makes little
sense to expropriate precious resources from the public schools and give
them to private schools." ' 5 The OSP will only continue to perpetuate the
dehabilitation of impoverished public schools, while continuing to elevate
private school education.
Governor Bush should look to the failures of other voucher programs,
in order to prevent the same mistakes from occurring in Florida's public
education system. For example, in the 1998-99 school year, about 6000
Milwaukee students received vouchers worth about $5000 each, for a total
cost of about twenty-nine million dollars.2' This created a net loss, of
twenty-two million dollars to the public schools. As the OSP continues to
mushroom, the Florida public school system will be subjected to the same
funding epidemic as other more limited voucher programs, forcing schools to
function on depleted funds and resources. 0
3. Article IX, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution
Finally, Article IX, section 6, sets forth the limitations on
appropriations of state school funds stating, "[t]he income derived from the
state school fund shall, and the principal of the fund may, be a propriated,
but only to the support and maintenance of free public schools." The OSP
unconstitutionally calls for the use of state school funds to be used for more
than just the support and maintenance of free public schools. 210 Since the
plan does not limit how long a student can participate in the OSP, the state
may end up completely financing a student's entire private school
education. 1 Instead of focusing on improving and investing in the public
204. FAQs, supra note 4.
205. Cirelli, supra note 1, at 494.
206. Emerging Track Record, supra note 66.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. FLA. CONST. art IX, § 6.
210. Holmes, supra note 5.
211. See id.
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school the student was originally assigned to, the OSP focuses more energy
and finances into keeping the student enrolled at a private institution.
IV. COMPARING VOUCHER PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO THE
OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
When the Supreme Court recently refused to resolve the national debate
over the constitutionality of voucher 2rograms, voucher advocates
proclaimed victory for voucher legislation.21 The Court declined to hear a
challenge over the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's decision to uphold the
MPCP, one of the few publicly funded school voucher programs in the
nation to allow participation by religious schools. 213 Voucher supporters'
excitement, however, is premature and relatively unfounded since the Court
did not validate vouchers. 1 4 While voucher proponents, including Governor
Bush, have galvanized their political efforts to promote school choice, they
should instead focus on the consistent failures and disappointments that have
resulted from the application of such programs.
A. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program v. The Opportunity
Scholarship Program
While the OSP and the MPCP may have some similarities, there are
some inherent differences in their statutory construction. Regardless, the
MPCP is indicative of the failure of the voucher concept.215 The MPCP was
216initially limited in purpose and scope. The program was created to help
prevent city schools from failing its poorest students. To qualify, parents
218
must live below the established poverty level. In the firstyear, only six
schools and 300 former public school students participated. Each student
gets about $4900 for use at private and parochial schools. Although the
MPCP started as limited in its application, the program's enrollment has
mushroomed well beyond initial expectations, causing havoc in the
Milwaukee public school system.220
212. See generally Establishment Clause, supra note 149.
213. Id. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998). See generally Waggoner,
supra note 29, at 165 (1996) (discussing the MPCP in detail).
214. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 602.
215. See Cirelli, supra note 1, at 486.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at486.
219. Id.
220. FAQs, supra note 4.
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In comparison, the OSP was designed to prevent Florida's students
from being trapped in failing schools.22 At its creation, the OSP was
applicable to 800 students. 22 Under the OSP, to be eligible for a voucher,
parents' income is irrelevant.223 Each student gets approximately $3500 for
use at private and parochial schools. 224 However, by the 2000 school year,
169 public schools could potentially be labeled failed schools. Another 1000
could be considered dangerously close to failing.225 The lessons learned
from the failures of the MPCP foreshadow the imminent collapse of
Florida's public school system.
Although some claim that vouchers have revitalized the Milwaukee
school system, it has not been the answer for which most educators and
politicians have been looking for. Many former supporters are extremely
disappointed over the results of the voucher program. Annette Polly
Williams, the democratic Wisconsin assemblywoman who sponsored the
nation's first publicly funded private school voucher system, is irate over the
results of the MPCP.226 She is furious over the business community's
attempts to exploit the vouchers, by expanding the program to include the
wealthiest parents: "We wanted parental choice. They're talking about
school choice. And when you're talking about school choice, you're not
talking about parents selecting schools, you're talking about schools
selecting parents." 2t 7
Moreover, as the MPCP has expanded, many participants have suffered
greatly. Funding for public schools has deteriorated,/ meanwhile, several
voucher schools have been forced to shut down and are under investigation
for misappropriation of funds.229 There is a desperate need for more
regulation and accountability of voucher programs, yet, many schools in
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. FAQ's, supra note 4.
226. Analisa Nazareno, Expansion of voucher program drawsflak (visited July 28, 1999)
<http:llwww.tdo.comllocal1ex99/pret28VOUSIDE-CMP-NWS.htn>.
227. Id.
228. In Milwaukee, statistics indicate that in the 1996-97 school year, voucher school
received about $1000 more per student than comparable public schools. Emerging Track
Record, supra note 66.
229. Five voucher schools have been forced to shut their doors. Two of the voucher
schools owe back wages to employees. For example, both Exito Education Center and
Milwaukee Preparatory School closed after officials were notified that the schools had been
overpaid under the voucher program and owed the state money: Exito $88,008, and Milwaukee
Prep $111,843. The Exito closure forced parents of 61 students to find mid year alternatives for
their children; Milwaukee Prep's closure stranded another 111 children. Eric Gunn, The Inside
Story: Vouchers (visited Aug. 4, 1999) <http://www.weac.orgtnews/ sept96/vouchers.htm>.
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Milwaukee have campaigned against any legislation ensuring more
accountability.
230
Florida legislators should not make the same mistakes as the MPCP.
The OSP is more expansive than the MPCP, therefore, it has the ability to do
more damage to the public school system. Since there is no evidence that
the voucher programs will be the remedy Florida's ailing schools need,
legislators should explore other options, treating vouchers as their last resort.
It defies common sense to set forth the proposition that by draining public
funding from demoralized and underfunded public schools, that these
schools will in return be more inspired and better equipped to meet the
challenges of modem education.
B. Trends in Voucher Legislation Throughout the Country
While the MPCP is still standing, other voucher programs have not
been able to withstand constitutional muster. Courts throughout the country
have recognized that vouchers make for bad public policy and are
detrimental to the evolution of society. The OSP should be condemned to
the same fate, as courts should be watchful of the warnings of other
jurisdictions. This comment strongly suggests that both state and federal
courts should adopt the same legal reasoning as the courts in Maine and
Vermont.
On May 27, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
District upheld a Maine law that bars the state from paying students' tuition at
religious schools.231  The ruling was extremely important to voucher
opponents, as it was the highest federal court to rule on the school issue thus
far. Under the disputed Maine law, the state would pay grants directly to
qualified private educational institutions to subsidize their schooling for
families who reside in communities that do not have public secondary
schools.232 The subsidy was only granted if the institutions were "non-
sectarian" in nature.233
The landmark decision stated that there is no binding precedent for the
proposition that direct payment of tuition by the state to a private sectarian
school is constitutionally permissible.z 4 Moreover, the court warned that
history indicates entanglement of church and state is "oppressive to religious
freedom. ' 235 The court stated in absolute terms that it is impermissible to have
230. Id.
231. Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999).
232. Id. at 59.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 61 n.5 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756,760 (1973)).
235. Id. at 61.
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broad sponsorship of religious schools.236 In failing to warrant that state aid be
used specifically for "secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes," the
statute granted invalid direct aid. 7  The court noted the confusion over
distinguishing direct and indirect aid and relied on the reasoning in Nyquist,
stating:
This dichotomy between direct and indirect aid is a recurring theme
throughout Establishment Clause litigation. Although not all cases
fit neatly within this formula, and this somewhat tenuous
distinction has been the subject of considerable criticism by
academia, it is the closest thing that we have to a workable bright
line rule, or that perhaps is possible.38
The court concluded its Establishment Clause argument by stating that
government aid should not be extended to parents who send their children to
religious institutions because it would create a "breach in the wall separating
the State from secular establishments."23 9 Moreover, the court called upon
the Supreme Court to determine the scope of direct aid to religious
institutions.240 Until the Supreme Court resolves the issue, voucher programs
should follow the same reasoning and be deemed unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the OSP does not meet the constitutional requirements as it
imposes direct benefits to religious schools.
The Supreme Court of Vermont was called upon to consider the
constitutional implications of Vermont statutes authorizing school districts
"to provide high school education to their students by paying tuition for
nonpublic schools selected by their parents."241 The controversy arose over
a parochial high school where the secular and sectarian aspects of its
educational program were intertwined. 242 The court held that the tuition
scheme transgressed the Vermont Constitution because when it reimbursed
236. Strout, 178 F.3d at 61.
237. l at 62.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 64.
240. Id.
241. Chittenden Town Sch. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 541 (Vt. 1999).
Similar to the OSP, the statute provided that parents could chose sectarian or non-sectarian
schools. Id. at 541.
242. Id. at 542. The Mount Saint Joseph Academy statement of philosophy depicted that
the curriculum included not only traditional scholastics, but moral and religious education,
stating, "[we] believe that learning occurs in an atmosphere where faith and community are
emphasized and overtly practiced." Id.
1999]
496
Nova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol24/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
tuition for sectarian schools, the school district failed to instill adequate
safeguards against the use of such funds for religious worship.
243
Additionally, the court left the question of whether "unfettered parental
choice between the public funding source and the educational provider will
eliminate any First Amendment objection to the flow of public money to
sectarian education" to the United States Supreme Court.2 4 The court found
for the purpose of the Vermont Constitution, parental choice only disguised
the fact that the true choice was in the hands of the private schools.245
Moreover, in dicta, the court noted that it found the reasoning in Jackson v.
Benson, the controversial Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling that upheld a
voucher program, unpersuasive. 246
Analogously, the OSP fails to put limitations on how sectarian schools
can distribute and use public funds and therefore should be deemed
unconstitutional. The OSP falsely leads parents to believe that they are
empowered to choose what school their children will attend. The reality is
that the OSP grants religious schools the discretion to chose what students
they deem worthy to attend.
V. CONCLUSION
The Bush/Brogan A+ Plan for Education will not make the grade.
Opportunity Scholarships are a cruel hoax that give false hope to the nation's
most disenfranchised. It is important that legislatures and the courts are not
enticed by the promises of free enterprise. American children have the right
to a high quality education that makes them competitive in the marketplace,
not victims of it. Public education should not be couched in language like
"survival of the fittest." The marketplace has failed before, and this time we
have much more to lose-our future. If the OSP is implemented, the grim
realities of voucher programs will come to the surface very quickly. This is
going to be a turning point in Florida's educational system and the courts
should look to the disappointments that have occurred in other states, to
protect Florida from the same fate. The future of Florida's public school
system is of great public importance. It is imperative that the
constitutionality and scope of voucher programs be addressed by the
Supreme Court. Florida's unprecedented voucher program would be an
ideal test case to put the voucher debate to rest. Until then, Florida students
will be condemned to a second-rate education.
243. Id. at 562.
244. Chittenden Town Sch., 738 A.2d at 563.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 559.
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VI. ADDENDUM
Five months after Florida enacted the first statewide voucher plan, the
OSP is consistently failing to make the grade. In a recent poll, voters
emphatically opposed the implementation of a voucher program in Florida
public schools. 7 As one voter proclaimed, "[o]ur taxes are paying for
public school, and if you want something other than public school, then you
should pay for it."2  Perhaps more disconcerting is the mass exodus of
teachers fleeing the state's lowest performing schools; paradoxically, the
very schools the OSP intended to save.249 One administrator notes, "[t]here
appears to be some panic around the A+ Plan, and we're having a difficult
time recruiting teachers, and we're having a difficult time holding onto
teachers. The problem arises over the reality that few educators want to
teach in a school that has already been labeled a failure?"5 1 The failure of
the OSP, should provide the impetus for the Supreme Court to deliver a
decisive ruling regarding school choice programs. Only when the Supreme
Court rises to the occasion and decides to take a final stand on this explosive
issue, will students be freed from the inferior education provided by voucher
programs.
Kelly Cohen
247. Analisa Nazareno, Poll: A Public Vote Would Put an End to Tuition Vouchers,
MIMu HERAID (Broward), Nov, 8, 1999, at 6B. The poll, conducted by the Washington,
D.C., research firm Schroth & Associates from October 28-31, found that 55 percent of voters
oppose vouchers, with a mere 38 percent supporting the concept. Id.
248. Id.
249. Daniel de Vise, A+ Plan Prompts Teacher Exodus, MIAMI HERALD (Broward),
Nov. 5, 1999, at lB.
250. Id.
251. Id. For example, 11 teachers transferred out of one failing school just a week
before classes began. At a different school, a group of 22 teaching candidates diminished to
two as soon as teachers found out the school had been branded with a D. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sarah,1 a sixty-two-year-old woman suffering from metastasized breast
cancer, is having a bedside meeting in the hospital with her oncologist. Dr.
Palmer looks at his wristwatch, clears his throat a few times, and begins,
"Now Sarah, the last treatment did not have the effect I had hoped." He
explains the technical and medical difficulties in treating her cancer, as
Sarah hangs on every word. "Doctor," Sarah interrupts, "What should I do?"
Dr. Palmer clears his throat again and looks away, "I think it is time to call
2hospice, like we discussed. There is nothing else I can do for you Sarah. Inall likelihood, your body will not last another six months."
1. This story is fictinal; however, it demonstrates the practical effects of the new 1999
legislation.
2. In this scenario, Sarah's doctor had taken the time previously to discuss her
end-of-life options. Unfortunately, in this era of managed care, these types of physician patient
discussions are rare. See generally Kathy Cerminara, Eliciting Patient Preferences in Today's
Health Care System, 4 J. PSYCHOL, PUB. POL. & LAW (forthcoming 1998) (discussing some of
the time constrains physicians face in today's market).
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Time passes, and Sarah is at home receiving hospice care. Her hospice
doctor, Dr. Neely, has not returned her phone calls, neither has Dr. Palmer.
The morphine that Dr. Palmer prescribed is inadequate for her pain. For the
past two days, Sarah has barely been able to breathe, let alone speak,
because the pain is so excruciating. Across town, Dr. Palmer receives the
message that Sarah called and is in pain. He thinks to himself, "I sent her to
hospice, there is nothing else I can do now. Besides, this is just the way it is
at the end and I already gave her a prescription for morphine." In the back of
his mind, a nagging fear lurks that if he prescribed additional morphine to
Sarah, he could be held liable if she were to die from it, or become addicted
to it.3 Dr. Palmer resolves to himself, "No, the hospice doctor can deal with
this now."
Meanwhile, Dr. Neely is sitting at his desk taking a five minute break.
He must see forty-five patients today in his busy general practice. He knows
he should call Sarah back, but thinks, "Who has time?" He never wanted to
deal with hospice patients, but the biggest health maintenance organization
payor in his practice referred her to his practice. He could not bite the hand
that feeds him and refuse to take her on as a patient. He looks at the message
and places it on the desk. He thinks to himself, "Her primary care physician
is still handling the case, I'm sure her care is adequate. If she calls again, I'll
follow up then." Meanwhile, Sarah writhes in pain.
Tragically, this story may become all too true in the near future. Recent
amendments to the Florida Statutes regulating hospice services have allowed
for general physician contracting, among other things.4 Overall, these
changes may have a detrimental impact on the quality of care that hospice
patients receive because they forever change the dynamics of the patient
physician relationship, and run counter to the hospice philosophy of care.
3. DAvID CUNDIFE, EurHANASiA Is NOT ThE ANSWER: A HOSPICE PHYSICIAN'S VIEW
115 (1992). See generally Ann Alpers, Criminal Actor Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving
the Care of the Dying, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 308 (1998) (describing some of the obstacles
physicians face when administering palliative care). On September 9, 1999 the "Pain Relief
Promotion Act" was introduced to the United States House of Representatives. This bill amends
the Controlled Substances Act to clarify that doctors may administer pain control drugs for the
legitimate purpose of aggressively managing pain even if the use of these drugs has the
unintended effect of increasing the risk of death. This bill passed the House on October 27, 1999
and is presently before the Senate for debate. UNITED STATES HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
COMM. ON THE JUDICLRY, 106th Cong. News Advisory on H.R. 2260 (Sept. 7, 1999).
4. Instead of having a staff physician as a full time employee of a hospice organization,
these amendments allow for the overall provision of hospice physician services through
contractual relationships. Audio Tape of the proposal of S.B. 1514, held by the Florida Senate
Committee on Long-Term Care and Aging (Mar. 11, 1999) (Tape is on file with Nova Law
Review and is also available by order from the Florida Senate).
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Hospice is a growing option for end-of-life care in Florida.5 The
services are intended for those who have less than six months to live and
who are medically diagnosed as suffering from a terminal illness.6 Hospice,
an approach to treating these terminally ill patients, focuses mainly on
relieving the physical symptoms of the disease, or providing palliative care.7
The approach to care is a holistic one, providing both psychological and
emotional support services to the patient and their family, while attempting
to make death as meaningful as possible for the patient. In Florida, the
legislature has recently changed the regulations governing hospice care and
that change may significantly impact the quality of care that Florida hospice
patients receive. 10
In April 1999, the Florida Legislature passed Senate Bill 1514, which
amends sections 400.605, 400.6085, and 400.609 of the Florida Statutes."
These statutes concern hospice care in Florida and how it is regulated and
operated. Senate Bill 1514 empowers the Department of Elderly Affairs12 to
create and to implement any and all regulations pertaining to hospice care in
Florida.13 In addition, the amendment also authorizes hospice organizations,
for the first time, to contract out for general physician services. Although
hospice sometimes contracted for physician services under certain
5. Health Care Financing Administration, Program Issuance, Division of Health
Standards and Quality, Transmittal Notice/All States Letter Number:. 41-97, (July 28, 1997)
[hereinafter "HCFA letter"].
6. VIRGINIA F. SENDOR & PATRICE M. O'CoNNER, HOSPICE PAuIATIvE CARE:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1 (1997).
7. Warren Wheeler, Hospice Philosophy: An Alternative to Assisted Suicide, 20 OHIO
N.U. L. REv. 755, 755 (1994). Palliative care is defined as the total care of patients whose
disease no longer responds to traditional, curative efforts. RUSSEL K. PORTENOY, New Directives
in Palliative Care, in END OF LIFE CARE IN TnE 21ST CENTURY. INCORPORATING PAIflATIVE CARE
INTO MAINSTREAM MEDICINE, 1 (Lifepath Hospice 1998). The control of pain and other
symptoms of the disease is the reason for this type of care. lM. The care strives to achieve the
best possible quality of life for terminally ill patients and their families. Id.
8. CUNDIHF, supra note 3, at 6.
9. 1999 Fla. Law ch. 99-139 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 400.605, .6085, .609 (1999)).
10. S.B. 1514, 16th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1999).
11. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-139.
12. The Florida Legislature created the Department of Elderly Affairs in 1991 in order to
protect, advise, and assist the state's elderly citizens to the fullest extent possible. Ch. 91-115, §
1, 1991 Fla. Laws 1224, 1224-25 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.41 (1993)). The Department has
the authority to plan, develop, and administer policy on programs for the elderly, and to provide a
visible agency for advocacy, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of programs for the elderly
within the state. FA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 58A-1.004(1) (1995).
13. S.B. 1514, 16th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1999).
14. FLA. STAT. §§ 400.605, .6085, .609 (1999).
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circumstances in Florida,15 these amendments expand the scope of Florida
hospices' general contracting abilities.
Hospice care, with all of its many aspects, is increasingly important to
the State of Florida since nineteen percent, or 2.7 million, of its population is
elderly, or over the age of sixty-five. 6 In 1992, roughly twenty percent of
the total number of elderly deaths in South Florida occurred within hospice
programs.' 7 Thus, any change in the regulation and operation of hospice
care is a matter of concern for a significant portion of Florida's population.
Section II of this article discusses the history and development of
hospice care and its regulations. It examines both the national and the
Florida hospice movement. Also, section II will explore some of the reasons
Florida law initially failed to allow for hospice to contract for physician
services.
Section III focuses on the reasons why the Florida Legislature changed
the hospice rules with these amendments. This section discusses issues such
as financial incentives, cost containment, and efficient administration. It
also explores the Florida Legislature's goals for hospice care and evaluates
the likelihood that these measures will succeed in achieving those goals.
Section IV examines three types of organizations that hospice could
contract with to provide physician services: managed care organizations;
physician practice management companies; and independent practitioners. It
evaluates which organization is better suited to perform this type of contract
by defining the role of each organization, and discussing the inherent
philosophical differences and similarities between these organizations and
hospice. Also, this section explores the ensuing ethical dilemmas the
physicians employed by these organizations encounter when dealing with
this type of contractual arrangement.
Section V addresses the many possible effects of this legislation, both
detrimental and positive, on the quality of care that hospice patients receive
15. 42 C.F.R. § 418.80 (1998). Section 122 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act (TEFRA) of 1982 (Pub. L. No. 97-248, enacted on Sept. 3, 1982) enacted section 1861(dd)
of the Social Security Act to expand the scope of Medicare benefits by authorizing coverage for
hospice care for terminally ill beneficiaries with a life expectancy of six months or less. 52 Fed.
Reg. 7412, 7413 (1987) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 418). Under this regulation, a hospice may use
contracted staff to meet the needs of its patients, but only when necessary to supplement hospice
employees during periods of peak patient loads or under extraordinary circumstances, not as a
general practice. 52 Fed. Reg. at 7413.
16. 12 JOSHUA M. WEINER & DAvID G. STEVENSON, LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE
ELDERLY: PROFILES OF THIRTEEN STATEs, 2 (1998).
17. BErM A. VIRNIG, Managed Care and End-of-Life Care, in END OF LIFE CARE IN THE
21ST CENTuRY: INCORPORATNG PALLIATIVE CARE nrro MAINSTREAM MEDICINE, 10 (Lifepath
Hospice 1998). In 1992, 32,950 deaths occurred among elderly Medicare beneficiaries in South
Florida; 6522 of these deaths occurred within a hospice program. Id.
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in Florida. In particular, one issue included in this section is the role of the
hospice doctor. This section compares and evaluates the type and quality of
care received before these amendments, and what is likely to ensue in the
future.
Section VI discusses some suggestions for improvement in the future
under these types of contractual arrangements. This section will explore
such issues as physician training in palliative care, interning abroad in the
birthplace of the hospice philosophy, and developing a bona fide medical
specialty in palliative care.
II. HOSPICE HISTORY
Hospice care began as one person's attempt to improve and change the
type and quality of care that terminally ill patients receive in their last stages
of life. 1 Dame Cicely Saunders, of Britain, founded the hospice movement
after sharing her views of death with a terminally ill cancer patient in her
ward.19 Hospice does not advocate any particular religion or belief.20 Indeed,
the hospice philosophy of spirituality embraces both agnostics and atheists.21
The fundamental hospice belief is that freeing the human spirit from
suffering through excellent pain and symptom management enables the
patient to redirect his or her energy toward maintaining and cultivating
relationships. 22 This fundamental belief has evolved into the hospice
philosophy, which is more of a metaphor than a particular plan of treatment
or a physical place.23 Hospice embraces the idea that care and comfort come
first, rather than cure, and strives to make the last stage of life as meaningful,
if not more so, than the other stages of life.24 The hospice philosophy
18. See Wheeler, supra note 7, at 755. Dame Cicely Saunders is the founding pioneer of
hospice philosophy in the world. Id. Trained initially as a nurse, she then received a degree in
medical social work, and she later received her degree to practice medicine. Id. In 1967, Dr.
Saunders opened St. Christopher's, the first modem day, free standing hospice. Id. at 756. She
coined the term "total pain" in reference to the emotional, mental, physical, and spiritual pain of
the terminally ill. Id.
19. Wheeler, supra note 7, at 756.
20. SENDOR & O'CoNNER, supra note 6, at 122.
21. k
22. Id. Hospice care is founded upon three basic principles: 1) a person must possess an
open mind; 2) a person must have friendship of the heart; and 3) he or she must have freedom of
spirit. Wheeler, supra note 7, at 755. They merely help the caregiver affirm to their patients that
regardless of sex, race, lifestyle, religion, or disease, the caregiver accepts them and cares about
their suffering. Id at 756.
23. Dianne Rosen, A Hospice Primer, 190 N.J. LAWYER 12, 12 (Apr. 1998).
24. Id.
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encompasses the idea that death is not the enemy; it should neither be
hastened nor postponed.2
In the United States, hospice began as a grass roots movement,
imported from England in 1973.26  In twenty-six years, the hospice
movement has grown rapidly with over 3100 hospice programs existing
nationwide.27 Of those approximately 3100 programs, Florida alone has
forty programs within its borders.2 The first few Florida hospice programs
opened their doors in the early 1970s in the Largo, Miami, and Orlando
areas.29 Since that time, Florida hospices have helped thousands of people
and their families face death in a dignified and spiritual manner.30 Over the
years, hospice has become a valued and utilized option for terminally ill
patients in Florida.
Hospice programs are found in a variety of settings. Most hospice
programs are home-care oriented;31 however, several programs are in nursing
homes or in patient "swing" beds in hospitals.32 Approximately fourteen
hospice programs have free standing facilities in the State of Florida at this
time.33 However, all of the care hospice patients receive in these alternative
settings34 is coordinated under the direction of the hospice interdisciplinary
25. Courtney S. Campbell et al., Conflicts of Conscience: Hospice and Assisted Suicide,
HAINGS CENTER REPORT 36, 37 (May-June 1995).
26. Wheeler, supra note 7, at 756.
27. National Hospice Organization, Hospice Fact Sheet (last modified Spring 1999)
<http://www.nho.org> [hereinafter "Hospice Fact Sheet"].
28. Senate Staff and Economic Impact Statement, S.B. 1514, 16th Legis. Sess., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 1999) (last modified Sept. 1999) <http://www.leg.state.fl.us>.
29. Telephone Interview with Lynne Mulder, Executive Director, Florida Hospices and
Palliative Care, Inc. (Aug. 12, 1999).
30. VmNIG, supra note 17, at 10 and accompanying text.
31. Wheeler, supra note 7, at 757. The hospice team makes all efforts to keep the patient
home in order to be the most comfortable. FLA. STAT. § 400.609 (2) (1999). However,
sometimes the family members need a break from caring for the patient or the patient requires a
higher intensity of care not available in the home setting. SENDOR & O'CONNER, supra note 6, at
36. Then the patient is transferred to an in patient facility to receive care. Id.
32. See id. Most beds in an in patient facility are given a specific purpose, i.e. intensive
care beds, geriatric beds, maternity beds, etc. However, in an in patient setting, when a patient
opts to elect hospice care that bed "swings" from its original purpose, i.e. oncology, to a hospice
bed.
33. Telephone Interview with Robert O'Conner, Vice President of Marketing,
Communications, and Membership, National Hospice Organization (Aug. 3, 1999).
34. Alternative settings refer to any in patient setting that is not the patient's home. It
includes nursing homes, skilled nursing facilities, in patient hospital beds, and adult family care
homes. See infra note 43, and accompanying text.
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team, which includes nurses, social workers, clergy, and physicians. 35 The
services the hospice interdisciplinary team directly provides are nursing
services, pastoral or counseling services, dietary counseling, and
36bereavement services. The team meets on a regular schedule to review,
revise, and update each patient's care plan.37 The team may now contract
out for physician services, along with other core services, 38 if hospice
requires it in general or during peak times.39  All of these services are
available to patients and their family members twenty-four hours per day,
seven days per week.40
E. TIME FOR CHANGE
Florida Senate Bill 1514 amends sections 400.605, 400.6085, and
400.609 of the Florida Statutes to allow the Department of Elderly Affairs a
larger role in regulating hospice standards.4 1 This amendment also allows
hospice organizations to contract out for physician services rather than
employing their own physicians.42 This section explores the many different
reasons Florida changed two major provisions of its hospice rules and the
goals the legislature wanted to achieve.
35. Ch. 99-139, § 2, 1999 Fla. Laws 811, 812 (codified at FRA. STAT. § 400.6085
(1999)). Hospice utilizes the services of an interdisciplinary team in order to fulfill all aspects of
the patient's total pain. Id.
36. Ch. 99-139, § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws 811, 812-14 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 400.609
(1)(A) (1999)).
37. SENoR & O'CONNER, supra note 6, at 141. A patient care plan is a condition of
participation if the hospice wants to receive Medicare remuneration for its services. 42 C.F.R. §
418.58 (1998). The plan must consist of an assessment of the patient's needs and identify the
services required, including pain management and symptom relief. It discuss in detail the scope
and frequency of services required in order to meet the patient's and the family's needs. §
418.58(c).
38. The core services consist of: 1) direct professional nursing services in the home
setting, 2) physician services for medical consultation and for the general medical care of the
patients to the extent that such needs are not met by the patient's own primary care physician; 3)
medical social services; 4) counseling, including "anticipatory grief"; and 5) bereavement
support, nutritional/dietary counseling. SENDOR & O'CONNER, supra note 6, at 144-45.
39. Ch. 99-139, § 3, 1999 Fla. Law 811, 812-14 (codified atFLA. STAT. § 400.609(1)(A)
(1999)).
40. Id.
41. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-139 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 400.605, .6085, .609 (1999)).
42. Id. See also Audio Tape of the proposal of S.B. 1514 held by the Florida Senate
Committee on Long Term Care and Aging (Mar. 11, 1999) (tape available by order from the
Florida Senate).
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A. The Department of Elderly Affairs
Initially, individual nursing homes, skilled nursing facilities, and adult
family care centers43 performed and set their own quality assurance
standards and disaster preparedness plans that encompassed hospice patients
present in these facilities.44 Presently, the Department of Elderly Affairs
("DOEA") has rule-making authority with respect to hospice standards and
procedures relating to license requirements, administrative management of a
hospice, and components of a patient plan of care.45 It oversees advance
directives and do not resuscitate orders, the provision of hospice care in
alternate settings, physical plant standards for hospice residential units,
disaster preparedness plans, quality assurance and utilization review
committees, and the collection of hospice data. 46  Earlier, it was the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") 47 that once
oversaw the professional licensure requirements of hospice organizations.
48
Probably, because hospice deals with health issues and receives most of its
remuneration from Medicare,49 a public health benefit, its governance was
initially assigned to HRS. 50 HRS was probably the best agency at that time
to handle the needs and requirements of hospice.
Florida delegated this additional authority for rule-making to the DOEA
in order to foster a more efficient administration. Since nineteen percent of
hospice deaths take place in nursing homes and skilled nursing facilities, 51 it
follows to allow the organization that generally regulates and sets the
standards for skilled nursing facilities and nursing homes to regulate the
43. The Florida Statutes define an adult family care home as "a full-time, family-type
living arrangement, in a private home, under which a person who owns or rents the home
provides room, board, and personal care, on a 24-hour basis, for no more than five disabled adults
or frail elders who are not relatives." FLA. STAT. § 400.618(2) (1999).
44. See Senate Staff Analysis, supra note 28, at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. In 1996, the same year as the Florida Legislature created the DOEA, it broke apart
HRS, creating the Department of Children and Families and reorganizing the rest under the
Department of Health. Senator William G. 'Doc' Myers Public Health Act of 1996, ch. 96-403,
1996 Fla. Laws 2642 (1996).
48. Ch. 93-179, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 1211, 1215 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 400.605(4)
(1995)).
49. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OIfICE, MEDICARE: IMPROPRIETIES BY
CONTRACrORS COMPROMIsED MEDICARE PRoGRAM INrF RrrY, GAO/OSI-99-7, at 4 (July 1999).
50. Since the Florida Legislature created the Department of Elderly Affairs in 1991, it is
likely that HRS was the only administrative agency equipped at the time to deal with regulating
hospice when hospice initially entered the State. Ch. 91-115, § 1, 1991 Fla. Laws, 1224, 1224-
25 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.41 (1993)).
51. Hospice Fact Sheet, supra note 27.
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aspect of hospice care present in these alternative settings. Also, since such
a large portion of hospice patients are age sixty-five and over in Florida,
52
the DOEA is the best administrative agency to coordinate all the different
end-of-life choices available to terminally ill patients. To assign this
responsibility elsewhere would result in duplicative administrative services
and wasteful utilization of resources.53 This aspect of the new amendments
to the Florida Statutes will probably have a beneficial effect on the care
received by Florida hospice patients.
B. Physician Contracting
Until July 1, 1999, hospices in Florida could not contract out for
general physician services.54 Physician services were, and are, part of the
core services that make up the interdisciplinary team.55 Hence, physician
services have always been an integral part of hospice care. The issues facing
the medical community when hospice began in this country in 19736 are
incredibly different from the issues facing it today. Managed care was
basically a novelty in 1973; thus, it was more efficient and practical for
hospice organizations to employ their own physicians. Most likely, the laws
were written in context with the times as the Florida Statutes never
expressly prohibited physician contracting, but omitted it, until now.
The supply of doctors able to work solely for a hospice organization
may be another reason which contributed to why the hospice statutes omitted
contracting out for physician services. With the increase in hospice services
in the past twenty years, the need for doctors willing to provide palliativecare has grown exponentially. Therefore, it is a reasonable conclusion that
52. See VmNG, supra note 17, at 10.
53. For example, since the DOEA already regulates the standards for nursing homes and
skilled nursing facilities in general, to have another department regulate hospice in these settings
would result in two different administrative agencies providing the same services, but in relation
to different patients, in one facility. It is much more efficient if only one agency regulated all the
care rendered in one setting.
54. FLRA STAT. § 400.609 (1999).
55. SENDOR & O'CoNNER, supra note 6, at 144.
56. Wheeler, supra note 7, at 756.
57. For example, in 1973 health maintenance organizations were just introduced to the
public consciousness in an effort to increase efforts to manage and finance care. See Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-e-14a (1994). In contrast, in 1999
the Federal Legislature is struggling with developing a patient's bill of rights as a direct result of
the managed care influence in medicine. Patient Bill of Rights, S. 2529, 105th Cong. (1998).
58. Hospice Fact Sheet, supra note 27.
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contracting may serve as a solution to the shortage of doctors able to provide
full time palliative services in a hospice facility.
Additionally the Florida Legislature amended the statutes to comport
with federal law. However, instead of harmonizing the state law with the
federal law, Florida expanded the scope of hospices' contracting abilities.
61
The federal law permits hospice organizations to contract out for physician
services, but only during periods of peak patient loads or under extraordinary
62circumstances. Now, however, the amendment broadens the statute to
include contracting for physician services in general.63 Physician contractinA
in general will aid in keeping hospice operating costs to a minimum.
Eighty-two percent of managed care plans6P offer hospice services.6 Since
Medicare and managed care plans pay a hospice organization one flat fee for
all the services, including physician services,67 it is vei important to keep
costs down. Full time physician services are expensive and a contract with
a physician group or managed care organization is one way a hospice
provider can lower its operating costs.
C. The Florida Legislature's Goals
The legislature's goals in respect to this bill are twofold. 69 First, the
goal of the legislature in regard to this bill is to expand the DOEA's rule-
59. However, flaws with these types of relationships will be discussed further in sections
IV and V, infra.
60. Telephone Interview with Cam Fientriss, Florida Legislative Consultant (July 12,
1999).
61. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-139 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 400.605, .6085, .609 (1999)).
See infra note 15, and accompanying text.
62. 42 C.F.R. § 418.80 (1998).
63. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-139.
64. Physicians receive one of the top salaries in the world. MARC A. RoDWIN, MEMICnE,
MoNEY, AND MORALS 5 (1993). For example, a physician's average annual income in 1990 was
$155,800 and $164,300 in 1991, about seven times the average salary. Id.
65. See infra note 75, and accompanying text for definition of managed care.
66. Hospice Fact Sheet, supra note 27.
67. Rosen, supra note 23, at 13. See generally, Joe Baker, Medicare Nuts and Bolts,
263 PulEsr 65 (May 1998) (reviewing the various payment arrangements founds when dealing
with Medicare).
68. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
69. Legislative intent was scarce regarding this bill. The only information regarding this
intent was furnished by the DOEA in a short two-paragraph synopsis. Department of Elder
Affairs, Explanatory provision of proposed Senate Bill 1514 (Fla.1999) [hereinafter 'DOEA'].
Interestingly, the legislature conducted no real debate on the issues and not one mention was
made of any of the conflicts presented in this article. In addition, the bill passed unanimously in
the Florida Senate and the House of Representatives. Journal for the Florida Senate, Vote Report
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making authority for hospice. As discussed, the amendments definitely
accomplish this goal both in theory and in practical application. The DOEA
is granted rule-making authority over physical plant standards for hospice
residential and in patient facilities and hospice standards in nursing homes,
assisted living facilities, and adult family care homes.71
Second, the amendments were to provide statutory clarification in
regard to the role of nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and adult
family care homes in the provision of hospice services. 72  The practical
application of this bill allows for hospice to provide all the services to a
terminally ill patient in a nursing home or other facility that it normally
would provide if that patient were in his or her own home.73 This translates
into confining the nursing home or alternate facility staff to its proper role.
Although the hospice assumes full responsibility for the management of the
hospice patient's care that is related to the terminal illness, the nursing
facility still retains the responsibility for providing the custodial, residential,
and other types of care required. Thus, the proper interpretation and
impact of this bill is quite narrow and limits itself solely to the provision of
palliative and comfort care at the end of life.
IV. WITH WHAT TYPE OF ORGANIZATION WILL HOSPICE CONTRACT TO
PROVIDE PHYSICIAN SERVICES?
The type of organization that a hospice contracts with to provide its
physician services is extremely important. The type of organization will
define the type of relationship between the hospice and the contracting
organization, thereby defining the relationship between the hospice patient
76
and the contracted doctor. Managed care, in general, has greatlyinfluenced, and indeed shaped, the way physicians practice medicine today.
for S.B. 1514, 39:0:1 (Mar. 30, 1999). Journal for the House of Representatives, Vote Report for
S.B. 1514,116:0:4 (Apr. 8,1999).
70. DOEA, supra note 69.
71. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-139 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 400.605, .6085, .609 (1999)).
DOEA Letter, supra note 69.
72. DOEA, supra note 69.
73. HCFA letter, supra, note 5, at 3.
74. Id,
75. Letter from Anna Cam Fentriss, Florida Legislative Consultant, to Jennifer Pender,
Nova Southeastern University, Junior Staff Member, Nova Law Review, (July 22, 1999) (on file
with the author).
76. Managed Care is any type of intervention in health care that offers alternate means of
delivery and finance with the goal of eliminating inappropriate care and thereby reducing costs.
Deven C. McGraw, Note, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians Be Required
to Disclose These to Patients?, 83 GEo. L.J. 1821, 1825 (1995).
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For example, managed care curbed the fee-for-service ("FFS") environment
previously utilized-where a payor paid a doctor directly for the services
rendered-by limiting doctor self-interest by destroying the tendency to
order unnecessary tests and referrals.77 However, the pendulum has swung
back, and now financial incentives exist for doctors not to refer or treat
patients in order to control costs. 78 The key difference is that in an FFS
arrangement, the health insurance is paid individually for every service
rendered, while now, in the era of managed care, the physician is paid one
fee to care for all of the patient's health care needs.79
Before this section explores the types of organizations from which
hospice has to choose, the role of the hospice physician must be examined. A
hospice physician has many various time consuming duties.80 For example,
a hospice physician may make house calls, and must coordinate and oversee
the palliative care rendered by the primary care physician. 81 Also, the
hospice physician evaluates the patient for ongoing and new problems,
prescribes medication, monitors symptoms, makes appropriate referrals, and
communicates at length with the patient about his or her condition and all
82the options from which the patient may choose. The landscape of managed
care does not make for easy bedfellows with hospice.
In this era of managed care, hospice has many choices of organizations
with which to contract,8 however, three choices predominate and this article
77. Peter B. Jurgeleit, Note, Physician Employment Under Managed Care: Toward a
Retaliatory Discharge Cause of Action for HMO-Affiliated Physicians, 73 IND. L. 255, 262
(1997).
78. Kate T. Christensen, Ethically Important Distinctions Among Managed Care
Organizations, 23 J. L. MED. & ETrHcs 223, 224 (1995).
79. McGraw, supra note 76, at 1823.
80. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-139 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 400.605, .6085, .609 (1999)).
In addition to these varied state standards, the hospice physician must meet the general medical
needs of the patients to the extent that the primary physician does not meet those needs, in order
to qualify for Medicare reimbursement. 42 C.F.R. § 418.86 (1998).
81. SENDOR & O'CoNNER, supra note 6, at 120.
82. Id. at 113.
83. For instance, the hospice may contract with an independent physician association
(IPA), which is a group of independent physicians that contract with a health maintenance
organization at a capitated, or set monthly fee in exchange for providing services. Christensen,
supra note 78, at 224. The hospice may also choose to contract with a preferred physician
organization (PPO) as another choice. In this type of arrangement, the doctor receives a dis-
counted FFS in exchange for providing services. Id. A group model health maintenance organi-
zation (Group HMO) is a physician group that contracts with a managed care organization to pro-
vide medical services in exchange for one capitated rate paid to the physician group out of which
salaries are paid with various incentives. Id. However, when this article refers to a Managed
Care Organization, included within this reference is all of the above mentioned organizations,
since all pay physicians financial incentives of one sort or another to control costs.
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explores each of the three individually: managed care organizations;
physician practice management companies; and independent practitioners.
A. Corporate Based Managed Care Organizations
A managed care organization ("MCO") is an organization "structured to
promote quality and access while restraining costs." MCOs provide medi-
cal care to subscribers by using a pre-chosen panel of physicians in exchange
for a monthly fee.85 MCOs are part of a system of health care delivery that
aims at constraining the physician's management of care in order to attain
some stated purpose. 86 Usually, that stated purpose is cost control and profit
while still providing quality care.87 Thus, a hospice could contract with an
MCO to provide physician services to its patients by paying a monthly fee.
By contracting with an MCO, a hospice would effectively shift the
burden of providing physician services and the risk of losing money on that
provision of care to the MCO.88 The hospice would experience cost savings
through this contract as compared to employing a physician because the flat
fee paid every month would be at a discounted rate.89 Additionally, if the
hospice organization decides to contract with an MCO for physician
services, it could work out that the patient's primary care physician becomes
his or her hospice physician.9° Arrangements like these would be beneficial
to hospice patients in that they would not need to change physicians so close
to the time of their death. Also, the patient's care could be managed by one
physician instead of both the primary care physician and the hospice
physician, thereby making the care more efficient. 91  However, this
arrangement in practice will be rare. The probability that the hospice will
contract with the exact MCO that contracts with the patient's primary care
physician is slim at best.
84. GEORGEJ. ANNAS Er AL, AMEmCAN HEALTH LAW 780 (1990).
85. RoDwiN, supra note 64, at 138.
86. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Managed Care at the Bedside: How Do We Look in the
Moral Mirror?, 7 KENNEXY INsT. OFETHCS J. 321,322 (1997).
87. Id
88. From this flat fee the MCO must pay the doctor, provide the care, and make a profit.
See RODWIN supra note 64, at 136.
89. Seeid
90. See iL at 138.
91. Usually, the primary care physician utilizes the hospice physician as a consultant on
palliative care issues. However, it is the hospice physician that has complete control over how
the patient's symptoms are managed. SENDOR & O'CONNER, supra note 6, at 120. If the primary
care physician is not adequately providing palliative care, it is the duty of the hospice physician to
step in and render the appropriate care. 42 C.F.R. § 418.86 (1998).
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However, other non-monetary costs are at stake if a hospice contracts
with an MCO: ethical dilemmas exist. First, each physician that the MCO
assigns to the "hospice rotation" is essentially an employee of that MCO.9
Financially, the physician depends upon his or her relationship with the
MCO, because he or she accepts money in exchange for the service to the
MCO, i.e., providing medical care at an appropriate price.93 Most MCOs, in
turn, shift all or part of their financial risk onto the physicians providing the
care.94 The effect of all this shifting is to bias physician judgment and lead
doctors to deny needed medical services.95
Additionally, this type of arrangement divides loyalties. The hospice
patients will not be the only patients for whose care the doctor is respons-
ible.96 The amount of time and monitoring that the hospice patient requires
from thephysician will be a difficult need to fulfill in the middle of a busy
practice. Also, MCOs use many different financial incentives to decrease
the utilization of expensive treatment options.98 The most infamous and dis-
graceful are the gag rules. Gag rules prevent enrolees from being made
aware that they have been denied a specific service or treatment and do not
make them aware of their appeal rights.99 Some MCOs prohibit their
physicians from informing patients about treatments that are not contained in
92. Pellegrino, supra note 86, at 324; Robert I. Field, New Ethical Relationships Under
Health Care's New Structure: The Need For A New Paradigm, 43 VIuL L. REV. 467, 476
(1998). Although many doctors are traditional employees of the Managed Care Organization,
many are independent contractors. However, many of the same pressures apply. For further
discussion of the dilemmas faced by independent practitioners, see section IV(C).
93. Pellegrino, supra note 86, at 324. The doctor experiences increased financial
dependence upon the MCO if a large percentage of the patients in his or her practice belong to
that MCO. See id
94. RODWIN, supra note 64, at 141.
95. Marc A. Rodwin, Managed-Care and Consumer Protection: What are the Issues?,
26 SErON HALL L. REv. 1007, 1012 (1996).
96. Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties
and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241,251 (1995).
97. See id at 242. Although not in a hospice setting, 18% of physicians are already
concerned about their ability to provide the care they think their patients need and 29% of
physicians are concerned about their ability to spend sufficient time with patients. KAREN SCOTT
CouiNs Er AL, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND SURVEY OF PHYSICiAN
EXPERIENCES wrrH MANAGED CARE, 3 (Mar. 1997).
98. Some common financial incentives include: bonus payments from unspent funds
and withholding portions of income which may be paid at the end of the year, depending on the
physician's overall cost containment. Christensen, supra note 78, at 224.
99. Joe Baker, Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations: Nuts and Bolts, 253
PLVESr 99, 113 (1997).
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the MCO protocol.1°° Although this practice is prohibited by federal rule,
the remnants of the practice, hidden in financial incentives, still exist101 For
instance, if a patient is not informed of a treatment option because it is too
expensive and the financial incentive induces the physician's self-interest,
the end result is the same. The patient is uninformed and any right the
patient may have had to appeal the treatment decision is moot.' Hence, if
hospice organizations in Florida choose to contract with MCOs to provide
physician services, they must understand that they may be putting their
patients' comfort at risk because the philosophy and mechanics of hospice
are inherently different from those of an MCO.
B. Physician Practice Management Companies or Professionally Based
Managed Care Organizations.
Physician practice management companies ("PPMCs") are a subpart of
managed care; however, they have one key feature different from the rest:
physicians serve as top administrators.1°3 This key difference affects the
organizational culture and the vision and goals of an organization'0 4 A
typical PPMC develops, integrates, and manages health care delivery
systems. 105 Usually, these groups employ some of the same financial strate-
gies as other corporate based MCOs and they accept remuneration from both
MCO's and traditional fee for service payors.
PPMCs provide doctors within the company many different services.
Some of these services include administrative services, claims administra-
tion, recruitment, training, and supervision of staff, enrollment, financial
record keeping and reporting, information systems, managed care contract-
ing, marketing and public relations, member services, network development,
and quality assurance.1 7 In effect, all of these services allow doctors to be
100. Iad Since diagnosing and treating pain may lead to expensive tests and specialists,
hospice patients may not receive all the care they require. See Diane E. Hoffman, Pain
Management and Palliative Care in the Era of Managed Care: Issues for Health Insurers, 26
LL. ME. & ETmcs 267,270 (1998).
101. William M. Sage, Physicians As Advocates, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1529, 1587-88
(1999).
102. Sage, supra note 101, at 1587.
103. See THOMAS M. GOREY, MANAGEMENT SERVICE ORGANIZATIONs: CASES AND
ANALYsIs 9 (1997).
104. See generally Dawn S. Carlson & Pamela L. Perrewe, Institutionalization of
Organizational Ethics Through Transformational Leadership, 14 J. OF Bus. ETmcs 829 (1995)
(discussing the "tickle-down" theory of leadership).
105. GOREY, supra note 103, at 9.
106. Id.
107. Iaat 6.
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doctors, and not worry about the business end of medicine. Also, by
centralizing these services, the PPMC lowers the overhead cost in providing
medical care, resulting in lower prices charged to patients, i.e., a lower price
charged to the hospice for a contract.
If a hospice organization contracts with a PPMC, the same shifting of
providing phxsician services occurs here as it does if it contracted with any
other MCO. Another similarity between this type of contract and one with
an MCO is that it may work out that the physician management group
contracted for employs the patient's primary care physician and thus, again,
the patient will not have to use another, different doctor. Again, it must be
stressed that this result is extremely unlikely. Hospice would experience
cost savings in contracting for PPMC services, rather than employing
physicians. Also, since physicians guide and develop PPMCs from their
inception, the integration and implementation of physician oriented ethics
are more likely within the organizational culture and vision. 19 Hence, the
typical organizational structure and culture of a PPMC has the potential to
complement the hospice philosophy.
However, some of the same ills that face MCOs also face PPMCs. The
company needs to make a profit in order to please its shareholders and to
continue in operation.110 Since the PPMC would only be paid one flat fee
per month for the physician services, the PPMC must find a way to contain
the costs related to this care. The PPMC could use financial incentives to
conserve health care spending that may result in a general lowering of the
quality of care and general under-treatment of hospice patients."' 1 However,
medical codes of ethics stress that physicians should consider their patients'
welfare and interests as primary, even to their own financial interests'
12
Since PPMCs have been infused with the ethics of the medical profession
since its inception, it is more likely that a physician contracted from one of
these organizations will continue to be the advocate and champion of the
patient.
C. The Independent Practitioner
An independent practitioner ("IP") is a sole doctor in his or her own
practice, or a small group of doctors practicing together with no affiliation
108. See RODWIN, supra note 64, at 136. See also Pellegrino, supra note 86, at 322 and
text accompanying note 86.
109. See Carlson, supra note 104, at 831.
110. Rodwin, supra note 95, at 1011-12.
111. Karen Visocan, Recent Changes in Medicare Managed Care: A Step Backwards for
Consumers?, 6 ELDER L.J. 31, 36-37 (1998).
112. Rodwin, supra note 96, at 246.
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with a larger organization. 13 IPs, in, general accept all types of remunera-
tion for their services. An IP is more like the traditional doctor of yesteryear
than any other discussed. A hospice that contracts with an IP will lower
operating costs by cutting out the cost of physician salaries.1 14 Also, if a
hospice contracts with an IP, the hospice could choose someone in the area
who has experience providing palliative care, thus continuing the same type
and quality of care previously provided by a trained hospice physician.
However, one physician working alone, or a small group of physicians
working together to provide the required hospice services could easily
become overwhelmed while trying to sustain a private practice that also
serves other patients. 115 Additionally, palliative care is expensive.116 The
amount of time that hospice patients require would take an IP away from his
or her profit producing patients, often resulting in a financial loss for the
physician.1 17 An arrangement such as this may result in competing interests
that the physician must balance. If a hospice decides to contract with an IP
to provide the required physician services, since the physician was the
decision-maker in accepting the contract, it is likely that the physician will
take an active role in performing and honoring his or her ethical obligations.
Hence, if a hospice decides to contract with an IP, the hospice should
consider that the philosophies of both complement one another.
V. PossIBLE EFFECrS OF THIS LEGISLATION ON THE QUALITY OF CARE OF
FLORIDA HOSPICE PATIENTS
Currently, no medical specialty in palliative care exists in the United
States. 1' However, palliative medicine is a recognized specialty of medicinein countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.119
113. An independent contractor is "[o]ne who makes an agreement with another to do a
piece of work, retaining in himself control of the means, method, and manner of producing the
result to be accomplished, neither party having the right to terminate the contract at will."
Heffner v. White, 45 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 1942).
114. Usually these contracts are entered at a discounted fee that is less than the average
physician-employee salary. See RODWIN, supra note 64, at 5 and accompanying text.
115. See SENDOR & O'CONNER, supra note 6, at 113; See generally Rodwin, supra note
95, at 1012.
116. GERALVINE SCHECHTER, Professionalism in Providing End-Of-Life Care, in CARING
FOR THE DYING: IDENTIFICATION AND PROMOTION OF PHYSICIAN CoMPETENCY, 5 (The American
Board of Internal Medicine 1996).
117. See id.
118. See UNrrED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFCE, SUICIDE PREvENTIoN: EFFORTS
TO INCREASE RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN PALLIATVE CARE, GAO/HEHS-98-128 at 25 (Apr.
1998) [hereinafter "GAO"].
119. PORTENOY, supra note 7, at 2.
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Nonetheless, few continuing education courses exist in the United States to
help train physicians in the goals and methods of palliative care.'
20
Therefore, the only training many physicians receive in end-of-life care is
experience. Indeed, many physicians who worked in hospice settings have
opted to become full time hospice doctors in order to provide more hands-on
care to terminally ill patients and to learn the finer points of palliative
medicine. 12 1 The lack of this training will likely have significant impact on
the quality of care Florida hospice patients receive.
When a hospice contracts with an organization for physician services,
whether an MCO or a PPMC, the impact on patient care could be significant.
The first issue that surfaces is that since most physicians have little or no
palliative care training, the situation will be one of the blind leading the
blind. If the hospice physician is under a duty to act as a consultant to the
patient's primary care physician on palliative care issues, 122 how can the
hospice physician instruct and monitor the primary care physician's
palliative treatments if he or she has no palliative care training? Indeed, it
will be nearly impossible for the hospice physician to fulfill his or her duty
to step in and resume control over the patient's palliative care should the
primary care physician's treatments prove inadequate,' 23 when the hospice
physician can barely define what is adequate palliative care. The lack of
palliative care knowledge and skills with which to treat terminal illnesses in
the vast majority of physicians is a disgrace. 124  More often than not,
inadequate pain relief is caused by the physician's reluctance to use the
medications aggressively enough to alleviate the patient's pain.125 This can
affect patient care because it results in substandard care for almost all
terminally ill patients and may evoke the desire to hasten death in a few.'2
120. GAO, supra note 118, at 11.
121. SENDOR& O'CONNER, supra note 6, at 120.
122. Id. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
123. SENDOR & O'CoNNER, supra note 6, at 120.
124. CUNDIFF, supra note 3, at 8. However, national attention has focused on this lack of
training in palliative care as a result of the recent debates concerning physician-assisted suicide.
Consequently, the availability of literature addressing this subject has increased. For example,
whole symposium issues of scholarly journals are dedicated to the subject of palliative care. See
Symposium, Legal and Regulatory Issues in Pain Management and More, 24 AM. J. L. & MED.
267 (Winter 1998). Additionally The Pain Relief Promotion Act has recently been introduced to
Congress. One of its major provisions concerns funding for education and training in Palliative
Care. H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (199).
125. John Glasson, Report of the Council on the Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Association, 10 IssuEs L. & MED. 91, 94 (1994); Hoffman, supra note 100, at
283.
126. CUNDIFF, supra note 3, at 9. The relation of hospice as an alternative to physician-
assisted suicide, or euthanasia, has been written about extensively. See generally CUND'FF supra
note 3; INsIrTE OF MEDICINE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE
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A second issue resulting from these amendments that could impact the
quality of care that the Florida hospice patient receives is physician time
constraints. Compared with three years ago, forty-one percent of physicians
report a decrease in the amount of time they spend with patients.
127
Considering this decrease, it may be impossible for a contracted hospice
physician to fulfill his or her obligation to treat for pain and symptom
control with the same degree of urgency and intensity as the hospice patient
deserves and requires.'2 Thus, the assembly line physician care component
in the hospice setting may result from this legislation.
The typical physician reaction to death is another issue resulting from
these amendments that could significantly impact the quality of care that
patients in Florida hospices receive. All of a general physician's instincts
and training focus on reversing the deadly progress of the disease thereby
returning the patient to good health. When a physician finally realizes that
the patient will die from the disease, he or she tends to withdraw under the
assumption that there is nothing else to offer.12 9 In addition, the physician
may interpret the death of a patient as a professional and personal failure.
130
General physicians are not trained to deal with their natural reactions to
death. Therefore, with the time pressures facing doctors in these times of
managed care, physicians may give in to these instincts to withdraw with
relief as a natural reaction to the impending death of the patient.
The competing interests discussed in section IV make up the fourth
issue that may impact the quality of care Florida hospice patients receive in
these types of contractual arrangements. These competing interests translate
into potential for a compromised patient physician relationship, If a
physician is struggling with an ethical dilemma caused by the clash of two
philosophies inherently juxtaposed to one another, the impact on the patient
physician relationship, s l and thus on the quality of care received, is
substantial. The physician may decide to cut comers to save time, or view as
(1997) [hereinafter "INSTrrum OF MEDICIME"]; Ira R. Byock, Kevorkian: Right Problem, Wrong
Solution, THm WASmNGToN POsT, Jan. 17, 1994, at A23.
127. CouNS, supra note 97, at 7.
128. See SENDOR & O'CONNER, supra note 6, at 105.
129. See CUNDIF, supra note 3, at 11.
130. ClRSTNE K. CASSEL, Overview on Attitudes of Physicians Toward Caring for the
Dying Patient, in CARING r-OR TiE DYING: IDENTIFICATION AND PROMOTION OF PHYSICIAN
COMPETENCY, 1 (The American Board of Internal Medicine 1996).
131. For an insightful analysis of the different components of the physician-patient
relationship, see Ezekiel L Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the Physician-Patient
Relationship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323, 323 (1995). Six C's summarize the
ideal physician-patient relationship: choice, competence, communication, compassion, continuity,
and (no) conflict of interest. Id.
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elective, expensive tests that he or she once viewed as essential. 12 Even if
the patient sustains no physical harm, the physician's financial incentives
have the ability to erode patient trust.133 For example, the patient may
second guess every treatment provided by the physician and wonder whether
he or she is being denied care as a direct result of the physician's self-
interest.134  Therefore, should a hospice contract with a physician
experiencing these difficulties, it effectively destroys two of the three
founding principles: an open mind and friendship of the heart.135
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The passage of these amendments to the Florida Statutes significantly
impacts and decreases the quality of care that Florida hospice patients
receive. The goal, now, is researching and developing measures that will
lessen or eliminate this detrimental effect. This suggestion proposes
initiatives to combat the physician's lack of training in palliative care, time
pressures, and conflicts of interest.
Plainly, physician education in palliative care needs improvement.
An increasing number of people suffer from chronic and progressively
disabling diseases, and the need for doctors trained in the provision of
palliative care increases accordingly.137 However, a specialty for palliative
care does not exist in the United States today,133 and only a few specialties
require the inclusion of specific palliative care topics. 3 9 Additionally, only
fifty-six percent of medical schools offer training in palliative care'4 and the
median number of instruction hours per medical program is tWo.14' "Many
medical schools do not specifically test for competency in palliative care
issues."'142 Indeed, the state of palliative care medicine in this country is a
disgrace.
132. David Orentlicher, Healthcare Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5
HEALTH MATRix, 141, 158 (1995).
133. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical
Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330, 333 (1995).
134. Id.
135. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
136. Timothy E. Quill, et al., Palliative Options of Last Resort, 278 JAMA 2099, 2099
(1997).
137. GAO, supra note 118, at 3.
138. Id. at 25.
139. Id. at 9.
140. Id. at 2.
141. Id. at 22.
142. GAO, supra note 118, at3.
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One long-term way to improve the state of palliative medicine in this
country is by changing the medical school curriculum to include palliative
care. However, the time available for instruction and training is fixed, thus
providing more time for palliative care training would decrease the amount
of time allotted to other areas. 143 On the other hand, medical schools' lack of
time and resources does not excuse the terrible deficiency in palliative care
in this country. Medical schools need to revise the curriculum by coopera-
tive efforts to specify core requirements.144 Medical school deans are not
without guidance; they can look to the Canadian curriculum and to courses
developed by Harvard Medical School in order to develop their own
requirements in palliative care.145 Ultimately, palliative care must become
an integral part of the medical school experience.
More than simply increasing palliative care education, medicine should
also recognize it as a specialty. The advantages of gaining specialty status
are numerous. This status brings professional stature, visibility, and power
in the uest for academic resources such as courses, positions, and residency
slots. However, specialty status is not the only way to increase the
number of palliative care experts. Creating journals dedicated to issues in
palliative care, establishing professional societies in this area of medicine,
and developing varied meetings and seminars are all other ways of expand-
ing and increasing the knowledge base of palliative care in this nation.
Immediate goals to correct the deficiency in physician knowledge and
training in palliative care will help combat the negative effects of this
legislation. Some short-term goals include creating an intern program in
hospice programs, interning abroad in the birthplace of hospice care, and
increasing the availability of continuing education courses.!4 Additionally,
the physician must be trained to resist the typical reaction to death, and the
emotional and physical withdrawal from patients. 49 Medical schools and
Continuing Education Courses need to offer training in dealing with the shift
from curative efforts to comfort care in order to ensure that the physician's
level of involvement with the patient in no way decreases. 50 Especially
since most of the physicians in the types of organizations with which a
hospice will contract possess little or no palliative care training, it is
143. IdR n.6.
144. INSTtrE OFMEDICINE, supra note 126, at 226.
145. d. at 407-12.
146. Id. at 226.
147. IU.
148. See CUnIFu, supra note 3, at 10-11.
149. Glasson, supra note 125, at 97.
150. Id.
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essential that the individual hospices develop physician training programs.
Each program should touch on core competencies requires in efficient and
adequate delivery of end-of-life care. For example, each hospice could
incorporate training set forth by the American Board of Internal Medicine in
their clinical competence in end-of-life care.152
Time constraints and conflicts of interest exist as a system wide
problem and not just as a hospice specific problem. Unfortunately, no
means exist that would eliminate these problems in this era of managed care.
However, ways to mitigate the threat these problems pose to patient quality
of care do exist.153 For example, the Florida Legislature could combat the
possible negative effects of this legislation by requiring complete disclosure
of all financial incentives and conflicts of interest to hospice patients.'
54
Indeed, the legislature could prohibit extremely problematic situations
altogether. 155 Also the American Medical Association and other professional
societies could encourage intensive training in professionalism and ethics.
156
These safeguards, working together with a physician's natural fear of
malpractice, 57 could effectively ensure ethical behavior of physicians and
safeguard the quality of care that patients receive.
VII. CONCLUSION
Multiple contracting options face hospices now that this legislation has
taken effect. The best option that hospice can choose is contracting with an
IP who has experience in providing palliative care. This is the best option
because it would closely mimic the traditional role of the full time hospice
physician. The second choice is to contract with a PPMC. This type of
contract would allow the physician to exercise some autonomy while
remaining within the framework of a contractual relationship. This
relationship would work because of the professional leadership present in
these companies. However, contracting with a Business or Corporate MCO
151. Most hospices provide in-house training for any staff that will be involved with the
provision of hospice care. SENDOR & O'CONNER, supra note 6, at 37.
152. INSTrrLTE oF MEDicm, supra note 126, at 405. The components of these core
competencies are medical knowledge, interviewing/counseling skills, team approach, symptom
assessment and management, professionalism, humanistic qualities, and medical ethics. Id.
153. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Lee Goldman, Protecting Patient Welfare in Managed Care:
Six Safeguards, 23 J. HEALTH POL POL'Y & L. 635, 635 (1998).
154. Id. at 640.
155. Id. at 641.
156. Id. at 642.
157. See Sage, supra note 101, at 1545. See generally, Linda B. Johnston, Note, Playing
Doctor: Who Controls the Practice of Medicine?, 66 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 425 (1992) (discussing
the effect of a physician's fear of lawsuits on his/her practice of medicine).
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to provide the hospice physician services is the least desirable choice for a
hospice to make. The MCO doctor is faced with multiple conflicts and the
founding philosophy of MCOs is in direct conflict with that of hospice
organizations. Thus, the detrimental impact on care would be significant.,
In the future, it behooves the Florida Legislature to turn a careful and
studious eye on this area of medicine. The need for effective and efficient
palliative care in this country will continue to grow. It is left in the legisla-
ture's hands to shape the policy that will impact the lives of so many Florida
residents. The Florida Legislature initially intended these amendments to
the Florida Statutes to serve as mere housekeeping measures, however, these
amendments have changed the face of death for Florida hospice patients.
Jennifer Pender
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